



INTERNATIONAL
MARITIME
ORGANIZATION

E

MARITIME SAFETY COMMITTEE
111th session
Agenda item 22

MSC 111/22/Add.3
6 July 2026
Original: ENGLISH

**REPORT OF THE MARITIME SAFETY COMMITTEE
ON ITS 111TH SESSION**

Attached are annexes 32 to 38 to the report of the Maritime Safety Committee on its 111th session (MSC 111/22).

**(See documents MSC 111/22/Add.1 for annexes 1 to 17,
and MSC 111/22/Add.2 for annexes 18 to 31)**

LIST OF ANNEXES

- ANNEX 32 DRAFT AMENDMENTS TO THE ORGANIZATION AND METHOD OF WORK OF THE MARITIME SAFETY COMMITTEE AND THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION COMMITTEE AND THEIR SUBSIDIARY BODIES (MSC-MEPC.1/CIRC.5/REV.7)
- ANNEX 33 BIENNIAL STATUS REPORTS OF THE SUB-COMMITTEES
- ANNEX 34 PROVISIONAL AGENDAS FOR THE FORTHCOMING SESSIONS OF THE SUB-COMMITTEES
- ANNEX 35 BIENNIAL STATUS REPORT OF THE MARITIME SAFETY COMMITTEE
- ANNEX 36 POST-BIENNIAL AGENDA OF THE MARITIME SAFETY COMMITTEE
- ANNEX 37 SUBSTANTIVE ITEMS FOR INCLUSION IN THE AGENDAS FOR MSC 112 AND MSC 113
- ANNEX 38 STATEMENTS BY DELEGATIONS AND OBSERVERS

ANNEX 32

DRAFT AMENDMENTS TO THE ORGANIZATION AND METHOD OF WORK OF THE MARITIME SAFETY COMMITTEE AND THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION COMMITTEE AND THEIR SUBSIDIARY BODIES (MSC-MEPC.1/CIRC.5/REV.7)*

"1 INTRODUCTION

...

1.4 The document will be kept under review and will be updated as necessary in the light of experience gained in its application, taking into account the document on Application of the Strategic Plan of the Organization (resolution A.117497(334)) as may be amended.

...

4 WORK PLANNING AND DELIVERY PROCESS

Outputs

...

4.2 In the process of preparing the next biennial agenda, the following outputs should be included:

- .1 continuous outputs;
- .2 outputs that have not been completed;
- .3 outputs from the post-biennial agenda, subject to the personnel and budgetary resources available; and

...

4.5 The overview of the Organization's overall planning hierarchy and its links to related processes, and of the Organization's strategic planning process and its related planning and reporting flows during the course of a biennium are shown in diagrams 1 and 2 contained in annex 1 to the document on *Application of the Strategic Plan of the Organization* (resolution A.117497(334)).

...

4.7 The Committees may receive the results of a Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) study carried out in accordance with Revised guidelines for Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) for use in the IMO rule-making process (FSA Guidelines) (MSC-MEPC.2/Circ.12/Rev.23). The criteria in paragraph 4.3 also apply to the outcomes of an FSA study that may be regarded by the Committees as proposals for new outputs (see also paragraph 4.18).

...

* The Committees' method of work (MSC-MEPC.1/CIRC.5/REV.7) is not reproduced entirely, only the paragraphs which are amended

4.15 The outcome of the Group of Chairs' preliminary assessment should be submitted by means of a working paper, which should include the form set out in annex 8 duly completed, to the Committee concerned, not later than two weeks before the opening of the relevant session, as a recommendation for consideration and decision.

...

Decision on acceptance and inclusion of outputs or the expansion of the scope of an output

...

4.21 Upon a decision by a Committee to include an output in its post-biennial agenda, the Committee shall include the accepted output, and the timescale for completion, in its proposals for the ~~list of outputs~~ work programme for the next biennium.

...

Management, control and reporting

4.34 In implementing the ~~work programme list of outputs~~, proper management and control mechanisms shall be in place to ensure that:

- .1 biennial agendas and provisional agendas of IMO organs are both clearly linked to the Strategic Plan, including the ~~work programme list of outputs~~;

...

4.35 In order to provide a transparent link between the Strategic Plan and the Organization's work, the following principles shall be applied:

- .1 the outputs contained in the biennial agenda shall – together with the Secretariat's Business Plan – form the basis of the biennial work of all the IMO organs and the budget of the Organization;
- .2 the outputs contained in the provisional and biennial agendas of all IMO organs shall all be outputs in the ~~work programme list of outputs~~ or included in the Secretariat's Business Plan;

...

4.42 Accordingly, the Chairs, Vice-Chairs and secretaries of the Committees and their subsidiary bodies have a specific responsibility for effective management of the planning and reporting cycle and for consistent and rigorous application of this document and the document on Application of the Strategic Plan of the Organization (resolution A.117497(334)).

...

Remote participation

5.39 All those joining the meetings using the hybrid meeting capabilities are asked to review Circular Letter No.4627 on *Guidance on the use of IMO hybrid meeting capability*, and to pay particular attention to the best practices outlined in annex 1 to that circular letter.

6 PROCEDURES FOR PREPARATION AND SUBMISSION OF DOCUMENTS

Preparation of documents

6.1 Documents should be prepared in single spacing and be as concise as possible so as to facilitate their timely processing. In order to enhance the clear understanding of documents, the following should be observed:

- .1 all documents should be preceded by a brief summary prepared in the form, and containing the information, indicated in the table below. Documents, especially proposals for the inclusion of an output, should demonstrate, where feasible, the linkages to the Strategic Plan by including, in the summary, references to the related strategic direction(s) and output(s):

SUMMARY	
<i>Executive summary:</i>	This description should be brief, outlining the proposed objective (an amendment, an Assembly resolution, a circular, information only, etc.), and include information on whether a proposal will have any financial implications for the shipping industry or for the IMO budget.
<i>Strategic direction, if applicable:</i>	A reference should be made to one or more relevant strategic directions in the Organization's Strategic Plan.
<i>Output:</i>	A reference should be made to one or more corresponding outputs in the biennial's ~~work programme list of outputs~~ . If there is no corresponding output, an appropriate descriptive text should be included.
<i>Action to be taken:</i>	A reference should be made to the paragraph of the document that states the action to be taken by the committee, subsidiary body, etc.
<i>Related documents:</i>	Other key documents should be listed to the extent that they are known to the originator of the document.

...

ANNEX 6

CHECKLIST FOR IDENTIFYING ADMINISTRATIVE REQUIREMENTS

This checklist should be used when preparing the analysis of implications required in submissions of proposals for the inclusion of outputs. The Committee may also use this checklist before adopting new, or amending existing, mandatory instruments, in order to satisfy itself that administrative requirements have been minimized to the greatest extent possible. For the purpose of this analysis, the term "administrative requirements" is defined in accordance with resolution A.1043(27), as an obligation arising from a mandatory IMO instrument to provide or retain information or data.

Instructions:

- (A) If the answer to any of the questions below is **YES**, the Member State proposing an output should provide supporting details on whether the requirements are likely to involve start-up and/or ongoing costs. The Member State should also give a brief description of the requirement and, if possible, provide recommendations for further work, e.g. would it be possible to combine the activity with an existing requirement?
- (B) If the proposal for the output does not contain such an activity, answer **NR** (Not required).
- (C) For any administrative requirement, full consideration should be given to electronic means of fulfilling the requirement in order to alleviate administrative burdens.

...

...

ANNEX 7

GUIDELINES FOR CONSIDERING AND REVIEWING THE OUTCOMES OF FORMAL SAFETY ASSESSMENT (FSA) STUDIES

Purpose

1 The purpose of these Guidelines is to assist the committees in considering and reviewing the outcomes (i.e. risk control options (RCOs) or other recommendations) of FSA studies. These Guidelines provide a bridge between the FSA Guidelines (MSC-MEPC.2/Circ.12/Rev.23) and the document on Application of the Strategic Plan of the Organization (resolution A.1174/97(334)), as may be amended.

Background

2 The Revised FSA Guidelines (MSC-MEPC.2/Circ.12/Rev.23) adequately cover the procedures to manage outcomes of an FSA study from initial submission to the committee through to the report of the FSA Experts Group to the committee."

...

ANNEX 33

BIENNIAL STATUS REPORTS¹ OF THE SUB-COMMITTEES

2026-2027 BIENNium

SUB-COMMITTEE ON CARRIAGE OF CARGOES AND CONTAINERS (CCC)									
Reference to SD ² , if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output for Year 1	Year 2	References
1	1.17	Development of guidelines for the use of ammonia cargo as fuel and provisions for the use of alternative fuels other than cargo on gas carriers	2026	MSC	CCC		Completed		MSC 103/21, paragraph 18.2; MSC 104/18, paragraph 15.16; MSC 105/20, paragraph 18.50; MSC 108/20, paragraph 14.20 and section 18; MSC 109/22, paragraphs 14.5 to 14.10 and 19.38.1. CCC 9/14, section 4, CCC 10/16, section 4; MSC 111/22, paragraphs 6.37 and 19.26.2

¹ For details, refer to Organizational Planning module of GISIS.

² Strategic directions:
SD 1: Ensure implementation of IMO instruments supported by capacity development
SD 2: Integrate new, emerging and advancing technologies in the regulatory framework
SD 3: Respond to climate change and reduce greenhouse gas emissions from international shipping
SD 4: Continue to engage in ocean governance
SD 5: Enhance global facilitation, supply chain resilience and security of international trade
SD 6: Address the human element
SD 7: Ensure the regulatory effectiveness of international shipping
SD 8: Ensure organizational effectiveness
OW: Other work

SUB-COMMITTEE ON CARRIAGE OF CARGOES AND CONTAINERS (CCC)									
Reference to SD ² , if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output for Year 1	Year 2	References
1	7.20	Development of measures to prevent the loss of containers	2025	MSC		CCC	Completed		CCC 11/16 paragraph 10.21; MSC 111/22, paragraph 19.26
2	2.3	Amendments to the IGF Code and development of guidelines for alternative fuels and related technologies	Continuous	MSC	HTW / PPR / SDC / SSE	CCC	Ongoing		MSC 94/21, paragraphs 18.5 and 18.6; MSC 96/25, paragraphs 10.1 to 10.3; MSC 97/22, paragraph 19.2; PPR 6/20, paragraph 3.39; MSC 102/24, paragraph 21.4; MSC 106/19, paragraph 16.42; MSC 108/20, sections 3 and 14; MSC 109/22, sections 3 and 14; MSC 111/22, section 6
2	2.23	Development of a goal-based instrument for maritime autonomous surface ships (MASS)	2030	MSC	III / HTW / CCC / SDC / SSE / NCSR		No work requested		MSC 104/18, paragraph 15.9.2; MSC 105/20, section 7; MSC 106/19, section 5; MSC 107/20, section 5; MSC 108/20, section 4; MSC 109/22, section 5; MSC 111/22, paragraphs 5.40 and 5.41
Notes:	MSC 111 agreed to assign the CCC, HTW, III, NCSR, SDC and SSE Sub-Committees as associated organs and agreed to extend the target completion year to 2030.								
3	3.8	Development of a safety regulatory framework to support the reduction of GHG emissions from ships using new technologies and alternative fuels	Continuous	MSC	MEPC / III / HTW / CCC / SDC / SSE	MSC	Ongoing		MSC 111/22, section 6

SUB-COMMITTEE ON CARRIAGE OF CARGOES AND CONTAINERS (CCC)									
Reference to SD ² , if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output for Year 1	Year 2	References
6	6.1	Role of the human element	Continuous	MSC / MEPC	III / PPR / CCC / SDC / SSE / NCSR	HTW	No work requested		MSC 89/25, paragraphs 10.10, 10.16 and 22.39 and annex 21; MEPC 78/17, paragraphs 10.4 and 13
6	6.2	Validated model training courses	Continuous	MSC / MEPC	III / PPR / CCC / SDC / SSE / NCSR	HTW	No work requested		MSC 100/20, paragraphs 10.3 to 10.6 and 17.28; MSC 105/20, section 16, MSC 108/20 PPR 9/21, section 12; MEPC 79/15, paragraphs 9.1, 9.14 to 9.15; MEPC 81/16, paragraph 10.1
6	6.11	Amendments to MSC.1/Circ.1264/Rev.1 and MSC.1/Circ.1358/Rev.1 to provide for additional equipment and safety measures	2027	MSC	CCC		No work requested		MSC 111/22, paragraph 19.13
7	7.1	Unified interpretation of provisions of IMO safety, security, environment, facilitation, liability and compensation-related conventions	Continuous	MSC / MEPC / FAL / LEG	III / PPR / CCC / SDC / SSE / NCSR		Ongoing		MSC 76/23, paragraph 20.3; MSC 78/26, paragraph 22.12; MSC 108/20, paragraph 18.13, section 19, MSC.1/Circ.1456/Rev.1, MSC.1/Circ.1572/Rev.2, MSC.1/Circ.1509/Rev., MSC.1/Circ.1511/Rev.1, MSC.1/Circ.1680; MEPC 78/17, section 4, and paragraphs 5.6 and 5.7;

SUB-COMMITTEE ON CARRIAGE OF CARGOES AND CONTAINERS (CCC)									
Reference to SD ² , if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output for Year 1	Year 2	References
									MEPC 79/15, paragraphs 4.8, 4.26, 4.27, 6.26 to 6.29; MEPC 80/17, paragraphs 4.11 and 5.24 CCC 10/16, section 10
7	7.10	Amendments to the IMDG Code and supplements	Continuous	MSC	CCC		Ongoing		MSC 105/20, paragraphs 3.59 and 14.4; MSC 108/20, sections 3 and 14, MSC 111/22, sections 3 and 14
7	7.13	Amendments to the IMSBC Code and supplements	Continuous	MSC	CCC		Ongoing		MSC 105/20, paragraphs 3.56 and 14.4; MSC 107/20, paragraphs 17.10 and 17.12; MSC 110/21, paragraphs 3.53 to 3.55
7	7.15	Development of amendments to SOLAS chapter II-2 and the FSS Code concerning detection and control of fires in cargo holds and on the cargo deck of container ships	2028	MSC	CCC	SSE	No work requested		MSC 110/21, paragraph 18.109.5
7	7.28	Consideration of reports of incidents involving dangerous goods or marine pollutants in packaged form on board ships or in port areas	Continuous	MSC / MEPC	III	CCC	Ongoing		CCC 7/15, section 9; CCC 8/18, section 9; CCC 9/14, section 9; MSC 109/22, sections 14 and 19

SUB-COMMITTEE ON CARRIAGE OF CARGOES AND CONTAINERS (CCC)									
Reference to SD ² , if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output for Year 1	Year 2	References
Notes: MSC 109 agreed to change the type of output from annual to continuous.									
7	7.40	Revision of the Revised guidelines for the preparation of the cargo securing manual (MSC.1/Circ.1353/Rev.2) to include a harmonized performance standard for lashing software to permit lashing software as a supplement to the Cargo Securing Manual	2026	MSC	CCC		In progress		MSC 108/20, paragraph 18.18; MSC 111/22, section 19
Notes: MSC 111 agreed to extend the target completion year of the existing output 7.40 on "Revision of the Revised guidelines for the preparation of the Cargo Securing Manual (MSC.1/Circ.1353/Rev.2) to include a harmonized performance standard for lashing software to permit lashing software as a supplement to the Cargo Securing Manual" to 2026									

Sub-Committee on Human Element, Training and Watchkeeping (HTW)									
Reference to SD, if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output for Year 1	Year 2	References
1	1.11	Measures to harmonize port State control (PSC) activities and procedures worldwide	Continuous	MSC / MEPC	HTW / PPR / NCSR	III	No work requested		MSC 101/24, paragraph 21.48; MEPC 75/18, paragraphs 11.10 and 11.11; MSC 104/18, paragraph 13.7.1; MSC 108/20, paragraph 13.7.1; MSC 109/22, paragraph 15.7; MEPC 78/17, paragraphs 7.73 and 9.8; MEPC 79/15, paragraphs 9.5 and 9.6; MEPC 81/16, paragraph 10.9.1
1	1.14	Development of engine control room alert management (ECRAM) performance standards	2028	MSC	HTW / SSE	SDC	No work requested		MSC 110/21, paragraph 18.43
1	1.26	Revision of MARPOL Annex IV and associated guidelines	2027	MEPC	III / HTW	PPR	No work requested		MEPC 71/17, paragraphs 14.8 and 14.9; MEPC 72/17, paragraph 15.10; MEPC 73/19, paragraph 15.19; PPR 6/20, section 14; and MEPC 74/18, paragraph 14.5; MEPC 78/17, paragraph 14.11; PPR 9/21, section 14; MEPC 78/17, paragraphs 14.7 to 14.11; MEPC 80/17, paragraph 9.19; MEPC 81/16, section 5

Sub-Committee on Human Element, Training and Watchkeeping (HTW)									
Reference to SD, if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output for Year 1	Year 2	References
Notes: MEPC 74 agreed to expand the scope of the existing output 1.26 and amend the title of the output from "Amendments to the 2012 Guidelines on implementation of effluent standards and performance tests for sewage treatment plants (resolution MEPC.227(64)) to address inconsistencies in their application" to read "Revision of MARPOL Annex IV and associated guidelines to introduce provisions for record-keeping and measures to confirm the lifetime performance of sewage treatment plants".									
2	2.3	Amendments to the IGF Code and development of guidelines for alternative fuels and related technologies	Continuous	MSC	HTW / PPR / SDC / SSE	CCC	No work requested		MSC 94/21, paragraphs 18.5 and 18.6; MSC 96/25, paragraphs 10.1 to 10.3; MSC 97/22, paragraph 19.2; PPR 6/20, paragraph 3.39; MSC 102/24, paragraph 21.4; MSC 106/19, paragraph 16.42; MSC 108/20, sections 3 and 14; MSC 109/22, sections 3 and 14; MSC 111/22, section 6
2	2.23	Development of a goal-based instrument for maritime autonomous surface ships (MASS)	2030	MSC	III / HTW / CCC / SDC / SSE / NCSR		No work requested		MSC 104/18, paragraph 15.9.2; MSC 105/20, section 7; MSC 106/19, section 5; MSC 107/20, section 5; MSC 108/20, section 4; MSC 109/22, section 5; MSC 111/22, paragraphs 5.40 and 5.41
Notes: MSC 111 agreed to assign the CCC, HTW, III, NCSR, SDC and SSE Sub-Committees as associated organs and agreed to extend the target completion year to 2030.									
3	3.8	Development of a safety regulatory framework to support the reduction of GHG emissions from ships	Continuous	MSC	MEPC / III / HTW / CCC / SDC / SSE	MSC	Ongoing		MSC 111/22, section 6; MSC 108/20, paragraph 5.4; HTW 12/12, section 7

Sub-Committee on Human Element, Training and Watchkeeping (HTW)									
Reference to SD, if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output for Year 1	Year 2	References
		using new technologies and alternative fuels							
4	4.3	Follow-up work emanating from the Action Plan to address marine plastic litter from ships	2027	MEPC	III / HTW / PPR		No work requested		MEPC 78/17, section 8; MEPC 79/15, section 8; MEPC 80/17, section 8
6	6.1	Role of the human element	Continuous	MSC / MEPC	III / PPR / CCC / SDC / SSE / NCSR	HTW	Ongoing		MSC 89/25, paragraphs 10.10, 10.16 and 22.39 and annex 21; MEPC 78/17, paragraphs 10.4 and 13; HTW 12/12, section 4
6	6.2	Validated model training courses	Continuous	MSC / MEPC	III / PPR / CCC / SDC / SSE / NCSR	HTW	Ongoing		MSC 100/20, paragraphs 10.3 to 10.6 and 17.28; MSC 105/20, section 16, MSC 108/20 PPR 9/21, section 12; MEPC 79/15, paragraphs 9.1, 9.14 to 9.15; MEPC 81/16, paragraph 10.1 HTW 12/12, section 3
6	6.3	Reports on unlawful practices associated with certificates of competency	Continuous	MSC	HTW		Ongoing		MSC 83/28, paragraph 12.2; MSC 109/22, section 19 HTW 12/12, section 5
Notes: MSC 109 changed the type of output from annual to continuous.									
6	6.5	Comprehensive revision of the guidelines on the implementation of the	2028	MSC/MEPC	HTW	III	No work requested		MSC 110/21, paragraph 18.5

Sub-Committee on Human Element, Training and Watchkeeping (HTW)									
Reference to SD, if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output for Year 1	Year 2	References
		ISM Code by Administrations and companies							
6	6.6	Revision of the IMO Standard Marine Communication Phrases (resolution A.918(22))	2028	MSC	HTW	NCSR	No work requested		MSC 107/20, paragraph 17.53
6	6.9	Scoping exercise and enhancement of the effectiveness of provisions on fatigue and seafarers' hours of work and rest	2027	MSC	III	HTW	In progress		MSC 110/21, paragraph 18.14 HTW 12/12, section 8
6	6.17	Comprehensive review of the 1978 STCW Convention and Code	2031	MSC	HTW		In progress		MSC 105/20, paragraph 18.13; MSC 107/20, paragraph 17.71; MSC 108/20, paragraph 16.5 HTW 12/12, section 6
7	7.42	Revision of the Interim explanatory notes for the assessment of passenger ship systems' capabilities after a fire or flooding casualty (MSC.1/Circ.1369) and related circulars	2027	MSC	HTW / SSE	SDC	Completed		MSC 110/21, section 18; MSC 108/20, paragraph 15.23.3; MSC 105/20, paragraphs 15.24.2 and 18.54; MSC 103/21, paragraph 18.31; MSC 111/22, paragraph 12.2
Notes: MSC 108 extended TCY to 2025, and MSC 110 extended TCY to 2027									

Sub-Committee on Implementation of IMO Instruments (III)									
Reference to SD, if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output for Year 1	Status of output for Year 2	References
1	1.4	Analysis of consolidated audit summary reports	Continuous	Assembly	MSC / MEPC / LEG / TCC / III	Council	Ongoing		MEPC 61/24, paragraph 11.14.1; MSC 88/26, paragraph 10.8; C 120/D, paragraphs 7.1 and 7.2; MSC 105/20, paragraph 13.10; MSC 106/19, paragraphs 14.11 and 16.37; MSC 108/20, paragraphs 13.8 and 13.9; MSC 109/22, paragraph 15.11 MEPC 78/17, paragraphs 10.7 to 10.11; MEPC 79/15, paragraph 9.3; MEPC 81/16, paragraph 10.7; III 8/19, section 8; III 9/19, section 8; III 10/18, section 8
1	1.5	Non-exhaustive list of obligations under instruments relevant to the IMO Instruments Implementation Code (III Code)	Continuous	MSC / MEPC	III		Ongoing		MSC 91/22, paragraph 10.30; MSC 108/20, paragraph 13.7.3 MEPC 77/16, paragraphs 10.8 and 10.9; MEPC 79/15, paragraph 9.13; MEPC

Sub-Committee on Implementation of IMO Instruments (III)									
Reference to SD, if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output for Year 1	Status of output for Year 2	References
									81/16, paragraph 10.9.3; III 11/16, section 9
Notes: MSC 109 and MEPC 83 agreed to change the type of output from "annual" to "continuous".									
1	1.11	Measures to harmonize port State control (PSC) activities and procedures worldwide	Continuous	MSC / MEPC	HTW / PPR / NCSR	III	Ongoing		MSC 101/24, paragraph 21.48; MEPC 75/18, paragraphs 11.10 and 11.11; MSC 104/18, paragraph 13.7.1; MSC 108/20, paragraph 13.7.1; MSC 109/22, paragraph 15.7; MEPC 78/17, paragraphs 7.73 and 9.8; MEPC 79/15, paragraphs 9.5 and 9.6; MEPC 81/16, paragraph 10.9.1 III 8/19, section 5; III 9/19, section 5; III 10/18, section 5; III 11/16, section 5
1	1.26	Revision of MARPOL Annex IV and associated guidelines	2027	MEPC	III / HTW	PPR	No work requested		MEPC 71/17, paragraphs 14.8 and 14.9; MEPC 72/17, paragraph 15.10; MEPC 73/19, paragraph 15.19; PPR 6/20, section 14;

Sub-Committee on Implementation of IMO Instruments (III)									
Reference to SD, if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output for Year 1	Status of output for Year 2	References
									and MEPC 74/18, paragraph 14.5; MEPC 78/17, paragraph 14.11 PPR 9/21, section 14; MEPC 78/17, paragraphs 14.7 to 14.11; MEPC 80/17, paragraph 9.19; MEPC 81/16, section 5; III 9/19, sections 5 and 10
Notes: MEPC 74 agreed to expand the scope of the existing output 1.26 and amend the title of the output from "Amendments to the 2012 Guidelines on implementation of effluent standards and performance tests for sewage treatment plants (resolution MEPC.227(64)) to address inconsistencies in their application" to read "Revision of MARPOL Annex IV and associated guidelines to introduce provisions for record-keeping and measures to confirm the lifetime performance of sewage treatment plants".									
2	2.23	Development of a goal-based instrument for maritime autonomous surface ships (MASS)	2030	MSC	III / HTW / CCC / SDC / SSE / NCSR		No work requested		MSC 104/18, paragraph 15.9.2; MSC 105/20, section 7; MSC 106/19, section 5; MSC 107/20, section 5; MSC 108/20, section 4; MSC 109/22, section 5; MSC 111/22, paragraphs 5.40 and 5.41
Notes: MSC 111 agreed to assign the CCC, HTW, III, NCSR, SDC and SSE Sub-Committees as associated organs and agreed to extend the target completion year to 2030.									
3	3.8	Development of a safety regulatory framework to support the reduction of GHG emissions from	Continuous	MSC	MEPC / III / HTW / CCC / SDC / SSE	MSC	No work requested		MSC 111/22, section 6

Sub-Committee on Implementation of IMO Instruments (III)									
Reference to SD, if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output for Year 1	Status of output for Year 2	References
		ships using new technologies and alternative fuels							
4	4.3	Follow-up work emanating from the Action Plan to address marine plastic litter from ships	2027	MEPC	III / HTW / PPR		No work requested		MEPC 78/17, section 8; MEPC 79/15, section 8; MEPC 80/17, section 8 ; III 8/19, section 14; III 9/19, section 14; III 10, section 13; III 11/16, section 12
6	6.1	Role of the human element	Continuous	MSC / MEPC	III / PPR / CCC / SDC / SSE / NCSR	HTW	No work requested		MSC 89/25, paragraphs 10.10, 10.16 and 22.39 and annex 21; MEPC 78/17, paragraphs 10.4 and 13
6	6.2	Validated model training courses	Continuous	MSC / MEPC	III / PPR / CCC / SDC / SSE / NCSR	HTW	No work requested		MSC 100/20, paragraphs 10.3 to 10.6 and 17.28; MSC 105/20, section 16, MSC 108/20 PPR 9/21, section 12; MEPC 79/15, paragraphs 9.1, 9.14 to 9.15; MEPC 81/16, paragraph 10.1; III 6/15, section 4; III 8/19, paragraphs 5.20 to 5.29; III 9/19, section 6; III 10/18, section 6; III 11/16, section 6

Sub-Committee on Implementation of IMO Instruments (III)									
Reference to SD, if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output for Year 1	Status of output for Year 2	References
6	6.5	Comprehensive revision of the guidelines on the implementation of the ISM Code by Administrations and companies	2028	MSC/MEPC	HTW	III	In progress		MSC 110/21, paragraph 18.5
6	6.9	Scoping exercise and enhancement of the effectiveness of provisions on fatigue and seafarers' hours of work and rest	2027	MSC	III	HTW	No work requested		MSC 110/21, paragraph 18.14
6	6.10	Development of an entrant training manual for PSC personnel	2027	MSC / MEPC	III		In progress		MSC 103/21, paragraph 18.36; MSC 106/19, paragraph 16.46 MEPC 76/15, paragraphs 10.1, 10.2 and 12.5; MEPC 79/15, paragraph 9.3; III 9/19, section 6
7	7.1	Unified interpretation of provisions of IMO safety, security, environment, facilitation, liability and compensation-related conventions	Continuous	MSC / MEPC / FAL / LEG	III / PPR / CCC / SDC / SSE / NCSR		Ongoing		MSC 76/23, paragraph 20.3; MSC 78/26, paragraph 22.12; MSC 108/20, paragraph 18.13, section 19, MSC.1/Circ.1456/Rev.1, MSC.1/Circ.1572/Rev.2, MSC.1/Circ.1509/Rev.1,

Sub-Committee on Implementation of IMO Instruments (III)									
Reference to SD, if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output for Year 1	Status of output for Year 2	References
									MSC.1/Circ.1511/Rev.1, MSC.1/Circ.1680; MEPC 78/17, section 4, and paragraphs 5.6 and 5.7; MEPC 79/15, paragraphs 4.8, 4.26, 4.27, 6.26 to 6.29; MEPC 80/17, paragraphs 4.11 and 5.24; III 8/19, section 13; III 9/19, section 13; III 10/18, section 12; III 11/16, section 11
7	7.4	Lessons learned and safety issues identified from the analysis of marine safety investigation reports	Continuous	MSC MEPC	/ III		Ongoing		MSC 92/26, paragraph 22.29; MSC 106/19, paragraphs 14.2 to 14.6; MSC 108/20, paragraphs 13.3 to 13.6; MSC 109/22, paragraphs 15.2 to 15.6; MEPC 79/15, paragraph 9.3; MEPC 81/16, paragraph 10.6; III 11/16, section 4
7	7.5	Identified issues relating to the implementation of IMO instruments from the analysis of data	Continuous	MSC MEPC	/ III		Ongoing		MSC 96/25, paragraph 23.13; MSC 106/19, paragraphs 14.12 and 16. MSC 108/20, paragraph 13.4; MSC 109/22, paragraph 15.3 MEPC 79/15,

Sub-Committee on Implementation of IMO Instruments (III)									
Reference to SD, if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output for Year 1	Status of output for Year 2	References
									paragraphs 12.13 and 12.14; MEPC 81/16, paragraph 10.3; III 8/19, section 7; III 9/19, section 7; III 10/18, section 7; III 11/16, section 7
7	7.7	Consideration and analysis of reports on alleged inadequacy of port reception facilities	Continuous	MEPC	III		Ongoing		MEPC 69/21, paragraph 19.11; MEPC 73/19, paragraphs 8.3 and 8.11; MEPC 74/18, paragraphs 4.33, 4.34 and 8.22; IMEPC 79/15, paragraphs 9.3 and 9.4; MEPC 81/16, paragraph 10.2; III 8/19, section 3; III 9/19, section 3; III 10/18, section 3; III 11/16, section 3
7	7.27	Updated Survey Guidelines under the Harmonized System of Survey and Certification (HSSC)	Continuous	MSC MEPC	/ III		Ongoing		MSC 79/23, paragraphs 9.19 and 9.20; MSC 104, paragraph 13.7.2; MSC 106/19, paragraphs 14.13 to 14; MSC 108/20, paragraph 13.7.2; MSC 109/22, section 15; MEPC 68/21, paragraphs 14.5 and

Sub-Committee on Implementation of IMO Instruments (III)									
Reference to SD, if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output for Year 1	Status of output for Year 2	References
									14.6; MEPC 72/17, paragraphs 7.4 and 4.24 to 4.33; MEPC 77/16, paragraph 10.7; MEPC 79/15, paragraphs 9.7 to 9.9; MEPC 81/16, paragraph 10.9.2; III 8/19, section 10; III 9/19, section 10; III 10/18, section 9; III 11/16, section 8
7	7.28	Consideration of reports of incidents involving dangerous goods or marine pollutants in packaged form on board ships or in port areas	Continuous	MSC / MEPC	III	CCC	No work requested		CCC 7/15, section 9; CCC 8/18, section 9; CCC 9/14, section 9; MSC 109/22, sections 14 and 19
Notes: MSC 109 agreed to change the type of output from annual to continuous.									
7	7.43	Review of the Casualty Investigation Code and the associated implementation Guidelines (resolution A.1075(28))	2028	MSC	III		In progress		MSC 110/21, paragraph 18.37
7	7.45	Development of guidelines addressing the implementation of provisions left to the satisfaction of the	2028	MSC			In progress		MSC 110/21, paragraph 18.91; MSC 111/22, paragraph 19.39

Sub-Committee on Implementation of IMO Instruments (III)									
Reference to SD, if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output for Year 1	Status of output for Year 2	References
		Administration', or equivalent, in the relevant mandatory IMO instruments							
Notes: To be commenced by the III Sub-Committee during the 2026-2027 biennium.									
8	8.15	Cooperate with the United Nations on matters of mutual interest, as well as provide relevant input/guidance	Continuous	Assembly	MSC / MEPC / FAL / LEG / TCC / III	Council	Ongoing		C 120/D, paragraphs 17(a).1-17(a).5 MEPC 78/17, paragraph 7.6 and section 8; MEPC 79/15, paragraphs 7.3 to 7.5; MEPC 80/17, paragraphs 7.2 to 7.4

Sub-Committee on Navigation, Communications and Search and Rescue (NCSR)									
Reference to SD, if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output Year 1	Status of output for Year 2	References
1	1.11	Measures to harmonize port State control (PSC) activities and procedures worldwide	Continuous	MSC / MEPC	HTW / PPR / NCSR	III	No work requested		MSC 101/24, paragraph 21.48; MEPC 75/18, paragraphs 11.10 and 11.11; MSC 104, paragraph 13.7.1; MSC 108/20, paragraph 13.7.1; MSC 109/22, paragraph 15.7; MEPC 78/17, paragraphs 7.73 and 9.8; MEPC 79/15, paragraphs 9.5 and 9.6; MEPC 81/16, paragraph 10.9.1
1	1.34	Development of global maritime SAR services, including harmonization of maritime and aeronautical procedures and amendments to the IAMSAR Manual	Continuous	MSC	NCSR		Ongoing		MSC 108/20, section 12; MSC 109/22, paragraph 13.4 and annex 11, MSC.1/Circ.1686; NCSR 12/20, section 7
2	2.1	Response to matters related to the ITU-R Study Groups and ITU World Radiocommunication Conference	Continuous	MSC	NCSR		Ongoing		MSC 106/19, paragraphs 13.28 to 13.33; MSC 107/20, paragraphs 15.4 and 15.5 and annex 36;

Sub-Committee on Navigation, Communications and Search and Rescue (NCSR)									
Reference to SD, if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output Year 1	Status of output Year 2	References
									NCSR 12/20, section 6 and annexes 7 and 8
2	2.5	Development of a transition scheme for the introduction of digital technology for Very High Frequency (VHF) voice communications	2027	MSC	NCSR		In progress		MSC 109/22, paragraph 19.26
2	2.7	Development of performance standards for dual frequency multi-constellation satellite-based augmentation systems (DFMC SBAS) and advanced receiver autonomous integrity monitoring (ARAIM) in shipborne radionavigation receivers	2027	MSC	NCSR		In progress		MSC 107/20, paragraph 17.58.2
2	2.12	Development of guidance to establish a framework for data distribution and global IP-based connectivity between shore-based facilities and ships for ECDIS S-100 products	2026	MSC	NCSR		In progress		MSC 109/22, paragraphs 19.27 to 19.34

Sub-Committee on Navigation, Communications and Search and Rescue (NCSR)									
Reference to SD, if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output Year 1	Status of output for Year 2	References
Notes: Output was initiated in 2025 and considered initially by NCSR 12.									
2	2.14	Revision of the Performance standards for gyro-compasses (resolution A.424(XI)) and Guidance for navigation and communication equipment intended for use on ships operating in polar waters (MSC.1/Circ.1612)	2027	MSC	NCSR		In progress		MSC 107/20, paragraph 17.47
2	2.15	Development of operational guidance for route exchange	2026	MSC	NCSR		In progress		MSC 109/22, paragraphs 19.30 and 19.44
2	2.17	Development of performance standards for Ranging mode (R-mode) in radionavigation receivers	2027	MSC	NCSR		In progress		MSC 110/21, paragraph 18.35
2	2.18	Development of guidelines for EPIRB which implement the two-way communication service via the SAR/Galileo Return	2026	MSC	NCSR		In progress		MSC 107/20, paragraph 17.35

Sub-Committee on Navigation, Communications and Search and Rescue (NCSR)										
Reference to SD, if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output Year	of for Year 1	Status of output Year 2	References
		Link service as a complement to EPIRB performance standards (resolution MSC.471(101))								
2	2.23	Development of a goal-based instrument for maritime autonomous surface ships (MASS)	2030	MSC	III / HTW / CCC / SDC / SSE / NCSR		No work requested			MSC 104/18, paragraph 15.9.2; MSC 105/20, section 7; MSC 106/19, section 5; MSC 107/20, section 5, MSC 108/20, section 4; MSC 109/22, section 5; MSC 111/22, paragraphs 5.40 and 5.41
Notes:		MSC 111 agreed to assign the CCC, HTW, III, NCSR, SDC and SSE Sub-Committees as associated organs and agreed to extend the target completion year to 2030.								
4	4.1	Identification and protection of Special Areas, Emission Control Areas and PSSAs and associated protective measures	Continuous	MEPC	NCSR		No work requested			MEPC 79/15, paragraph 10.10 MEPC 78/17, section 11; MEPC 79/15, section 10; MEPC 80/17, section 11
6	6.1	Role of the human element	Continuous	MSC / MEPC	III / PPR / CCC / SDC / SSE / NCSR	HTW	No work requested			MSC 89/25, paragraphs 10.10, 10.16 and 22.39 and annex 21; MEPC 78/17, paragraphs 10.4 and 13.

Sub-Committee on Navigation, Communications and Search and Rescue (NCSR)										
Reference to SD, if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status output Year	of for 1	Status output Year 2	References
6	6.2	Validated model training courses	Continuous	MSC / MEPC	III / PPR / CCC / SDC / SSE / NCSR	HTW	Ongoing			MSC 100/20, paragraphs 10.3 to 10.6 and 17.28; MSC 105/20, section 16; MSC 108/20, paragraph 12.32; PPR 9/21, section 12; MEPC 79/15, paragraphs 9.1, 9.14 to 9.15; MEPC 81/16, paragraph 10.1
Notes:		Output 6.2 will be included in the provisional agenda of NCSR 14								
6	6.6	Revision of the IMO Standard Marine Communication Phrases (resolution A.918(22))	2028	MSC	HTW	NCSR	No work requested			MSC 107/20, paragraph 17.53
Notes:		Output 6.6 will be included in the provisional agenda of NCSR 14								
7	7.1	Unified interpretation of provisions of IMO safety, security, environment, facilitation, liability and compensation-related conventions	Continuous	MSC / MEPC / FAL / LEG	III / PPR / CCC / SDC / SSE / NCSR		Ongoing			MSC 76/23, paragraph 20.3; MSC 78/26, paragraph 22.12; MSC 108/20, paragraph 18.13, section 19, MSC.1/Circ.1456/Rev.1, MSC.1/Circ.1572/Rev.2, MSC.1/Circ.1509/Rev.1, MSC.1/Circ.1511/Rev.1, MSC.1/Circ.1680;

Sub-Committee on Navigation, Communications and Search and Rescue (NCSR)										
Reference to SD, if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status output Year	of for 1	Status output Year 2	References
										MEPC 78/17, section 4, and paragraphs 5.6 and 5.7; MEPC 79/15, paragraphs 4.8, 4.26, 4.27, 6.26 to 6.29; MEPC 80/17, paragraphs 4.11 and 5.24
7	7.2	Developments in GMDSS services, including guidelines on maritime safety information (MSI)	Continuous	MSC	NCSR		Ongoing			MSC 108/20, section 12, MSC.1/Circ.1310/Rev.2,
7	7.22	Routeing measures and ship reporting systems	Continuous	MSC	NCSR		Ongoing			MSC 108/20, paragraph 12.4, SN.1/Circ.343; MSC 109/22, paragraph 13.3, COLREG.2/Circ.81, SN.1/Circ.344
7	7.23	Updates to the LRIT system	Continuous	MSC	NCSR		Ongoing			

Sub-Committee on Ship Design and Construction (SDC)									
Reference to SD, if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output for Year 1	Status of output for Year 2	References
1	1.3	Development of amendments to chapter 6 of the 2009 MODU Code regarding electrical equipment capable of operation after shutdown	2026	MSC	SSE	SDC	Completed		SDC 12/18, paragraph 12.6 MSC 111/22, paragraph 12.32
1	1.14	Development of engine control room alert management (ECRAM) performance standards	2028	MSC	HTW / SSE	SDC	In Progress		MSC 110/21, paragraph 18.43 SDC 12/18, paragraph 6.17 MSC 111/22, paragraph 12.12
1	1.16	Experience building phase (EBP) for the reduction of underwater radiated noise from shipping	2028	MEPC	SDC		Extended		MSC 108/20, paragraph 18.24; MSC 107/20, paragraph 12.24 and MSC 105/20, paragraph 15.23; MEPC 81/16, paragraphs 10.11-10.16 and MEPC 78/17 paragraph 10.3; MEPC 84/WP.1/Rev.1, paragraph 9.13; SDC 12/18, paragraph 8.41; SDC 11/17, section 15; SDC 10/17, paragraph 5.21; SDC 9/16, section 5;

Sub-Committee on Ship Design and Construction (SDC)											
Reference to SD, if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status output Year	of for 1	Status output Year 2	of for	References
											SDC 8/18, section 14 and annex 11; SDC 12/18, paragraph 8.41; MSC 111/22, paragraph 12.15
2	2.3	Amendments to the IGF Code and development of guidelines for alternative fuels and related technologies	Continuous	MSC	HTW / PPR / SDC / SSE	CCC	No work requested				MSC 94/21, paragraphs 18.5 and 18.6; MSC 96/25, paragraphs 10.1 to 10.3; MSC 97/22, paragraph 19.2; PPR 6/20, paragraph 3.39; MSC 102/24, paragraph 21.4; MSC 106/19, paragraph 16.42, MSC 108/20, sections 3 and 14; MSC 109/22, sections 3 and 14; MSC 111/22, section 6
2	2.6	Guidelines for use of Fibre-Reinforced Plastics (FRP) within ship structures	2026	MSC	SDC		Completed				MSC 98/23, paragraph 10.22; MSC 107/20, paragraph 17.89 SDC 12/18, paragraph 7.18; MSC 111/22, paragraph 19.42

Sub-Committee on Ship Design and Construction (SDC)									
Reference to SD, if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output for Year 1	Status of output for Year 2	References
2	2.9	Revision of SOLAS chapters II-1 (part C) and V, and related instruments regarding steering and propulsion requirements, to address both traditional and non-traditional propulsion and steering systems	2028	MSC	SSE	SDC	In progress		MSC 105/20, paragraph 18.23; MSC 107/20, paragraph 12.4, MSC 110/21, section 18 SDC 12/18, paragraphs 5.14 and 5.15
Notes: MSC 110 extended TCY to 2028									
2	2.23	Development of a goal-based instrument for maritime autonomous surface ships (MASS)	2030	MSC	III / HTW / CCC / SDC / SSE / NCSR		Ongoing		MSC 104/18, paragraph 15.9.2; MSC 105/20, section 7; MSC 106/19, section 5; MSC 107/20, section 5; MSC 108/20, section 4; MSC 109/22, section 5; MSC 111/22, paragraphs 5.40 and 5.41
Notes: MSC 111 agreed to assign the CCC, HTW, III, NCSR, SDC and SSE Sub-Committees as associated organs and agreed to extend the target completion year to 2030.									
3	3.8	Development of a safety regulatory framework to support the reduction of GHG emissions from ships using new	Continuous	MSC	MEPC / III / HTW / CCC / SDC / SSE	MSC	Ongoing		SDC 12/18, paragraphs 9.27 and 9.30; MSC 111/22, section 6

Sub-Committee on Ship Design and Construction (SDC)									
Reference to SD, if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output for Year 1	Status of output for Year 2	References
		technologies and alternative fuels							
6	6.1	Role of the human element	Continuous	MSC / MEPC	III / PPR / CCC / SDC / SSE / NCSR	HTW	No work requested		MSC 89/25, paragraphs 10.10, 10.16 and 22.39 and annex 21; MEPC 78/17, paragraph 10.4 and 13
6	6.2	Validated model training courses	Continuous	MSC / MEPC	III / PPR / CCC / SDC / SSE / NCSR	HTW	No work requested		MSC 100/20, paragraphs 10.3 to 10.6 and 17.28; MSC 105/20, section 16, MSC 108/20, paragraph 12.32; PPR 9/21, section 12; MEPC 79/15, paragraphs 9.1, 9.14 to 9.15; MEPC 81/16, paragraph 10.1
7	7.1	Unified interpretation of provisions of IMO safety, security, environment, facilitation, liability and compensation-related conventions	Continuous	MSC / MEPC / FAL / LEG	III / PPR / CCC / SDC / SSE / NCSR		Ongoing		MSC 76/23, paragraph 20.3; MSC 78/26, paragraph 22.12; MSC 108/20, paragraph 18.13, section 19, MSC.1/Circ.1456/Rev.1, MSC.1/Circ.1572/Rev.2, MSC.1/Circ.1509/Rev.1, MSC.1/Circ.1511/Rev.1,

Sub-Committee on Ship Design and Construction (SDC)									
Reference to SD, if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output Year 1	Status of output Year 2	References
									MSC.1/Circ.1680; MEPC 78/17, section 4, and paragraphs 5.6 and 5.7; MEPC 79/15, paragraphs 4.8, 4.26, 4.27, 6.26 to 6.29; MEPC 80/17, paragraphs 4.11 and 5.24; SDC 12/18, paragraph 10.3
7	7.21	Amendments to the 2011 ESP Code	Continuous	MSC	SDC		Ongoing		MSC 92/26, paragraph 13.31; MSC 107/20, paragraph 12.2; MSC 108/20, section 3 and paragraph 15.5, MSC.553(108); SDC 12/18, paragraph 4.28; MSC 111/22, paragraph 12.8 and 12.9
7	7.31	Development of amendments to chapter 15 of the FSS Code on enclosed spaces containing a nitrogen receiver or a	2027	MSC	SSE	SDC	In progress		SDC 12/18, paragraphs 13.9 and 13.10; MSC 111/22, paragraph 12.33

Sub-Committee on Ship Design and Construction (SDC)									
Reference to SD, if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output for Year 1	Status of output for Year 2	References
		buffer tank of nitrogen generator systems							
7	7.32	Revision of the Guidelines for the application of plastic pipes on ships (resolution A.753(18))	2028	MSC	SSE	SDC	Extended		SDC 12/18, paragraph 14.9; MSC 111/22, paragraph 12.34
7	7.33	Review and, if necessary, amendment of SOLAS regulations II-2/13.4.1.1 and 13.4.2.1 to clarify the requirements on escape arrangements from the lower part of machinery spaces	2027	MSC	SDC		Completed		MSC 110/21, paragraph 18.73; MSC 111/22, paragraphs 12.24 and 12.30
7	7.42	Revision of the Interim explanatory notes for the assessment of passenger ship systems' capabilities after a fire or flooding casualty (MSC.1/Circ.1369) and related circulars	2027	MSC	HTW / SSE	SDC	Completed		MSC 110/21, section 18; MSC 108/20, paragraph 15.23.3; MSC 105/20, paragraphs 15.24.2 and 18.54; MSC 103/21, paragraph 18.31; SDC 12/18, paragraph 3.27; MSC 111/22, paragraph 12.2
Notes: MSC 108 extended TCY to 2025, and MSC 110 extended TCY to 2027									

Sub-Committee on Ship Systems and Equipment (SSE) ³									
Reference to SD, applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output for Year 1	Status of output for Year 2	References
1	1.3	Development of amendments to chapter 6 of the 2009 MODU Code regarding electrical equipment capable of operation after shutdown	2026	MSC	SSE	SDC	Completed		MSC 111/22, paragraph 12.32
1	1.13	Development of amendments to paragraph 2.1.2.5 of chapter 5 of the FSS Code on construction requirements for gaskets	2026	MSC	SSE		Completed		MSC 107/20, paragraph 17.16 SSE 12/21, paragraph 7.7
1	1.14	Development of engine control room alert management (ECRAM) performance standards	2028	MSC	HTW / SSE	SDC	No work requested		MSC 110/21, paragraph 18.43
2	2.3	Amendments to the IGF Code and development of guidelines for alternative fuels and related technologies	Continuous	MSC	HTW / PPR / SDC / SSE	CCC	No work requested		MSC 94/21, paragraphs 18.5 and 18.6; MSC 96/25, paragraphs 10.1 to 10.3; MSC 97/22, paragraph 19.2; PPR 6/20, paragraph 3.39; MSC 102/24, paragraph 21.4; MSC 106/19,

³ SSE 12 reports to MSC 112. However, for the purpose of presenting the status reports of all sub-committees, the biennial agenda of SSE Sub-Committee is included as prepared by SSE 12 (SSE 12/21, annex 4).

Sub-Committee on Ship Systems and Equipment (SSE) ³									
Reference to SD, applicable if	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output for Year 1	Status of output for Year 2	References
									paragraph 16.42, MSC 108/20, sections 3 and 14; MSC 109/22, sections 3 and 14; MSC 111/22, section 6
2	2.9	Revision of SOLAS chapters II-1 (part C) and V, and related instruments regarding steering and propulsion requirements, to address both traditional and non-traditional propulsion and steering systems	2028	MSC	SSE	SDC	No work requested		MSC 105/20, paragraph 18.23; MSC 107/20, paragraph 12.4, MSC 110/21, section 18; MSC 111/22, paragraph 12.10
Notes: MSC 110 extended TCY to 2028									
2	2.16	Revision of SOLAS chapter III and the International Life-Saving Appliance (LSA) Code	2027	MSC	SSE		In progress		MSC 98/23, paragraphs 20.41 and 20.42; SSE 12/21, section 5
2	2.23	Development of a goal-based instrument for maritime autonomous surface ships (MASS)	2030	MSC	III / HTW / CCC / SDC / SSE / NCSR				MSC 104/18, paragraph 15.9.2; MSC 105/20, section 7; MSC 106/19, section 5; MSC 107/20, section 5; MSC 108/20, section 4; MSC 109/22, section 5; MSC 111/22, paragraphs 5.40 and 5.41

Sub-Committee on Ship Systems and Equipment (SSE) ³									
Reference to SD, applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output for Year 1	Status of output for Year 2	References
Notes:	MSC 111 agreed to assign the CCC, HTW, III, NCSR, SDC and SSE Sub-Committees as associated organs and agreed to extend the target completion year to 2030.								
3	3.8	Development of a safety regulatory framework to support the reduction of GHG emissions from ships using new technologies and alternative fuels	Continuous	MSC	MEPC / III / HTW / CCC / SDC / SSE	MSC	Ongoing		MSC 111/22, section 6; SSE 12/21, section 17
6	6.1	Role of the human element	Continuous	MSC MEPC	/ III / PPR / CCC / SDC / SSE / NCSR	HTW	No work requested		MSC 89/25, paragraphs 10.10, 10.16 and 22.39 and annex 21; MEPC 78/17, paragraphs 10.4 and 13
6	6.2	Validated model training courses	Continuous	MSC MEPC	/ III / PPR / CCC / SDC / SSE / NCSR	HTW	Completed		MSC 100/20, paragraphs 10.3 to 10.6 and 17.28; MSC 105/20, section 16, MSC 108/20, paragraph 12.32; PPR 9/21, section 12; MEPC 79/15, paragraphs 9.1, 9.14 to 9.15; MEPC 81/16, paragraph 10.1; SSE 12/21, paragraph 11.7
7	7.1	Unified interpretation of provisions of IMO safety, security, environment, facilitation, liability and	Continuous	MSC MEPC FAL / LEG	/ III / PPR / CCC / SDC / SSE / NCSR		Ongoing		MSC 76/23, paragraph 20.3; MSC 78/26, paragraph 22.12; MSC 108/20,

Sub-Committee on Ship Systems and Equipment (SSE) ³									
Reference to SD, applicable if	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output for Year 1	Status of output for Year 2	References
		compensation-related conventions							paragraph 18.13, section 19, MSC.1/Circ.1456/Rev.1, MSC.1/Circ.1572/Rev.2, MSC.1/Circ.1509/Rev.1, MSC.1/Circ.1511/Rev.1, MSC.1/Circ.1680; MEPC 78/17, section 4, and paragraphs 5.6 and 5.7; MEPC 79/15, paragraphs 4.8, 4.26, 4.27, 6.26 to 6.29; MEPC 80/17, paragraphs 4.11 and 5.24; SSE 12/21, section10
7	7.15	Development of amendments to SOLAS chapter II-2 and the FSS Code concerning detection and control of fires in cargo holds and on the cargo deck of container ships	2028	MSC	CCC	SSE	In progress		MSC 103/21, paragraph 18.8; MSC 110/21, paragraph 18.109.5; SSE 12/21, section12
7	7.19	Amendments to the LSA Code for thermal performance of immersion suits	2027	MSC	SSE		In progress		MSC 84/24, paragraph 22.48 MSC 110/21, paragraph 18.109.4 SSE 12/21, section 15
7	7.25	Revision of the Revised guidelines for the maintenance and	2026	MSC	SSE		Completed		MSC 107/20, paragraph 17.60; SSE 12/21, paragraph 4.8

Sub-Committee on Ship Systems and Equipment (SSE) ³									
Reference to SD, applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output for Year 1	Status of output for Year 2	References
		inspections of fixed carbon dioxide fire-extinguishing systems (MSC.1/Circ.1318/Rev.1) to clarify the testing and inspection provisions for CO2 cylinders							
7	7.29	Comprehensive review of the Requirements for maintenance, thorough examination, operational testing, overhaul and repair of lifeboats and rescue boats, launching appliances and release gear (resolution MSC.402(96)) to address challenges with their implementation	2027	MSC	SSE		In progress		MSC 107/20, paragraph 17.62; SSE 12/21, section 14
7	7.30	Amendments to SOLAS chapter III and chapter IV of the LSA Code to require the carriage of self-righting or canopied reversible liferafts for new ships	2027	MSC	SSE		In progress		MSC 99/22, paragraph 20.22; SSE 12/21, section 6
7	7.31	Development of amendments to chapter 15 of the FSS Code on enclosed spaces	2027	MSC	SSE	SDC	No work requested		MSC 110/21, paragraph 18.108.2

Sub-Committee on Ship Systems and Equipment (SSE) ³									
Reference to SD, applicable if	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output for Year 1	Status of output for Year 2	References
		containing a nitrogen receiver or a buffer tank of nitrogen generator systems							
7	7.32	Revision of the Guidelines for the application of plastic pipes on ships (resolution A.753(18))	2028	MSC	SSE	SDC	No work requested		MSC 105/20, paragraph 18.40; SSE 11/20, paragraph 17.10; MSC 110/21, paragraph 18.108.3
7	7.34	Revision of the 2010 FTP Code to allow for new fire protection systems and materials	2028	MSC	SSE		Extended		SSE 10/20, section 8; MSC 103/21, paragraph 18.28; SSE 12/21, section 8
Notes: MSC 111 extended TCY to 2028									
7	7.36	New requirements for ventilation of survival craft	2027	MSC	SSE		In progress		SSE 10, section 3; MSC 109/22, paragraph 12.2; SSE 12/21, section 3
7	7.37	Evaluation of adequacy of fire protection, detection and extinction arrangements in vehicle, special category and ro-ro spaces in order to reduce the fire risk of ships carrying new energy vehicles	2027	MSC	SSE		In progress		MSC 105/20, paragraph 18.43; SSE 11/20, section 16; SSE 12/21, section 16

Sub-Committee on Ship Systems and Equipment (SSE) ³									
Reference to SD, applicable if	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output for Year 1	Status of output for Year 2	References
Notes: SSE 12 agreed to request MSC 112 to extend the completion year for this output to 2029.									
7	7.41	Development of provisions to consider prohibiting the use of fire-fighting foams containing fluorinated substances, in addition to PFOS for fire-fighting on board ships	2026	MSC	SSE		In progress		MSC 101/24, paragraph 21.27; SSE 12/21, section 13
Notes: SSE 12 agreed to request MSC 112 to extend the target completion year of the output to 2027.									
7	7.42	Revision of the Interim explanatory notes for the assessment of passenger ship systems' capabilities after a fire or flooding casualty (MSC.1/Circ.1369) and related circulars	2027	MSC	HTW / SSE	SDC	Completed		MSC 110/21, section 18; MSC 108/20, paragraph 15.23.3; MSC 105/20, paragraphs 15.24.2 and 18.54; MSC 103/21, paragraph 18.31; MSC 111/22, paragraph 12.2
Notes: MSC 108 extended TCY to 2025, and MSC 110 extended TCY to 2027									
7	7.48	Review and update SOLAS regulation II-2/9 on containment of fire to incorporate existing guidance and clarify requirements	2026	MSC	SSE		In progress		MSC 105/20, paragraphs 18.8 and 18.9; SSE 12/21, section 9
Notes: SSE 12 agreed to request MSC 112 to extend the target completion year of the output to 2028.									

ANNEX 34

PROVISIONAL AGENDAS FOR THE FORTHCOMING SESSIONS OF THE SUB-COMMITTEES

PROVISIONAL AGENDA FOR CCC 12

- 1 Adoption of the agenda
- 2 Decisions of other IMO bodies
- 3 Amendments to the IGF Code and development of guidelines for alternative fuels and related technologies (2.3)
- 4 Development of a safety regulatory framework to support the reduction of GHG emissions from ships using new technologies and alternative fuels (3.8)
- 5 Amendments to the IMSBC Code and supplements (7.13)
- 6 Amendments to the IMDG Code and supplements (7.10)
- 7 Revision of the Revised guidelines for the preparation of the Cargo Securing Manual (MSC.1/Circ.1353/Rev.2) to include a harmonized performance standard for lashing software to permit lashing software as a supplement to the Cargo Securing Manual (7.40)
- 8 Consideration of reports of incidents involving dangerous goods or marine pollutants in packaged form on board ships or in port areas (7.28)
- 9 Unified interpretation of provisions of IMO safety, security, environment, facilitation, liability and compensation-related conventions (7.1)
- 10 Biennial status report and provisional agenda for CCC 13
- 11 Election of the Chair and Vice-Chair for 2027
- 12 Any other business
- 13 Report to the Committees

PROVISIONAL AGENDA FOR HTW 13

- 1 Adoption of the agenda
- 2 Decisions of other IMO bodies
- 3 Validated model training courses (6.2)
- 4 Role of the human element (6.1)
- 5 Reports on unlawful practices associated with certificates of competency (6.3)
- 6 Comprehensive review of the 1978 STCW Convention and Code (6.17)
- 7 Development of a safety regulatory framework to support the reduction of GHG emissions from ships using new technologies and alternative fuels (3.8)
- 8 Scoping exercise and enhancement of the effectiveness of provisions on fatigue and seafarers' hours of work and rest (6.9)
- 9 Biennial agenda and provisional agenda for HTW 14
- 10 Election of Chair and Vice-Chair for 2028
- 11 Any other business
- 12 Report to the Maritime Safety Committee

PROVISIONAL AGENDA FOR III 12

- 1 Adoption of the agenda
- 2 Decisions of other IMO bodies
- 3 Consideration and analysis of reports on alleged inadequacy of port reception facilities (7.7)
- 4 Lessons learned and safety issues identified from the analysis of marine safety investigation reports (7.4)
- 5 Review of the Casualty Investigation Code and the associated implementation Guidelines (resolution A.1075(28)) (7.43)
- 6 Measures to harmonize port State control (PSC) activities and procedures worldwide (1.11)
- 7 Development of an entrant training manual for PSC personnel (6.10)
- 8 Identified issues relating to the implementation of IMO instruments from the analysis of data (7.5)
- 9 Analysis of consolidated audit summary reports (1.4)
- 10 Updated Survey Guidelines under the Harmonized System of Survey and Certification (HSSC) (7.27)
- 11 Non-exhaustive list of obligations under instruments relevant to the IMO Instruments Implementation Code (III Code) (1.5)
- 12 Comprehensive revision of the Guidelines on the implementation of the ISM Code by Administrations and companies (6.5)
- 13 Unified interpretation of provisions of IMO safety, security, environment, facilitation, liability and compensation related conventions (7.1)
- 14 Cooperate with the United Nations on matters of mutual interest, as well as provide relevant input/guidance - Review the draft guidelines for the seaworthiness and safety inspection of small fishing vessels and associated inspection checklist (OW 8)
- 15 Biennial agenda and provisional agenda for III 13
- 16 Election of Chair and Vice-Chair for 2027
- 17 Any other business
- 18 Report to the Committees

PROVISIONAL AGENDA FOR NCSR 13

- 1 Adoption of the agenda
- 2 Decisions of other IMO bodies
- 3 Routeing measures and ship reporting systems (7.22)
- 4 Updates to the LRIT system (7.23)
- 5 Developments in GMDSS services, including guidelines on maritime safety information (MSI) (7.2)
- 6 Response to matters related to the ITU-R Study Groups and ITU World Radiocommunication Conference (2.1)
- 7 Development of global maritime SAR services, including harmonization of maritime and aeronautical procedures and amendments to the IAMSAR Manual (1.34)
- 8 Development of guidelines for EPIRB which implement the two-way communication service via the SAR/Galileo Return Link service as a complement to EPIRB performance standards (resolution MSC.471(101)) (2.18)
- 9 Development of guidance to establish a framework for data distribution and global IP-based connectivity between shore-based facilities and ships for ECDIS S-100 products (2.12) and operational guidance for route exchange (2.15)
- 10 Development of performance standards for dual frequency multi-constellation satellite-based augmentation systems (DFMC SBAS) and advanced receiver autonomous integrity monitoring (RAIM) in shipborne radionavigation receivers (2.7)
- 11 Development of a transition scheme for the introduction of digital technology for Very High Frequency (VHF) voice communications (2.5)
- 12 Revision of the Performance standards for gyro-compasses (resolution A.424(XI)) and Guidance for navigation and communication equipment intended for use on ships operating in polar waters (MSC.1/Circ.1612) (2.14)
- 13 Development of performance standards for Ranging mode (R-mode) in radionavigation receivers (2.17)
- 14 Unified interpretation of provisions of IMO safety, security, environment, facilitation, liability and compensation-related conventions (7.1)
- 15 Biennial status report and provisional agenda for NCSR 14
- 16 Election of Chair and Vice-Chair for 2027
- 17 Any other business
- 18 Report to the Maritime Safety Committee

PROVISIONAL AGENDA FOR SDC 13

- 1 Adoption of the agenda
- 2 Decisions of other IMO bodies
- 3 Amendments to the 2011 ESP Code (7.21)
- 4 Revision of SOLAS chapters II-1 (part C) and V, and related instruments regarding steering and propulsion requirements, to address both traditional and non-traditional propulsion and steering systems (2.9)
- 5 Development of engine control room alert management (ECRAM) performance standards (1.14)
- 6 Development of a safety regulatory framework to support the reduction of GHG emissions from ships using new technologies and alternative fuels (3.8)
- 7 Development of amendments to chapter 15 of the FSS Code on enclosed spaces containing a nitrogen receiver or a buffer tank of nitrogen generator systems (7.31)
- 8 Revision of the Guidelines for the application of plastic pipes on ships (resolution A.753(18)) (7.32)
- 9 Experience-building phase (EBP) for the reduction of underwater radiated noise from shipping (1.16)
- 10 Unified interpretation of provisions of IMO safety, security, environment, facilitation, liability and compensation-related conventions (7.1)
- 11 Biennial status report and provisional agenda for SDC 14
- 12 Election of Chair and Vice-Chair for 2028
- 13 Any other business
- 14 Report to the Maritime Safety Committee

PROVISIONAL AGENDA FOR SSE 13

- 1 Adoption of the agenda
- 2 Decisions of other IMO bodies
- 3 New requirements for ventilation of survival craft (7.36)
- 4 Development of a safety regulatory framework to support the reduction of GHG emissions from ships using new technologies and alternative fuels (3.8)
- 5 Revision of SOLAS chapter III and the LSA Code (2.16)
- 6 Amendments to SOLAS chapter III and chapter IV of the LSA Code to require the carriage of self-righting or canopied reversible liferafts for new ships (7.30)
- 7 Evaluation of adequacy of fire protection, detection and extinction arrangements in vehicle, special category and ro-ro spaces in order to reduce the fire risk of ships carrying new energy vehicles (7.37)
- 8 Revision of the 2010 FTP Code to allow for new fire protection systems and materials (7.34)
- 9 Review and update SOLAS regulation II-2/9 on containment of fire to incorporate existing guidance and clarify requirements (7.48)
- 10 Unified interpretation of provisions of IMO safety, security, environment, facilitation, liability and compensation-related conventions (7.1)
- 11 Development of amendments to SOLAS chapter II-2 and the FSS Code concerning detection and control of fires in cargo holds and on the cargo deck of containerships (7.15)
- 12 Development of provisions to consider prohibiting the use of foams containing fluorinated substances, in addition to PFOS, for fire-fighting on board ships (7.41)
- 13 Comprehensive review of the Requirements for maintenance, thorough examination, operational testing, overhaul and repair of lifeboats and rescue boats, launching appliances and release gear (resolution MSC.402(96)) to address challenges with their implementation (7.29)
- 14 Amendments to the LSA Code for thermal performance of immersion suits (7.19)
- 15 Biennial status report and provisional agenda for SSE 14
- 16 Election of Chair and Vice-Chair for 2028
- 17 Any other business
- 18 Report to the Maritime Safety Committee

ANNEX 35

BIENNIAL STATUS REPORT¹ OF THE MARITIME SAFETY COMMITTEE FOR THE 2026-2027 BIENNIUM

Reference to SD ² , if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output Year 1	Year 2	References
1	1.2	Input on identifying emerging needs of developing countries, in particular SIDS and LDCs to be included in the ITCP	Continuous	TCC	MSC / MEPC / FAL / LEG		No work requested		MEPC 78/17, section 12; MEPC 79/15, section 7; MEPC 80/17, section 12
1	1.3	Development of amendments to chapter 6 of the 2009 MODU Code regarding electrical equipment capable of operation after shutdown	2026	MSC	SSE	SDC	Completed		MSC 111/22, paragraph 12.32;
1	1.4	Analysis of consolidated audit summary reports	Continuous	Assembly	MSC / MEPC / LEG / TCC / III	Council	Ongoing		MEPC 61/24, paragraph 11.14.1; MSC 88/26, paragraph 10.8; C 120/D, paragraphs 7.1 and 7.2; MSC 105/20, paragraph 13.10;

¹ For details, refer to Organizational Planning module of GISIS.

² Strategic directions:
SD 1: Ensure implementation of IMO instruments supported by capacity development
SD 2: Integrate new, emerging and advancing technologies in the regulatory framework
SD 3: Respond to climate change and reduce greenhouse gas emissions from international shipping
SD 4: Continue to engage in ocean governance
SD 5: Enhance global facilitation, supply chain resilience and security of international trade
SD 6: Address the human element
SD 7: Ensure the regulatory effectiveness of international shipping
SD 8: Ensure organizational effectiveness
OW: Other work

Reference to SD ² , if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output Year 1	Year 2	References
									MSC 106/19, paragraphs 14.11 and 16.37; MSC 108/20, paragraphs 13.8 and 13.9; MSC 109/22, paragraph 15.11 MEPC 78/17, paragraphs 10.7 to 10.11; MEPC 79/15, paragraph 9.3; MEPC 81/16, paragraph 10.7 MSC 105/20, paragraph 13.10; MSC 106/19, paragraphs 14.11 and 16.37; MSC 108/20, paragraphs 13.8 and 13.9; MSC 109/22, paragraph 15.11; MSC 111/22, paragraph 2.6
1	1.5	Non-exhaustive list of obligations under instruments relevant to the IMO Instruments Implementation Code (III Code)	Continuous	MSC / MEPC	III		Ongoing		MSC 91/22, paragraph 10.30; MSC 108/20, paragraph 13.7.3; MSC 111/22, paragraph 17.9.3 MEPC 77/16, paragraphs 10.8 and 10.9; MEPC 79/15, paragraph 9.13;

Reference to SD ² , if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output Year 1	Year 2	References
									MEPC 81/16, paragraph 10.9.3
Notes: MSC 109 and MEPC 83 agreed to change the type of output from "annual" to "continuous".									
1	1.7	Identify thematic priorities within the area of maritime safety and security, marine environmental protection, facilitation of maritime traffic and maritime legislation	Annual	TCC	MSC / MEPC / FAL / LEG		No work requested		MEPC 78/17, section 12; MEPC 80/17, section 12; MSC 108/20, paragraphs 19.18 to 19.20, FAL 49/22, paragraph 16.5 MSC 108/20, paragraphs 19.18 to 19.20
1	1.11	Measures to harmonize port State control (PSC) activities and procedures worldwide	Continuous	MSC / MEPC	HTW / PPR / NCSR	III	Ongoing		MSC 101/24, paragraph 21.48; MEPC 75/18, paragraphs 11.10 and 11.11; MSC 104, paragraph 13.7.1; MSC 108/20, paragraph 13.7.1; MSC 109/22, paragraph 15.7; MSC 111/22, paragraph 17.9.1 MEPC 78/17, paragraphs 7.73 and 9.8; MEPC 79/15, paragraphs 9.5 and 9.6; MEPC 81/16, paragraph 10.9.1

Reference to SD ² , if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output Year 1	Year 2	References
1	1.13	Development of amendments to paragraph 2.1.2.5 of chapter 5 of the FSS Code on construction requirements for gaskets	2026	MSC	SSE		In progress		MSC 107/20, paragraph 17.16
1	1.14	Development of engine control room alert management (ECRAM) performance standards	2028	MSC	HTW / SSE	SDC	In progress		MSC 110/21, paragraph 18.43; MSC 111/22, paragraph 12.12
1	1.17	Development of guidelines for the use of ammonia cargo as fuel and provisions for the use of alternative fuels other than cargo on gas carriers	2026	MSC	CCC		Completed		MSC 103/21, paragraph 18.2; MSC 104/18, paragraph 15.16; MSC 105/20, paragraph 18.50; MSC 108/20, paragraph 14.20 and section 18; MSC 109/22, paragraphs 14.5 to 14.10 and 19.38.1; CCC 9/14, section 4, CCC 10/16, section 4; MSC 111/22, paragraphs 6.37 and 19.26.2
1	7.20	Development of measures to prevent the loss of containers	2025	MSC		CCC	Completed		CCC 11/16, paragraph 10.21
1	1.34	Development of global maritime SAR services, including harmonization of maritime and aeronautical	Continuous	MSC	NCSR		Ongoing		MSC 108/20, section 12; MSC 109/22, paragraph 13.4 and annex 11,

Reference to SD ² , if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output Year 1	Year 2	References
		procedures and amendments to the IAMSAR Manual							MSC.1/Circ.1686; NCSR 12/20, section 7
2	2.1	Response to matters related to the ITU-R Study Groups and ITU World Radiocommunication Conference	Continuous	MSC	NCSR		Ongoing		MSC 106/19, 1 paragraphs 3.28 to 13.33; MSC 107/20, paragraphs 15.4 and 15.5 and annex 36; NCSR 12/20, section 6 and annexes 7 and 8
2	2.3	Amendments to the IGF Code and development of guidelines for alternative fuels and related technologies	Continuous	MSC	HTW / PPR / SDC / SSE	CCC	Ongoing		MSC 94/21, paragraphs 18.5 and 18.6; MSC 96/25, paragraphs 10.1 to 10.3; MSC 97/22, paragraph 19.2; PPR 6/20, paragraph 3.39; MSC 102/24, paragraph 21.4; MSC 106/19, paragraph 16.42, MSC 108/20, sections 3 and 14; MSC 109/22, sections 3 and 14; MSC 111/22, section 6
2	2.5	Development of a transition scheme for the introduction of digital technology for Very High Frequency (VHF) voice communications	2027	MSC	NCSR		In progress		MSC 109/22, paragraph 19.26

Reference to SD ² , if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output Year 1	Year 2	References
2	2.6	Guidelines for use of Fibre-Reinforced Plastics (FRP) within ship structures	2026	MSC	SDC		Completed		MSC 98/23, paragraph 10.22; MSC 107/20, paragraph 17.89; MSC 111/22, paragraph 12.13 MSC.1/Circ.1574/Rev.1
2	2.7	Development of performance standards for dual frequency multi-constellation satellite-based augmentation systems (DFMC SBAS) and advanced receiver autonomous integrity monitoring (ARAIM) in shipborne radionavigation receivers	2027	MSC	NCSR		In progress		MSC 107/20, paragraph 17.58.2
2	2.9	Revision of SOLAS chapters II-1 (part C) and V, and related instruments regarding steering and propulsion requirements, to address both traditional and non-traditional propulsion and steering systems	2028	MSC	SSE	SDC	In progress		MSC 105/20, paragraph 18.23; MSC 107/20, paragraph 12.4; MSC 110/21, section 18; MSC 111/22, paragraph 12.10
Notes: MSC 110 extended TCY to 2028									
2	2.11	Development of a comprehensive strategy on maritime digitalization	2027	FAL	MSC / MEPC		In progress		MSC 108/20, paragraph 2.16; MEPC 82/17, paragraph 14.10; FAL 50/20, section 8; MSC 111/22, paragraph 21.19

Reference to SD ² , if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output Year 1	Year 2	References
Notes: FAL 50 invited LEG 113 to become an associated organ									
2	2.12	Development of guidance to establish a framework for data distribution and global IP-based connectivity between shore-based facilities and ships for ECDIS S-100 products	2026	MSC	NCSR		In progress		MSC 109/22, paragraphs 19.27 to 19.34
2	2.14	Revision of the Performance standards for gyro-compasses (resolution A.424(XI)) and Guidance for navigation and communication equipment intended for use on ships operating in polar waters (MSC.1/Circ.1612)	2027	MSC	NCSR		In progress		MSC 107/20, paragraph 17.47
2	2.15	Development of operational guidance for route exchange	2026	MSC	NCSR		In progress		MSC 109/22, paragraph 19.30
2	2.16	Revision of SOLAS chapter III and the International Life-Saving Appliance (LSA) Code	2027	MSC	SSE		In progress		MSC 98/23, paragraphs 20.41 and 20.42
2	2.17	Development of performance standards for Ranging mode (R-mode) in radionavigation receivers	2027	MSC	NCSR		In progress		MSC 110/21, paragraph 18.35
2	2.18	Development of guidelines for EPIRB which implement the two-way communication service via the SAR/Galileo Return Link service as a complement to EPIRB	2026	MSC	NCSR		In progress		MSC 107/20, paragraph 17.35

Reference to SD ² , if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output Year 1	Year 2	References
		performance standards (resolution MSC.471(101))							
2	2.21	Review of Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) studies by the FSA Experts' Group	Continuous	MSC			Ongoing		MSC 105/20, section 11; MSC 106/19, section 9; MSC 107/20, section 10; MSC 108/20, section 11; MSC 109/22, section 11
2	2.23	Development of a goal-based instrument for maritime autonomous surface ships (MASS)	2030	MSC	III / HTW / CCC / SDC / SSE / NCSR		In progress		MSC 104/18, paragraph 15.9.2; MSC 105/20, section 7; MSC 106/19, section 5; MSC 107/20, section 5; MSC 108/20, section 4; MSC 109/22, section 5; MSC 111/22, section 5
Notes: MSC 111 agreed to assign the CCC, HTW, III, NCSR, SDC and SSE Sub-Committees as associated organs and agreed to extend the target completion year to 2030.									
3	3.8	Development of a safety regulatory framework to support the reduction of GHG emissions from ships using new technologies and alternative fuels	Continuous	MSC	MEPC / III / HTW / CCC / SDC / SSE	MSC	Ongoing		MSC 111/22, section 6
4	4.2	Input to the ITCP on emerging issues relating to sustainable development and achievement of the SDGs	Continuous	TCC	MSC / MEPC / FAL / LEG		No work requested		MEPC 72/17, section 12; MEPC 73/19, section 13; MEPC 74/18, section 12; MEPC 78/17, section 12; MEPC 80/17, section 12
5	5.2	Guidelines and guidance on the implementation and interpretation of SOLAS	Continuous	MSC			Ongoing		MSC 109/22, paragraph 19.16.3

Reference to SD ² , if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output Year 1	Year 2	References
		chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code							
Notes: MSC 109 changed they type of the output from annual to continuous.									
5	5.3	Consideration and analysis of reports on piracy and armed robbery against ships	Continuous	MSC			Ongoing		MSC 105/20, paragraph 9.1; MSC 106/19, section 7; MSC 107/20, section 7; MSC 108/20, section 8; MSC 109/22, sections 9 and 19
Notes: MSC 109 changed the type of output from "annual" to "continuous".									
5	5.4	Revised guidance relating to the prevention of piracy and armed robbery to reflect emerging trends and behaviour patterns	Continuous	MSC	LEG		Ongoing		MSC 105/20, paragraph 9.1; MSC 106/19, paragraph 7.7; MSC 107/20, section 7; MSC 108/20, section 8, MSC 109/22, sections 9 and 19
Notes: MSC 109 changed the type of output from "annual" to "continuous".									
5	5.6	Development of amendments to the Revised guidelines on the prevention of access by stowaways and the allocation of responsibilities to seek the successful resolution of stowaway cases (resolutions FAL.13(42) and MSC.448(99))	2027	FAL	MSC		Completed		FAL 49/22 paragraph 19.3, MSC 110/21, paragraph 18.92; FAL 50/20, section 12 and resolution FAL.20(50); MSC 111/22 paragraphs 7.5 and 7.6
5	5.9	Development of amendments to the Revised guidelines for	2027	FAL	MSC		No work requested		FAL 48/20 paragraph 17.7;

Reference to SD ² , if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output Year 1	Year 2	References
		the prevention and suppression of the smuggling of drugs, psychotropic substances and precursor chemicals on ships engaged in international maritime traffic (resolutions FAL.9(34) and MSC.228(82))							MSC 108/20, paragraph 2.16; FAL 50/20, section 11
5	5.11	Development of guidelines on port nautical information	2028	FAL	MSC		No work requested		FAL 50/20, paragraph 17.3; MSC 111/22, paragraphs 19.24 and 19.25
Notes: FAL 50 has invited MSC to become associated organ. MSC 111 agreed to become an associated organ.									
5	5.12	Measures to address maritime security threats	2027	LEG	MSC		In progress		
5	5.13	IMO's contribution to addressing unsafe mixed migration by sea	2026	MSC / FAL / LEG			Completed		FAL 41/17, paragraph 7.15; MSC 98/23, paragraph 16.14; FAL 43/20, paragraph 10.7; MSC 101/24, paragraph 19.8; MSC 104/18, paragraph 9.5; MSC 105/20, section 10; FAL 46/24, paragraph 11.4, MSC106/19, section 8; resolution MSC.528(106); MSC 107/20, section 9,

Reference to SD ² , if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output Year 1	Year 2	References
									MSC 108/20, section 9; MSC 109/22, section 10; FAL 49/22, section 14; FAL 50/20, section 13; MSC 111/22, paragraph 9.2
Notes: FAL 50 agreed to complete the output (FAL 50/20, paragraph 13.4). MSC 111 agreed that the work on the output had been completed (MSC 111/22, paragraph 9.2)									
5	5.15	Development of a non-mandatory maritime cyber code	2028	FAL	MSC		No work requested		FAL 50/20 paragraph 17.9; MSC 111/22 paragraph 19.25
Notes: FAL 50 invited MSC to become associated organ									
6	6.1	Role of the human element	Continuous	MSC / MEPC	III / PPR / CCC / SDC / SSE / NCSR	HTW	Ongoing		MSC 89/25, paragraphs 10.10, 10.16 and 22.39 and annex 21; MEPC 78/17, paragraphs 10.4 and 13
6	6.2	Validated model training courses	Continuous	MSC / MEPC	III / PPR / CCC / SDC / SSE / NCSR	HTW	Ongoing		MSC 100/20, paragraphs 10.3 to 10.6 and 17.28; MSC 105/20, section 16; MSC 108/20, paragraph 12.32; PPR 9/21, section 12; MEPC 79/15, paragraphs 9.1, 9.14 to 9.15; MEPC 81/16, paragraph 10.1

Reference to SD ² , if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output Year 1	Year 2	References
6	6.3	Reports on unlawful practices associated with certificates of competency	Continuous	MSC	HTW		Ongoing		MSC 83/28, paragraph 12.2; MSC 109/22, section 19
Notes: MSC 109 changed the type of output from annual to continuous.									
6	6.5	Comprehensive revision of the guidelines on the implementation of the ISM Code by Administrations and companies	2028	MSC/MEPC	HTW	III	In progress		MSC 110/21, paragraph 18.5
6	6.6	Revision of the IMO Standard Marine Communication Phrases (resolution A.918(22))	2028	MSC	HTW	NCSR			MSC 107/20, paragraph 17.53
6	6.9	Scoping exercise and enhancement of the effectiveness of provisions on fatigue and seafarers' hours of work and rest	2027	MSC	III	HTW	In progress		MSC 110/21, paragraph 18.14
6	6.10	Development of an entrant training manual for PSC personnel	2027	MSC / MEPC	III		In progress		MSC 103/21, paragraph 18.36; MSC 106/19, paragraph 16.46 MEPC 76/15, paragraphs 10.1, 10.2 and 12.5; MEPC 79/15, paragraph 9.3
6	6.11	Amendments to MSC.1/Circ.1264/Rev.1 and MSC.1/Circ.1358/Rev.1 to provide for additional equipment and safety measures	2027	MSC	CCC		No work requested		MSC 111/22, paragraph 19.13

Reference to SD ² , if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output Year 1	Year 2	References
6	6.17	Comprehensive review of the 1978 STCW Convention and Code	2031	MSC	HTW		In progress		MSC 105/20, paragraph 18.13; MSC 107/20, paragraph 17.71; MSC 108/20, paragraph 16.5
7	7.1	Unified interpretation of provisions of IMO safety, security, environment, facilitation, liability and compensation-related conventions	Continuous	MSC / MEPC / FAL / LEG	III / PPR / CCC / SDC / SSE / NCSR		Ongoing		MSC 76/23, paragraph 20.3; MSC 78/26, paragraph 22.12; MSC 108/20, paragraph 18.13, section 19, MSC.1/Circ.1456/Rev.1, MSC.1/Circ.1572/Rev.2, MSC.1/Circ.1509/Rev.1, MSC.1/Circ.1511/Rev.1, MSC.1/Circ.1680; MEPC 78/17, section 4, and paragraphs 5.6 and 5.7; MEPC 79/15, paragraphs 4.8, 4.26, 4.27, 6.26 to 6.29; MEPC 80/17, paragraphs 4.11 and 5.24
7	7.2	Developments in GMDSS services, including guidelines on maritime safety information (MSI)	Continuous	MSC	NCSR		Ongoing		MSC 108/20, section 12, MSC.1/Circ.1310/Rev.2,
7	7.4	Lessons learned and safety issues identified from the analysis of marine safety investigation reports	Continuous	MSC / MEPC	III		Ongoing		MSC 92/26, paragraph 22.29; MSC 106/19, paragraphs 14.2 to 14.6;

Reference to SD ² , if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output Year 1	Year 2	References
									MSC 108/20, paragraph 13.3 to 13.6; MSC 109/22, paragraphs 15.2 to 15.6 MEPC 79/15, paragraph 9.3; MEPC 81/16, paragraph 10.6
Notes: MSC 109 and MEPC 83 agreed to change the type of output from "annual" to "continuous".									
7	7.5	Identified issues relating to the implementation of IMO instruments from the analysis of data	Continuous	MSC / MEPC	III		Ongoing		MSC 96/25, paragraph 23.13; MSC 106/19, paragraphs 14.12 and 16. MSC 108/20, paragraph 13.4; MSC 109/22, paragraph 15.3 MEPC 79/15, paragraphs 12.13 and 12.14; MEPC 81, paragraph 10.3
Notes: MSC 109 agreed to change the type of output from "annual" to "continuous", subject to concurrence of MEPC.									
7	7.6	Consideration and analysis of reports and information on persons rescued at sea and stowaways	Continuous	MSC / FAL			Ongoing		FAL 50/20, section 14
Notes: MSC 109 agreed to change the type of output from "annual" to "continuous". FAL 49 concurred it.									
7	7.10	Amendments to the IMDG Code and supplements	Continuous	MSC	CCC		Ongoing		MSC 105/20, paragraphs 3.59 and 14.4; MSC 108/20, sections 3 and 14;

Reference to SD ² , if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output Year 1	Year 2	References
									MSC 111/22, sections 3 and 14
7	7.13	Amendments to the IMSBC Code and supplements	Continuous	MSC	CCC		Ongoing		MSC 105/20, paragraphs 3.56 and 14.4; MSC 107/20, paragraphs 17.10 and 17.12; MSC 110/21, paragraphs 3.53 to 3.55
7	7.15	Development of amendments to SOLAS chapter II-2 and the FSS Code concerning detection and control of fires in cargo holds and on the cargo deck of container ships	2028	MSC	CCC	SSE	In progress		MSC 103/21, paragraph 18.8; MSC 110/21, paragraph 18.109.5
7	7.19	Amendments to the LSA Code for thermal performance of immersion suits	2027	MSC	SSE		In progress		MSC 84/24, paragraph 22.48; MSC 110/21, paragraph 18.109.4
7	7.21	Amendments to the 2011 ESP Code	Continuous	MSC	SDC		Ongoing		MSC 92/26, paragraph 13.31; MSC 107/20, paragraph 12.2; MSC 108/20, section 3 and paragraph 15.5, MSC.553(108); MSC 111/22, paragraphs 12.7 to 12.9
7	7.22	Routeing measures and ship reporting systems	Continuous	MSC	NCSR		Ongoing		MSC 108/20, paragraph 12.4, SN.1/Circ.343; MSC 109/22, paragraph 13.3,

Reference to SD ² , if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output Year 1	Year 2	References
									COLREG.2/Circ.81, SN.1/Circ.344
7	7.23	Updates to the LRIT system	Continuous	MSC	NCSR		Ongoing		
7	7.24	Verified goal-based new ship construction standards for tankers and bulk carriers	Continuous	MSC			Ongoing		MSC 106/19, section 4; MSC 107/20, section 4, MSC 109/22, section 4 MSC 111/22, section 4
7	7.25	Revision of the Revised guidelines for the maintenance and inspections of fixed carbon dioxide fire-extinguishing systems (MSC.1/Circ.1318/Rev.1) to clarify the testing and inspection provisions for CO ₂ cylinders	2026	MSC	SSE		In progress		MSC 107/20, paragraph 17.60
7	7.26	Reports to the MSC on information communicated by STCW Parties	Continuous	MSC			Ongoing		MSC 109/22, sections 19 and 21, MSC.1/Circ.1164/Rev.29
Notes: MSC 109 changed the type of output from annual to continuous.									
7	7.27	Updated Survey Guidelines under the Harmonized System of Survey and Certification (HSSC)	Continuous	MSC / MEPC	III		Ongoing		MSC 79/23, paragraphs 9.19 and 9.20; MSC 104/18, paragraph 13.7.2; MSC 106/19, paragraph 14.13 to 14; MSC 108/20, paragraph 13.7.2; MSC 109/22, section 15; MSC 111/22, paragraphs 17.9.2 and

Reference to SD ² , if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output Year 1	Year 2	References
									17.15. MEPC 68/21, paragraphs 14.5 and 14.6; MEPC 72/17, paragraphs 7.4 and 4.24 to 4.33; MEPC 77/16, paragraph 10.7; MEPC 79/15, paragraphs 9.7 to 9.9; MEPC 81/16, paragraph 10.9.2
Notes: MSC 109 agreed to change the type of output from annual to continuous, subject to the concurrence of MEPC.									
7	7.28	Consideration of reports of incidents involving dangerous goods or marine pollutants in packaged form on board ships or in port areas	Continuous	MSC / MEPC	III	CCC	Ongoing		CCC 7/15, section 9; CCC 8/18, section 9; CCC 9/14, section 9; MSC 109/22, sections 14 and 19
Notes: MSC 109 agreed to change the type of output from annual to continuous.									
7	7.29	Comprehensive review of the Requirements for maintenance, thorough examination, operational testing, overhaul and repair of lifeboats and rescue boats, launching appliances and release gear (resolution MSC.402(96)) to address challenges with their implementation	2027	MSC	SSE		In progress		MSC 107/20, paragraph 17.62

Reference to SD ² , if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output Year 1	Year 2	References
7	7.30	Amendments to SOLAS chapter III and chapter IV of the LSA Code to require the carriage of self-righting or canopied reversible liferafts for new ships	2027	MSC	SSE		In progress		MSC 99/22, paragraph 20.22
7	7.31	Development of amendments to chapter 15 of the FSS Code on enclosed spaces containing a nitrogen receiver or a buffer tank of nitrogen generator systems	2027	MSC	SSE	SDC	In progress		MSC 110/21, paragraph 18.108.2; MSC 111/22, paragraph 12.33
7	7.32	Revision of the Guidelines for the application of plastic pipes on ships (resolution A.753(18))	2028	MSC	SSE	SDC	In progress		MSC 105/20, paragraph 18.40; MSC 110/21, paragraph 18.108.3; MSC 111/22, paragraph 12.34
7	7.33	Review and, if necessary, amendment of SOLAS regulations II-2/13.4.1.1 and 13.4.2.1 to clarify the requirements on escape arrangements from the lower part of machinery spaces	2027	MSC	SDC		Completed		MSC 110/21, paragraph 18.73; MSC 111/22, paragraphs 12.24 and 12.30
7	7.34	Revision of the 2010 FTP Code to allow for new fire protection systems and materials	2028	MSC	SSE		Extended		MSC 103/21, paragraph 18.28; MSC 109/22, paragraph 12.10
7	7.36	New requirements for ventilation of survival craft	2027	MSC	SSE		In progress		MSC 109/22, paragraph 12.2

Reference to SD ² , if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output Year 1	Year 2	References
7	7.37	Evaluation of adequacy of fire protection, detection and extinction arrangements in vehicle, special category and ro-ro spaces in order to reduce the fire risk of ships carrying new energy vehicles	2027	MSC	SSE		In progress		MSC 105/20, paragraph 18.43
7	7.39	Review of the financial architecture of the LRIT system	2026	MSC			Completed		MSC 110/21, paragraph 18.70; MSC 111/22, paragraph 11.17 and annexes 22 and 23
7	7.40	Revision of the Revised guidelines for the preparation of the cargo securing manual (MSC.1/Circ.1353/Rev.2) to include a harmonized performance standard for lashing software to permit lashing software as a supplement to the Cargo Securing Manual	2026	MSC	CCC		Extended		MSC 108/20, paragraph 18.18; MSC 111/22, section 19
Notes: MSC 111 agreed to extend the target completion year to 2026									
7	7.41	Development of provisions to consider prohibiting the use of fire-fighting foams containing fluorinated substances, in addition to PFOS for fire-fighting on board ships	2026	MSC	SSE		In progress		MSC 101/24, paragraph 21.27
7	7.42	Revision of the Interim explanatory notes for the assessment of passenger ship	2027	MSC	HTW / SSE	SDC	Completed		MSC 111/22, paragraph 12.2; MSC 110/21, section 18;

Reference to SD ² , if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output Year 1	Year 2	References
		systems' capabilities after a fire or flooding casualty (MSC.1/Circ.1369) and related circulars							MSC 108/20, paragraph 15.23.3; MSC 105/20, paragraphs 15.24.2 and 18.54; MSC 103/21, paragraph 18.31; MSC 111/22, paragraph 12.2
Notes: MSC 108 extended TCY to 2025, and MSC 110 extended TCY to 2027									
7	7.43	Review of the Casualty Investigation Code and the associated implementation Guidelines (resolution A.1075(28))	2028	MSC	III		In progress		MSC 110/21, paragraph 18.37
7	7.45	Development of guidelines addressing the implementation of provisions left 'to the satisfaction of the Administration', or equivalent, in the relevant mandatory IMO instruments	2028	MSC					MSC 110/21, paragraph 18.91; MSC 111/22, paragraph 19.39
7	7.48	Review and update SOLAS regulation II-2/9 on containment of fire to incorporate existing guidance and clarify requirements	2026	MSC	SSE		In progress		MSC 105/20, paragraphs 18.8 and 18.9; MSC 110/21, paragraph 14.18
8	8.1	Endorsed proposals for the development, maintenance and enhancement of information systems and related guidance (GISIS, websites, etc.)	Continuous	Council	MSC / MEPC / FAL / LEG / TCC		Ongoing		MEPC 78/17, paragraph 4.45; MEPC 79/15, paragraphs 6.1 to 6.5 and 9.4; MEPC 80/17, paragraphs 6.11 to 6.13

Reference to SD ² , if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output Year 1	Year 2	References
8	8.9	Revised documents on organization and method of work and the Rules of Procedures, as appropriate	Continuous	Council	MSC / MEPC / FAL / LEG / TCC		Completed		MSC-MEPC.1/Circ.5/Rev.6, subject to concurrence of MEPC 83; MSC 109/22, sections 18 and 19; MSC 111/22, paragraph 18.5 MSC-MEPC.1/Circ.5/Rev.8, subject to concurrent approval by MEPC 85 MEPC 78/17, section 13; MEPC 79/15, section 11; MEPC 80/17, section 13; FAL 49/22, paragraph 18.5 (FAL.8/Circ.1); FAL 50/20, paragraph 16.9 (FAL.8/Circ.1/Rev.1)
8	8.12	Consideration for the enhancement and improvement of multilingualism and the language services at IMO	Continuous	Council	MSC / MEPC / FAL / LEG / TCC		Ongoing		
8	8.14	Endorsed proposals for new outputs as accepted by the Committees	Continuous	Council	MSC / MEPC / FAL / LEG / TCC		Ongoing		MEPC 78/17, section 14; MEPC 79/15, section 12; MEPC 80/17, section 14; MSC 109/22, section 19; FAL 50/20, section 17 MSC 109/22, section 19
8	8.15	Cooperate with the United Nations on matters of mutual	Continuous	Assembly	MSC / MEPC / FAL	Council	Ongoing		C 120/D, paragraphs 17(a).1-17(a).5

Reference to SD ² , if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output Year 1	Year 2	References
		interest, as well as provide relevant input/guidance			/ LEG / TCC / III				MEPC 78/17, paragraph 7.6 and section 8; MEPC 79/15, paragraphs 7.3 to 7.5; MEPC 80/17, paragraphs 7.2 to 7.4
8	8.16	Cooperate with other international bodies on matters of mutual interest, as well as provide relevant input/guidance	Continuous	Assembly	MSC / MEPC / FAL / LEG / TCC	Council	Ongoing		C 120/D, paragraphs 17(a).1-17(a).5 MEPC 78/17, sections 7 and 8; MEPC 79/15, sections 7 and 8; MEPC 80/17, sections 7 and 8

ANNEX 36

POST-BIENNIAL AGENDA* OF THE MARITIME SAFETY COMMITTEE

Number	Biennium (when the output was placed on the post- biennial agenda)	Reference to Strategic Direction, if applicable	Description	Parent organ(s)	Associated organs(s)	Coordinating organ(s)	Timescale (sessions)	References
194	2022-2023	1	Development of measures to ensure the safe operation of elevators on board ships	MSC	SSE		4	MSC 106/19, paragraphs 16.25 and .26
239	2026-2027	1	Development of amendments to SOLAS regulation V/7.3 and revision of MSC.1/Circ.1079/Rev.1 on Guidelines for preparing plans for cooperation between search and rescue services and passenger ships	MSC	NCSR		2	MSC 111/22, paragraph 15.19
201	2022-2023	2	Consideration of descriptions of Maritime Services in the context of e-navigation	MSC	FAL / NCSR		1	MSC 107/20, paragraph 17.77.1. MSC.1/Circ.1610/Rev.1
202	2022-2023	2	Development of generic performance standards for shipborne satellite navigation system receiver equipment	MSC	NCSR		1	MSC 107/20, paragraph 17.76
210	2022-2023	6	Development of guidance to address time pressure and related organizational factors	MSC	III	HTW	1	MSC 107/20, paragraph 17.23

* For details, refer to Organizational Planning module of GISIS.

Number	Biennium (when the output was placed on the post- biennial agenda)	Reference to Strategic Direction, if applicable	Description	Parent organ(s)	Associated organs(s)	Coordinating organ(s)	Timescale (sessions)	References
233	2024-2025	6	Development of guidelines addressing risks of falls from height	MSC	III	HTW	4	MSC 110/21, paragraph 18.46
213	2022-2023	7	Development of guidelines for harmonizing the date format of various certificates issued under IMO instruments	MSC / FAL	III		2	MSC 107/20, paragraph 17.41
216	2022-2023	7	Development of amendments to the LSA Code and resolution MSC.81(70) to address the in-water performance of SOLAS lifejackets	MSC	SSE		2	MSC 101/24, paragraph 21.6; SSE 9/20, paragraph 8.19; MSC 101/24, paragraph 21.9 MSC 107/20, paragraph 14.24
217	2022-2023	7	Safety measures for non-SOLAS ships operating in polar waters	MSC	SDC		2	MSC 107/12, paragraph 3, MSC 107/20, paragraph 17.80 and annex 38
225	2024-2025	7	Clarification of applicable equipment standards for fire-fighters' outfits in chapter 3 of the FSS Code	MSC	SSE		1	MSC 110/21, paragraph 18.39
226	2024-2025	7	Revision of resolution MSC.81(70) concerning requirements for testing the compliance of pyrotechnics	MSC	SSE		2	MSC 110/21, paragraph 18.52
227	2024-2025	7	Mitigation of fire risks caused by leakages from low-pressure fuel pipes and lubrication oil pipes, and use of thermal imaging cameras when inspecting insulations, in engine rooms	MSC	SSE		2	MSC 110/21, paragraph 18.56

Number	Biennium (when the output was placed on the post- biennial agenda)	Reference to Strategic Direction, if applicable	Description	Parent organ(s)	Associated organs(s)	Coordinating organ(s)	Timescale (sessions)	References
228	2024-2025	7	Revision of the LSA Code regarding lowering speed requirements for fast rescue boats	MSC	SSE		1	MSC 110/21, paragraph 18.61
229	2024-2025	7	Revision of testing requirements for floor covering materials in SOLAS regulation II 2/6.2.1	MSC	SSE		1	MSC 110/21, paragraph 18.77
230	2024-2025	7	Revision of SOLAS regulation II-2/20 and chapter 7 of the FSS Code	MSC	SSE		1	MSC 110/21, paragraph 18.80
234	2024-2025	7	Application of resolution MSC.402(96) to high-speed craft and mobile offshore drilling units in the HSC Codes and MODU Codes	MSC	SSE		2	MSC 110/21, paragraph 18.48
240	2026-2027	7	Revision of paragraph 4.6.3.1 of the LSA Code for free-fall lifeboat safety harness	MSC	SSE		1	MSC 111/22, paragraphs 19.3 to 19.5
241	2026-2027	7	Revision of paragraph 3.5.4 and table 19.1 of SOLAS regulation II-2/19	MSC	SSE		1	MSC 111/22, paragraphs 19.6 to 19.8
31	2024-2025	7	Finalization of a non-mandatory instrument on regulations for non-convention ships	MSC	III		1	MSC 96/25, paragraph 9.4; MSC 101/24, paragraph 21.38; MSC 104/18, section 5; MSC 105/20, section 4; MSC 107/20, paragraphs 17.83, 19.9 and 19.10.

Number	Biennium (when the output was placed on the post- biennial agenda)	Reference to Strategic Direction, if applicable	Description	Parent organ(s)	Associated organs(s)	Coordinating organ(s)	Timescale (sessions)	References
								MSC 108/20, section 10; MSC 109/22, section 17
238	2026-2027	8	Revision of MSC-MEPC.3/Circ.4/Rev.1 on casualty-related matters in the context of reports on marine casualties and incidents	MSC	III		2	MSC 111/22, paragraphs 19.15 to 19.16

ANNEX 37

SUBSTANTIVE ITEMS FOR INCLUSION IN THE AGENDAS FOR MSC 112 AND MSC 113

112th session of the Committee (14 to 18 December 2026)

Decisions of other IMO bodies

Amendments to mandatory instruments

Goal-based new ship construction standards

Development of a goal-based instrument for maritime autonomous surface ships (MASS)

Development of a safety regulatory framework to support the reduction of GHG emissions from ships using new technologies and alternative fuels

Measures to enhance maritime security

Piracy and armed robbery against ships

Ship systems and equipment (Report of the twelfth session of the Sub-Committee)

Navigation, communications and search and rescue (Report of the thirteenth session of the Sub-Committee)

Implementation of IMO instruments (Report of the twelfth session of the Sub-Committee)

Carriage of cargoes and containers (Urgent matters emanating from the twelfth session of the Sub-Committee)

[Application of the Committee's method of work]

Work programme

Election of Chair and Vice-Chair for 2027

Any other business

113th session of the Committee (Spring 2027)

Decisions of other IMO bodies

Amendments to mandatory instruments

Development of a goal-based instrument for maritime autonomous surface ships (MASS)

Development of a safety regulatory framework to support the reduction of GHG emissions from ships using new technologies and alternative fuels

Measures to enhance maritime security

Piracy and armed robbery against ships

[Measures to address maritime security threats]

[Formal safety assessment]

Human element, training and watchkeeping (Report of the thirteenth session of the Sub-Committee)

Ship systems and equipment (Report of the thirteenth session of the Sub-Committee)

Pollution Prevention and Response (Report of the fourteenth session of the Sub-Committee)

Carriage of cargoes and containers (Report of the twelfth session of the Sub-Committee)

[Application of the Committee's method of work]

Work programme

Election of Chair and Vice-Chair for 2028

Any other business

ANNEX 38

STATEMENTS BY DELEGATIONS AND OBSERVERS*

AGENDA ITEM 2

Statement by the delegation of Australia

Australia commends the work of the IMO to support seafarer safety in the face of Iran's egregious attacks on the territories, including territorial waters, of members of the GCC and Jordan, as well as efforts by the IMO and the Secretary-General on securing safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz as soon as conditions permit.

Australia welcomes the extended ceasefire between the United States and Iran, and we call for negotiations to continue. The priorities must be deescalation, re-opening the Strait of Hormuz, and finding an end to this conflict through a negotiated outcome.

Iran's threats and attacks against civilian vessels in and around the Strait of Hormuz are unacceptable. These attacks, along with Iran's de facto closure of the Strait, have caused unprecedented energy supply shocks around the world. The longer this situation continues, the more significant the impact on the global economy will be, the more risk to food security, and the greater the human cost.

Australia is pleased to support the UAE-led submission to MSC, recalling the Council's decisions at its 36th Extraordinary Session, and demanding that Iran ceases its threats and attacks against commercial and merchant vessels, critical port infrastructure, and coastal civilian infrastructure. The deaths of seafarers, the ongoing stranding of thousands of merchant and commercial vessels, and the impact on global supply lines are unacceptable.

We support the UAE's proposed MSC resolution, expressing deep concern at the impact of Iran's attacks on maritime security and seafarer safety; calling on Iran to immediately cease its attacks on the territories of GCC countries and Jordan; and requesting the Secretary-General deploy his good offices.

Australia will continue to support UN action and efforts by international partners in the Strait of Hormuz to ensure seafarer safety, facilitate the safe evacuation of merchant vessels, and restore navigational rights and freedoms in accordance with international law.

We again call on Iran and its proxies to cease their dangerous and destabilising attacks.

We ask that our Statement be appended to the report of this Committee.

Thank you Chair

Australia aligns itself with the statements made by [others].

Since the Russian Federation began its unprovoked and unjustified full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, it has continued to take actions which have repeatedly placed the marine

* Statements have been included in this annex in the order in which they are listed in the report, sorted by agenda items, and in the language of submission (including translation into any other language if such translation was provided).

environment and seafarers at serious risk and damaged economic security. These include ongoing attacks on merchant vessels, port infrastructure and coastal facilities, as well as the severe disruption to navigation in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov.

Australia shares the deep concerns raised by Ukraine, and echoed by others regarding the Russian Federation's aggression which continues to endanger seafarers, undermine the safety and security of international shipping, and undermine global food and energy security.

We commend Ukraine for its sustained efforts to maintain safe maritime corridors and facilitate the export of essential goods despite persistent threats. These efforts have contributed significantly to global food security and supply chain stability. We further acknowledge the professionalism and resilience of Ukrainian seafarers and port personnel operating under exceptionally challenging conditions.

Australia supports Ukraine's call for strengthened monitoring, accountability for attacks on shipping, action against "shadow fleet" practices, and continued technical cooperation. Upholding international maritime law and ensuring navigational rights and freedoms remain essential to the integrity of the IMO and to global maritime safety.

We reaffirm our unwavering support for Ukraine in the face of the Russian Federation's unprovoked and unjustified full-scale invasion.

Thank you, Chair.

Statement by the delegation of Bahrain

Please find below the statement of the Kingdom of Bahrain in relation to document MSC WP.13, as well as documents MSC WP.14, MSC WP.15, MSC WP.16 and MSC WP.17, in addition to MSC 111/INF.18 and MSC 111/2/2.

[السيد الرئيس،

، أن تعرب عن خالص شكرها لمساعدة الأمين العام للمنظمة MSC 111/WP.13 تود مملكة البحرين، بصفتها إحدى الدول الراعية للوثيقة البحرية الدولية على متابعته المستمرة للتطورات الخطيرة في منطقة الخليج العربي ومضيق هرمز، كما تتقدم بالشكر لدولة الإمارات العربية المتحدة على وثائقها المهمة المقدمة بشأن حماية سلامة الملاحة الدولية وأمن البحارة. كما نتقدم بخالص التعازي لعائلات البحارة الذين فقدوا حياتهم نتيجة الاعتداءات الإيرانية التي استهدفت السفن التجارية، ونتمنى الشفاء العاجل لجميع المصابين.

السيد الرئيس،

تمثل تحركاً مسؤولاً ينسجم مع اختصاص المنظمة البحرية الدولية في حماية الأرواح في البحر وضمان MSC 111/WP.13 إن الوثيقة سلامة وأمن الملاحة الدولية وحرية المرور العابر في مضيق هرمز، باعتباره أحد أهم الممرات البحرية الحيوية للتجارة والطاقة العالمية.

إن ما تنتهجه إيران من استمرار الهجمات على السفن التجارية، والتهديدات بإغلاق مضيق هرمز، واستخدام الصواريخ والطائرات المسيّرة ونشر الألغام البحرية ضد السفن والبحارة المدنيين، تمثل تهديداً خطيراً لسلامة الملاحة الدولية، وتتعارض مع القانون الدولي ومبادئ حرية الملاحة الذي يراعاه المجتمع الدولي.

، لما يمثله اعتمادها من خطوة MSC 111/WP.13 ومن هذا المنطلق، تدعو مملكة البحرين جميع الدول الأعضاء إلى دعم وتأييد الوثيقة مهمة لحماية البحارة، وضمان انسياب التجارة العالمية، وتعزيز أمن واستقرار الملاحة البحرية الدولية.

السيد الرئيس،

وفي المقابل، ترفض مملكة البحرين بشكل قاطع المزاعم والادعاءات الواردة في الوثائق المقدمة من الجمهورية الإسلامية الإيرانية، وترى أنها تمثل محاولة لصرف انتباه اللجنة عن القضية الأساسية المتمثلة في التهديدات والأعمال التي تعرضت لها السفن التجارية وحرية الملاحة في المنطقة.

كما تؤكد مملكة البحرين أن أعمال لجنة السلامة البحرية يجب أن تبقى قائمة على الحقائق الفنية والقانونية المرتبطة بحماية الأرواح في البحر وسلامة الملاحة الدولية، بعيداً عن أي محاولات لتبرير أو تسييس الأعمال التي تهدد أمن السفن والبحارة والممرات البحرية الدولية. وشكراً السيد الرئيس]

Statement by the delegation of Cuba

Extendemos una cálida felicitación a nuestras colegas por el Día internacional de la Mujer en el sector marítimo. Agradecemos a Singapur por el café ofrecido.

La delegación de Cuba quisiera expresar sus observaciones, estrictamente, sobre el documento WP.14 "Graves consecuencias de la medida de los Estados Unidos denominada oficialmente "Estados Unidos bloqueará los buques que entren o salgan de los puertos iraníes", presentado por la delegación de la República Islámica de Irán.

Consideramos que los elementos operacionales y jurídicos expuestos, constituyen una contribución oportuna para las deliberaciones de este Comité. Por cuanto describen afectaciones directas a la seguridad de la navegación, al bienestar de la gente de mar y a la estabilidad del transporte marítimo internacional.

Nuestra delegación expresa su profunda preocupación ante la aplicación de medidas coercitivas unilaterales en espacios marítimos estratégicos. Acciones como los bloqueos navales, constituyen violaciones de los principios de libertad de comercio y navegación. Estos son pilares fundamentales que esta prestigiosa Organización promueve de manera constante, para garantizar la sostenibilidad del transporte marítimo en virtud del Derecho Internacional.

Señor Presidente:

Cuba se pronuncia ante este plenario desde la profunda experiencia de sufrir, por casi 70 años, un bloqueo económico, comercial y financiero severo y continuado. Conocemos de primera mano el impacto negativo de las regulaciones extraterritoriales, destinadas a entorpecer el suministro de combustible, perseguir a los armadores, intimidar a empresas aseguradoras y sancionar arbitrariamente a buques comerciales.

Es precisamente desde esa vivencia que expresamos que la imposición de legislaciones internas unilaterales, no puede justificar la interferencia contra el transporte marítimo comercial. Tampoco menoscabar las prerrogativas legítimas de los Estados de abanderamiento y ribereños. Estas conductas coercitivas generan una peligrosa incertidumbre operacional, vulneran la soberanía nacional y exponen a las tripulaciones civiles a riesgos inaceptables.

Apoyamos el criterio de que la evaluación de la seguridad marítima debe realizarse siempre de manera neutral, técnica y objetiva. En tal sentido, valoramos los mecanismos de intercambio de información de la OMI. Reafirmamos la importancia de que estos sigan fortaleciendo la debida complementariedad y cooperación con las autoridades ribereñas. Puntualmente en sus funciones esenciales de búsqueda, salvamento y control del tráfico marítimo.

Señor Presidente:

Para concluir, Cuba reafirma el derecho inalienable de todas las naciones a desarrollar sus relaciones comerciales marítimas en un entorno pacífico, seguro y predecible, libre de injerencias o presiones externas.

Instamos a este Comité a tomar nota de los riesgos operacionales expresados en los documentos presentados y a continuar el fortalecimiento de la cooperación internacional sobre la base del estricto respeto al Derecho Internacional y a la Convención de las Naciones Unidas sobre el Derecho del Mar.

Agradeceríamos que nuestra declaración figure en el informe final de este Comité.

Statements by the delegation of Cyprus

The delegation of Cyprus reaffirms unwavering commitment to the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Ukraine. These principles are not abstract ideals, they are the foundation of international law, stability, and peace among nations.

Ukraine's right to determine its own future, free from external coercion or aggression, must be fully respected. Any violation of this right undermines not only Ukraine but the entire rules-based international order upon which we all depend.

We therefore call for continued and strengthened diplomatic, humanitarian and economic support, if possible. It is essential that the international community remains united in condemning aggression and in upholding accountability.

Solidarity to Ukraine is our responsibility. Supporting Ukraine is not only about one nation's struggle, it is about defending the shared values of sovereignty, freedom, and the rule of law.

We kindly request that this statement is annexed to the report of the committee.

Statement by the delegation of Indonesia

First, Indonesia would like to extend our warmest wishes on the occasion of International Women in Maritime Day. We also thank the delegation of Singapore for kindly hosting this morning's coffee break.

Turning to the matter at hand, Indonesia thanks the Secretariat and all submitters of documents under this agenda item.

Chair, we have just received the Secretary-General's briefing from last week. The picture it paints is deeply troubling. The situation in and around the Strait of Hormuz has not improved, if anything, it has worsened. The number of confirmed incidents has now reached 38. Eleven seafarers have lost their lives. Many are injured and one still missing.

These are not statistics. They are human beings who went to sea to earn a living, with no part in the political disputes unfolding around them. Yet, it is innocent seafarers who are bearing the heaviest toll from the situation in the region. On behalf of Indonesia, I wish to express our deepest condolences to the families and loved ones of all seafarers who have perished in this situation.

Chair, we must also speak plainly about what seafarers in that region are enduring right now. There are crew members aboard vessels that have been detained by certain authorities, stranded for weeks, unable to leave.

The question of repatriation and crew change is far from straightforward. Vessels must continue to maintain safe manning levels, while arranging replacement crews, ensuring safe transit in and out of an active conflict zone, and coordinating among all relevant parties remain highly complex undertakings. In many cases, these processes are simply not feasible under the current conditions. Meanwhile, these seafarers remain on board, isolated, uncertain, and increasingly distressed.

This situation cannot continue.

Indonesia therefore calls on all parties involved to immediately refrain from any unlawful use of force inconsistent with the UN Charter, to ensure navigational rights according to UNCLOS,

and to release detained vessels without delay. We also call on all parties to return to diplomatic engagement, the situation must be resolved peacefully, at the negotiating table, before more innocent lives are lost.

In this light, Indonesia also supports the establishment of a safe maritime corridor for the evacuation of stranded seafarers and vessels. We support humanitarian measures to ensure continuous provision of essential supplies, crew change, and repatriation. And we fully support the Secretary-General's continued efforts and good offices to make this a reality, we encourage him to pursue this with urgency. Further to ensure the safety and welfare of affected seafarers, practical efforts is needed, including, where appropriate, through coordination not only within IMO but also with relevant humanitarian bodies within the UN system.

At the same time, we believe it is essential that any outcome of this Committee remain balanced, technical, and constructive, with a focus on the core role of IMO, namely protecting seafarers and ensuring the safety and security of navigation.

Statement by the delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran

Introduction of documents MSC 111/WP.14, MSC 111/WP.15 and MSC 111/WP.16

Distinguished Chair,
Distinguished delegates,
SG

These documents have been submitted in direct response to the outcome of the thirty-sixth extraordinary session of the Council, which urged IMO committees, within their respective mandates, to consider the implications of the situation for affected seafarers, commercial vessels and the implementation of IMO instruments, to take appropriate action, and to report back to the Council.

Iran fully recognizes the seriousness of the issues before this Committee. We attach the highest importance to the safety and security of navigation, the protection and welfare of seafarers, search and rescue, emergency response, port operations, maritime safety infrastructure, and the continuity of lawful international maritime transport.

However, Distinguished Chair, any consideration by the Maritime Safety Committee must be technical, balanced, comprehensive, non-discriminatory and based on verified information. It must not be used to validate selective allegations, to prejudge legal responsibility in a complex inter-State situation, or to transform contested political narratives into a technical IMO outcome.

The three documents submitted by Iran are intended to assist the Committee in seeing the full picture.

First, document MSC 111/WP.16 addresses the serious implications of the aggression carried out by the United States and the Israeli regime against the Islamic Republic of Iran for maritime safety, security of navigation and seafarers in the Persian Gulf, the Sea of Oman and the Strait of Hormuz.

The document explains that the present risks to maritime safety cannot be assessed in isolation from their root cause: the unlawful use of force against Iran's sovereignty, territorial integrity, islands, coastal areas and maritime approaches. It also recalls that Iran, as the competent coastal State bordering the Strait of Hormuz, has kept maritime safety, search and

rescue, emergency response, traffic monitoring and navigational safety functions operational, and that the Strait of Hormuz remains open to maritime navigation.

In this regard, the document also draws attention to the serious scale of harm sustained by vessels, seafarers and maritime safety infrastructure during the war and ceasefire period. According to the information available, 116 incidents involving 276 vessels have been recorded, including 186 ships that were sunk or otherwise destroyed.

The human impact has also been severe. Fifty-four seafarers were killed, 66 were injured, seven remain missing, and 28 were taken hostage, of whom five are still in captivity. In addition, damage was sustained by four maritime operations buildings, four Vessel Traffic Services stations, and eight relay units, all of which are essential for safe navigation, emergency coordination and maritime traffic management.

These figures demonstrate that the situation is not limited to isolated incidents. It reflects a broader pattern of harm affecting ships, seafarers, search and rescue capacity, traffic monitoring, navigational safety infrastructure and maritime emergency response. This is precisely why any consideration by MSC must be comprehensive, balanced, technically grounded and inclusive of all sources of risk.

A Committee entrusted with maritime safety cannot ignore such figures, nor can it adopt a selective outcome that records only one narrative while excluding documented harm to Iranian vessels, seafarers and maritime safety infrastructure.

Second, document MSC 111/WP.14 draws the Committee's attention to the serious safety implications of the United States measure officially entitled "U.S. to Blockade Ships Entering or Exiting Iranian Ports".

This document is not based on speculation. It is based on the United States' own official statement. On 12 April 2026, the United States Central Command publicly issued a statement under the title "U.S. to Blockade Ships Entering or Exiting Iranian Ports", declaring that United States forces would begin implementing a blockade of all maritime traffic entering and exiting Iranian ports.

Distinguished delegates,

This is a very serious matter for the Maritime Safety Committee. If a State officially announces that it will blockade ships entering or exiting the ports of another State, this is not merely a political issue. It is a direct maritime safety issue. It affects commercial maritime traffic, port access, voyage planning, safe navigation, search and rescue, emergency response, crew change, medical support, access to places of refuge, and the delivery of essential supplies to ships and seafarers.

The Committee is therefore invited to consider a simple but fundamental question: can MSC discuss the safety of navigation and the welfare of seafarers in the Persian Gulf, the Sea of Oman and the Strait of Hormuz, while ignoring an officially announced United States blockade of ships entering or exiting Iranian ports?

Iran's answer is clear: it cannot.

From an MSC perspective, such blockade measures create operational uncertainty for masters, crews, shipowners, operators, insurers, charterers, cargo interests and port users. They may delay vessels, restrict port access, obstruct essential supplies, affect crew change and repatriation, interfere with medical assistance and communication with families, and

disrupt search and rescue, emergency response, salvage, repair, towing, bunkering, medical evacuation, fire-fighting and access to places of refuge.

These are not abstract legal consequences. They are practical maritime safety consequences.

Distinguished Chair,

The United States blockade measure must also be seen together with other official United States statements and conduct. As explained in Iran's related document MSC 111/WP.15, senior United States officials, including the President of the United States, have publicly referred to the seizure of Iranian vessels and cargoes in terms of "piracy" and acting "like pirates". United States prosecutorial authorities have also acknowledged the seizure of vessels identified as **M/T MAJESTIC** and **M/T TIFANI** and the taking of approximately 3.8 million barrels of Iranian oil.

This wider pattern — blockade, interdiction, seizure, diversion and confiscation — directly affects the safety and predictability of international maritime transport. It also creates serious risks for seafarers, who must never become collateral victims of coercive measures at sea.

Distinguished delegates,

Document MSC 111/WP.14 therefore asks the Committee to address the United States blockade measure as a direct, serious and continuing source of risk to maritime safety, seafarer welfare, search and rescue, emergency response, port access, crew change, essential supplies and the continuity of international maritime transport.

The document also recalls that, under international law, the blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of another State falls within the legal parameters of aggression. It further recalls that third States must not allow their territory, airspace, ports, military facilities, logistical infrastructure or other assets to be used to support, facilitate or sustain coercive maritime measures that endanger commercial shipping, seafarers or maritime safety services.

This concern is particularly serious where such facilities are located close to the Strait of Hormuz, the Sea of Oman and major commercial shipping routes.

Distinguished Chair,

Iran submits this document because the Committee cannot adopt a credible, balanced or technically sound approach if it considers only one narrative while ignoring an officially announced blockade affecting Iranian ports and maritime approaches.

Any MSC outcome must therefore reflect all sources of risk to maritime safety. It must include the United States blockade measure and related coercive restrictions. It must not be limited to selective allegations against Iran. It must be neutral, technical, comprehensive and non-discriminatory.

Iran remains fully committed to the safety and security of navigation, the welfare of seafarers, search and rescue, emergency response, and the orderly conduct of maritime transport. But these objectives cannot be achieved by ignoring the very measures that create operational uncertainty, restrict port access, endanger seafarers and increase navigational risks.

We therefore invite the Committee to take note of document MSC 111/WP.14 and to ensure that any reporting or follow-up concerning the Persian Gulf, the Sea of Oman and the Strait of Hormuz duly reflects the United States blockade measure and its serious implications for maritime safety and seafarers.

Third, document MSC 111/WP.15 addresses maritime piracy, armed seizure and confiscation of commercial vessels and cargoes by the United States, including incidents involving **M/T TIFANI, M/T MAJESTIC, M/T TOUSKA** and other vessels carrying Iranian cargoes. The document refers to public statements by senior United States officials, including statements by the President of the United States characterizing such conduct as "piracy" and as acting "like pirates", as well as statements by United States domestic prosecutorial authorities acknowledging the seizure and confiscation of Iranian oil cargoes.

The purpose of this document is to ensure that armed interference with commercial vessels and cargoes is not excluded from the Committee's attention merely because the acting State describes it as domestic, sanctions-related or prosecutorial enforcement. From the perspective of maritime safety and security, the operational reality is clear: merchant vessels and cargoes have been seized, diverted, appropriated or confiscated at sea by force or coercion, with direct consequences for ships, crews, cargoes and the wider maritime community.

Distinguished Chair,

Iran has submitted these documents because the Committee cannot arrive at a fair, credible or technically sound outcome if it considers only one selective narrative while ignoring other sources of risk. The safety of navigation, the welfare of seafarers and the integrity of maritime transport require that all relevant incidents, all relevant actors and all relevant causes of risk be considered.

Iran rejects any attempt to portray the present situation as if it were caused by one State alone, while disregarding the aggression against Iran, the United States blockade of ships entering or exiting Iranian ports, the armed seizure and confiscation of Iranian commercial vessels and cargoes, and the role of States that have allowed their territory, airspace, ports, military facilities or logistical infrastructure to be used in connection with hostile activities against Iran.

In particular, Iran draws the Committee's attention to the fact that facilities located in the United Arab Emirates have been used in connection with hostile activities against Iran. A State that facilitates aggression and contributes to maritime safety risks cannot credibly present itself as a neutral guardian of maritime safety and seafarer welfare.

Distinguished delegates,

Iran's position is clear.

Iran supports practical, humanitarian and technical measures to protect seafarers, maintain safe navigation, facilitate essential supplies, support crew change and repatriation, preserve search and rescue and emergency response functions, and ensure the continuity of lawful international maritime transport.

Iran does not support the use of this Committee for selective political attribution, one-sided condemnation, or the creation of an institutional chain intended to carry contested allegations from IMO into other United Nations bodies.

Any MSC outcome should therefore be neutral, balanced and technical. It should be based on verified information. It should cover all sources of risk. It should not prejudice the rights and obligations of the States concerned under international law. It should respect the sovereign rights, responsibilities and legitimate interests of the competent coastal States. It should not be used to justify external military involvement, externally imposed maritime corridors, escort arrangements or other mechanisms that may increase tensions and operational risks.

Distinguished Chair,

The Islamic Republic of Iran stands ready to engage constructively with Member States, the Secretariat and all relevant stakeholders on any outcome that genuinely protects seafarers and ships, preserves safety of navigation and remains within the technical mandate of MSC.

But Iran cannot accept an approach that ignores the aggression against Iran, ignores the United States blockade, ignores armed seizure and confiscation of Iranian commercial vessels and cargoes, ignores the use of regional facilities for hostile activities, and then attributes the resulting risks selectively to Iran.

We therefore invite the Committee to take note of documents MSC 111/WP.14, MSC 111/WP.15 and MSC 111/WP.16, and to ensure that any consideration of this matter remains comprehensive, non-discriminatory, technically grounded and faithful to the true mandate of this Committee.

Thank you, Chair.

Statement of objection to MSC 111/WP.13/Rev.1

Distinguished Chair,
Distinguished delegates,
SG

The Islamic Republic of Iran takes the floor to place on record its firm objection to the selective, politically motivated and non-neutral draft MSC resolution contained in document MSC 111/WP.13/Rev.1, submitted by the United Arab Emirates and other co-sponsors.

Iran fully shares the concerns regarding the safety and security of navigation, the welfare of seafarers, search and rescue, emergency response and the continuity of commercial shipping. However, these objectives cannot be achieved through a selective, one-sided and politically motivated text.

The draft resolution contained in document MSC 111/WP.13/Rev.1, as currently formulated, is an example of selective political attribution, double standards and the misuse of a technical IMO body for political purposes. Iran does not accept the premises, narrative or political characterization contained in the draft resolution.

The text ignores the root causes of the present situation, including the aggression carried out by the United States and the Israeli regime against the Islamic Republic of Iran, the United States blockade and coercive maritime measures, the armed seizure and confiscation of Iranian commercial vessels and cargoes, and the use of regional territory, airspace, military assets and infrastructure in connection with hostile activities against Iran.

The United Arab Emirates is not a neutral or disinterested actor in this matter. Iran has placed on record that the territory, airspace, military assets and infrastructure of the United Arab Emirates have been used in connection with hostile activities by the United States and the Israeli regime against Iran, including activities affecting Iranian territory, islands, coastal areas and maritime approaches. Such conduct is legally relevant under the principles reflected in General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX), including article 3(f), concerning the use of the territory of one State for the perpetration of an act of aggression against a third State.

A State whose own conduct is directly relevant to the risks under discussion cannot credibly present itself before this Committee as an impartial guardian of maritime safety, seafarer welfare or freedom of navigation. The selective approach of the United Arab Emirates, which focuses only on certain vessels allegedly affected by Iran while ignoring Iranian vessels, Iranian seafarers, Iranian maritime safety assets and other affected ships and infrastructure, demonstrates the lack of balance and good faith in this initiative.

Iran also recalls that references to the outcomes of C/ES, FAL, LEG and MEPC should not be presented as if they reflected consensus on political attribution against Iran. Those discussions were contested, and Iran placed on record its clear objections to selective attribution and to the use of technical IMO bodies for political condemnation.

Iran has continued to maintain maritime safety, search and rescue, emergency response, traffic monitoring and navigational safety functions. The Strait of Hormuz remains open to maritime navigation. Any outcome of this Committee must therefore be technical, balanced, non-discriminatory and based on all relevant incidents and all sources of risk.

Distinguished Chair,

As long as this draft resolution remains before the Committee, Iran is entitled, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure, to identify and seek correction of its most serious defects. This should not be interpreted as acceptance of the draft resolution, its assumptions, its selective attribution or its condemnatory language.

Rather, the amendments that I will present illustrate some of the clearest examples of the selective and non-neutral character of the UAE-led text.

First, the title itself prejudices the matter by attributing the situation to the alleged "unlawful activities of the Islamic Republic of Iran". A technical MSC resolution should not begin with a political attribution against one Member State. Iran, therefore, proposes deleting these words, so that the title would read:

"Actions to ensure the safety and security of navigation and of seafarers in the Arabian Sea, Sea of Oman and the Gulf region, particularly in and around the Strait of Hormuz"

Second, operative paragraph 1 singles out Iran while ignoring all other States and parties whose conduct has created or aggravated risks to maritime safety, including the United States, the Israeli regime and the United Arab Emirates. Iran, therefore, proposes replacing operative paragraph 1 with:

"CALLS UPON all concerned States and parties to exercise maximum restraint, to refrain from any action that may endanger merchant and commercial vessels, seafarers, maritime safety infrastructure or the safety of navigation, and to act in accordance with international law."

Third, operative paragraph 11 moves the matter outside the technical mandate of MSC by encouraging political action in other United Nations bodies. This confirms that the draft is not merely a maritime-safety text. Iran, therefore, proposes deleting operative paragraph 11 in its entirety.

Fourth, operative paragraph 14 requests reporting only on the alleged impact of "Iran's attacks", rather than on all relevant incidents and all sources of risk. This is a clear example of selective reporting. Iran, therefore, proposes replacing operative paragraph 14 with:

"REQUESTS the Secretary-General to closely monitor the situation and provide neutral, technical and inclusive updates to Member States and relevant IMO organs on all relevant incidents and all sources of risk affecting international shipping, the well-being of seafarers and port workers, and the security of cargo, without selective attribution."

Distinguished Chair,

These examples demonstrate why the draft resolution, in its present form, cannot be regarded as balanced, technical or non-discriminatory. The amendments proposed by Iran are minimum corrective safeguards intended to preserve the technical mandate, neutrality and credibility of MSC and to prevent this Committee from being used by the United Arab Emirates and its supporters as a platform for selective political condemnation against Iran.

Iran respectfully requests that these amendments be considered before any action is taken on the draft resolution as a whole.

The Islamic Republic of Iran reserves its position on the draft resolution and requests that this statement be reflected in the final report and annexed to the report of the Committee.

Thank you, Chair.

Statement by the Islamic Republic of Iran after the roll-call vote

Secretary-General,
Distinguished Chair,
Distinguished delegates,

The Islamic Republic of Iran takes note of the outcome of the vote.

Iran thanks those delegations that expressed concern regarding the selective, one-sided and political character of the draft resolution, and those that underlined that the present maritime-security situation cannot be separated from its root causes, namely the aggression and unlawful use of force by the United States and the Israeli regime against the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Iran regrets that the Committee has adopted a text which remains selective, politically motivated and condemnatory. The outcome of a vote cannot transform a one-sided text into a balanced technical assessment. The resolution ignores the full factual, legal and operational context of the situation and fails to incorporate Iran's minimum corrective amendments aimed at removing selective attribution, avoiding political escalation and ensuring neutral reporting on all incidents and all sources of risk.

Distinguished delegates,

This resolution addresses one narrative while disregarding the root causes of the present risks: the unlawful aggression by the United States and the Israeli regime against Iran, the maritime blockade imposed by the United States, and the armed seizure and confiscation of Iranian commercial vessels and cargoes. It also remains silent on the role of the United Arab Emirates and other regional actors whose territory, airspace, military assets and infrastructure have been used in connection with hostile activities against Iran.

Some States invoke maritime safety, freedom of navigation and humanitarian concerns selectively, while disregarding the Charter of the United Nations and the peremptory norm

prohibiting aggression. They ignore the cause and focus politically and selectively on its consequences. This is the essence of double standards. International law cannot be invoked against one State while the unlawful conduct of those who created, facilitated or aggravated the present risks is ignored.

The resolution refers to certain vessels and certain seafarers, while remaining silent on the severe harm suffered by Iranian vessels, Iranian seafarers, Iranian port workers and Iranian maritime safety infrastructure. This is not a balanced outcome. It is not a technical outcome. It falls short of the neutrality expected from a specialized agency of the United Nations.

Iran underlines that the adoption of this resolution cannot affect, prejudice or diminish the legal position of the Islamic Republic of Iran regarding the root causes of the situation, the unlawful use of force against Iran by the United States and the Israeli regime, the involvement and support of the United Arab Emirates and other actors, the blockade and restrictions affecting maritime traffic, or the armed seizure and confiscation of Iranian commercial vessels and cargoes.

Iran has acted, and will continue to act, as a responsible coastal State committed to the safety and security of navigation, the welfare of seafarers, search and rescue, emergency response and the protection of maritime safety infrastructure.

Iran cannot accept double standards, selective humanitarian concern, or the use of this technical Committee to serve political objectives. Iran will continue to support any genuinely neutral, technical and non-discriminatory effort aimed at protecting all seafarers, facilitating essential supplies and crew change, strengthening emergency response, and addressing all sources of risk without selective attribution.

Iran respectfully requests that its objection to the adopted resolution, its legal position, and the full text of this statement be duly reflected in, and annexed to, the report of the Committee.

Statement by the delegation of Israel

Israel commends the Secretary-General and the International Maritime Organization for their continued efforts to support affected seafarers and commercial shipping and to address the serious implications of the current situation for maritime safety and security.

As in previous meetings, Israel remains deeply concerned by the ongoing threats posed by the Iranian regime and its proxies to international maritime navigation and regional stability. Iran's continued interference with commercial shipping, attacks and harassment against civilian vessels, and threats to critical maritime routes, including the Strait of Hormuz, represent a direct challenge to freedom of navigation and to the rules-based international order.

These threats are particularly alarming in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, where the Houthis, acting as an Iranian proxy, continue to be a threat on commercial shipping and the safety of civilian crews. The international community must also remain vigilant regarding piracy and maritime insecurity off the coast of Somalia, which could further threaten maritime safety and global trade.

Against this background, Israel welcomes and fully supports the draft resolution proposed by the United Arab Emirates under document MSC 111/ WP.13, and oppose any proposal submitted by Iran. We believe this initiative represents a timely and responsible response to the growing threats facing international maritime security and demonstrates the important role of this Organization in addressing such challenges collectively.

Israel therefore calls on Member States to support the adoption of the draft resolution, to stand united in safeguarding freedom of navigation and the safety of seafarers, and to firmly reject attempts by Iran to deflect responsibility or advance proposals that undermine the credibility of this discussion and the broader efforts of the Organization to address these threats effectively.

Thank you, Chair.

We kindly request that this statement be annexed to the report of the meeting.

Statement by the delegation of Japan

First of all, we would like to express our gratitude for the Secretary-General and the IMO Secretariat for their tireless efforts in addressing the present situation in and around the Strait of Hormuz.

We once again stress the utmost importance of ensuring the safe and free navigation of the Strait and the safety and welfare of seafarers in the Strait of Hormuz for all vessels, including those related to Japan. To uphold the fundamental principle of international maritime law, IMO Member States should continue to emphasize their importance not only within the IMO framework but also at every appropriate opportunity.

Japan also recalls that the Legal Committee condemned the reported toll system for vessels passing through the Strait of Hormuz and the discriminatory measures, which were contrary to the purposes of IMO.

Japan further expresses its strong appreciation for the ongoing coordination efforts undertaken by the Secretary-General and the IMO Secretariat for the establishment of a safe maritime framework proposed by Japan and cosponsors, and supported by many delegations at the IMO Council in March, and urges the relevant parties to take necessary immediate actions to facilitate the safe evacuation of merchant ships.

Thank you, and Japan kindly requests that its statement be annexed to the final report of the Committee.

Statement by the delegation of Kuwait

كلمة دولة الكويت

تأييد المقترح الوارد في الوثيقة 1 WP. أمام لجنة السلامة البحرية (MSC 111)

شكراً السيد الرئيس،

(MSC 111/WP.3) يسرّ وفد دولة الكويت أن يُعرب عن تأييده الكامل وتضامنه التام مع الوثيقة

والتي تدعو لجنة السلامة البحرية إلى النظر في اعتمادها، وتطالب إيران بوقف هجماتها فوراً وضمن

حرية الملاحة في الخليج العربي ومضيق هرمز وحماية البحارة والسفن التجارية المتضررة

السيد الرئيس،

ان ما توثقه سجلات المنظمة البحرية الدولية من سقوط أكثر من عشرة ضحايا وثمانية عشر
تندرج في خانة الإحصاء، بل ترقى إلى مستوى الاستغاثة الإنسانية التي تُلقى على عاتق هذه اللجنة الموقرة
مسؤولية أخلاقية وقانونية تستوجب التحرك الفوري واتخاذ موقف حازم وحاسم

تدعم دولة الكويت الوثيقة، التي تطالب بوقف فوري وغير مشروط لجميع الهجمات على السفن
وإزالة الألغام البحرية وضمان المرور العابر دون عوائق عبر مضيق هرمز
ونرحب بالدعوة لتبادل المعلومات مع التشديد على ضرورة أن تكون البيانات المقدمة للمنظمة
موثوقة ومتحقق منها .

السيد الرئيس،

المنظمة وجدت لحماية البحارة وضمان سلامة الشحن الدولي وأمنه. لذا ندعم إبقاء هذا الملف
مفتوحاً وتفعيل التنسيق بين لجان المنظمة المعنية، إذ إن أبعاد هذه الأزمة تتجاوز اختصاص لجنة واحدة .

شكراً السيد الرئيس،

والله ولي التوفيق

وفد دولة الكويت – لجنة السلامة البحرية – الدورة 111

Statement by the delegation of Luxembourg

Bonjour Monsieur le Président,
Bonjour à toutes les délégations,
Tout d'abord j'aimerais remercier le secrétaire général pour la réception organisée à l'occasion
de la Journée internationale de la femme dans le secteur maritime.
J'aimerais remercier tous ceux qui ont offert les pauses-café et les réceptions.
Le Luxembourg adresse ses condoléances aux familles et aux proches des gens de mer qui
ont péri à la suite des attaques perpétrées contre les navires dans la région.
Nous affirmons que les gens de mer bloqués dans la zone touchée ne devraient pas devenir
des victimes collatérales du conflit.
Pour être bref, nous soutenons pleinement la décision adoptée à la 36e session
extraordinaire du Conseil de l'OMI.
Par ailleurs nous nous associons à la déclaration faite par Chypre et nous soutenons le
document MSC 111/WP.13/Rev.1.
Finalement, le Luxembourg exprime ses reconnaissances au secrétaire général pour son
effort continu déployé pour remédier à la situation.
Nous demandons que cette intervention soit jointe au rapport final de ce comité.
Merci Monsieur le Président.

Statement by the delegation of Malaysia

Malaysia thanks the Secretariat and delegations of the UAE and the Islamic Republic of Iran for their submissions under this agenda item. Malaysia expresses its highest appreciation to the Secretary-General of the International Maritime Organization for providing updates and continued guidance on developments in the Strait of Hormuz.

Malaysia deeply regrets the current situation in and around the Strait of Hormuz, which continues to adversely affect international shipping and the safety and welfare of seafarers. Reports of casualties, injuries, and prolonged stranding of crews remain a matter of serious concern.

In this regard, Malaysia calls on all parties to exercise maximum restraint, avoid any form of aggression, and uphold the principles of international law, including those reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

Malaysia invites delegates to centre the discussion on the need to emphasise that our collective efforts must remain focused on practical and immediate measures to support affected seafarers, including facilitating safe navigation, ensuring access to essential supplies, and safeguarding their welfare and rights.

Malaysia aligns with other distinguished delegations before us in highlighting the importance of maintaining safe and uninterrupted navigation through this critical sea lane, while ensuring that discussions within this Committee remain constructive, balanced, and within the technical mandate of the IMO.

Malaysia remains committed to working closely with all delegations to advance cooperation, de-escalation, and practical solutions in support of maritime safety and the protection of seafarers.

We request that our intervention be appended to the Committee report.

Statement by the delegation of Malta

Firstly, we want to start by congratulating and to express our appreciation for the women's day event of yesterday.

Malta expresses deep concern over the escalation in the Arabian Gulf, particularly the situation affecting the Strait of Hormuz.

This delegation would like to reconfirm our support for the Decision taken by the 36th Extraordinary Session of the IMO Council with regards to the situation in the region.

That Decision rightly recognized the gravity of the situation and called upon IMO bodies to take appropriate action in support of affected seafarers, vessels, and the effective implementation of the Organization's instruments, according to their respective mandates.

As regard to document MSC 111/WP.13/Rev.1, we thank the co-sponsors for their proposal highlighting the threats to maritime safety, seafarer welfare, and global supply chains. We do support the text of the Draft Resolution, as contained in the Annex of that document.

Furthermore, we reaffirm the importance of upholding and respecting the right of transit passage in accordance with international law.

We also express our deep concerns regarding attacks on Malta registered ships in this area and would like to sincerely thank the Sultanate of Oman and others for the assistance given to such ships in distress.

Malta reiterates that the freedom of navigation is the cornerstone for global trade, energy security, and maritime stability. We stress that seafarers must not be exposed to unnecessary risk while performing their duties.

We would like to conclude by expressing our appreciation to the IMO and the Secretary-General's continued commitment and efforts to contribute to enhancing the safety of seafarers through the Region.

We request that our statement be appended to the Committees report.

Statement by the delegation of Netherlands (Kingdom of the)

The Kingdom of the Netherlands would like to express its deep concern regarding the deteriorating situation in the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf, and the consequences of continued escalation for the safety of vessels and innocent seafarers operating in the region.

We strongly condemn the recent attacks on commercial shipping. We call upon Iran to fully comply with its obligations under international law and to ensure the safe and unimpeded passage of commercial vessels through this vital waterway.

The security of maritime routes and the preservation of freedom of navigation are shared responsibilities of all states. Respect for international law must remain the foundation of our collective actions, and any disruption to critical waterways, such as the Strait of Hormuz, must be avoided.

In addition, we are increasingly concerned about the recent use of falsely flagged vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz [over the past one and a half weeks]. Such practices undermine trust and transparency in international shipping. We remain deeply troubled by the potential consequences of these fraudulent activities for the safety and security of seafarers, as well as for the overall integrity of maritime operations.

Finally, the impact on global shipping and the resulting disruption to global supply chains continues to intensify. Above all, we must place the strongest possible emphasis on the safety and wellbeing of seafarers, who are facing serious and ongoing risks in the region.

We are deeply concerned for those seafarers on vessels that remain unable to leave the area and who continue to operate under dangerous conditions. Their safety must be an immediate priority, and it is essential that they have reliable access to basic provisions such as food and water. In addition, every effort should be made to facilitate crew changes, [ensuring that seafarers are not forced to remain in high-risk situations for prolonged periods.]

Our thoughts are especially with the families and loved ones of those seafarers who have lost their lives or who remain missing as a result of the attacks.

Seafarers are key workers. Their dedication guarantees the continued flow of energy and humanitarian supplies on which countries around the world depend. Protecting them is our first obligation.

Statement by the delegation of Palau

Thank you Chair,

Let me apologise to the interpreters because I have made some small changes.

First Let me congratulate the SG for the yesterday event for the Woman in Maritime. Let me also thanks all the member states for the refreshments provided during this Committee.

Back to the matter I hands, as a Small Island Developing State, shipping is a vital lifeline which sustains our economy and communities.

Any disruption of the delicate and poor maritime connectivity with the Pacific region has a significantly negative impact on all activities.

Due to recent disruptions in energy supply caused by the situation in the Strait of Hormuz, supply difficulties are increasing dramatically, with negative repercussions on our economic development.

The concern also concerns the complicated situation of seafarers.

Far from their families, stranded on ships with food and water shortages and trapped because of a conflict unrelated to them.

We condemn all actions that jeopardize the safety of seafarers and call for a diplomatic solution to the crisis.

Ensuring safety and freedom of navigation, maintain the safety and survival of seafarers and put an end to the disruptions caused to the global economy by the situation in and around the Strait of Hormuz is essential .

As co-sponsor we therefore support the Resolution contained in document MSC 111/WP.13/Rev.1 of the United Arab Emirates.

Last, this delegation would like to express our appreciation to the Secretary-General for the continued efforts he has made on this sensitive issue.

Finally, Chair , we request that our intervention be attached to the final report.

Thank you Chair

Statement by the delegation of the Philippines

Thank you, Chair. My delegation joins all others in commemorating International Women in Maritime Day. We note that this session of the Maritime Safety Committee has been convened at a time of continued and heightened risk to international shipping and to the maritime safety and the welfare of seafarers.

The Philippines wishes to place on record its concern and condemnation of all hostile actions directed against innocent civilian seafarers and merchant vessels in and around the Strait of Hormuz. Such acts are a grave threat to the safety of human life at sea, freedom of navigation, stability of global supply chains, and the rules-based international maritime order.

The Philippines cites in particular the attack on the vessel the **CMA CGM San Antonio** with 7 Filipino seafarers injured. They are not combatants. They are civilians carrying out routine, lawful, and indispensable seafarer duties under internationally recognized principles.

We repeat again our call for the immediate de-escalation of tensions and for all parties to exercise maximum restraint, return to diplomacy and dialogue, and uphold the peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the UN Charter and international law. We also call for full respect for the human rights, dignity, safety, and welfare of all seafarers, consistent with the Manila Declaration of 2025 and the relevant obligations under the Maritime Labour Convention 2006, MARPOL, SOLAS, and UNCLOS. We emphasize the obligation to preserve freedom of navigation and transit rights through international straits, ensure the provision of assistance to persons in distress at sea, and safeguard civilian shipping from interference and violence.

We express strong support for the humanitarian initiatives of the IMO Secretary-General, including efforts toward the establishment of an evacuation and humanitarian corridor for distressed seafarers, as agreed upon during the 36th Extraordinary Session of the IMO Council. Relatedly, any discussion concerning the routing of vessels must be firmly anchored on the existing international legal and regulatory frameworks approved by the IMO, including COLREGS, SOLAS, and General Provisions on Ships' Routing.

The Philippines believes that the IMO, particularly this Committee, plays a vital role as the principal forum for dialogue on maritime safety in waterways. We call on this Committee to continue to provide a platform for Member States to exchange information, assess navigational risks, and advance cooperation to uphold its core mandate to safeguard life at sea and ensure the security and stability of international shipping lanes in accordance with international law.

Mr. Chair, may we request that our statement be appended to the Report of the Committee.

Statement by the delegation of Poland

Poland strongly supports all efforts undertaken within the IMO and the United Nations aimed at the peaceful resolution of conflicts and ensuring access to essential humanitarian assistance to those in need, including in relation to the current situation in the Strait of Hormuz. In particular, Poland commends and fully supports the initiative of the Secretary-General, as well as his personal engagement, in facilitating the establishment of a safe corridor to assist stranded seafarers.

Poland also wishes to reaffirm its strong support for the Decision adopted by the 36th Extraordinary Session of the IMO Council. Furthermore, Poland aligns itself with the statements delivered by Cyprus and other delegations in support of the draft Resolution contained in document MSC 111/WP.13/Rev.1.

Poland kindly requests that this statement be reflected in the report.

Statements by the delegation of the Russian Federation

Decisions of other IMO bodies (Strait of Hormuz crisis)

"Уважаемый господин Председатель,

Мы неоднократно заявляли, что с сожалением относимся к ситуации, в которой сегодня находятся ближневосточные страны. Мы твёрдо выступаем за возвращение к политико-дипломатическому процессу с целью урегулирования имеющихся разногласий при обеспечении интересов безопасности всех без исключения государств региона.

Считаем абсолютно неприемлемыми любые удары по гражданским судам и портовой инфраструктуре, с какой бы стороны они ни наносились.

Вновь выражаем наши глубочайшие соболезнования всем пострадавшим и семьям погибших в результате текущего кризиса.

Вместе с тем, Господин Председатель, позвольте вновь выразить наше серьёзное беспокойство по поводу продолжающегося превращения сессий рабочих органов ИМО в политическую площадку для коллективного дискриминационного осуждения отдельных государств-членов. Как мы видим, теперь это происходит на каждом мероприятии в стенах нашей Организации. Представленные документы по данному вопросу являются очередным подтверждением этому.

Ещё раз повторяем: корень нынешнего кризиса лежит далеко за пределами Ормузского пролива, а его возможное решение находится далеко за рамками мандата ИМО и, в частности, Комитета по безопасности на море.

Как мы видим, например и в особенности, в первом постановляющем параграфе проекта резолюции (operational paragraph) (MSC 111/WP.13/Rev.1) те действия (призывы или требования), которые там предлагаются, выходят далеко за мандат нашей организации.

В таких сложнейших геополитических кризисах и ситуациях, как текущий, не может быть виновна только одна страна и все находящиеся в этом зале это прекрасно знают!!

Наша первоочередная общая задача – обеспечить защиту и безопасность моряков, которые и так каждый день, находясь в море, рискуют своей жизнью и здоровьем. Мы призываем коллег вернуться к конструктивной работе в рамках мандата ИМО и не использовать трибуну Комитета для заявлений, не имеющих прямого отношения к его компетенции. Сосредоточиться не на соревнованиях по обвинению друг друга или коллективному осуждению одного из членов Организации, а на конкретных мерах в рамках мандата Комитета, которые помогут облегчить страдания невинных моряков, затронутых нынешним кризисом.

По текущему кризису в регионе Организация уже полтора месяца на каждом своем заседании принимает какие-то односторонние решения и резолюции с явными обвинениями и осуждениями одной страны. Очевидно уже, что подобные наши действия точно не приведут ни к какому выходу из сложившейся ситуации, а лишь наоборот способствуют эскалации напряжения. Мы (как организация) можем и дальше, конечно продолжать в том же русле, принять еще сотню подобных резолюций, только реальный результат от подобных наших действий не то, что нулевой, он скорее отрицательный. При этом тысячи моряков остаются всё так же заблокированными в регионе (вот до нас тут выступала делегация Индонезии, с похожими словами). Неудивительно в этой связи, что моряки всё чаще заявляют, что ИМО, погрязнув в политических спорах и разногласиях, не уделяет должного внимания именно им - реальным морякам (людям),

т.е. тем, которым Организация призвана служить в первую очередь. На мой взгляд, это совсем не красит ИМО, а наоборот выставляет Организацию в неприглядном свете.

При этом мы высоко ценим те усилия, которые предпринимает лично Генеральный Секретарь для освобождения заблокированных моряков, но очевидно, что нашему Генеральному Секретарю нужна наша с вами помощь.

Нам же всем с вами следует принимать нейтральные взвешенные решения, призывающие все участвующие стороны (подчеркиваю все стороны) к скорейшему урегулированию конфликта дипломатическим путем, оставив при этом сугубо политические призывы и лозунги для другой площадки.

Только принятие подобных решений с нашей стороны могут показать миру нашу с вами действительную/реальную вовлеченность в поиске приемлемых развязок в текущей ситуации.

Сказав это, наша страна не поддерживает проект резолюции, представленный в документе WP.13/Rev.1 и мы резервируем свою позицию по этому вопросу."

Mr. Chair,

We have stated on multiple occasions that we view with regret the situation in which the Middle Eastern countries find themselves today. We firmly advocate for a return to a political and diplomatic process aimed at resolving existing differences while ensuring the security interests of all States in the region, without exception.

We consider absolutely unacceptable any strikes against civilian ships and port infrastructure, regardless of which side they come from.

We once again express our deepest condolences to all those affected and to the families of those who have lost their lives as a result of the current crisis.

At the same time, Mr. Chair, allow me to reiterate our serious concern over the continuing transformation of sessions of IMO working bodies into a political platform for the collective discriminatory condemnation of individual Member States. As we see it, this is now happening at every event within our Organization. The documents presented on this matter are yet another confirmation of this trend.

We repeat once more: the root of the current crisis lies far beyond the Strait of Hormuz, and any possible solution lies far beyond the mandate of IMO and, in particular, of the Maritime Safety Committee.

As we see, for example and in particular, in the first operational paragraph of the draft resolution (MSC 111/WP.13/Rev.1), the actions (calls or demands) proposed therein go far beyond our Organization's mandate.

In such complex geopolitical crises and situations as the current one, there cannot be only one country at fault – and everyone in this room knows that very well!!

Our primary common task is to ensure the protection and safety of seafarers, who already risk their lives and health every day while at sea. We call on colleagues to return to constructive work within the IMO mandate and not to use the Committee's podium for statements that are not directly related to its competence. We must focus not on a competition of mutual accusations or collective condemnation of one Member of the Organization, but on concrete measures within the Committee's mandate that can help alleviate the suffering of innocent seafarers affected by the current crisis.

Regarding the current crisis in the region, the Organization has, for a month and a half now, at each of its meetings, been adopting one-sided decisions and resolutions with explicit accusations and condemnations of a single country. It is already evident that such actions will certainly not lead to any way out of the current situation – quite the contrary, they contribute to escalating tensions. We (as the Organization) can, of course, continue on the same path and adopt another hundred such resolutions, but the actual result of such actions on our part is not merely zero – it is rather negative. Meanwhile, thousands of seafarers remain just as blocked in the region (the delegation of Indonesia spoke before us with similar words). It is therefore unsurprising that seafarers are increasingly stating that IMO, having become mired in political disputes and disagreements, is not paying due attention to them – the real seafarers (the human beings), i.e., those whom the Organization is called upon to serve in the first place. In my view, this does not reflect well on IMO; on the contrary, it paints the Organization in an unfavourable light.

At the same time, we highly appreciate the efforts personally undertaken by the Secretary-General to secure the release of the blocked seafarers, but it is obvious that our Secretary-General needs our assistance – yours and mine.

All of us together need to adopt neutral and balanced decisions that call upon all parties involved (I stress - all parties) to resolve the conflict as soon as possible by diplomatic means, while leaving purely political appeals and slogans for another forum.

Only the adoption of such decisions on our part can show the world our genuine/real commitment to finding acceptable solutions in the current situation.

Having said this, our country does not support the draft resolution contained in document WP.13/Rev.1, and we reserve our position on this matter.

General Statement on the Black Sea

"Уважаемый господин Председатель,

В связи с вновь прозвучавшими обвинениями в адрес нашей страны хотели бы привлечь внимание Комитета к преступным деяниям самой Украины.

В отношении повторяющихся обвинений в адрес Российской Федерации в атаке на то или иное судно или тот или иной портовый объект хотели бы отметить, что Украина цинично умалчивает о собственных преступных действиях.

Это именно Вооружённые силы Украины развязали беспрецедентную кампанию по вооружённым атакам на гражданские суда и российской портовой инфраструктуре.

В своем выступлении мы не станем комментировать то, что сейчас прозвучало. Мы делали это неоднократно.

Мы бы хотели отдельно привлечь внимание Комитета к следующему.

Как известно, газовоз «Арктик Метаз», зарегистрированный под флагом России и следовавший с грузом СПГ в китайский порт, был атакован безэкипажными катерами и беспилотниками 3 марта этого года в непосредственной близости от берегов Мальты. В результате атаки на судне возник пожар, оно потеряло управление, и было оставлено экипажем в силу наличия серьёзной угрозы для жизни членов экипажа (двое членов экипажа получили ранения).

Преступная атака вызывает особую обеспокоенность своей беспрецедентностью, а также грубым нарушением норм международного морского и гуманитарного права. Мы уже не раз выражали нашу позицию в отношении данной атаки на сессиях других рабочих органов Организации.

Этот удар в Средиземном море превращает его акваторию в еще один потенциально кризисный район для глобального судоходства. Атака на российское судно и другие подобные инциденты в Средиземном и Черном морях, как уже открыто сообщается в СМИ, в том числе западных, являются результатом спланированных операций украинских вооружённых формирований.

Хотели бы подчеркнуть нашу принципиальную позицию о том, что Российская Федерация освобождается от ответственности как государство флага, поскольку инцидент стал результатом военного действия и террористической атаки со стороны Украины.

Однако, несмотря на наличие безусловных оснований для освобождения от ответственности, собственник судна незамедлительно организовал эвакуацию экипажа и обеспечил наблюдение за аварийным судном, осуществлял взаимодействие с морскими властями Ливии и принимал меры для организации осмотра судна в целях определения возможности буксировки и спасания судна с учетом причиненных военной атакой повреждений.

Мы выражаем большую признательность ливийской стороне за оказанное содействие и помощь. До настоящего момента только Ливия предпринимала меры по разрешению ситуации с дрейфующим судном, оказала содействие в эвакуации членов экипажа с терпящего бедствия судна.

В этой связи хотим подчеркнуть, что никакие ограничения, включая незаконные односторонние санкции, не могут служить препятствием для выполнения безусловной обязанности оказывать помощь людям, терпящим бедствие на море. Эта обязанность четко закреплена в основополагающих документах международного морского права, в том числе, в Международной конвенции по охране человеческой жизни на море (СОЛАС), в Международной конвенции по поиску и спасанию на море (SAR), а также в Конвенции ООН по морскому праву (UNCLOS). Ни один из этих документов не делает каких-либо исключений для случаев действия санкционных режимов или иных политических ограничений. Принцип спасения человеческой жизни на море является фундаментальной нормой международного права и должен неукоснительно соблюдаться всеми государствами без какой-либо дискриминации.

Российская сторона и судовладелец находятся в постоянном контакте со спасательными службами прибрежных государств и готовы к продолжению взаимодействия.

При этом, следует отметить, что именно односторонние нелегитимные западные санкции, не позволяют судовладельцу и ливийской стороне привлечь иностранные спасательные организации к работам по разрешению ситуации с газовозом. Несмотря на направление многочисленных запросов в международные спасательные компании, в настоящее время не получено ни одного предложения.

С учетом изложенного, призываем Комитет осудить уничтожение российского газовоза, а также незаконные односторонние санкции, которые создают реальные угрозы человеческой жизни на море, и призвать государства-члены к взаимодействию по обеспечению безопасности судоходства и защите окружающей среды."

Dear Chair,

In connection with the new accusations against our country, we would like to draw the attention of the Committee to the criminal acts of Ukraine itself.

Regarding the repeated accusations against the Russian Federation of attacking one vessel or another, or one port facility or another, we would like to note that Ukraine is cynically silent about their own criminal actions.

It was the Ukrainian Armed Forces that unleashed an unprecedented campaign of armed attacks on civilian vessels and Russian port infrastructure.

In our statement, we will not comment on what has just been said. We have done so on many occasions. We would like to specifically draw the Committee's attention to the following.

As known, the Russian-flagged Arctic Metagas, a gas carrier en route to the port in China with a cargo of LNG, was attacked by unmanned surface vessels and drones on March 3 of this year off the coast of Malta. As a result of the attack, the vessel caught fire, lost control, and was abandoned by the crew owing to a serious threat to the lives of the crew members (two crew members were injured).

This criminal attack is particularly concerning owing to its unprecedented nature and its flagrant violation of international maritime and humanitarian law. We have repeatedly expressed our position regarding this attack at sessions of other working bodies of the Organization.

This attack in the Mediterranean Sea turns its waters into yet another potential crisis zone for global shipping. The attack on the Russian vessel and other similar incidents in the Mediterranean and Black Seas, as has already been openly reported in the media, including Western ones, are the result of the planned operations by the Ukrainian armed forces.

We would like to emphasize our principled position that the Russian Federation is exempt from liability as a Flag State, since the incident was the result of the military action and the terrorist attack by Ukraine.

However, despite the existence of unconditional grounds for exemption from liability, the owner of the vessel immediately organized the evacuation of the crew and ensured surveillance of the vessel in distress, interacted with the Libyan maritime authorities and took measures to organize an inspection of the vessel in order to determine the possibility of towing and salvaging the vessel, taking into account the damage caused by the military attack.

We express our deep gratitude to the Libyan side for its assistance and support. Until now, only Libya has taken steps to resolve the situation with the drifting vessel and assisted in the evacuation of the crew members from the distressed vessel.

In this regard, we would like to emphasize that no restrictions, including unlawful unilateral sanctions, can impede the fulfilment of the unconditional duty to provide assistance to persons in distress at sea. This responsibility is clearly enshrined in the fundamental documents of international maritime law, including the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR) and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). None of these documents makes any exceptions for sanctions regimes or other political restrictions. The principle of saving life at sea is a fundamental norm of international law and must be strictly observed by all States without discrimination.

The Russian side and the shipowner are in constant contact with the rescue services of coastal states and are ready to continue cooperation.

It should be noted that it is precisely the unilateral, illegitimate Western sanctions that prevent the shipowner and the Libyan side from engaging foreign rescue organizations to resolve the situation with the gas carrier. Despite numerous requests to international rescue companies, not a single offer has been received to date.

In view of the above, we call on the Committee to condemn the destruction of the Russian gas carrier, as well as the illegal unilateral sanctions that create real threats to human life at sea, and to call on Member States to cooperate in order to ensure the safety of navigation and environmental protection.

Statement by the delegation of Saudi Arabia

شكرا السيد الرئيس

يتقدم وفد المملكة بالشكر والتقدير على الجهود التي تبذلها المنظمة البحرية الدولية والأمين العام في تعزيز سلامة الملاحة وحماية البحارة، وتؤكد المملكة العربية السعودية، في ظل التحديات والمتغيرات الراهنة التي تشهدها المنطقة، بما في ذلك التطورات المرتبطة بمضيق هرمز وتأثيراتها على حركة الملاحة البحرية وسلاسل الإمداد العالمية، التزامها المستمر بدعم أمن وسلامة الملاحة البحرية، والمحافظة على انسيابية التجارة الدولية، وتعزيز مرونة القطاع البحري واللوجستي إقليمياً ودولياً. وتفخر المملكة برعايتها للوثيقة MSC 111/WP.13 ونؤكد دعمها وأهميتها ما ورد فيها في ضوء التهديدات الخطيرة التي تطل سلامة الملاحة ورفاهية البحارة في مضيق هرمز والمنطقة المحيطة. وندعو اللجنة إلى اتخاذ ما تراه مناسباً ضمن مسؤولياتها. كما نكرر موقف المملكة الواضح والراسخ لدعمنا لقرارات المجلس الاستثنائي الوارد في وثيقة القرارات C/ES.36/D والذي يدين الاعتداءات التي تنتهك القانون الدولي وتهدد أمن التجارة العالمية. ونؤكد قلقنا البالغ إزاء الآثار الأمنية والاقتصادية لهذه التطورات على النقل البحري وسلاسل الإمداد، وأيضاً نؤكد وحسب القوانين الدولية أن مضيق هرمز هو ممر ومعبور دولي مع أهمية العبور والمرور البريء للسفن فيه.

وفي هذا الصدد قد عملت المملكة، من خلال منظومتها البحرية واللوجستية، على اتخاذ حزمة من الإجراءات والمبادرات الاستباقية لضمان استمرارية العمليات التشغيلية وتقليل الآثار الناتجة عن التحديات الجيوسياسية الراهنة، ومن أبرزها استمرار استقبال وقبول الحجوزات من قبل الخطوط الملاحية دون انقطاع، وتفعيل المسارات والحلول اللوجستية البديلة، وتعزيز خدمات الترانزيت بما يساهم في المحافظة على تدفق التجارة البحرية واستمرارية سلاسل الإمداد.

كما قامت المملكة بتسهيل وصول الحاويات والبضائع الواردة وإعادة التصدير في بعض الموانئ الإقليمية، من خلال إطلاق مبادرات لمناطق التخزين وإعادة التوزيع الخليجية دعماً للتكامل اللوجستي الإقليمي، وعززت التعاون والتنسيق المستمر مع شركاء النجاح من الجهات الحكومية والقطاع الخاص وموانئ دول مجلس التعاون لدول الخليج العربية، إيماناً بأهمية العمل المشترك في مواجهة التحديات الاستثنائية.

وكذلك إضافة إلى إطلاق (18) خدمة وخطاً ملاحياً جديداً لتعزيز الترابط البحري ورفع مرونة الشبكات الملاحية. وفي إطار المحافظة على الأمن الغذائي والدوائي، تم اتخاذ إجراءات استباقية لضمان استمرار تدفق الأغذية والأدوية والإمدادات الحيوية، إلى جانب ضمان انسيابية الصادرات السعودية واستمرار نفاذها إلى الأسواق الإقليمية والدولية بكفاءة عالية. وشملت الجهود كذلك تفعيل مركز المعرفة وخدمات المستفيدين لتعزيز التواصل المباشر مع القطاع البحري واللوجستي ومعالجة التحديات التشغيلية بشكل فوري، إضافة إلى إطلاق مبادرات لتفعيل اللجان والفرق الداعمة المشتركة، وإنشاء مناطق لتفويج وتنظيم حركة الشاحنات بهدف رفع الكفاءة التشغيلية وتقليل الازدحام.

وفي إطار دعم القطاع البحري واللوجستي خلال هذه المرحلة، تم تمديد وزيادة فترات الإعفاء لبعض الخدمات والأجور التشغيلية، إلى جانب عقد أكثر من (40) ورشة عمل واجتماعاً تنسيقياً مع القطاع الخاص والشركاء الاستراتيجيين لمتابعة المستجدات التشغيلية وتطوير الحلول المشتركة بصورة مستمرة.

وتؤكد المملكة العربية السعودية استمرارها في العمل مع المجتمع البحري الدولي، وتحت مظلة المنظمة البحرية الدولية، لدعم أمن وسلامة الملاحة البحرية، وتعزيز استدامة ومرونة سلاسل الإمداد العالمية، بما يساهم في استقرار التجارة الدولية وخدمة الاقتصاد العالمي. وشكراً لكم.

Thank you, Mr. Chair,

The delegation of the Kingdom extends its appreciation for the efforts undertaken by the International Maritime Organization and the Secretary-General in enhancing maritime safety and protecting seafarers. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, in light of the current challenges and developments in the region—including those related to the Strait of Hormuz and their implications for maritime traffic and global supply chains—reaffirms its continued commitment

to supporting the security and safety of maritime navigation, maintaining the smooth flow of international trade, and enhancing the resilience of the maritime and logistics sectors regionally and globally.

The Kingdom is proud to sponsor document MSC 111/WP.13 and reiterates its support for and the importance of its contents in light of the serious threats affecting maritime safety and the welfare of seafarers in the Strait of Hormuz and the surrounding region. We call upon the Committee to take appropriate action within its mandate.

We also reiterate the Kingdom's clear and firm position in support of the resolutions of the extraordinary Council session contained in document C/ES.36/D, which condemns attacks that violate international law and threaten the security of global trade. We express our deep concern regarding the security and economic impacts of these developments on maritime transport and supply chains. We further affirm, in accordance with international law, that the Strait of Hormuz is an international strait, guaranteeing the right of transit and innocent passage for vessels.

In this context, the Kingdom, through its maritime and logistics ecosystem, has implemented a package of proactive measures and initiatives to ensure operational continuity and mitigate the impacts of ongoing geopolitical challenges. Among the most prominent of these are the continued acceptance of bookings by shipping lines without interruption, the activation of alternative routes and logistics solutions, and the enhancement of transit services to maintain the flow of maritime trade and the continuity of supply chains.

The Kingdom has also facilitated the movement of inbound containers, cargo, and re-exports at certain regional ports by launching initiatives for storage and redistribution hubs in the Gulf region, in support of regional logistics integration. It has strengthened continuous coordination and cooperation with government entities, private sector partners, and ports across the Gulf Cooperation Council states, reflecting the importance of collective action in addressing exceptional challenges.

Additionally, 18 new shipping services and routes have been launched to enhance maritime connectivity and strengthen the resilience of shipping networks.

In support of food and medical security, proactive measures have been taken to ensure the uninterrupted flow of food, medicines, and vital supplies, while also ensuring the seamless export of Saudi products to regional and international markets with high efficiency.

Efforts have also included the activation of knowledge centers and beneficiary services to enhance direct communication with the maritime and logistics sectors and promptly address operational challenges. Initiatives were launched to activate joint support committees and task forces, as well as to establish truck marshaling and flow-regulation zones to improve operational efficiency and reduce congestion.

As part of supporting the maritime and logistics sector during this period, certain service fees and operational charges have been extended or waived. In addition, more than 40 workshops and coordination meetings have been held with private sector stakeholders and strategic partners to monitor operational developments and continuously develop joint solutions.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia reaffirms its continued commitment to working with the international maritime community under the umbrella of the International Maritime Organization to support maritime safety and security, and to enhance the sustainability and resilience of global supply chains in a manner that contributes to the stability of international trade and the global economy.

Statement by the delegation of Spain

Muchas gracias señor presidente y buenos días a todas las delegaciones.

Hemos solicitado la palabra para informar al comité sobre el operativo llevado a cabo por España en los días previos al inicio de esta sesión y que ha permitido gestionar la crisis generada por un brote de hantavirus en el crucero **Hondius** de bandera de los Países Bajos mediante su acogida en el puerto de Granadilla en el sur de Tenerife, en las Islas Canarias.

La respuesta positiva de España a la petición de colaboración realizada por la OMS en base al Reglamento Internacional Sanitario ha permitido diseñar y desplegar un operativo de recepción, atención y repatriación sin precedentes, gracias a la coordinación con la OMS, la Comisión Europea, el Centro Europeo para la Prevención y el Control de Enfermedades, los 23 países con nacionales a bordo del **Hondius**, así como el Reino de los Países Bajos como estado de abanderamiento.

El crucero **Hondius** permaneció en el puerto de Granadilla en el sur de la isla de Tenerife durante los días 10 y 11 de mayo, tras recibir autorización expresa de entrada a puerto de refugio por parte de la administración marítima española.

El operativo desplegado ha asegurado el control y desarrollo de los protocolos necesarios, habiéndose repatriado a 127 personas de distintas nacionalidades entre pasajeros (87), tripulantes (36) y personal sanitario (4), mediante 10 vuelos especiales.

Durante su estancia en puerto, el crucero **Hondius** recibió la asistencia habitual de los servicios portuarios de carácter técnico-náutico. Además, se le suministró combustible, provisiones de boca, medicinas, equipos médicos y botellas de oxígeno, zarpando con posterioridad con destino a Rotterdam con 26 tripulantes a bordo.

La decisión de acoger al crucero **Hondius** responde al compromiso de España con la salud global, con el derecho internacional, con el multilateralismo y con la cooperación internacional.

España desea reconocer la labor de todos los profesionales que han participado en el operativo de acogida y la colaboración del capitán y la tripulación del **Hondius** y de la compañía naviera.

España espera poder compartir próximamente con todos los estados miembros de la OMI, la experiencia adquirida en el desarrollo del operativo de acogida como ejemplo de coordinación entre estados miembros y agencias especializadas de las NNUU.

Por último, solicitamos que esta declaración se adjunte como anexo en el informe final del comité.

Statement by the delegation of Tonga

Tonga aligns itself with the concerns expressed regarding the serious threats to the safety and security of international navigation, seafarers, and commercial shipping in and around the Strait of Hormuz.

As a Small Island Developing State, shipping is a vital lifeline that sustains our economy and our communities. Tonga depends heavily on safe, secure, and reliable maritime trade routes, and any disruption to the already delicate and limited maritime connectivity to our region, has multiplied effects on our economy and way of life. Across the world, energy prices are increasing, and few feel these increases more acutely than SIDS. In Tonga, energy supply

already faces uncertainties even under normal circumstances. The recent disruptions caused by the situation in and around the Strait of Hormuz have only compounded these challenges. This will have long-term implications for our economic development, and creates serious risks for the well-being of our societies. We know this is also the case for many countries around the world.

Of paramount concern is the plight of seafarers who remain separated from their families for extended periods, stranded on vessels facing critical shortages of food and water, and caught in the midst of a conflict they neither initiated nor intensified. We strongly condemn all actions that jeopardize the safety and welfare of seafarers and reiterates its call for unified international action to protect their lives and ensure the safety and survival of those stranded in, or transiting through, the waters in and around the Strait of Hormuz.

As co-sponsor of this paper MSC111/WP13/Rev.1 Tonga supports its full adoption and thanks the United Arab Emirates for initiating the proposed draft resolution and stresses its emphasis on safeguarding seafarers, ensuring the continued flow of essential goods and energy supplies, and encouraging coordinated international efforts to reduce risks to maritime safety and security. We also support calls for restraint and for all parties to act in accordance with international law in order to prevent further escalation and disruption to global shipping.

We further call on all States in a position to do so to take the necessary measures to ensure the safety and freedom of navigation, safeguard seafarers, and address the disruptions to the global economy caused by the situation in and around the Strait of Hormuz.

Finally, Chair, we kindly request that this intervention be appended to the report of the Committee.

Statements by the delegation of Ukraine

Decisions of other IMO bodies (Strait of Hormuz crisis)

Thank you, Chair.

Ukraine, as a co-sponsor, fully supports the adoption of the draft MSC resolution contained in document MSC 111/WP.13/Rev.1 and expresses its sincere appreciation to the United Arab Emirates for its leadership in initiating this important proposal. We also thank the United Arab Emirates for submitting document MSC 111/WP.17, which provides important additional information on the situation in the region and further demonstrates the urgent need for action by the Committee.

Ukraine aligns itself with the conclusions of the Council at its thirty-sixth extraordinary session and fully shares the serious concerns expressed in the draft resolution regarding threats, attacks and unlawful interference with merchant and commercial ships in and around the Strait of Hormuz.

The safety and welfare of seafarers must remain at the centre of our consideration. Attacks and threats against commercial shipping, the use of unmanned aerial systems, missiles, sea mines, projectiles and drone boats, as well as any attempt to close, obstruct or otherwise interfere with international navigation, create unacceptable risks for civilian crews, vessels, cargoes, port workers, the marine environment and global supply chains.

Ukraine is also directly concerned by the situation of merchant and commercial ships and their crews unable to safely leave the affected region. Ukrainian nationals are among the seafarers

affected, including on board vessels that have been seized. This further underlines the urgent need for continued practical efforts to facilitate their safe return.

In this regard, Ukraine expresses its sincere appreciation to the Secretary-General and the Secretariat for their continued attention to this matter, for closely monitoring the situation, and for their efforts to assist affected seafarers, including with a view to facilitating their safe return.

Ukraine also expresses its gratitude to Member States, international organizations, industry stakeholders and all those who are providing practical assistance to seafarers and vessels in the affected region, including water, food, fuel and other essential supplies. We respectfully encourage the continuation of these important efforts for as long as necessary.

Ukraine supports the clear demand contained in the draft resolution that the Islamic Republic of Iran immediately and unconditionally cease its attacks, refrain from any actions or threats aimed at closing, obstructing or otherwise interfering with international navigation in the region, and fully respect its obligations under international law.

With regard to the documents submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran under this agenda item, Ukraine does not support the narratives or conclusions contained therein. In our view, these documents do not assist the Committee in addressing the real and urgent maritime safety and security concerns before us. The Committee should remain focused on the protection of seafarers, the safety and security of navigation, and the need to respond clearly to the threats and unlawful activities of Iran in and around the Strait of Hormuz.

Chair, our Committee should send a clear, united and principled message: attacks and threats against merchant shipping are unacceptable; freedom of navigation and the right of transit passage must be fully respected; and seafarers must never be placed at risk or used as instruments of pressure.

In this context, and as stated at the outset, Ukraine, as one of the co-sponsors, fully supports the adoption of the draft MSC resolution contained in document MSC 111/WP.13/Rev.1 and kindly requests that this statement be reflected in the report of the Committee and annexed thereto.

Thank you, Chair.

Statement of Ukraine under agenda item 2 – document MSC 111/2/3

Ukraine would like to thank the Secretariat for preparing document MSC 111/2/3 and the draft guidance on training and certification of seafarers affected by the situation in the Arabian Sea, the Sea of Oman and the Gulf region, particularly in and around the Strait of Hormuz.

We support the development and approval of this guidance. The safety, welfare and professional continuity of seafarers must remain a priority, especially when exceptional security circumstances directly affect their ability to renew certificates, undergo required training, or comply fully with the relevant provisions of the STCW Convention and Code.

Ukraine also welcomes the practical and pragmatic approach proposed in the draft guidance, while maintaining the fundamental objectives of safety of navigation and protection of the marine environment. This balance is essential.

In this context, Ukraine would like to recall the useful practice developed under the auspices of IMO and regional port State control regimes at the beginning of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, including the approach reflected in IMO Circular Letter No. 4524/Add.2. That experience demonstrated that timely, coordinated and humanitarian-oriented guidance

can provide real support to affected seafarers, Administrations, flag States and port States in exceptional circumstances.

Also, in light of the need for enhanced communication between relevant stakeholders, reflected in paragraph 11 of draft guidance, our delegation would like to note that additional arrangements between Parties to STCW Convention should also be duly taken into account for notification purposes, as referenced in circular MSC.1/Circ.1450.

We therefore support the Committee's consideration of the draft guidance set out in the annex to document MSC 111/2/3 and its further use by Member States, Administrations, flag States and port States, as appropriate.

General Statement on the Black Sea

Ukraine takes the floor to draw the Committee's attention to the further deterioration of the maritime security situation in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, including in and around the Kerch Strait, as a direct consequence of the Russian Federation's ongoing armed aggression against Ukraine.

In recent weeks, Russia has significantly intensified its attacks in the maritime domain. In April alone, more than 500 UAV attacks against Ukrainian port infrastructure were recorded, leaving Ukrainian ports effectively under attack every other day.

These attacks have affected merchant ships, port facilities, grain storage infrastructure and vessel traffic services. For example, on 2 April, grain storage facilities and the Chornomorsk Vessel Traffic Service centre were damaged, injuring two employees of the Delta-Pilot branch of the Ukrainian Sea Ports Authority. On 19 April, the Belize-flagged merchant ship QUEEN LILA, carrying 30,500 tonnes of corn, was damaged on the shipping route to the port of Pivdennyi, with the chief officer injured. On 22 April, the Saint Kitts and Nevis-flagged vessel AJAX, carrying 5,000 tonnes of sugar, was hit in the port of Odesa, where the Ukrainian tug PELENG was also sunk. As recently as yesterday, Russian UAV attacks also targeted several civilian vessels, including vessels flying the flags of Panama, Guinea-Bissau and the Marshall Islands.

Furthermore, while this Committee was already in session, the Russian Federation carried out one of the most brutal attacks against Ukraine since the beginning of its full-scale aggression. The attack claimed civilian lives, including those of children, and struck residential areas and civilian infrastructure.

These attacks form part of a broader and deliberate pattern of strikes against civilian infrastructure, including ports, coastal facilities and logistics chains essential for maritime trade and global food security. Since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, Russia has damaged or destroyed more than 900 port infrastructure facilities in Ukraine, with 246 people affected as a result of these attacks.

Chair,

Despite these constant attacks, Ukraine continues to ensure the functioning of the Black Sea maritime corridor. In the first four months of 2026, Ukrainian seaports handled 29.5 million tonnes of cargo, including 16 million tonnes of grain. Since the launch of the Ukrainian Sea Corridor, nearly 200 million tonnes of cargo have been transported, including 117 million tonnes of agricultural products. This demonstrates the corridor's vital role for global food security, while also underlining the need for practical support, enhanced protection of port infrastructure, and sustained international attention to the risks created by Russia's attacks.

In this regard, Ukraine recalls IMO Assembly resolution A.1183(33), which remains fully relevant. Russia's attacks continue to affect international shipping, seafarers, port infrastructure, maritime trade and the marine environment.

Ukraine also draws attention to the continued use of maritime routes for the illegal export of stolen Ukrainian grain and other agricultural and non-agricultural products from the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine. We call on Member States, flag States, port States, shipowners, operators, insurers and classification societies to exercise enhanced due diligence and ensure that their vessels, services or jurisdictions are not used to facilitate such illegal activities.

Russia's attacks against civilian maritime infrastructure are taking place in parallel with its continued use of non-compliant and high-risk shipping practices, including the so-called shadow fleet. These practices undermine maritime safety, environmental protection, transparency, proper insurance coverage and the integrity of international shipping.

In this context, Ukraine recalls IMO Assembly resolution A.1192(33) and welcomes the important work already undertaken by IMO, Member States and relevant international partners to address unsafe and deceptive shipping practices. We encourage the continuation and further strengthening of these efforts, including through improved information exchange, enhanced due diligence, stronger flag State responsibility, effective port State control and full implementation of IMO instruments.

To conclude, Chair,

Attacks against civilian ports, merchant ships and maritime infrastructure must never be normalized.

The most urgent and necessary step remains clear: the Russian Federation must end its war of aggression against Ukraine as soon as possible, cease all attacks against civilian infrastructure, including ports and maritime facilities, and fully respect international law.

Until this happens, Ukraine, for its part, will continue to defend freedom of navigation and global food security, and counts on continued international support, practical assistance and clear condemnation of the Russian Federation's actions.

Thank you, Chair and we kindly request that this statement be reflected in the report of the Committee and annexed thereto.

Statement by the delegation of the United Arab Emirates

Mr. Chair,

Regarding documents MSC 111/WP.14 and MSC 111/WP.16, the United Arab Emirates categorically rejects the Islamic Republic of Iran's misleading reference to it, contained in the above-mentioned documents, which are baseless and unacceptable, and invites the MSC to do the same.

The Islamic Republic of Iran's responsibility for its unlawful actions in and around the Strait of Hormuz is well-established, and Iran's actions continue to endanger commercial shipping and the safety, health and wellbeing of seafarers.

The United Arab Emirates recalls in this regard that the IMO Council, in its Declaration adopted by consensus, at its thirty-sixth extraordinary session, and the Legal Committee (at its one hundred and thirteenth session), and its Marine Environment Protection Committee (at its eighty-fourth session) have strongly condemned Iran's threats and attacks against vessels.

Further, Iran's attempt, in MSC 111/WP.16, to portray itself as a responsible coastal state, which "has consistently upheld the freedom of navigation and the safety and security of maritime activities" and its claim that the Strait of Hormuz "remains open to maritime navigation" is similarly untenable, and contradicts Iran's own statements and actions as well as the above-mentioned decisions of the IMO. It is worth recalling in this regard that the IMO Legal Committee strongly condemned the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz by Iran, as well as threats related to the laying of mines in and around the Strait and the reported toll system it imposed on vessels passing through the Strait of Hormuz. Responsible coastal States such as the Member States of the Gulf Cooperation Council have prioritized the more than 1500 ships and 20,000 seafarers stranded since Iran began its actions.

The United Arab Emirates calls for this Committee to support the United Arab Emirates' proposed resolution that is co-sponsored by several Member States to this Committee

May I request to include this statement in the final report of the Committee.

بشأن الوثقتين MSC 111/WP.14 و MSC 111/WP.16 فإن دولة الإمارات العربية المتحدة ترفض رفضاً قاطعاً الادعاءات التي لا أساس لها من الصحة والواردة في الوثائق المذكورة أعلاه، وتدعو لجنة السلامة البحرية إلى أن يحذو حذوها. ترفض دولة الإمارات العربية المتحدة رفضاً قاطعاً في المحتوى المضلل الذي وجهته إليها جمهورية إيران الإسلامية، والواردة في الوثائق المذكورة أعلاه، والتي نعتبرها غير مقبولة ولا أساس لها من الصحة. إن مسؤولية جمهورية إيران الإسلامية عن أعمالها غير القانونية في مضيق هرمز وحوله راسخة، ولا تزال أعمال إيران تُعرض الملاحة التجارية وسلامة وصحة ورفاهية البحارة للخطر. وتذكر دولة الإمارات العربية المتحدة في هذا الصدد بأن مجلس المنظمة البحرية الدولية، في إعلانه الذي تم اعتماده بالإجماع (في دورته الاستثنائية السادسة والثلاثين)، وكذلك اللجنة القانونية (في دورتها المئة والثالثة عشرة)، ولجنة حماية البيئة البحرية (في دورتها الرابعة والثمانين)، قد أدانوا بشدة تهديدات إيران وهجماتاتها على السفن. علاوة على ذلك، فإن محاولة إيران، في وثيقتها رقم MSC 111/WP.16، تصوير نفسها كدولة ساحلية مسؤولة، كما تشير "بأنها" دعمت باستمرار حرية الملاحة وسلامة وأمن الأنشطة البحرية"، وإدعائها بأن مضيق هرمز "لا يزال مفتوحاً للملاحة البحرية"، أمرٌ لا أساس له من الصحة، ويتناقض مع تصريحات إيران وأفعالها، فضلاً عن قرارات المنظمة البحرية الدولية المذكورة آنفاً. ومن الجدير بالذكر في هذا الصدد أن اللجنة القانونية للمنظمة البحرية الدولية أدانت بشدة الإغلاق الفعلي لمضيق هرمز من قبل إيران، فضلاً عن التهديدات المتعلقة بزرع الألغام في المضيق وحوله، ونظام الرسوم الذي فرضته على السفن العابرة له. وقد أولت الدول الساحلية المسؤولة، مثل دول مجلس التعاون الخليجي، الأولوية لأكثر من 1500 ألف سفينة و 20000 بحار عالقين منذ بدء إيران لهجماتاتها. كما تدعو دولة الإمارات العربية المتحدة هذه اللجنة إلى دعم مشروع القرار الذي اقترحتة الإمارات في وثيقتها MSC 111/WP.13/Rev.1، والذي شاركت في رعايته عدة دول أعضاء. أن وفد بلادي يطلب إدراج هذا البيان في التقرير النهائي للجنة

Statements by the delegation of the United Kingdom

Decisions of other IMO bodies (Strait of Hormuz crisis)

Thank you, Chair.

The United Kingdom condemns the Iranian regime's reckless and indiscriminate attacks on maritime infrastructure in the region which has jeopardised the safety and security of seafarers and represents a serious risk to the safety of navigation as well as the marine environment.

As a co-sponsor, we support Working Paper 13 proposing a draft resolution on this matter to this Committee.

We also support the Secretary General in his efforts to evacuate the ships currently stranded in the Strait of Hormuz, along with the 20,000 stranded seafarers. Their safety and welfare must be the absolute priority of this Organization.

Freedom of navigation must be restored in the Strait, in line with international law as reflected in UNCLOS. Shipping should not be used as leverage, innocent seafarers must not be put at risk, and there is no place for tolls in international straits.

The United Kingdom is working closely with international partners, and through the wider UN, to support the Secretary General, as he works to deliver on the decisions made by the Council in March. As member states of the IMO we have a shared responsibility to help reinforce international law, while maintaining a focus on the safety and security of seafarers, and the consistent application of existing rules.

Thank you Chair, and we kindly request that this statement annexed to the report.

General Statement on the Black Sea

Thank you Chair,

I would like to thank the distinguished delegate from Ukraine for updating the committee on the ongoing situation in the Black Sea and Sea of Azov.

Since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russia has jeopardised the safety and security of seafarers on countless occasions. The United Kingdom remains deeply concerned about the continuing threats to maritime infrastructure and personnel in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov and reiterates the importance of upholding international maritime law.

The Russian Federation's actions continue to show a flagrant disregard for IMO Resolution A.1183(33) and are inconsistent with the principles and purposes of this Organization. Russia's actions undermine our shared work to enhance maritime security and safety capacity. Adherence to the rules-based order is fundamental to maritime security, freedom of navigation and resilience of international trade and is more important now than ever.

Thank you, Chair and we kindly request that this statement be annexed to the report of the committee.

Statement by the delegation of the United Republic of Tanzania

The United Republic of Tanzania thanks the submitters of this agenda item which highlights the serious and continuing threats to the safety and security of international navigation and to the welfare of seafarers operating in and around the Strait of Hormuz. Tanzania fully shares the concerns expressed in the document and supports ongoing efforts within the IMO to protect seafarers and preserve the freedom of navigation in accordance with international law.

On this, the United Republic of Tanzania wishes to inform the Committee of a tragic incident involving a Tanzanian seafarer in the Gulf of Oman.

On 2 May 2026, the convoy comprising the **Tug Volans** and the **Barge Badr** was subjected to two external kinetic impact events while transiting in the Gulf of Oman en route to the United Arab Emirates.

Tragically, Mr. Mchama Maregesi Mongu, a Tanzanian national serving as Bosun on board, sustained fatal injuries while resting in the accommodation at the time of the impact and died at the scene.

The United Republic of Tanzania expresses its sincere appreciation to the Governments and authorities of Oman and the United Arab Emirates for their prompt assistance to the affected crew and for facilitating the timely sharing of information through diplomatic channels.

Through the Tanzania Shipping Agencies Corporation, in close cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and East African Cooperation and the Embassy and Consulate in the United Arab Emirates, Tanzania has continued to provide support to the bereaved family in coordination with the relevant authorities in the United Arab Emirates. The deceased body has been transported to Tanzania today (18 May 2026) after the required procedures in the host country have been completed.

Tanzania extends its deepest condolences to the family, relatives, seafarers union and colleagues of Mr. Mchama Maregesi Mongu.

This tragic event is a stark reminder of the dangers faced by seafarers while undertaking their duties in support of global trade and while exercising the right of innocent passage under International law.

In this context, Tanzania recalls the relevant principles of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), including the right of innocent passage, the duty to respect the safety of navigation, the responsibilities of flag States, and the duty to render assistance to persons in distress at sea. Tanzania therefore makes a humanitarian appeal to all parties concerned to exercise maximum restraint and to ensure that seafarers, merchant vessels, maritime transport routes and other innocent third parties are protected from harm. Seafarers are civilian workers serving global trade and should not become victims of circumstances beyond their control. The protection of human life at sea, the safety of navigation and the uninterrupted movement of maritime transport must remain matters of common concern to the international community.

Tanzania therefore encourages continued cooperation, timely information sharing and practical measures aimed at safeguarding innocent seafarers, protecting maritime transport, and preventing further loss of life or injury to persons not involved in any conflict or aggression.

We request this statement to be reflected in the final report of the Committee. Thank you, Chair and Happy International Day for Women in Maritime.

Statement by the Observer of the European Commission

If you allow me, in view of our celebrations yesterday I would like to express the sympathy of the European Commission with all the female seafarers who are victims of Russia's war or aggression, as well as those trapped on their ships in the Persian Gulf.

Mr. Chairman,

The two pillars of the work of the MSC are safety and security.

It is therefore good that our Ukraine colleagues keep reminding us of the regrettable negative consequences for the safety and security of international shipping of Russia's illegal and unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine.

Indeed, this war has affected both the safety as well as the security of numerous seafarers, with many of them having even lost their lives.

And these consequences go further than maritime security, as they even affect global food security.

Therefore, the European Commission will continue to provide its unwavering support to the Ukraine people, and will do so everywhere, including in international shipping and thus also at IMO.

I would be obliged if my statement could be included in the report of this meeting.

AGENDA ITEM 3

Statement by the delegation of Nigeria

MSC 111/3

Nigeria appreciates the diligent work of the Secretariat, Member States and relevant Sub-Committees in advancing these amendments to the 1974 SOLAS Convention and associated mandatory instruments.

We recognize that the proposed amendments to the SOLAS Convention, the 2011 ESP Code, the 1994 and 2000 HSC Codes, the IP Code, the LSA Code, as well as resolution MSC.402(96), collectively strengthen the global maritime safety architecture and reinforce the Organization's enduring commitment to safeguarding life at sea.

Nigeria particularly welcomes the emphasis on enhanced inspection regimes, operational reliability of life-saving appliances, and improved maintenance standards, which remain critical to reducing casualties and ensuring safer ship operations globally.

Nigeria therefore supports the adoption of the draft amendments contained in annexes 1 to 7 of document MSC 111/3, in accordance with article VIII(b)(iv) of the 1974 SOLAS Convention.

We further encourage continued technical cooperation and capacity-building support to assist developing countries in timely implementation and effective enforcement of these instruments.

In our view, uniform implementation, supported by practical training and technology transfer, will ensure that the intended safety benefits of these amendments are realized across all regions, including emerging maritime economies and developing coastal States.

Thank you, Chair.

MSC 111/3/2

Thank you Chair,
Nigeria thanks the Secretariat for document MSC 111/3/2 and commends the Sub-Committee on Carriage of Cargoes and Containers and the Editorial and Technical Group for their

extensive work in finalizing draft amendments 43-26 to the International Maritime Dangerous Goods (IMDG) Code.

Nigeria recognizes the IMDG Code as a critical global instrument for ensuring the safe carriage of dangerous goods by sea and for protecting human life, property, marine ecosystems and port infrastructure from incidents associated with hazardous cargoes.

Considering evolving cargo profiles, technological developments and increasing volumes of dangerous goods transported through international supply chains, Nigeria supports the continuous updating of the Code to reflect emerging risks, operational experience and advances in safety management practices. Nigeria therefore supports the proposed amendments with a view to their adoption.

Nigeria further emphasizes that effective implementation of the IMDG Code remains essential for developing maritime nations, particularly those with expanding port infrastructure and growing participation in international trade and logistics.

In this regard, Nigeria underscores the importance of sustained technical cooperation, training and capacity-building support to strengthen the ability of maritime administrations, port State control authorities, shippers, freight forwarders and seafarers to implement the Code consistently and effectively.

Nigeria also encourages continued collaboration among Member States, industry stakeholders and the Secretariat to ensure harmonized enforcement, improved compliance awareness and enhanced preparedness for dangerous goods incidents.

Nigeria remains committed to supporting measures that strengthen maritime safety, environmental protection and the resilience of global maritime transport systems.

Thank you, Chair.

MSC 111/3/3

Thank you Chair,

Nigeria thanks the Republic of Korea for document MSC 111/3/3 and for drawing attention to the consequential editorial clarification required in SOLAS regulation V/19 arising from the introduction of the VHF Data Exchange System (VDES) as an alternative to the Automatic Identification System (AIS).

Nigeria supports the observations presented and agrees that regulatory clarity and consistency are essential to avoid unintended interpretations that could create uncertainty regarding the continued carriage requirements applicable to ships constructed before 1 July 2002.

Nigeria recognizes the growing importance of VDES as part of the modernization of maritime communications, navigation safety and digital maritime services, particularly in supporting more efficient data exchange, enhanced situational awareness and future e-navigation applications.

In this regard, Nigeria supports efforts to ensure that the transition framework from AIS-only provisions to AIS or VDES arrangements remains coherent, legally certain and operationally practical.

Nigeria further emphasizes that as the Organization advances digitalization and modernization of navigational systems, due consideration should continue to be given to the implementation

capacities of developing countries, particularly in areas relating to infrastructure readiness, spectrum management, equipment upgrades, training and technical support.

For many developing maritime administrations and shipping operators, the gradual integration of emerging technologies such as VDES will require sustained capacity-building and technology transfer to ensure safe and harmonized implementation across the global fleet.

Nigeria therefore supports the proposed editorial alignment in paragraph 7 of the document, as it preserves the original intent of the SOLAS carriage requirements while maintaining continuity in the application of navigational safety obligations.

Nigeria remains committed to supporting measures that enhance maritime safety, navigational efficiency and the secure digital transformation of international shipping.

Thank you, Chair.

AGENDA ITEM 4

No statements were submitted under this agenda item

AGENDA ITEM 5

Statement submitted by the delegation of Nigeria

MSC 111/ 5

MSC 111/5/1

Thank you Chair,

Nigeria thanks the Secretariat for document MSC 111/5/1 and welcomes the GBS review of Part 3 of the draft MASS Code.

Nigeria considers this review timely and essential, particularly as the Committee moves towards finalization of the non-mandatory Code.

The development of a goal-based instrument for Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships must be anchored on clarity, consistency, risk-based analysis and practical implement-ability.

Nigeria therefore welcomes the finding that the draft Code provides a sound starting point, while also noting the need to address priority findings that may affect implementation before approval, and to carry forward more complex issues into the experience-building phase.

Nigeria further emphasizes that the experience-building phase should not be treated as a formality, but as a structured opportunity to test assumptions, strengthen hazard identification, improve cross-chapter consistency and ensure that functional requirements remain aligned with the core principles of goal-based standards.

For developing maritime nations, including Nigeria, it will be important that the Code remains understandable, implementable and supported by technical cooperation, training and digital capacity-building.

Nigeria therefore supports consideration of the findings and proposals in the annex and encourages that the future development of the MASS Code remains safety-centred, evidence-based, inclusive and responsive to the practical realities of all Member States.

Thank you, Chair.

MSC 111/5

Thank you Chair,

Nigeria thanks the Chair of the Intersessional MASS Working Group, the Secretariat and all delegations for the substantial progress reflected in document MSC 111/5.

Nigeria welcomes the continued development of a goal-based instrument for Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships and recognizes that MASS represents one of the most consequential transitions in the future of shipping, with implications for safety, security, liability, training, seafarer welfare, port readiness and the role of maritime administrations.

Nigeria supports the Group's careful attention to the human element, particularly the provisions on safe manning, human oversight and control, human-centred design, watchkeeping, remote operations centres and the continuing responsibility of a human master.

For Nigeria, it is important that technological innovation should enhance maritime safety and efficiency without weakening accountability, competence standards or the central role of trained maritime professionals.

Nigeria further supports the proposed three-step approach: finalizing the non-mandatory MASS Code, developing interim guidance during the experience-building phase, and eventually establishing appropriate mandatory standards for training, certification and watchkeeping.

Nigeria considers this phased approach prudent, especially given the legal and practical complexities surrounding remote operators, the possible application of the STCW framework, and the need to avoid premature regulatory assumptions before sufficient operational experience is gathered.

Nigeria also emphasizes that developing countries must be fully supported in this transition through technical cooperation, digital infrastructure support, training, capacity-building and technology transfer, so that MASS does not widen the maritime technology gap between advanced and developing maritime nations.

Accordingly, Nigeria supports the re-establishment of the MASS Working Group at MSC 111 and encourages that the final Code remain inclusive, practical, safety-centred and capable of supporting equitable participation in the future of autonomous shipping.

Thank you, Chair.

MSC 111/5/7

Nigeria thanks Norway, Spain, the United Arab Emirates and the United Kingdom for document MSC 111/5/7 and welcomes the useful proposals for structuring the experience-building phase for the MASS Code.

Nigeria supports the view that the EBP should be carefully designed, evidence-based and inclusive, drawing lessons from previous IMO experience-building processes while recognizing the unique complexity of Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships.

Nigeria considers it important that the EBP should have a clear scope, defined objectives, prioritized work areas, a reporting template and an action plan that enables Member States, industry, academia, recognized organizations and other stakeholders to share practical evidence from trials, simulations, operational experience and research.

Such a structured approach will help ensure that the non-mandatory MASS Code evolves into a robust, practical and globally acceptable mandatory instrument.

Nigeria further supports the proposal for a phased EBP, with the first phase addressing urgent gaps and unintended consequences before adoption of the mandatory Code, and the second phase continuing after adoption to support implementation and long-term learning.

For developing maritime nations, this process must also include technical cooperation, capacity-building, digital infrastructure support and equitable access to knowledge, so that participation in MASS development is not limited to technologically advanced States alone.

Nigeria therefore encourages that the EBP give particular attention to human element issues, training and certification of remote operators, safe manning, cybersecurity, connectivity, search and rescue, port State control, legal implications and the readiness of maritime administrations.

Nigeria supports further consideration of the proposals in paragraphs 38 to 41 and encourages the MASS Working Group to develop an EBP framework that is transparent, practical, inclusive and capable of supporting safe and equitable innovation in global shipping.

MSC 111/5/12

Thank you Chair,

Nigeria thanks the United Kingdom for document MSC 111/5/12 and welcomes the constructive proposals aimed at refining the definitions chapter of the draft MASS Code.

Nigeria considers precise and consistent terminology essential to the successful finalization and future implementation of the Code, particularly given the technical, legal and operational complexity of Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships.

Clear definitions of terms such as autonomous, control action, connectivity, MASS function, systemic failure and verification are not merely editorial matters; they are central to ensuring common understanding among Administrations, shipowners, remote operators, recognized organizations, port State control authorities and other stakeholders.

Nigeria therefore supports further consideration of these proposals by the MASS Working Group, with a view to improving clarity, avoiding ambiguity and strengthening the legal certainty of the non-mandatory Code.

Nigeria further emphasizes that as the MASS Code develops towards future mandatory application, its definitions must remain practical, technologically neutral and sufficiently flexible to accommodate innovation without compromising safety, accountability or human oversight.

In this regard, Nigeria supports efforts to distinguish clearly between automation, autonomy and remote operations, while ensuring that the role of human intervention, system verification, failure management and operational control remains properly reflected.

Nigeria also encourages that any refinements to definitions should be tested against the needs of developing maritime administrations, including ease of interpretation, implementation, survey, certification and enforcement.

Nigeria therefore supports referring the proposals to the MASS Working Group and encourages that the final Code remain coherent, accessible and capable of supporting safe, inclusive and globally harmonized implementation of autonomous shipping technologies.

MSC 111/5/13

Nigeria thanks the delegation of Japan for document MSC 111/5/13 and commends its thoughtful contribution towards the development of a structured and practical framework for the Experience-Building Phase (EBP) following the adoption of the non-mandatory MASS Code.

Nigeria supports the view that the EBP must have a clearly defined purpose, measurable objectives and an inclusive feedback mechanism capable of capturing operational, technical, legal and regulatory experiences from Member States at varying levels of technological readiness.

In our view, the proposed purpose of the EBP, namely, to improve the texts contained in the non-mandatory MASS Code through practical operational experience, represents a pragmatic and balanced approach.

However, Nigeria wishes to underscore that the EBP should also serve as a platform for identifying capacity gaps, infrastructure limitations and human element considerations, particularly for developing countries, to ensure that the eventual mandatory MASS framework is globally implementable, equitable and reflective of diverse maritime realities.

Nigeria further supports the establishment of a structured feedback mechanism and appreciates Japan's proposed categorization of operational experiences, comments on the Code and suggested refinements.

Nevertheless, we emphasize that any data-gathering and reporting process under the EBP must remain flexible, transparent and non-prescriptive, considering the differing levels of technological advancement and institutional preparedness among Member States.

Nigeria believes that the EBP should encourage broad participation from Administrations, industry, academia and seafarer representatives, while avoiding the creation of burdensome reporting obligations that may inadvertently exclude developing States from meaningful participation.

We also support the proposal for intersessional engagements during the EBP, as these would facilitate continuous technical exchange, strengthen common understanding and promote confidence-building among Member States as the Organization progresses toward the development of a future mandatory MASS Code.

MSC 111/5/18

Nigeria thanks the delegation of the United Kingdom for document MSC 111/5/18 and commends the constructive proposals aimed at strengthening the integrity, traceability and practical implementation of certification arrangements under the draft MASS Code.

Nigeria supports the effort to enhance clarity and consistency in the forms of certificates for Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships and Remote Operation Centres, particularly the proposals relating to version control, use of IMO identification numbers, linkage of certificates to associated records, and inclusion of references to additional surveys.

These elements are essential to ensuring credibility, transparency and effective oversight by flag, port and coastal States, especially as the Organization advances toward a future mandatory framework for MASS operations.

Nigeria also considers the proposal to include clearer references to the applicable IMO resolution, as well as alignment with the terminology currently reflected in the draft MASS Code, to be both practical and necessary in avoiding future interpretative ambiguities.

Nigeria further welcomes the proposal regarding electronic certification, recognizing that digital accessibility of MASS and ROC certificates will be particularly important for unmanned or remotely operated vessels.

However, Nigeria wishes to emphasize that the transition toward electronic certification systems must be accompanied by adequate safeguards relating to cybersecurity, authentication, interoperability and accessibility for Administrations with varying technological capacities.

In addition, Nigeria supports the inclusion of information relating to testing areas, MASS functions and ROC operational locations, as these would significantly assist port State control officers and relevant authorities in understanding the operational profile and limitations of MASS operations.

In our view, the development of certification arrangements under the MASS Code should remain practical, flexible and implementation-oriented, while ensuring that developing countries are not disadvantaged by overly complex administrative or technological requirements as the maritime sector moves progressively toward autonomous shipping operations.

AGENDA ITEM 6

No statements were submitted under this agenda item

AGENDA ITEM 7

Statement by the delegation of Belgium

MSC 111/7

Merci Mr le Président,

La Belgique s'excuse par avance, cette intervention étant plus longue que nos déclarations habituelles.

INTRODUCTION

La Belgique remercie le Secrétariat pour les mises à jour figurant dans le document MSC 111/7. Nous remercions également la délégation des États-Unis pour la soumission en temps opportun du document MSC 111/7/1. La Belgique s'aligne sur la position de Chypre et soutient les propositions qui figurent dans le document en question.

CONSTAT

Monsieur le Président, la criminalité organisée dans le secteur maritime est un phénomène mondial et intrinsèquement transnational, qui affecte tous les niveaux de notre industrie.

En 2023, 121 tonnes de cocaïne ont été saisies dans le port d'Anvers — représentant une valeur marchande de plus de 5 milliards de livres sterling — mais avec un impact limité sur les réseaux criminels.

À titre de comparaison, la première compagnie mondiale de transport maritime par conteneurs a enregistré des bénéfices d'environ 30 milliards de livres sterling, soit seulement six fois plus que les 5 milliards de livres sterling représentant :

- uniquement ce qui a été saisi;
- dans un seul port;
- et limité à un seul type de marchandise illicite.

Même des pertes de cette ampleur ne semblent pas perturber significativement ces organisations. Cela illustre l'ampleur considérable des flux financiers illicites qui demeurent en dehors de nos économies légales.

La stabilité des prix de la cocaïne sur le long terme suggère que l'offre continue de répondre à une demande croissante, voire de la renforcer.

AU-DELÀ DU TRANSPORT MARITIME

L'impact de la criminalité organisée dans le domaine maritime va bien au-delà du narcotrafic. Les réseaux criminels exploitent les vulnérabilités de l'ensemble de la chaîne logistique. Outre le trafic de stupéfiants, cela comprend notamment la traite des êtres humains, le trafic d'armes et le trafic d'animaux sauvages.

Le volume des trafics illicites a considérablement augmenté, conduisant les réseaux criminels à exploiter les énormes volumes de cargaisons transportés par le transport maritime international.

Nous sommes également préoccupés par les indications selon lesquelles une part importante des navires opérant au sein de la « flotte fantôme » serait liée à des financements illicites provenant d'organisations criminelles. Cela a des conséquences directes sur la protection du milieu marin, la sécurité maritime et le bien-être des gens de mer.

GENS DE MER

Nous constatons une augmentation préoccupante :

- de la criminalisation de membres d'équipage innocents;
- des violations de la Convention du travail maritime de 2006; et
- des cas d'abandon de gens de mer.

Parallèlement, le renforcement des mesures de sûreté dans les ports — telles que celles mises en œuvre à Anvers — a conduit les organisations criminelles à adapter leurs méthodes. Nous observons désormais une augmentation des tentatives de corruption, de coercition ou d'intimidation visant les gens de mer, les travailleurs portuaires et leurs proches.

Cette évolution constitue une préoccupation grave pour la sûreté et l'intégrité du personnel maritime.

DIMENSION MONDIALE

La violence liée aux trafics s'étend des points d'origine et d'entrée vers les ports intermédiaires et les réseaux intérieurs.

Les saisies à grande échelle n'éliminent pas l'activité criminelle; elles incitent les réseaux criminels à exploiter le maillon faible suivant. La criminalité s'adapte en permanence; elle suit la voie de la moindre résistance.

Notre réponse doit être collective et coordonnée. Agir en silos ne fait que déplacer le problème.

POURQUOI L'OMI

La Belgique reconnaît pleinement le travail essentiel accompli par les autorités douanières, les services répressifs et les systèmes judiciaires en matière d'interception, d'application de la loi et de poursuites judiciaires.

Toutefois, si l'application de la loi est essentielle, la prévention demeure la réponse la plus efficace au défi complexe que représente la criminalité organisée.

À cet égard, l'OMI joue un rôle unique et éprouvé. Avec plus de 50 instruments internationaux, l'Organisation a démontré à maintes reprises sa capacité à établir des cadres préventifs mondiaux qui améliorent de manière constante la qualité et le fonctionnement de notre secteur.

WHY ISPS

One such framework is the ISPS Code, introduced after September 2001, which strengthens maritime security through access control, risk assessment, and preparedness. Today's threat landscape has evolved significantly, but the ISPS framework remains highly relevant.

It is inherently risk-based, proportional, and adaptable. The ISPS Code is constructed in a way that investments can be targeted where there is danger and/or risk is identified. Not all ports, routes, or cargoes face equal risk – mirroring the uneven threat posed by illicit trade and organized crime.

SUMMARY

For these reasons, Belgium supports interested Member States and NGOs to put further thought into how to leverage the ISPS Code framework to enhance maritime security and fight organized crime. As was previously mentioned, one such way could be the 2003 IMO/ILO Code of practice on security in ports.

Any actions should be targeted. A new output should have a clear scope, and work undertaken should be guided by well-defined terms of reference.

Organized crime represents a global challenge with far-reaching consequences for maritime security, safety, the environment, and human rights.

It is essential that this Committee treats it with the priority and level of ambition it requires, and engages in substantive work commensurate with the scale of the challenge.

Thank you, Chair.

Statement by the delegation of Cuba

MSC 111/7

Señor Presidente:

1. La delegación de Cuba ha examinado los documentos **MSC 111/7 y MSC 111/7/1** presentados. Sin embargo, deseamos expresar nuestra profunda reserva sobre la propuesta de ampliar o reinterpretar el ámbito de aplicación del **Código PBIP** para abordar de manera genérica las "actividades ilícitas y delictivas".
2. Es imperativo recordar que el Código PBIP fue concebido y adoptado tras los eventos del 11 de septiembre con un objetivo claro y delimitado: **la protección contra el terrorismo marítimo**. Intentar desvirtuar este mandato técnico original mediante el uso de conceptos legales ambiguos como "actividades ilícitas" sin una definición clara, genera inseguridad jurídica para los Estados Miembros.
3. A nuestra delegación le preocupa que este tipo de "vigilancia estratégica" basada en criterios subjetivos pueda ser utilizada para politizar los estándares de protección de la OMI. Introducir términos imprecisos en un código técnico obligatorio abre la puerta a que medidas coercitivas unilaterales sean confundidas con "estándares de seguridad marítima", lo cual podría utilizarse para señalar injustificadamente a puertos o buques de Estados Miembros como "no seguros" o "incapaces de cumplir con las normas".
4. El cumplimiento del Código PBIP no debe convertirse en una herramienta para obstaculizar el comercio internacional legítimo ni para encarecer injustamente los seguros y costos operativos de las naciones en desarrollo mediante calificaciones de riesgo arbitrarias.
5. **Señor Presidente**, Cuba considera que las "actividades ilícitas" mencionadas en el documento, como el contrabando o el tráfico ilícito, ya cuentan con marcos legales internacionales específicos y competencias dentro de otros comités y agencias. Por tanto, nos oponemos a cualquier reforma que pretenda ampliar el Código PBIP más allá de su propósito original de protección antiterrorista.
6. Instamos a este Comité a mantener el carácter técnico y neutral de nuestras normativas, evitando que la arquitectura de protección marítima de la OMI sea utilizada como un instrumento de presión política o comercial.

Muchas gracias, Señor Presidente.

Statement by the delegation of Nigeria

MSC 111/7

Nigeria thanks the Secretariat for the comprehensive update contained in document MSC 111/7 and commends the continued efforts of the Organization in strengthening global maritime security governance through the implementation of SOLAS chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code.

Nigeria particularly welcomes the sustained improvements in the Maritime Security module of GISIS and encourages all SOLAS Contracting Governments to ensure that their maritime security-related information, especially Port Facility Security Plans and designated contact details, remain updated and accurate.

In this regard, Nigeria recognizes the value of the electronic transfer facility under MSC.1/Circ.1603 in reducing administrative burdens and enhancing efficiency.

As a country with one of the busiest maritime domains in Africa and a major gateway to the Gulf of Guinea, Nigeria attaches great importance to credible maritime domain awareness, inter-agency coordination, and robust port facility security compliance as essential pillars for secure and resilient international shipping.

Nigeria further welcomes the Secretariat's continued expansion of maritime security capacity-building initiatives, particularly in the areas of cybersecurity awareness, insider threat management, whole-of-government approaches, and maritime domain awareness.

We strongly support the implementation of resolution A.1205(34) on Capacity-Development Strategy and underscore the need for equitable access to technical cooperation and sustained funding support for developing countries.

Nigeria wishes to highlight its own ongoing efforts under the Deep Blue Project, the SPOMO Act framework, and regional cooperation mechanisms under the Yaoundé Architecture, which have significantly contributed to the reduction of piracy and armed robbery incidents in the Gulf of Guinea.

We therefore encourage stronger partnerships between IMO, Member States, regional organizations, industry stakeholders, and UN entities to address emerging maritime security threats, including cyber risks, terrorism targeting maritime infrastructure, and illicit trafficking.

Nigeria also encourages continued support for the International Maritime Security Trust Fund to ensure that maritime security assistance reaches vulnerable regions where the protection of global trade routes remains critically important.

MSC 111/7/1

Nigeria thanks the United States for the submission of document MSC 111/7/1 and for drawing the Committee's attention to the evolving nature of maritime security threats confronting the global shipping industry.

Nigeria agrees that the maritime domain has significantly changed since the adoption of the ISPS Code in 2002, particularly with the rise of sophisticated transnational organized crime networks, illicit trafficking, cyber-enabled criminality, and the increasing convergence between maritime insecurity and terrorism financing.

In this regard, Nigeria supports the need for a measured and forward-looking review of the ISPS Code to ensure that it remains fit for purpose, resilient, and responsive to emerging realities.

However, such a review should preserve the risk-based and flexible nature of the ISPS framework while avoiding the imposition of disproportionate compliance burdens on developing countries, particularly those with limited technical and financial capacities.

Any future enhancements should therefore be guided by practicality, capacity-building needs, and the principle of balanced implementation across Member States.

Nigeria further believes that efforts to strengthen the ISPS framework should build upon existing regional and international cooperation mechanisms, lessons learned from successful maritime security architectures, and ongoing work within other IMO bodies, including the Legal Committee.

Nigeria's experience in the Gulf of Guinea through the implementation of the SPOMO Act, the Deep Blue Project, and collaboration under the Yaoundé Architecture demonstrates that effective maritime security requires strong legal frameworks, inter-agency coordination, intelligence sharing, maritime domain awareness, and sustained international cooperation.

Nigeria therefore encourages Member States to approach any future review of the ISPS Code holistically, including consideration of cyber threats, insider threats, illicit trafficking, and port vulnerability assessments, while ensuring that technical assistance and capacity development remain central to implementation.

Nigeria stands ready to engage constructively with Member States and the Secretariat in further discussions toward strengthening global maritime security without undermining the efficiency and fluidity of international trade.

Statement by the delegation of Ukraine

Document MSC 111/7/1

Since our delegation is taking the floor for the first time during this session, at the outset, allow me to congratulate you on assuming the Chairship and to congratulate Mr. Gabor Szemler on his election as Vice-Chair.

We would also like to express our sincere thanks to the Secretary-General for hosting yesterday's reception, as well as to those countries and organizations that kindly hosted the coffee and tea breaks.

Ukraine thanks the United States for submitting document MSC 111/7/1 on the review of the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code.

Ukraine supports the proposal to consider how the ISPS Code could be leveraged to enhance maritime security and address new and emerging threats. Since its adoption in 2002, the ISPS Code has proved to be a key IMO instrument for the protection of ships and port facilities. However, today's security environment is significantly more complex.

Ukraine agrees that the ISPS Code should be reviewed in light of current realities, including organized crime, illicit trade, deceptive shipping practices, cyber threats, attacks on critical maritime infrastructure, and other threats affecting maritime security.

For Ukraine, it is particularly important that such a review also takes into account security challenges arising in situations of international armed conflict. The Russian Federation's armed aggression against Ukraine has shown that merchant ships, port facilities, vessel traffic services, grain terminals and coastal infrastructure may become direct targets of attacks, creating grave risks for seafarers, shipping companies, coastal States and global supply chains.

Ukraine also believes that the review should reflect the broader geopolitical security context, including the recent escalation in the Middle East and threats to freedom of navigation in and around the Strait of Hormuz. These developments confirm that maritime security cannot be viewed only through the traditional lens of terrorism or criminal activity.

Ukraine notes that this proposal is consistent with the work of the Legal Committee, including the decisions taken by LEG 113 under agenda item 15, "Measures to address maritime security threats". In our view, MSC and LEG should work in a mutually reinforcing manner, addressing the legal and technical dimensions of maritime security coherently across the Organization.

Thank you Chair and we request that this statement be reflected in the report of the Committee and attached to it.

Statement by the Observer of ICS

We thank the United States for its submission. ICS will always support the enhancement of maritime security, and we recognise the impact of the ISPS Code over two decades in which shipping has, sadly, been repeatedly subjected to maritime security threats.

Chair, the ISPS Code was devised in response to the atrocity of 9/11 to prevent and protect against terror threats in or from the maritime sphere. As such, during development of the Code, other maritime security threats, like piracy and armed robbery, were deliberately excluded.

Bitter experience has confirmed that restricting the code in this way was the right decision. Whilst aspects of the Code may be applied to other security challenges, shipping often requires more agile solutions than the Code affords. For example, the Ship Security Plan might contribute to the mitigation of a threat such as piracy or warlike activity, but other measures will be required to fully protect the vessel and crew owing to their immediacy and dynamism. It is for this reason that the Best Management Practices series was developed by industry. These complement ISPS, but allow for real time threat assessment and response throughout the voyage.

We appreciate, Chair, that the proposal considers how ISPS could be changed to enhance security associated with illicit or criminal activity. In this context we note that significant work is already underway in the Facilitation Committee to update the Revised guidelines for the prevention and suppression of the smuggling of drugs, psychotropic substances and precursor chemicals on ships engaged in international maritime traffic. This workstream is explicitly focussed on transnational organized crime and its role in drug smuggling. It covers a plethora of criminal pursuits. We strongly believe that this presents a far better means for the Organization to address the threats identified in MSC111/7/1, than opening the industry's cornerstone security regulation without a clear vision of its consequences or impact.

The ISPS Code is a foundational instrument. It was game-changing for shipping's approach to maritime security. Any proposed amendment to it should be forensically scrutinised and, moreover, the deliberate limitations placed on it at its inception recognised and understood.

Therefore, Chair, ICS does not support opening the ISPS Code for revision. We believe that the Organization should focus on completing the FAL Committee's significant revision of the drugs guidelines, and their subsequent implementation through the entire supply chain beyond the scope of ISPS, so that trade is secured from threats and criminality that often originate many thousands of miles inland.

Thank you Chair, we request that this statement be included in the Committee's report.

AGENDA ITEM 8

Statement by the delegation of Malaysia

Malaysia expresses sincere appreciation to the Secretariat for the diligent and comprehensive preparation of the document under consideration. The meticulous compilation and presentation of incident data is greatly valued, as it plays a vital role in strengthening maritime safety and operational integrity on a global scale. Malaysia particularly welcomes the continued practice of sharing incident reports and encourages the timely dissemination of such information to relevant national authorities. Access to this data enables Malaysia to maintain accurate records, conduct in-depth analysis, and implement targeted improvements that enhance navigational safety and support evidence-based maritime policy development. While Malaysia notes the reported increase in piracy and armed robbery incidents in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore in 2025, we wish to clarify the position based on national records. According to data maintained by the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA), no incidents were officially reported within Malaysia's jurisdiction in the Strait of Malacca during the period concerned. MMEA further notes that, although the referenced document records six incidents of petty theft in 2025, this assessment may be low as vessel masters and shipowners do not always report minor offences to the agency. Nevertheless, MMEA continues to maintain regular patrols and surveillance operations in identified high-risk areas as part of ongoing efforts to deter and combat maritime crime and to ensure the safety and security of navigation.

To ensure greater clarity and support precise situational analysis, Malaysia recommends that future reporting distinguish clearly between incidents occurring in the Malacca Strait and those in the Singapore Strait. This distinction is important owing to the differing operational responsibilities, enforcement regimes, and navigational characteristics of these two vital sea lanes.

Malaysia remains deeply committed to safeguarding its maritime domain through a range of proactive and coordinated measures. These include sustained maritime patrols, regular enforcement operations, prompt response to assistance requests, and the timely execution of maritime security interventions. These efforts highlight Malaysia's dedication to maintaining the highest standards of safety, security, and the rule of law at sea, particularly the accuracy, consistency, and legitimacy of piracy and armed robbery reporting in our waters.

In this regard, Malaysia respectfully invites our recommendations for improved data disaggregation and encourages continued collaboration in enhancing maritime domain awareness, with the shared objective of ensuring safe, secure, and resilient shipping routes for all.

Request our intervention to be appended in the Committee report.

Statement by the delegation of Nigeria

MSC 111/8

Thank you Chair,

Nigeria thanks the Secretariat for the comprehensive update contained in document MSC 111/8 and commends the continued efforts of the Organization, Member States, and regional partners in combating piracy and armed robbery against ships.

While noting with concern the global increase in reported incidents in 2025, Nigeria is encouraged by the continued reduction in hostage and kidnapping cases in the Gulf of Guinea, which reflects the positive impact of strengthened regional cooperation and sustained national efforts.

Nigeria reiterates that maritime insecurity remains a transnational challenge requiring coordinated international responses rooted in information sharing, capacity-building, legal enforcement, and operational collaboration.

In this regard, Nigeria continues to implement robust measures under the SPOMO Act, the Deep Blue Project, enhanced maritime domain awareness systems, and coordinated naval operations, which have significantly strengthened surveillance, interdiction capability, and prosecution of maritime crimes within our waters and across the Gulf of Guinea region.

Nigeria further welcomes the Secretariat's sustained support for the implementation of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct and expresses appreciation to development partners, including Germany, the Republic of Korea, Saudi Arabia, and the European Union, for their financial and technical contributions to maritime security initiatives in West and Central Africa.

Nigeria strongly supports the Whole-of-Government approach being promoted under the Yaoundé Architecture, recognizing that maritime security is inseparable from economic stability, trade facilitation, fisheries protection, and regional development.

We therefore encourage Member States to continue timely reporting of piracy and armed robbery incidents through GISIS, strengthen cooperation among regional information-sharing centres, and support sustainable funding for the WCA Trust Fund to consolidate the gains already achieved in the Gulf of Guinea.

Nigeria remains committed to working closely with IMO, regional organizations, industry stakeholders, and international partners to ensure that the Gulf of Guinea continues its transition from a piracy hotspot to a model of regional maritime security cooperation and resilience.

Statement by the delegation of Palau

Hijacking of M/T HONOUR 25 (IMO 9109735) Palau Flag Incident Summary:

On 21 April 2026, the Palau flag was notified by EUNAVFOR Operation ATALANTA that the MT HONOUR 25 had been attacked by pirates off the coast of Somalia. While initial reports from the vessel's management were delayed owing to a lack of SSAS alerts, it was confirmed on 24 April 2026 that the vessel is under pirate custody. Negotiations between shipowners and pirates are still ongoing.

Current Situation (As of 12 May 2026): Direct communication: Company's CSO confirmed to be in direct contact with the Master through his official phone.

Vessel Status: The vessel remains under the control of approximately 31 well-armed pirates (equipped with AK-47s and RPGs as per EUNAVFOR Operation ATALANTA information). Crew Welfare: There are 17 crew members on board. While reported safe as of the last contact, the Master has issued desperate pleas for help. Crucially, we have been informed by the Company's CSO that on-board provisions are now critically depleted, escalating this from a maritime security incident to a severe humanitarian crisis. Negotiations: Private negotiations through local tribal channels are ongoing but have reached a standstill, with progress moving at a dangerously slow pace. Vessel still at anchor in TTW, 2 nm off the coast. ATALANTA Spanish Frigate in the area with air assets collecting INTEL directly. Pakistan getting involved owing to nationality of majority of crew. Not clear the details of the involvement yet, but there might be two frigates on the scene.

Given the gravity of the situation and the sovereign obligations of the Flag State, Palau respectfully requests that the IMO: Exert Diplomatic action: Engage directly with the Federal Government of Somalia and relevant regional administrations to prioritize the safe and early release of the vessel and its crew. Humanitarian Advocacy: Highlight the critical lack of provisions to the Somali authorities to ensure that basic necessities reach the crew. The Flag State remains in close contact with Operation ATALANTA and the vessel's managers. However, we believe that formal engagement by the IMO at the diplomatic level is now essential to break the current deadlock and prevent possible loss of life.

Statement by the Observer of ITF

First, the ITF would like to thank the Secretariat for document MSC 111/8, and the Secretary-General for drawing attention to this urgent matter in his opening speech.

We note with serious concern the increase in incidents of piracy and armed robbery against ships reported during 2025, as well as the recent incidents in the Gulf of Aden and waters off Somalia.

These recent cases are a stark reminder that piracy in this region has not disappeared. It remains a real and immediate threat to all seafarers.

For seafarers, piracy is not a theoretical maritime security issue. It is a direct threat to their lives, safety and mental wellbeing, with consequences that continue long after an incident ends.

Chair, as a former seafarer, I personally remember transiting high-risk areas and the stress that such passages created for us as a crew, and also for our families ashore, and that was only the stress of the passage itself. It is therefore difficult to imagine the fear, trauma and uncertainty faced by seafarers who are attacked, captured or held hostage.

The resurgence of such incidents is a worrying development for international shipping, and especially for the safety, security, welfare and wellbeing of seafarers.

The fact that seafarers continue to be held hostage remains deeply concerning. They should never become victims of violence or prolonged captivity while carrying out their essential duties in support of global trade.

In this regard, we emphasize the importance of coordinated action among flag States, coastal States, States of nationality of seafarers, shipowners and all relevant stakeholders, to ensure that seafarers affected by such incidents are protected and supported, and that all appropriate measures are taken with their safety as the primary consideration.

These situations require professional crisis management. Where crews are taken hostage, or where communication with perpetrators becomes necessary, access to experienced crisis negotiation expertise can be essential to help protect lives, avoid escalation and support a safe resolution.

At the same time, we encourage both governments and industry to continue taking a proactive approach to maritime security, including through prevention, clear crisis-response plans, effective information-sharing, regional cooperation, and full implementation of relevant IMO guidance and frameworks.

We kindly ask you chair to have the statement reflected in the final report

Statement by the Observer of ReCAAP ISC

ReCAAP celebrates and commemorates two decades of regional cooperation and partnership for safer seas in Asia. We would like to express our gratitude and appreciation to the ReCAAP Contracting Parties, shipping industry, maritime community and partner organisations for the support and contributions over the years.

ReCAAP ISC will continue with its capacity building and cooperative arrangement programmes, while also providing data analysis based on accurate and verified incident reports to the maritime community.

For the period January – April this year, there were no incidents of Piracy on the high seas. However, 27 incidences of armed robbery against ships occurred within coastal States jurisdiction, which is 50% decrease compared to 54 incidents during the same period in 2025. The decrease of incidents occurred in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore (SOMS), India, Indonesia and South China Sea.

Incidents occurring in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore account for 62% of the incidents in Asia. These incidents were of low severity and opportunistic in nature. Most incidents involved perpetrators who were not armed and crew not injured; and the perpetrators escaped immediately on being sighted by the alert ship's crew.

The situation in the SOMS has seen significant improvement this year, with 16 incidents reported during January – April 2026 compared to 45 incidents during the same period in 2025. Notably, the number of incidents in SOMS declined significantly since September 2025 after several perpetrators were arrested by the Indonesian authorities in July and August 2025. This demonstrated that the arrests made by the authorities created effective deterrence against further attacks.

For the sixth consecutive years, there was no incident of abduction of crew for ransom in Sulu-Celebes seas and the waters off Eastern Sabah. The last incident was reported on 17 January 2020.

Moving forward, the Centre will continue to build on its strength in data analytics, providing deeper insights and analysis on piracy and sea robbery incidents in Asia. We will also study the nexus between piracy and armed robbery against ships and other maritime crimes, and forge stronger links with regional law enforcement agencies to enhance information sharing and operational response.

The Centre will also continue to engage the shipping community and partner organisations to strengthen cooperation and solicit feedback on how the Centre can stay relevant to serve the needs of stakeholders, ensuring incident-free transit for the ships through Asian waters.

I would like to request this statement to be recorded in the Report for MSC 111 session.

AGENDA ITEM 9

No statements were submitted under this agenda item

AGENDA ITEM 10

Statement by the delegation of Nigeria

MSC 110/10/1

Nigeria thanks the co-sponsors for document MSC 110/10/1 and commends the efforts to further refine the draft MSC-FAL circular on guidelines concerning the recovery of deceased persons and of death after recovery.

Nigeria supports the overarching humanitarian objective of the proposed guidance, particularly the emphasis on preserving human dignity, respecting cultural and religious sensitivities, and ensuring effective cooperation among flag States, coastal States, port States, RCCs and shipmasters.

In situations involving distress at sea, especially under the complex realities of unsafe mixed migration, practical and coordinated procedures are essential to support masters and crews who often operate under extremely difficult circumstances.

Nigeria also welcomes the balanced approach reflected in the proposed amendments, which seek to align the draft circular more closely with existing IMO instruments, including SOLAS, the SAR Convention and resolution MSC.528(106), while clarifying the important role of flag States in facilitating coordination and support.

We believe the revised text appropriately reinforces shared responsibilities without imposing undue operational burdens on rescuing ships.

Nigeria therefore supports continued constructive engagement towards the adoption of practical, humane and implementable guidance that strengthens international cooperation and contributes to safer and more dignified management of rescue operations at sea.

AGENDA ITEM 11

Statement by the delegation of The Cook Islands

The Cook Islands thanks the proponents of documents MSC 111/11/1 and MSC 111/11/2 for this important discussion on unlocking the LRIT system for the benefit of the entire maritime community.

From our perspective, the issue before us is fundamentally one of maritime domain awareness with an economic dimension. The LRIT system was designed under SOLAS chapter V regulation 19-1 to enable Contracting Governments to obtain reliable and secured long-range identification and tracking information in support of maritime safety, security, environmental protection and SAR purposes. The system remains technically robust, secure and generates large volumes of reliable ship position information — yet only a limited proportion of its information is being acquired by coastal States, and we note that both demand and its modest revenue are concentrated among a small number of States. We are of the opinion that the enhancement of maritime awareness globally may well outweigh these modest revenues.

LRIT offers important advantages over AIS, particularly in the context of the shadow or dark fleet. While AIS is an open broadcast system vulnerable to spoofing and manipulation, LRIT operates within a secure government-to-government framework using authenticated satellite terminals, providing reliable and authoritative position information for regulatory and compliance purposes. For flag States, including the Cook Islands, LRIT enhances the ability to identify vessels intermittently operating in the shadow or dark fleet by detecting unexplained AIS interruptions, and has demonstrated its reliability in tracking ships when AIS terminals are disconnected for security reasons.

Colleagues,

We should not lose sight of the significant benefit of free access to LRIT information for coastal States. This would result in a direct enhancement of maritime domain awareness for all, enabling more systematic monitoring of vessel movements within the existing 1,000 nautical mile entitlement under SOLAS, improving maritime safety, security, environmental protection and oversight of suspicious vessel activities in areas of national interest at no additional LRIT costs to flag States.

Wider use of LRIT information could also strengthen global maritime governance and Port State oversight. As LRIT relies on approved satellite terminals, authenticated ship identities and integration within recognised Data Centres, with the active involvement of both IMO and IMSO, broader access to LRIT data could limit the ability of vessels operating with fraudulent identities to go undetected, and could support international efforts to combat fraudulent ship registration and enhance maritime transparency through PSC campaigns. In this regard, future enhancement of LRIT deserves serious consideration — but first, the system needs to be unlocked.

The Cook Islands therefore strongly supports the Brazilian proposal to make LRIT information available free of charge to coastal States within the existing 1,000 nautical mile entitlement under SOLAS. Limiting free access to the EEZ only, as suggested in document MSC 111/11/2, would significantly reduce operational value by up to 95% for Pacific States. Similarly, partial cost reductions, as suggested in this document, would remain insufficient to enable meaningful and systematic use by developing States and Small Island Developing States – but also by developed nations with significant maritime traffic, where the cost would remain extremely high.

We welcome the IMSO technical analysis circulated under IMSO Circ. 57, now available as J-paper 8, confirming that the LRIT system can support substantially increased information exchanges without major operational impact, addressing some of the concerns in document MSC 111/11/3, and we support this document being considered by the WG.

We believe this technical work, including possible IDE testing and further review, could continue intersessionally for consideration at MSC 112, where any final technical validation and amendments could be considered for approval.

Chair, let us be clear, from a policy perspective, MSC is already in a position to make a policy decision - as requested by MSC 110 - on the free provision of LRIT information to coastal States within the existing entitlement framework established under SOLAS — which the Cook Islands fully supports.

Thank you Chair, and we request that this statement be reflected in the body of the report and appended in full to the report.

Statement by the delegation of Ecuador

"La delegación de Ecuador apoya las declaraciones realizadas por las delegaciones de Brasil, Chipre, Turquía, Argentina, Ghana y Colombia; considera que las acciones de los puntos 4 y 6 están intrínsecamente vinculadas: las enmiendas al SOLAS establecen el marco jurídico y la resolución revisada define el modelo operativo.

Respecto a las enmiendas al SOLAS, la delegación de Ecuador recomienda que el Comité apruebe en esta sesión los proyectos de enmiendas al Capítulo V, Regla 19-1, según se presentan en el Anexo 2, con miras a su adopción en el MSC 112. Apoyamos una fecha de entrada en vigor expedita. Retrasar la implementación solo prolongaría la subutilización del sistema.

Con relación al punto 6, apoyamos su adopción con la descripción detallada del nuevo modelo de costos. Consideramos razonable la fecha efectiva provisional del 1 de enero de 2028 para permitir las pruebas del IDE y los ajustes contractuales. No obstante, apoyamos la posibilidad contemplada en el párrafo 5.3 de que esta resolución pueda implementarse antes de la entrada en vigor de las enmiendas al SOLAS, para facilitar la introducción rápida del nuevo modelo.

Agradecemos a las delegaciones que instaron a la cautela y sugirieron que los textos deberían considerarse como punto de partida tanto en grupo de trabajo como en este plenario. Su contribución ha permitido un examen más riguroso.

En este sentido, esta delegación reitera y destaca, como ya fuera analizado durante el grupo de trabajo y esta plenaria, que el impacto financiero y técnico de este cambio es modesto en el contexto del sistema en su conjunto.

El acceso sin costo a la información LRIT fortalecerá la gobernanza marítima mundial, mejorará la seguridad y protección marítima y contribuirá a combatir las flotas oscuras y el registro fraudulento de buques, estos son asuntos de creciente preocupación por la Organización, vinculado al documento MSC 111/7/1 sobre la revisión del Código PBIP.

Pido disculpas a los intérpretes por los cambios realizados en mi declaración y por lo extensa que fue. Finalmente solicitamos que nuestros comentarios queden reflejados en el informe del Comité y que esta Declaración sea anexada al mismo."

The delegation of Ecuador supports the statements made by the delegations of Brazil, Cyprus, Türkiye, Argentina, Ghana, and Colombia; it considers that the actions in points 4 and 6 are intrinsically linked: the amendments to SOLAS establish the legal framework, and the revised resolution defines the operational model.

Regarding the amendments to SOLAS, the delegation of Ecuador recommends that the Committee approve the draft amendments to chapter V, Regulation 19-1, as presented in Annex 2, during this session, with a view to their adoption at MSC 112. We support an early entry-into-force date. Delaying implementation would only prolong the underutilization of the system.

Regarding item 6, we support its adoption, including the detailed description of the new cost model. We consider the provisional effective date of 1 January 2028 to be reasonable, as it allows time for IDE testing and contractual adjustments. However, we support the option envisaged in paragraph 5.3—whereby this resolution could be implemented prior to the entry into force of the SOLAS amendments—to facilitate the rapid introduction of the new model.

We thank the delegations that urged caution and suggested that the texts should be treated as a starting point, both in the working group and in this plenary session. Their contribution has enabled a more rigorous review.

In this regard, this delegation reiterates and emphasizes—as previously discussed during the working group and this plenary session—that the financial and technical impact of this change is modest within the context of the system as a whole.

Free access to LRIT information will strengthen global maritime governance, enhance maritime safety and security, and contribute to combating "dark fleets" and fraudulent vessel registration—issues of growing concern to the Organization, as linked to document MSC 111/7/1 regarding the review of the ISPS Code.

I apologize to the interpreters for the changes made to my statement and for its length. Finally, we request that our comments be reflected in the Committee's report and that this statement be annexed thereto.

Statement by the delegation of Georgia

Georgia supports the proposal submitted by Brazil and thanks the delegation for the work undertaken on this very important matter. We would also like to thank IMSO for its proactive efforts and for the excellent document it produced within a very short timeframe.

Georgia takes note of the concerns raised regarding financial sustainability, system capacity and the possible redistribution of costs within the LRIT framework. However, in our view, these considerations should be assessed in light of the original purpose and legal nature of LRIT as a mandatory SOLAS instrument established to serve collective maritime safety, security and governance objectives, rather than as a commercial service operating strictly on a cost-recovery logic.

The proposal under consideration does not create new reporting obligations, new categories of data, or new technical requirements for ships. The data is already mandatorily transmitted under SOLAS and the infrastructure already exists and operates globally. The issue before the Committee is therefore primarily one of accessibility and operational utilization by entitled coastal States.

Georgia further considers that maintaining financial barriers for access to already existing LRIT information risks undermining the effective implementation and practical value of the system, particularly for developing coastal States with legitimate maritime safety, security and port State control responsibilities. In practice, this contributes to the continued underutilization of a globally established governance mechanism.

With regard to concerns about scalability and increased data traffic, Georgia believes that decisions should be guided by objective technical evidence. We note that no evidence has been presented demonstrating that the LRIT architecture is incapable of accommodating broader operational use. On the contrary, the system was specifically designed as a secure and scalable global platform.

Finally, Georgia considers that broader access to LRIT data serves the collective interest of the international maritime community by strengthening maritime domain awareness, supporting compliance verification, improving transparency and contributing to the identification of high-risk or non-compliant shipping activities. In this context, facilitating access

to LRIT information for entitled coastal States should be viewed not as a transfer of burden, but as an investment in stronger global maritime governance under the IMO framework.

Georgia therefore considers the Brazilian proposal constructive and forward-looking and supports further work in this direction.

And we respectfully request the Statement to be added to the final report of this committee.

Statement by the delegation of Singapore

This delegation would like to thank the working group for the considerable and extensive work. Special thanks to our WG chair Ringo and the secretariat Ozkan and Elizabeth for your hard work over these few days.

On action point 2, this delegation is unable to endorse the Group's agreement that the proposed review of the LRIT financial architecture is considered necessary and justified at this juncture. The Group had noted in paragraph 3.3 of the report that the proposal would result in a fundamental shift in the cost-sharing model, with the potential financial implications being acknowledged in the table provided in Annex 1. Moreover, in our next action point 3, the Committee is about to invite the European Commission to request EMSA to conduct performance testing of the IDE to verify operational capacity and performance, which we fully support. But until we are able to receive these results and assess them in this Committee, we are not able to have the complete picture of the financial implications of the proposal.

To be clear, as a flag state and a coastal state, Singapore is not yet able to endorse the proposed review of the LRIT financial architecture. This is not because we oppose it. Rather, we are not able to come to a conclusive evidence-based decision at this time because there remains a lack of clarity on the potential financial implications highlighted in Annex 1. The fact that further supporting data may not yet be available cannot be taken to mean that no further issues or concerns exist that might need to be considered as part of this review.

Only with a fuller picture of the proposed review of the LRIT financial architecture can this delegation be in a position to make the decision that is requested of the Committee. The WG Chair and secretariat had helpfully advised that this LRIT working group could be re-established at the next sessions of this Committee, and since this is still within the target completion of this output, this delegation is of the view that we do have time to gain this fuller picture and make the decision at a later stage.

Chair, on action points 4 and 6, this delegation is fully aware that the discussion in the working group was not easy. There were divergent views on a number of issues, including the earlier action point to endorse the proposed review of the LRIT financial architecture, which proved to us that the draft text that we have in the Annex has to be provisional and that we are not at a stage where we could approve any draft SOLAS amendments. This was highlighted in the working group by several delegations as reflected in paragraph 4.4 of the WG report WP.11.

As such, Singapore is not in a position to support approving the draft SOLAS amendments at this session, as proposed earlier by Brazil. Over and above the divergence of views on the technical discussions, this delegation has procedural concerns on the manner by which the draft amendments to SOLAS Regulations V/19-1 and Resolution MSC.263(84)/Rev.1 were considered at this session.

Firstly, the Terms of Reference to the Group was clear – we were to advise the committee on how to proceed with the development of amendments to SOLAS and any associated instruments if necessary. We were not tasked to develop the amendments themselves.

While this delegation acknowledges that providing some provisional text would be helpful for the Committee's deliberation, we subsequently worked on documents and checklists that were meant for approval and adoption of SOLAS amendments. Singapore and a number of other delegation had reiterated to the Group that we must stick with our task as spelled out in the TOR, and not go beyond it with the intent of pushing for approval at this session, which now appears to be the request of some.

Secondly, Singapore is concerned with the haste at which this matter is being considered by the Committee and the Working Group, with little regard for established IMO processes and methods of work. We would like to highlight two instances.

1. While we appreciate the study recently conducted by IMSO, this was a paper that was only circulated to member states as a J paper in the afternoon of the first day of MSC. We were told that this contained important technical analysis for our discussions, but delegations were not provided with sufficient time to consider the information therein. The haste of this inclusion also meant that the paper was not translated to the other working languages like regular meeting documents. Nevertheless, this paper was frequently referenced by delegations both at Plenary and at the WG, without sufficient time for other member states to consider the information thoroughly.

2. After the working group acknowledged the need for amendments to SOLAS, the draft text proposals were either only circulated the night before, or seen by the Working Group on Tuesday morning right before we proceeded with the deliberation. These are proposed mandatory amendments to SOLAS. Yet, delegations were not given sufficient time to consider these thoroughly with our experts and lawyers back home. Conversely, these were hurriedly pushed through despite concerns raised about potential unintended consequences that should be carefully considered. Due diligence in this Committee should not and cannot be sacrificed.

Chair, the manner by which this matter was hurriedly pushed through should be concerning. We do not want to presume the intentions of the proponents, but given that there are clearly still concerns raised by a number of delegations, should we not at least attempt to bridge these differences?

Now, this delegation would like to address the proposal just made by [Brazil] to deviate from the established 4-year SOLAS amendment cycle. This cycle is established in MSC.1/Circ.1481 for the very purpose of avoiding such a situation where we rush through amendments. Nevertheless, the circular provides for expedited actions in the case of exceptional circumstances, for which the criteria is set out clearly in paragraph 4 of circular 1481. Our delegation notes that paragraph 4.5 of the Working Group report WP.11 clearly stated that the Group "indicated that the draft amendments did not meet the exceptional circumstances criteria". Moreover, the original new output proposal by Brazil in MSC 110/18/13, as well as the Group of Chairs assessment in MSC 110/WP.2, had both recommended for these amendments to follow the regular 4-year cycle.

If this Committee pushes through to adopt these amendments under exceptional circumstances, which we view to be largely based on financial considerations and reflected in the title of this agenda, how then would we consider other important SOLAS amendments that have direct safety implications and yet still have to align with the 4-year cycle?

Chair, our point is simple. There is still time for us to consider the proposals on the table, and so there is no need for this Committee to rush to approve anything at this session. We have made good progress and none of it should be wasted, and so we would propose for the relevant provisional text to be forwarded to the next session or the relevant sub-committee as a starting point for further consideration. We need to do this correctly and not make mistakes by rushing it through.

Chair, we apologise for our lengthy intervention but I hope you and all distinguished delegates can see why this was necessary. To that end, we would like to request for our statement to be appended to the final report please.

Thank you very much Chair.

Statement by the delegation of Tuvalu

Since this is our first intervention, let me congratulate you and your co-chair for your re-elections.

To the matter at hand now. Chair, Tuvalu already participates in the LRIT system as part of the SOLAS framework. However, in practice, like many developing coastal States, Tuvalu has never really been able to benefit operationally from the system as a coastal State because the current charging model makes systematic use financially burdensome.

We believe therefore that this agenda item is one of the key issues of this session of the MSC.

The Brazilian proposal, contained in document MSC111/11, essentially seeks to make standard LRIT data available free of charge to entitled coastal States within the existing 1,000 nautical mile entitlement. It is important to note that, this does not create a new right, as the right already exists under SOLAS. The issue is that under the current model, most countries cannot afford to systematically use the LRIT system.

For a country such as Tuvalu, this modification would be very significant.

Currently, many Pacific Island States have very limited maritime domain awareness capabilities and often cannot afford expensive commercial maritime surveillance services. At the same time, they already participate, and in a way enable, a global LRIT system capable of providing secure and reliable ship position information, but without being able to use it actively because of the cost barrier.

Supporting the Brazilian proposal would therefore potentially allow Tuvalu and many other Pacific States to finally make practical operational use of LRIT for monitoring maritime activity around their coasts and throughout the wider 1,000 NM entitlement area, at no additional cost.

This is also important from a regional security and governance perspective. Wider use of LRIT could significantly strengthen maritime safety, maritime security and awareness of suspicious maritime activities throughout the Pacific region.

The technical concerns initially raised now appear largely resolved following the IMSO technical analysis contained in IMSO Circular Letter Number 57. The study demonstrates that the LRIT system can comfortably sustain full coastal State entitlement, even in a scenario where all LRIT polygons worldwide would be fully activated, while still operating well below its technical capacity.

The financial aspects have also already been extensively covered in the Brazilian submission in document MSC111/11/1. In that respect, this committee appears to have the necessary information to take the policy decision requested by MSC 110.

Some of the alternative proposals currently being discussed raise difficulties.

The Canadian proposal, contained in document MSC 111/11/2, while constructive in intent, would limit free access to the EEZ only. In practice, this would significantly reduce the operational value of LRIT for Pacific island States, as access would often be limited to vessels already approaching ports or coastal areas. It would also create additional technical complexity through the need for new 200 NM polygon configurations and revisions to technical arrangements.

The Liberian proposal, contained in document MSC111/11/3, also raises a number of concerns. While presented as a broader reflection on the LRIT framework, the paper argues that cost may not actually be the primary reason behind the underutilization of LRIT by coastal States. However, this appears difficult to reconcile with the practical reality observed over the past 15 years, during which many developing coastal States have simply been unable to afford systematic use of LRIT information because of the cumulative costs associated with regular requests.

The Liberian paper also suggests that there is insufficient technical evidence demonstrating that the LRIT infrastructure could sustain broader use. However, the IMSO technical analysis contained in Circular Letter No.57 now appears to address precisely that issue by demonstrating that the LRIT infrastructure can comfortably support full activation of coastal State entitlements globally while still operating well below its technical capacity.

Lastly, the Liberian paper relates to the possibility that wider access to LRIT information could generate additional costs for shipowners. In practice, however, the LRIT reports are already being transmitted today under existing SOLAS obligations. For open registries, these satellite transmission costs are already incorporated into the fees charged to ships. For more traditional registries, the costs are generally already absorbed by the administration itself. In both cases, the information is already being paid for and transmitted regardless of whether coastal States receive access to it.

Making existing LRIT information available to entitled coastal States therefore does not generate additional transmission costs. The exchange of LRIT information between Data Centres and the IDE is already automated and operates through machine-to-machine internet-based exchanges. In practical terms, the discussion is therefore largely about redistribution of already available information rather than creation of new operational costs.

It is also widely understood that certain large registries currently generate revenues through the sale of LRIT information linked to ships operating in areas such as North American waters. Understandably, those registries may therefore wish to preserve existing revenue streams. However, from the perspective of many developing coastal States, the broader global benefits associated with opening access to LRIT may significantly outweigh the relatively limited financial losses currently being discussed.

This is why many believe it is important that MSC 111 follows the direction given by MSC 110 and takes a policy decision now, while allowing any remaining technical or drafting matters to be refined through the Working Group and finalized at MSC 112 if necessary.

From Tuvalu's perspective, this discussion is not only about technical arrangements or limited revenue losses affecting a small number of actors. It is also about whether countries with

limited resources should finally be allowed to benefit from a system they already participate in, but cannot afford to use effectively today. This is why Tuvalu supports the Brazilian proposal allowing 4 positions a day free of charge within 1000 nm for coastal states.

Supporting the Brazilian proposal is an important act of international solidarity and practical maritime capacity building, allowing more than one hundred coastal States to strengthen maritime awareness, safety and security capabilities that are currently out of reach financially.

Tuvalu would like this intervention to be appended to the report of this Committee.

Statement by the United Republic of Tanzania

The United Republic of Tanzania, as a co-sponsor of document MSC 111/11, thanks all delegations that have contributed thoughtful analyses to this important discussion, including the submissions by Brazil, Canada and Liberia.

This matter is not merely about revising a charging mechanism. It is fundamentally about whether access to maritime situational awareness should depend on the financial capacity of individual coastal States.

For many developing countries, the strategic value of LRIT lies not in the generation of revenue, but in the ability to obtain timely information that supports safety, security, environmental protection and search and rescue. When access to standard position reports is constrained by recurring costs, the States that stand to benefit most from the system are often the least able to use it fully.

At the same time, any adjustment to the financial architecture should preserve the technical integrity and long-term sustainability of the LRIT system and should avoid transferring a disproportionate burden to flag States or shipowners.

In this regard, the proposal to provide standard six-hourly reports free of charge appears to offer a practical means of restoring the original cooperative spirit of LRIT, while enabling broader and more equitable participation in the exchange of information.

Viewed from this perspective, the question before the Committee is less about who pays for individual reports and more about how the Organization can ensure that a global system established for collective safety and security is used to its full potential by all Contracting Governments.

With these observations, the United Republic of Tanzania supports further work towards a balanced and sustainable solution that improves access to LRIT information for all entitled States.

We request that this statement is annexed to the final report of this Committee.

AGENDA ITEM 12

Statement by the delegation of Cook Islands

MSC 111/12/2 (CHILE) – COMMENTS ON DOCUMENT MSC 111/12

The Cook Islands thanks Chile for document MSC 111/12/2 and acknowledges the validity of the concern raised regarding the security dimension of the ongoing revision of the Code of Safety for Nuclear Merchant Ships.

However, the Cook Islands wishes to place on record a more fundamental concern. The Cook Islands, consistent with its longstanding position and the principles enshrined in the Treaty of Rarotonga establishing the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone, has deep concerns regarding the use of nuclear technology in merchant shipping, particularly in or near Pacific waters.

The Cook Islands will monitor this work closely mindful of any regulatory framework that could facilitate the introduction of nuclear-powered merchant vessels.

The Cook Islands encourages the Committee to take into account the concerns of Pacific Island States and the principles of the nuclear-free Pacific in the conduct of this work.

Thank you Chair, and please reflect our intervention in the Committee's report and append it to the report.

Statement by the delegation of Nigeria

MSC 111/12

Thank you Chair,

Nigeria thanks IACS for its constructive comments on document MSC 111/12 and acknowledges the practical concerns raised regarding the proposed revocation of MSC.1/Circ.1689.

Nigeria notes that the work undertaken by SDC 11 and SDC 12 has provided important clarification on the interpretation of the term "lower part of the space" under SOLAS regulations II-2/13.4.1.1.1 and 13.4.2.1.1, and that no demonstrated safety deficiency requiring amendment of the existing regulations was identified.

In this regard, Nigeria appreciates the need to preserve regulatory consistency, legal certainty and uniform implementation, particularly in the context of differing port State control practices that may create unnecessary operational and compliance challenges for ships already approved by flag Administrations and recognized organizations.

Nigeria therefore sees merit in retaining and revising MSC.1/Circ.1689 rather than revoking it entirely, to clearly communicate the Committee's agreed interpretation and support a harmonized and pragmatic approach by PSC authorities.

Such clarification would help avoid divergent enforcement actions and provide confidence to Administrations, shipowners and recognized organizations while respecting the sovereign responsibility of flag States in approving compliant escape arrangements.

Nigeria supports continued emphasis on cooperation, consistency and practical implementation in the application of SOLAS provisions, with due regard to both safety objectives and regulatory predictability for the industry.

Thank you, Chair.

MSC 111/12/1

Thank you Chair,

Nigeria thanks IACS for the constructive submission contained in document MSC 111/12/1 and acknowledges the efforts of SDC 11 and SDC 12 in clarifying the interpretation of SOLAS regulations II-2/13.4.1.1.1 and 13.4.2.1.1 concerning escape arrangements from the lower part of machinery spaces.

Nigeria notes with appreciation the conclusion reached by the Sub-Committee that no demonstrated safety deficiencies were identified under the current regulatory framework.

At the same time, we recognize the practical concerns highlighted by IACS regarding varying interpretations during port State control inspections and the potential uncertainty this may create for ship operators, Administrations and recognized organizations.

In this regard, Nigeria sees merit in retaining the essential guidance contained in MSC.1/Circ.1689 through an appropriately revised circular, rather than revoking it entirely.

Such an approach would preserve the Committee's agreed interpretation that the "lower part of the space" may refer to the lowest deck level, platform or passageway, while also promoting consistency, predictability and harmonized implementation among PSC authorities.

Nigeria believes that maintaining clear interpretative guidance will support uniform enforcement, reduce avoidable disputes during inspections, and reinforce confidence in approvals granted by flag States in accordance with SOLAS requirements and established safety principles.

Thank you, Chair.

AGENDA ITEM 13

Statement by the delegation of Cook Islands

MSC 111/13 (Secretariat) - Report of the twelfth session of the Sub-Committee (HTW 12)

Thank you, Chair.

The Cook Islands supports the continued development of training provisions for seafarers serving on ships using alternative fuels and new technologies.

In considering paragraph 2.4 of document MSC 111/13, concerning the approval of the draft interim guidelines on training for seafarers on ships using ammonia as fuel, the Cook Islands wishes to recall its statement reflected in paragraph 7.18 of document HTW 12/12.

As stated at HTW 12, safety must remain paramount, and decarbonization objectives should not unduly accelerate decisions in areas where operational experience remains limited. Ammonia, as an atmospheric pollutant, presents a distinct risk profile, including its acute

toxicity, which poses significant risks to the crew and the environment, and it should therefore not be treated as procedurally equivalent to other alternative fuels such as methanol.

The Cook Islands therefore emphasizes the need for continued review of these guidelines, to ensure they follow a precautionary approach and are technically mature and sufficiently robust to adequately minimize risks to seafarers, ships and the marine environment.

Thank you, Chair, and please duly reflect this intervention in the body of the Committee's report and append it to the report.

AGENDA ITEM 14

Statements by the delegation of Nigeria

MSC 111/14/8

Thank you Chair,

Nigeria thanks Canada for document MSC 111/14/8 and commends the comprehensive overview of its national regulatory framework on shipboard fumigation and the practical measures implemented to enhance the safety of seafarers and shore-side personnel.

Nigeria shares the concerns expressed regarding fumigation-related casualties and recognizes the significant risks associated with the handling and use of pesticides in cargo holds, particularly during fumigation in transit.

We welcome the emphasis placed on enhanced crew training, continuous gas monitoring, proper certification, emergency preparedness and strengthened supervision, all of which contribute to improving onboard safety and reducing exposure to toxic substances.

Nigeria supports continued work within the Organization to review and strengthen existing IMO guidance on fumigation practices, taking into account lessons learned from incidents and evolving operational realities.

While recognizing that implementation approaches may vary depending on national circumstances and capacities, Nigeria agrees that clear regulatory frameworks, effective oversight and practical risk-control measures are essential to safeguarding human life at sea.

We therefore support further consideration of the proposal for a new output aimed at improving existing recommendations and encourage balanced discussions on how best to promote uniform safety standards, capacity-building and effective implementation by Member States, particularly developing countries.

Thank you, Chair.

AGENDA ITEM 15

Statements by the delegation of China

Thank you, Chair.

China consistently believes that this Organization, as the authoritative body in the international maritime field, should strictly follow established procedures in its work, as this is the foundation for maintaining the Organization's credibility and operational order. Furthermore, the inspection of certificates of foreign-flagged ships falls exclusively within the purview of port States.

Introducing verification requirements for insurance certificates into ship reporting systems – whereby a coastal State imposes mandatory reporting and inspection requirements for civil liability certificates on ships transiting through straits used for international navigation – is inconsistent with relevant provisions of international conventions such as UNCLOS and SOLAS 1974. The Committee may wish to note that, during last year's UN General Assembly discussions on oceans and the law of the sea, the proposal to grant coastal States the power to verify compulsory liability insurance was also not adopted.

Furthermore, our delegation wishes to convey the concerns recently expressed to us by many shipping organizations. From a navigational perspective, given the navigational channels of straits and other natural conditions, particularly in narrow, congested, or adverse weather situations, imposing additional reporting requirements may distract crew attention and introduce additional risk factors, which runs counter to the original intention of traffic separation schemes. Another potential risk factor is that technical or network interruptions or delays in the reporting submission process – where a ship fails to submit within a specified area or within a specified time – could force the ship to reduce speed or even stop, greatly increasing navigation safety hazards. One may consider: if such a requirement is introduced in this area and sets a precedent, and then all other similar waterways follow suit with similar reporting systems, the cumulative global navigation safety risk would increase significantly.

Finally, our delegation wishes to return to the essence of this debate. At this moment, the most pressing concerns for IMO and the shipping industry – the net-zero framework, substandard ships, and impeded straits – all require one thing in common: an effective multilateral mechanism that is observed by all parties. In this context, placing regional regulations and objectives above international law will only lead to greater disorder in international law, creating greater obstacles to safe and environmentally sound shipping operations. We should not repeatedly affirm freedom of navigation under one agenda item while attempting to impose certain conditions and restrictions under another.

This delegation requests that this statement be reflected in the main body of the meeting report and also attached as an annex to the report. Thank you, Chair.

Statement by the delegation of the Russian Federation (1)

Уважаемый господин Председатель!

Наш документ (MSC 111/15/5) возвращает нас к той напряженной дискуссии, которая состоялась в период сессии Подкомитета NCSR в прошлом году в отношении предложенных изменений (поправок) к обязательным системам судовых сообщений – SOUNDREP и BELTREP, в частности в отношении предоставления прибрежному государству информацию о страховке судов и копии соответствующих судовых страховых свидетельств.

Российская Федерация считает необходимым, прежде всего, обратить внимание Комитета на то, что предлагаемые изменения (поправки) не соответствуют положениям Конвенции ООН по морскому праву (UNCLOS), закрепляющей свободу судоходства и право транзитного прохода через международные проливы, которое не может быть ограничено дополнительными условиями.

Введение обязательного доклада о страховых свидетельствах, также прямо противоречит Правилу V/11 СОЛАС (в частности параграфу 8). Помимо этого, поправки фактически распространяют действие регионального законодательства ЕС - Директивы 2009/20/ЕС - на международные проливы, регулируемые исключительно международным правом. Использование любых ссылок на региональное законодательство в качестве правового основания для предъявления требований к транзитным судам в международных проливах является недопустимым и создаёт

опасный прецедент для аналогичных односторонних ограничений со стороны других прибрежных государств.

Российская Федерация также обращает внимание на нарушение процедур ИМО: документ NCSR 12/3/3(Austria et al.) был представлен всего за два месяца до открытия сессии Подкомитета, тогда как циркуляр MSC.1/Circ.1608 (подпункт 3.2) предписывает, чтобы документы, предлагающие подобные существенные изменения к существующим Обязательным системам судовых сообщений не позднее, чем за шесть месяцев до открытия соответствующей сессии Подкомитета NCSR.

В этой связи Российская Федерация обращает внимание Комитета на то, что в ходе 12-й сессии подкомитета NCSR поднимался вопрос о необходимости проведения юридической оценки предложений государств по Обязательным Системам судовых сообщений (ОССС) до их одобрения. Указанный вопрос не получил должного рассмотрения на сессии Подкомитета, что, по нашему мнению, является существенным пробелом в действующей процедуре и соответственно одной из причин, по которым документ с очевидными правовыми противоречиями был одобрен к утверждению.

Предлагаемые поправки противоречат также существу действующего международно-правового режима контроля страхования судов. Проверка наличия страхового свидетельства на борту отнесена международными конвенциями, а именно, - Конвенцией о гражданской ответственности за ущерб от загрязнения бункерным топливом 2001 года (BUNKERS 2001), Конвенцией о гражданской ответственности за ущерб от загрязнения нефтью 1992 года (CLC 1992) и Найробийской конвенцией об удалении затонувших судов 2007 года (WRC 2007) - исключительно к компетенции государства порта при заходе или выходе судна из порта. Дополнительное требование подтверждать наличие страховки в рамках Обязательной Системы судовых сообщений (ОССС) при транзитном проходе дублирует уже осуществлённый портовый контроль и подрывает доверие к его результатам, а также возлагает на экипаж необоснованную административную нагрузку в момент маневрирования в стеснённых водах. Следует также учитывать, что не все государства являются участниками перечисленных конвенций, что делает применение данного требования непоследовательным и дискриминационным в отношении судов, флаг которых поднят государствами – не являющихся участниками соответствующих договоров.

Исходя из вышеизложенного, Российская Федерация предлагает Комитету отклонить предложенные поправки к ОССС SOUNDREP и BELTREP в части включения требований о предоставлении страховых свидетельств как не имеющих достаточного правового обоснования и противоречащих UNCLOS, СОЛАС и процедурным нормам ИМО, либо рассмотреть возможность применения данного требования исключительно на добровольной основе. Также напоминаем, что по итогам рассмотрения данного вопроса на Подкомитете NCSR Российская Федерация запросила Секретариат провести юридический анализ и представить на Комитет результаты, указав, противоречат ли предлагаемые поправки к системам Обязательных судовых сообщений - Конвенции ООН по морскому праву и правилу V/11 Конвенции СОЛАС, а также резолюции MSC.433(98) или MSC.1/Circ. 1608.

Dear Chair!

Our document (MSC 111/15/5) takes us back to the intense discussion that took place during the NCSR Sub-Committee session last year regarding the proposed changes (amendments) to the mandatory ship reporting systems – SOUNDREP and BELTREP – in particular regarding the provision to the coastal State of information on the insurance of ships and copies of the relevant ship insurance certificates.

The Russian Federation considers it necessary, first of all, to draw the Committee's attention to the fact that the proposed changes (amendments) do not comply with the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which enshrines freedom of

navigation and the right of transit passage through international straits, which cannot be limited by additional conditions.

The introduction of mandatory insurance certificate reporting also directly contradicts SOLAS Regulation V/11 (particularly paragraph 8). Furthermore, the amendments in fact extend the application of EU regional legislation—Directive 2009/20/EC—to international straits, which are governed exclusively by international law. Using any reference on regional legislation as a legal basis for imposing requirements on transit vessels in international straits is unacceptable and creates a dangerous precedent for similar unilateral restrictions by other coastal states.

The Russian Federation also draws attention to a violation of IMO procedures: document NCSR 12/3/3(Austria et al.) was submitted just two months before the opening of the session of the Sub-Committee, while circular MSC.1/Circ.1608 (subparagraph 3.2) prescribes that the documents proposing such significant changes to the existing Mandatory Ship Reporting Systems to be submitted no later than six months before the opening of the relevant session of the NCSR Sub-Committee.

In this regard, the Russian Federation draws the Committee's attention to the fact that during the 12th session of the NCSR Subcommittee, the issue of the need to conduct a legal assessment of States' proposals for Mandatory Ship Reporting Systems (MSRS) prior to their approval was raised. This issue was not adequately addressed at the Sub-Committee session, which, in our view, represents a significant gap in the current procedure and, therefore, one of the reasons why a document with obvious legal contradictions was approved for adoption.

The proposed amendments also contradict the existing international legal regime for monitoring ship insurance. Verification of the presence of an insurance certificate on board is assigned by international conventions—namely, the Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage, 2001 (BUNKERS 2001), the Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 1992 (CLC 1992), and the Nairobi Convention on the Removal of Wrecks, 2007 (WRC 2007)—to the exclusive responsibility of port States upon a vessel's entry into or departure from a port. The additional requirement to confirm insurance coverage under the Mandatory Ship Reporting System (MSRS) during transit duplicates existing port inspections, undermines confidence in their results, and imposes an unreasonable administrative burden on the crew when manoeuvring in confined waters. It should also be taken into account that not all states are parties to the listed conventions, which makes the application of this requirement inconsistent and discriminatory in relation to ships whose flags are raised by states that are not parties to the relevant treaties.

Based on the above, the Russian Federation proposes that the Committee reject the proposed amendments to the SOUNDREP and BELTREP Ship Reporting System in terms of the inclusion of requirements for the provision of insurance certificates as lacking sufficient legal justification and contradicting UNCLOS, SOLAS and IMO procedural standards, or consider the possibility of applying this requirement solely on a voluntary basis. We also recall that, following the consideration of this issue by the NCSR Sub-Committee, the Russian Federation requested the Secretariat to conduct a legal analysis and submit the results to the Committee, indicating whether the proposed amendments to the Mandatory Ship Reporting systems of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and Regulation V/11 of the SOLAS Convention, as well as resolution MSC.433(98) or MSC.1/Circ.1608.

Statement by the delegation of Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)

Gracias Sr Presidente,

Esta delegación desea, en primer lugar, agradecer al World Shipping Council y a la delegación de China Hong Kong por las recepciones ofrecidas el día de ayer, así como a la delegación de Nigeria por la pausa del café que acabamos de disfrutar.

La República Bolivariana de Venezuela agradece a todas las delegaciones que han presentado documentos en este punto de agenda, al tiempo que manifiesta su apoyo pleno al documento MSC 111/15/5 presentado por la Federación de Rusia y a su declaración, a su vez apoyada por la República Popular China, referente al rechazo a las modificaciones obligatorias a los sistemas SOUNDREP y BELTREP ante el MSC 111.

Venezuela considera que exigir certificados de seguros excede el mandato de la regla 5/11 del Convenio SOLAS y vulnera el derecho de paso en tránsito de la CNUDM, intentando imponer legislación regional en estrechos internacionales. Estas medidas duplican innecesariamente las inspecciones del Estado rector del puerto (PSC) y generan graves riesgos operativos al distraer a la tripulación durante maniobras náuticas críticas. Además, exponen información legal confidencial a graves vulnerabilidades de ciberseguridad y discriminan comercialmente a los buques con menor conectividad satelital.

Presidente,

Ante la evidente violación de los plazos procedimentales dictados en la circular MSC.1/Circ.1608, Venezuela solicita rechazar la obligatoriedad de estas medidas. De implementarse, deben ser estrictamente voluntarias para preservar la seguridad marítima, la equidad tecnológica y la libertad de navegación universal.

Venezuela reserva su posición sobre este asunto y solicita que esta declaración sea añadida al informe final del Comité.

Muchas gracias, Señor Presidente.

Statement by the delegation of the Russian Federation (2)

Уважаемый господин Председатель!

В течение последнего времени Российская Федерация последовательно информировала Международную морскую организацию (ИМО) (на предыдущих сессиях нашего Комитета, на сессиях Совета (С134, С 135) и на прошедшей сессии Ассамблеи (А 34) о том, что в период с 2022 по 2025 год признанный ИМО Поставщик услуг подвижной спутниковой связи Инмарсат - компания Инмарсат Глобал Лимитед ввела ограничения в отношении судов под российским флагом, отключив суда от услуг системы подвижной спутниковой связи Инмарсат, признанной компонентом ГМССБ.

Российская Федерация ведет учет судов под российским флагом, отключенных от услуг подвижной спутниковой связи Инмарсат в период с 2022 по 2026 год.

На текущий момент количество российских судов, отключенных компанией Инмарсат Глобал Лтд от услуг системы подвижной спутниковой связи Инмарсат, составляет 179 единиц. С момента проведения 135-ой сессии Совета ИМО (с ноября прошлого года) по настоящее время количество отключенных судов только под флагом Российской Федерации увеличилось более чем на 40 %.

В 2025 году в дополнение к блокировке услуг спутниковой связи, произведенной компанией Инмарсат Глобал Лтд, один из ее провайдеров, компания «Marlink AS», Норвегия, ввела глобальные ограничения в отношении 11 судов под флагом Российской

Федерации, заблокировав на них услуги подвижной спутниковой связи Инмарсат. В качестве причины блокировки указана финансовая задолженность, что не соответствует действительности и, как следствие, нарушает правила оказания услуг подвижной спутниковой связи в ГМССБ.

В этой связи Российская Федерация обращает внимание, что связь общего назначения (general communications), предоставляемая компанией Инмарсат Глобал Лтд, используется на судах, в том числе под российским флагом, для работы судовой аппаратуры системы ОСДР (LRIT) в соответствии с требованиями Правила V/19-1 Конвенции СОЛАС-74. При отключении связи общего назначения компания Инмарсат Глобал Лтд блокирует передачу с судов информации ОСДР в адрес Российского центра системы ОСДР и не позволяет аварийно-спасательным службам получать актуальную информацию о местоположении российских судов для организации поиска и спасания людей и судов, терпящих бедствие на море. Что в явном виде влияет самым негативным образом на обеспечение безопасности мореплавания и защиту человеческих жизней в море – то есть собственно того, для чего вся система ГМССБ и создавалась. Вы только вдумайтесь в эти слова и факты, дамы и господа! Люди на море терпят бедствие (или могут оказаться в этой ситуации), а признанный нашей организацией провайдер блокирует возможность осуществить должным образом поиск и спасание этих людей! Это вообще что такое? Для чего мы тут все с вами нужны вообще тогда, если жизни моряков для нас с вами (или по крайней мере для некоторых в этой Организации) вообще не имеют никакого значения!??? Неудивительно в этой связи, что моряки всё чаще заявляют, что Организация (ИМО) обсуждает всё что угодно, принимает непонятно какие решения, оторванные от реальности, но совершенно забыла про них, про реальных моряков, т.е. тех, для которых эта Организация и должна работать.

Связь общего назначения (general communication), используется и для передачи с судна сигналов Судовой системы тревожного оповещения (SSAS). При угрозе нападения на российские суда возможность передачи сигнала SSAS через аппаратуру системы спутниковой связи Инмарсат блокируется компанией Инмарсат Глобал Лтд. Соответственно моряки могут остаться без необходимой срочной помощи и в этом случае.

Исходя из вышеизложенного, Российская Федерация призывает объективно рассмотреть сложившуюся ситуацию и принять действенные меры с целью исключения подобной практики.

Принимая во внимание использование каналов связи общего назначения для функционирования систем ОСДР(LRIT) и ССТО (SSAS), и ту роль, которую эти системы выполняют в вопросах безопасности мореплавания и сохранения человеческой жизни, Российская Федерация призывает Комитет рассмотреть вопрос внесения соответствующих изменений в главу IV Конвенции СОЛАС, определяющих роль и место услуги связи общего пользования (general communication), предоставляемой признанными операторами спутниковой связи для судов в море.

Российская Федерация призывает страны, которых также коснулись подобные ограничения, присоединиться к данному заявлению.

Сказав это, в заключении, мы бы хотели поблагодарить Секретариат ИМО в лице Директора Maritime Safety Division, а также Генерального директора ИМСО, за их вовлеченность в эту текущую ситуацию и готовность ко всяческому содействию с их стороны.

Dear Chair!

Over the past period, the Russian Federation has consistently informed the International Maritime Organization (IMO) – at previous sessions of our Committee, at sessions of the Council (C 134, C 135) and at the past session of the Assembly (A 34) – that, between 2022 and 2025, the IMO-recognized mobile satellite service provider Inmarsat – namely, Inmarsat Global Limited – introduced restrictions against ships under the Russian flag, disconnecting

them from the services of the Inmarsat mobile satellite communication system recognized as a component of the GMDSS.

The Russian Federation is keeping a record of ships under the Russian flag that have been disconnected from Inmarsat mobile satellite communication services between 2022 and 2026. As of now, the number of Russian ships disconnected by Inmarsat Global Limited from the Inmarsat mobile satellite communication system stands at 179.

Since the 135th session of the IMO Council (November last year) to the present day, the number of disconnected ships under the Russian flag alone has increased by more than 40%. In 2025, in addition to the satellite communication services blocking carried out by Inmarsat Global Limited, one of its providers – Marlink AS of Norway – imposed global restrictions against 11 ships under the Russian flag, blocking Inmarsat mobile satellite communication services on those ships. The stated reason for the blocking is financial indebtedness, which is not true and consequently violates the rules for the provision of mobile satellite communication services in the GMDSS.

In this regard, the Russian Federation draws attention to the fact that general communications provided by Inmarsat Global Limited are used on ships, including those under the Russian flag, for the operation of LRIT shipborne equipment in accordance with Regulation V/19-1 of the SOLAS 74 Convention. When disconnecting general communications, Inmarsat Global Limited blocks the transmission of LRIT information from ships to the Russian LRIT Data Centre and prevents search and rescue authorities from receiving up-to-date position information on Russian ships for the purpose of organizing search and rescue of persons and ships in distress at sea. This clearly has the most negative impact on maritime safety and the protection of human life at sea – i.e., precisely the purpose for which the entire GMDSS was created. Just think about these words and facts, ladies and gentlemen! People are in distress at sea (or may find themselves in that situation), and a provider recognized by our Organization blocks the possibility of properly carrying out search and rescue for those people! What is this all about? Why are we all here at all, if the lives of seafarers mean nothing to us (or at least to some in this Organization)?! It is no wonder, in this context, that seafarers increasingly state that the Organization (IMO) discusses everything under the sun, adopts incomprehensible decisions detached from reality, but has completely forgotten about them – the real seafarers, i.e. those for whom this Organization should serve.

General communications are also used to transmit Ship Security Alert System (SSAS) signals from a ship. When a threat of attack against Russian ships arises, the possibility of transmitting an SSAS signal via Inmarsat satellite communication equipment is blocked by Inmarsat Global Limited. Consequently, seafarers may also be left without the necessary emergency assistance in that case.

Based on the foregoing, the Russian Federation calls for an objective consideration of the current situation and for effective measures to be taken to exclude such practice.

Taking into account the use of general communication channels for the operation of the LRIT and SSAS systems, and the role these systems play in maritime safety and the preservation of human life, the Russian Federation urges the Committee to consider introducing appropriate amendments to Chapter IV of the SOLAS Convention, defining the role and place of the general communication service provided by recognized mobile satellite service operators to ships at sea.

The Russian Federation calls upon countries that have also been affected by such restrictions to associate themselves with this statement.

Having said this, in conclusion we wish to thank the IMO Secretariat, in the person of the Director of the Maritime Safety Division, as well as the Director-General of the IMSO, for their engagement in this ongoing situation and their readiness to provide every possible assistance from their side.

AGENDA ITEM 16

Statement by the delegation of Nigeria

MSC 111/16

Thank you Chair,

Nigeria thanks the Secretariat and the Sub-Committee on Pollution Prevention and Response for the comprehensive work undertaken at PPR 13 and reflected in document MSC 111/16.

Nigeria supports the continued efforts of the Organization to strengthen pollution prevention measures while ensuring that safety, operational practicality and environmental sustainability remain appropriately balanced.

We support the proposed amendments to the IBC Code concerning products listed in List 1 of the MEPC.2/Circular and welcome the continued cooperation between IMO sub-committees in addressing emerging environmental risks, including the potential impacts associated with the shipment of plastic pellets in bulk.

Nigeria also takes note of the work relating to the reduction of volatile organic compound emissions and the associated draft amendments to MARPOL Annex VI.

We recognize the importance of measures aimed at reducing atmospheric emissions from shipping, while emphasizing the need for adequate technical guidance, implementation support and consideration of the operational realities of developing countries and emerging maritime economies.

Nigeria remains committed to constructive engagement in advancing pragmatic, science-based and globally implementable solutions that support both environmental protection and the safe, efficient operation of international shipping.

Thank you Chair.

AGENDA ITEM 19

Statement by the Observer of ITF

Thank you, Chair.

ITF thanks the co-sponsors for document MSC 111/19/3 and supports the proposal for a new output to amend MSC.1/Circ.1264/Rev.1 and MSC.1/Circ.1358/Rev.1.

From the seafarers' perspective, this is an urgent safety matter. The paper showed that at least 49 seafarers and shore workers have died and 86 have been seriously injured following exposure to hazards associated with fumigation of cargo holds since the current

Recommendations were approved. And at least 25 seafarer deaths were due to fumigant entered accommodation spaces during the voyage.

This is not simple implementation issue. There are systemic gaps in the current Recommendations, particularly in relation to periodic monitoring, pre-loading inspection, communication of risks to crews, and the recognition of associated hazards such as oxygen depletion, fire and explosion.

Seafarers should not be expected to manage life-threatening risks without adequate information, equipment and safeguards. The proposed output is therefore necessary, proportionate and directly linked to preventing further loss of life.

ITF supports the action requested in paragraph 35 and invites the Committee to agree to the new output.

We kindly ask that the statement is reflected in the final report.

Thank you chair.

AGENDA ITEM 21

Statement by the delegation of Nigeria

MSC 111/21

Thank you Chair,

Nigeria thanks the Secretariat for the update provided in document MSC 111/21 concerning the continued development of the International Quality Assessment Review Body (IQARB).

Nigeria welcomes the progress made in consolidating IQARB into an independent legal entity and recognizes its growing contribution towards strengthening transparency, consistency and confidence in the quality oversight of recognized organizations.

We note with appreciation the work undertaken through the issuance of Factual Statements, the independent analytical review process, and the efforts to broaden participation among flag States, industry stakeholders and regulatory bodies.

Nigeria further acknowledges that IQARB can serve as a useful complementary mechanism in supporting Member States in fulfilling certain oversight responsibilities under the III Code and the RO Code, while fully preserving the sovereign responsibility of flag Administrations to effectively supervise recognized organizations acting on their behalf.

In this regard, Nigeria supports continued engagement between IMO and IQARB, including the sharing of best practices and the promotion of balanced, inclusive and transparent participation, particularly as discussions evolve regarding non-IACS recognized organizations and future institutional arrangements.

Strengthening confidence in the performance and accountability of recognized organizations remains essential to advancing global maritime safety, environmental protection and effective implementation of IMO instruments.

Thank you Chair.

MSC 111/21/1

Thank you Chair,

Nigeria thanks the Secretariat for the update contained in document MSC 111/21/1 and commends the continued collaboration between IMO, ITU and other stakeholders aimed at strengthening the resilience of telecommunication submarine cables, which remain critical infrastructure for global trade, digital connectivity and maritime operations.

Nigeria recognizes that submarine cables are particularly important for developing economies and coastal States, including those in Africa, where they support financial systems, communications, port operations and broader socio-economic development.

We therefore welcome the outcomes of the Second International Submarine Cable Resilience Summit and support enhanced international cooperation to improve cable protection, monitoring and rapid repair capabilities.

Nigeria also sees merit in the recommendations relating to greater awareness by seafarers of navigation in proximity to submarine cables, as well as improved measures to prevent anchor dragging and related damage.

In this regard, any future consideration within IMO should remain practical, balanced and implementation-oriented, taking into account the realities and capacities of developing countries and the need to avoid undue operational burdens on ships and Administrations.

Nigeria supports continued engagement between IMO and ITU on this matter, including further technical discussions within the relevant Sub-Committees, with a view to strengthening maritime safety, environmental protection and the resilience of global communications infrastructure.

Thank you Chair.

MSC 111/21/2

Thank you Chair,

Nigeria thanks the co-sponsors for document MSC 111/21/2 and welcomes the timely discussion on the increasing integration of artificial intelligence systems into safety-critical marine equipment.

Nigeria recognizes the immense potential of AI technologies to enhance navigational safety, situational awareness, distress response, pollution prevention and overall operational efficiency within the maritime sector.

At the same time, we acknowledge that the growing reliance on AI-driven systems introduces new safety, cybersecurity, accountability and human-element considerations which require careful and coordinated international attention to ensure that innovation does not outpace regulatory preparedness.

Nigeria therefore supports the initiation of discussions towards the development of harmonized IMO performance standards or guidance for AI systems embedded in marine equipment, particularly where such systems perform safety-related functions.

In our view, any future framework should remain practical, risk-based and human-centred, ensuring transparency, reliability, cybersecurity resilience and effective human oversight, while also considering the differing technological capacities of Member States and the need for technical cooperation and capacity-building.

Nigeria believes that IMO is best placed to provide a globally consistent approach that promotes safe innovation, avoids fragmented regulatory regimes and strengthens confidence in the responsible deployment of AI within international shipping.

Thank you Chair.

MSC 111/21/3

Thank you Chair,

Nigeria thanks the International Association of Ports and Harbors (IAPH) for the submission of the Cyber Resilience Guidelines for Emerging Technologies in the Maritime Supply Chain and commends the Association for its proactive leadership in advancing maritime cybersecurity.

Nigeria recognizes that the accelerating deployment of emerging technologies such as Artificial Intelligence, IoT, automation, drones and 5G systems presents enormous opportunities for improving efficiency, sustainability and operational performance across the maritime sector.

At the same time, these technologies introduce increasingly sophisticated cyber risks which require coordinated, forward-looking and resilient governance frameworks.

Nigeria therefore supports the Committee taking note of these Guidelines and considering their inclusion as a relevant industry reference under the revised Guidelines on maritime cyber risk management, MSC-FAL.1/Circ.3/Rev.3.

In doing so, Nigeria underscores the importance of ensuring that cyber resilience measures remain practical, scalable and accessible to developing countries, particularly in the areas of capacity-building, technical cooperation and technology transfer.

Nigeria further encourages continued collaboration between IMO, Member States, industry stakeholders and port authorities to strengthen cyber preparedness across the global maritime supply chain and safeguard confidence in the ongoing digital transformation of international shipping.

Thank you Chair.

MSC 111/21/5 and MSC 111/21/4

Thank you Chair,

Nigeria thanks the Secretariat and IACS for the information provided in documents MSC 111/21/4 and MSC 111/21/5 regarding the development of the International Quality Assessment Review Body (IQARB).

Nigeria welcomes the establishment of IQARB as an important step towards strengthening confidence, transparency and consistency in the oversight of recognized organizations performing statutory functions on behalf of flag Administrations.

Nigeria further supports the proposal for the appointment of an independent IMO observer to IQARB, recognizing that credibility, impartiality and institutional integrity are essential to maintaining trust in the quality assurance framework governing recognized organizations.

In this regard, Nigeria agrees that the observer must remain fully independent of the body under observation, with clear terms of reference and transparent reporting to the Committee.

Such an arrangement will enhance accountability, reinforce uniform implementation of IMO instruments and contribute to the continued strengthening of global maritime safety standards.

Thank you Chair.