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REPORT OF THE MARITIME SAFETY COMMITTEE ON ITS 110TH SESSION

Attached are annexes 30 to 37 to the report of the Maritime Safety Committee on its 110th session (MSC 110/21).

(See documents MSC 110/21/Add.1 for annexes 1 to 13, MSC 110/21/Add.2 for annex 14, and MSC 110/21/Add.3 for annexes 15 to 29)

LIST OF ANNEXES

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ANNEX 30

BIENNIAL STATUS REPORTS[2] OF THE SUB-COMMITTEES

2024-2025 BIENNIUM

Sub-Committee on Carriage of Cargoes and Containers (CCC)									
Reference to SD,[3] if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output for Year 1	Status of output for Year 2[4]	References
1	1.17	Development of guidelines for the use of ammonia cargo as fuel and provisions for the use of alternative fuels other than cargo on gas carriers	2026	MSC	CCC		In progress	In progress	MSC 103/21, para.18.2; MSC 104/18, para. 15.16; MSC 105/20, para. 18.50; MSC 108/20, para. 14.20 and sec.18; MSC 109/22, paras. 14.5 to 14.10 and 19.38.1. CCC 9/14, sec.4, CCC 10/16, sec.4

2 For details, refer to Organizational Planning module of GISIS.

3 Strategic directions:
SD 1: Ensure implementation of IMO instruments supported by capacity development
SD 2: Integrate new, emerging and advancing technologies in the regulatory framework
SD 3: Respond to climate change and reduce greenhouse gas emissions from international shipping
SD 4: Continue to engage in ocean governance
SD 5: Enhance global facilitation, supply chain resilience and security of international trade
SD 6: Address the human element
SD 7: Ensure the regulatory effectiveness of international shipping
SD 8: Ensure organizational effectiveness
OW: Other work

4 CCC 11 is due to meet in September 2025.

Sub-Committee on Carriage of Cargoes and Containers (CCC)									
Reference to SD,[3] if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output for Year 1	Status of output for Year 2[4]	References
2	2.3	Amendments to the IGF Code and development of guidelines for alternative fuels and related technologies	Continuous	MSC	HTW / PPR / SDC / SSE	CCC	Ongoing	Ongoing	MSC 94/21, paras.18.5 and 18.6; MSC 96/25, paras.10.1 to 10.3; MSC 97/22, para.19.2; PPR 6/20, para. 3.39; MSC 102/24, para. 21.4; MSC 106/19, para. 16.42, MSC 108/20, secs.3 and 14; MSC 109/22, secs.3 and 14.
2	2.25	Revision of the Interim recommendations for carriage of liquefied hydrogen in bulk	2026	MSC	CCC		In progress	In progress	MSC 105/20, para. 18.28; MSC 108/20, sec.14, MEPC 82/17, para. 14.12. CCC 8/18, sec.14; CCC 9/14, sec.7; CCC 10/16, sec.14
3	3.8	Development of a safety regulatory framework to support the reduction of GHG emissions from ships using new technologies and alternative fuels	Continuous	MSC	MEPC / III / HTW / CCC / SDC / SSE	MSC	Ongoing	Ongoing	MSC 109/22, sec.6 CCC 10/16, sec.10
6	6.1	Role of the human element	Continuous	MSC / MEPC	III / PPR / CCC / SDC / SSE / NCSR	HTW	No work requested	No work requested	MSC 89/25, paras. 10.10, 10.16, 22.39 and annex 21; MEPC 78/17, paras.10.4 and 13.
6	6.2	Validated model training courses	Continuous	MSC / MEPC	III / PPR / CCC / SDC / SSE / NCSR	HTW	No work requested	No work requested	MSC 100/20, paras. 10.3 to 10.6 and 17.28; MSC 105/20, sec.16, MSC 108/20 PPR 9/21, sec.12; MEPC 79/15, paras. 9.1, 9.14 to 9.15; MEPC 81/16, para.10.1

Sub-Committee on Carriage of Cargoes and Containers (CCC)									
Reference to SD,[3] if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output for Year 1	Status of output for Year 2[4]	References
6	6.15	Revision of resolution A.1050(27) to ensure the safety of personnel entering enclosed spaces on board ships	2024	MSC	III / HTW / PPR / SDC / SSE	CCC	Completed		MSC 101/24, para. 21.48; MSC 104/18, para.15.16; MSC 106/19, para.16.31; MSC 108/20, para.14.15; MSC 110/21, sec.16, MSC resolution CCC 9/14, sec.8; CCC 10/16, sec.8
7	7.1	Unified interpretation of provisions of IMO safety, security, environment, facilitation, liability and compensation-related conventions	Continuous	MSC / MEPC / FAL / LEG	III / PPR / CCC / SDC / SSE / NCSR		Ongoing	Ongoing	MSC 76/23, para.20.3; MSC 78/26, para. 22.12; MSC 108/20, para. 18.13, sec.19, MSC.1/Circ.1456/Rev.1, MSC.1/Circ.1572/Rev.2, MSC.1/Circ.1509/Rev.1, MSC.1/Circ.1511/Rev.1, MSC.1/Circ.1680; MEPC 78/17, sec.4, and paras. 5.6 and 5.7; MEPC 79/15, paras. 4.8, 4.26, 4.27, 6.26 to 6.29; MEPC 80/17, paras. 4.11 and 5.24 CCC 10/16, sec.10
7	7.10	Amendments to the IMDG Code and supplements	Continuous	MSC	CCC		Ongoing	Ongoing	MSC 105/20, para 3.59 and 14.4; MSC 108/20, secs.3 and 14 CCC 10/16, sec.6
7	7.13	Amendments to the IMSBC Code and supplements	Continuous	MSC	CCC		Ongoing	Ongoing	MSC 105/20, para. 14.4 and para. 3.57; MSC 107/20, para. 17.10 and 17.12 CCC 10/16, sec.5
7	7.15	Development of amendments to SOLAS chapter II-2 and the	2028	MSC	CCC	SSE	In progress	In progress	MSC 103/21, para.18.8; SSE 8/20, sec.10;

Sub-Committee on Carriage of Cargoes and Containers (CCC)									
Reference to SD,[3] if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output for Year 1	Status of output for Year 2[4]	References
		FSS Code concerning detection and control of fires in cargo holds and on the cargo deck of container ships							MSC 106/19, sec.9; SSE 9/20, sec.10; SSE 10/20, sec.10; SSE 11/20, sec.12; MSC 110/21, sec.18 CCC 10/16, sec.15
Notes:	MSC 110 extended the target completion year to 2028.								
7	7.20	Develop measures to prevent the loss of containers at sea	2025	MSC	III / HTW / SDC / NCSR	CCC	In progress	In progress	MSC 108/20, para. 3.9 to 3.12 and 3.70, MSC.550(108) CCC 10/16, sec.11
7	7.28	Consideration of reports of incidents involving dangerous goods or marine pollutants in packaged form on board ships or in port areas	Continuous	MSC / MEPC	III	CCC	Ongoing	Ongoing	CCC 7/15, sec.9; CCC 8/18, sec.9; CCC 9/14, sec.9; MSC 109/22, secs.14 and 19 CCC 10/16, sec.9
Notes:	MSC 109 and MEPC 83 changed the type of output from "annual" to "continuous".								
7	7.40	Revision of the Revised guidelines for the preparation of the cargo securing manual (MSC.1/Circ.1353/Rev.2) to include a harmonized performance standard for lashing software to permit lashing software as a supplement to the Cargo Securing Manual	2025	MSC	CCC		In progress	In progress	MSC 108/20, para. 18.18 CCC 10/16, sec.7

Sub-Committee on Human Element, Training and Watchkeeping (HTW)									
Reference to SD, if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output for Year 1	Status of output for Year 2	References
3	3.8	Development of a safety regulatory framework to support the reduction of GHG emissions from ships using new technologies and alternative fuels	Continuous	MSC	MEPC / III / HTW / CCC / SDC / SSE	MSC	Ongoing	Ongoing	MSC 109/22, sec.6 MSC 108/20, para.5.4
6	6.1	Role of the human element	Continuous	MSC / MEPC	III / PPR / CCC / SDC / SSE / NCSR	HTW	Ongoing	Ongoing	MSC 89/25, paras. 10.10, 10.16 and 22.39 and annex 21; MEPC 78/17, paras.10.4 and 13. HTW 11/11, sec.4;
6	6.2	Validated model training courses	Continuous	MSC / MEPC	III / PPR / CCC / SDC / SSE / NCSR	HTW	Ongoing	Ongoing	MSC 100/20, paras. 10.3 to 10.6 and 17.28; MSC 105/20, sec.16, MSC 108/20 PPR 9/21, sec.12; MEPC 79/15, paras. 9.1, 9.14 to 9.15; MEPC 81/16, para.10.1 HTW 11/11, sec.3
6	6.3	Reports on unlawful practices associated with certificates of competency	Continuous	MSC	HTW		Ongoing	Ongoing	MSC 83/28, para.12.2; MSC 109/22, sec.19 HTW 11/11, sec.5
Notes:	MSC 109 changed the type of output from "annual" to "continuous".								
6	6.17	Comprehensive review of the 1978 STCW Convention and Code	2026	MSC	HTW		In progress	In progress	MSC 105/20, para.18.13; MSC 107/20, para. 17.71; MSC 108/20, para. 16.5 HTW 11/11, sec.6

Sub-Committee on Implementation of IMO Instruments (III)									
Reference to SD, if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output for Year 1	Status of output for Year 2[5]	References
1	1.4	Analysis of consolidated audit summary reports	Annual	Assembly	MSC / MEPC / LEG / TCC / III	Council	Completed		MEPC 61/24, para. 11.14.1; MSC 88/26, para. 10.8; C 120/D, para. 7.1 and 7.2; MSC 105/20, para.13.10; MSC 106/19, paras. 14.11 and 16.37; MSC 108/20, paras. 13.8 and 13.9; MSC 109/22, para. 15.11 MEPC 78/17, paras. 10.7 to 10.11; MEPC 79/15, para. 9.3; MEPC 81/16, para.10.7; MEPC 83/17, para.11.6 III 8/19, sec.8; III 9/19, sec.8; III 10/18, sec.8
1	1.5	Non-exhaustive list of obligations under instruments relevant to the IMO Instruments Implementation Code (III Code)	Continuous	MSC / MEPC	III		In progress	Ongoing	MSC 91/22, para. 10.30; MSC 108/20, para. 13.7.3; MSC 109/22, para.15.17 MEPC 77/16, paras. 10.8 and 10.9; MEPC 79/15, para. 9.13; MEPC 81/16, para. 10.9.3; MEPC 83/17, para.11.9 III 8/19, sec.11; III 9/19, sec.11; III 10/18, sec.10
Notes:	MSC 109 and MEPC 83 changed the type of output from "annual" to "continuous".								

[5] III 11 to take place from 21 to 25 July 2025.

Sub-Committee on Implementation of IMO Instruments (III)									
Reference to SD, if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output for Year 1	Status of output for Year 2[5]	References
1	1.11	Measures to harmonize port State control (PSC) activities and procedures worldwide	Continuous	MSC / MEPC	HTW / PPR / NCSR	III	Ongoing	Ongoing	MSC 101/24, para. 21.48; MEPC 75/18, paras. 11.10 and 11.11; MSC 104, para.13.7.1; MSC 108/20, para.13.7.1; MSC 109/22, prar.15.7 MEPC 78/17, paras.7.73 and 9.8; MEPC 79/15, paras. 9.5 and 9.6; MEPC 81/16, para.10.9.1; MEPC 83/17, para.11.9 III 8/19, sec.5; III 9/19, sec.5; III 10/18, sec.5
1	1.14	Development of guidance in relation to Mandatory IMO Member State Audit Scheme (IMSAS) to assist in the implementation of the III Code by Member States	2024	MSC / MEPC	III		Completed		MSC 103/21, para.18.38; MSC 106/19, paras.14.23 and 14.24; MSC 108/20, paras.13.10 to 13.13 MEPC 76/15, paras. 10.2 and 12.5; MEPC 79/15, para. 9.3; MEPC 81/16, para.10.8; MSC-MEPC.2/Circ.19 III 8/19, sec.9; III 9/19, sec.9
Notes:	MSC 108, having concurred with the decision of MEPC 81, approved MSC-MEPC.2/Circ.19 on Guidance in relation to the IMO Member State Audit Scheme (IMSAS) to assist in the implementation of the III Code by Member States.								
1	1.18	Development of guidance on assessment and applications of remote surveys, ISM Code audits and ISPS Code verifications	2025	MSC / MEPC	III		In progress	In progress	MSC 104/18, para.15.5; MSC 106/19, para.14.16; MSC 105/20, para. 18.52; MSC 108/20, para. 13.13; MSC 109/22, para.15.16 MEPC 79/15, para. 9.13; MEPC 81/16, para. 10.1;

Sub-Committee on Implementation of IMO Instruments (III)									
Reference to SD, if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output for Year 1	Status of output for Year 2[5]	References
									MEPC 83/17, para.11.1 III 8/19, sec.12; III 9/19, sec.12; III 10/18, sec.11
Notes:	Target completion year extended to 2025.								
4	4.3	Follow-up work emanating from the Action Plan to Address Marine Plastic Litter from Ships	2027	MEPC	III / HTW / PPR		In progress	In progress	MEPC 78/17, sec.8; MEPC 79/15, sec.8; MEPC 80/17, sec.8; MEPC 83/17, sec.8 III 8/19, sec.14; III 9/19, sec.14; III 10, sec.13
6	6.2	Validated model training courses	Continuous	MSC / MEPC	III / PPR / CCC / SDC / SSE / NCSR	HTW	Ongoing	Ongoing	MSC 100/20, paras. 10.3 to 10.6 and 17.28; MSC 105/20, sec.16, MSC 108/20 PPR 9/21, sec.12; MEPC 79/15, paras. 9.1, 9.14 to 9.15; MEPC 81/16, para.10.1 III 6/15, sec.4; III 8/19, paras. 5.20 to 5.29; III 9/19, sec.6; III 10/18, sec.6
6	6.10	Development of an entrant training manual for PSC personnel	2027	MSC / MEPC	III		Postponed	Postponed	MSC 103/21, para.18.36; MSC 106/19, para.16.46 MEPC 76/15, paras. 10.1, 10.2 and 12.5; MEPC 79/15, para. 9.3 III 9/19, sec.6
Notes:	It will be developed after the finalization of the IMO Model Course 3.09 on Port State Control, which is expected to be validated by III 11.								

Sub-Committee on Implementation of IMO Instruments (III)									
Reference to SD, if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output for Year 1	Status of output for Year 2[5]	References
7	7.1	Unified interpretation of provisions of IMO safety, security, environment, facilitation, liability and compensation-related conventions	Continuous	MSC / MEPC / FAL / LEG	III / PPR / CCC / SDC / SSE / NCSR		Ongoing	Ongoing	MSC 76/23, para. 20.3; MSC 78/26, para. 22.12; MSC 108/20, para. 18.13, sec.19, MSC.1/Circ.1456/Rev.1, MSC.1/Circ.1572/Rev.2, MSC.1/Circ.1509/Rev.1, MSC.1/Circ.1511/Rev.1, MSC.1/Circ.1680; MSC 110/21, para. 11.14, MSC.1/Circ.1692 MEPC 78/17, sec.4, and paras. 5.6 and 5.7; MEPC 79/15, paras. 4.8, 4.26, 4.27, 6.26 to 6.29; MEPC 80/17, paras. 4.11 and 5.24 III 8/19, sec.13; III 9/19, sec.13; III 10/18, sec.12
7	7.4	Lessons learned and safety issues identified from the analysis of marine safety investigation reports	Continuous	MSC / MEPC	III		Completed	Ongoing	MSC 92/26, para. 22.29; MSC 106/19, paras.14.2 to 14.6; MSC 108/20, paras.13.3 to 13.6; MSC 109/22, paras.15.2 to 15.6 MEPC 79/15, para. 9.3; MEPC 81/16, para. 10.6; MEPC 83/17, paras.11.2 and 11.3 III 8/19, sec.4; III 9/19, sec.4; III 10/18, sec.4
Notes:	MSC 109 and MEPC 83 changed the type of output from "annual" to "continuous".								

Sub-Committee on Implementation of IMO Instruments (III)									
Reference to SD, if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output for Year 1	Status of output for Year 2[5]	References
7	7.5	Identified issues relating to the implementation of IMO instruments from the analysis of data	Continuous	MSC / MEPC	III		Completed	Ongoing	MSC 96/25, para.23.13; MSC 106/19, paras.14.12 and 16. MSC 108/20, para.13.4; MSC 109/22, para.15.3 MEPC 79/15, paras. 12.13 and 12.14; MEPC 81, para.10.3; MEPC 83/17, para.11.1 III 8/19, sec.7; III 9/19, sec.7; III 10/18, sec.7
Notes:	MSC 109 and MEPC 83 changed the type of output from "annual" to "continuous".								
7	7.7	Consideration and analysis of reports on alleged inadequacy of port reception facilities	Continuous	MEPC	III		Completed	Ongoing	MEPC 69/21, para. 19.11; MEPC 73/19, paras. 8.3 and 8.11; MEPC 74/18, paras. 4.33, 4.34 and 8.22 IMEPC 79/15, paras. 9.3 and 9.4; MEPC 81/16, para.10.2; MEPC 83/17, para.11.1 III 8/19, sec.3; III 9/19, sec.3; III 10/18, sec.3
7	7.27	Updated Survey Guidelines under the Harmonized System of Survey and Certification (HSSC)	Continuous	MSC / MEPC	III		In progress	Ongoing	MSC 79/23, paras. 9.19 and 9.20; MSC 104, para.13.7.2; MSC 106/19, paras.14.13 to 14; MSC 108/20, para.13.7.2; MSC 109/22, sec.15. MEPC 68/21, paras. 14.5 and 14.6; MEPC 72/17, paras. 7.4 and 4.24 to 4.33;

Sub-Committee on Implementation of IMO Instruments (III)									
Reference to SD, if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output for Year 1	Status of output for Year 2[5]	References
									MEPC 77/16, para.10.7; MEPC 79/15, paras. 9.7 to 9.9; MEPC 81/16, para.10.9.2; MEPC 83/17, para.11.9 III 8/19, sec.10; III 9/19, sec.10; III 10/18, sec.9
Notes:	MSC 109 and MEPC 83 changed the type of output from "annual" to "continuous".								
7	7.45	Development of guidance to assist competent authorities in the implementation of the Cape Town Agreement of 2012	2024	MSC	III		Completed		MSC 106/19, paras.16.17 and 16.46; MSC 108/20, 13.14; MSC 109/22, paras.15.12 to 15.15; Res.MSC.571(109) III 9/19, sec.15; III 10/18, sec.14
Notes:	MSC 109 adopted resolution MSC.571(109) on guidance to assist competent authorities in the implementation of the Cape Town Agreement of 2012.								

Sub-Committee on Navigation, Communications and Search and Rescue (NCSR)									
Reference to SD, if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output for Year 1	Status of output for Year 2	References
1	1.3	Revision of the criteria for the provision of mobile satellite communication services in the Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (GMDSS) (resolution A.1001(25))	2024	MSC	NCSR		Completed		MSC 101/24, para.21.33; MSC 107/20, para. 17.77.2, MSC 108/20, sec.12, MSC 109/22, para. 13.11 and annex 14 NCSR 9/24, sec.11; NCSR 10/22, sec.11; NCSR 11/19, sec.11 and annex 7
1	1.11	Measures to harmonize port State control (PSC) activities and procedures worldwide	Continuous	MSC / MEPC	HTW / PPR / NCSR	III	No work requested	No work requested	MSC 101/24, para. 21.48; MEPC 75/18, paras. 11.10 and 11.11; MSC 104, para.13.7.1; MSC 108/20, para.13.7.1; MSC 109/22, prar.15.7 MEPC 78/17, paras.7.73 and 9.8; MEPC 79/15, paras. 9.5 and 9.6; MEPC 81/16, para.10.9.1; MEPC 83/17, para.11.9
1	1.34	Development of global maritime SAR services, including harmonization of maritime and aeronautical procedures and amendments to the IAMSAR Manual	Continuous	MSC	NCSR		Ongoing	Ongoing	MSC 108/20, sec.12; MSC 109/22, para. 13.4 and annex 11, MSC.1/Circ.1686; NCSR 12/20, section 7
1	1.35	Review of the appropriateness and effectiveness of SOLAS regulation IV/5 (Provision of radiocommunication services)	2025	MSC	NCSR		Completed		MSC 106/19, para. 16.37; MSC 107/20, para. 17.78.3; MSC 109/22, para. 13.10 NCSR 11/19, sec.10

Sub-Committee on Navigation, Communications and Search and Rescue (NCSR)									
Reference to SD, if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output for Year 1	Status of output for Year 2	References
2	2.1	Response to matters related to the ITU-R Study Groups and ITU World Radiocommunication Conference	Continuous	MSC	NCSR		Ongoing	Ongoing	MSC 106/19, paras.13.28 to 13.33; MSC 107/20, paras. 15.4 and 15.5 and annex 36; NCSR 12/20, section 6 and annexes 7 and 8
2	2.12	Development of guidance to establish a framework for data distribution and global IP-based connectivity between shore-based facilities and ships for ECDIS S100 products	2026	MSC	NCSR			In progress	MSC 109/22, paras.19.27 to 19.34; NCSR 12/20, section 14
2	2.14	Development of procedures and requirements for the recognition of augmentation systems in the World-wide radionavigation system	2025	MSC	NCSR			Completed	MSC 107/20, para. 17.58.1; NCSR 12/20, section 8 and annex 9
2	2.17	Development of guidelines for software maintenance of shipboard navigation and communication equipment and systems	2026	MSC	NCSR			Completed	MSC 107/20, para. 17.33; NCSR 12/20, section 10 and annex 16
2	2.18	Development of guidelines for EPIRB which implement the two-way communication service via the SAR/Galileo Return Link service as a complement to EPIRB performance standards (resolution MSC.471(101))	2026		NCSR			In progress	MSC 107/20, para. 17.35

Sub-Committee on Navigation, Communications and Search and Rescue (NCSR)									
Reference to SD, if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output for Year 1	Status of output for Year 2	References
2	2.19	Revision of the Performance Standards for Shipborne BeiDou Satellite Navigation System (BDS) Receiver Equipment (resolution MSC.379(93))	2025	MSC	NCSR			Completed	MSC 107/20, para. 17.55; NCSR 12/20, section 13 and annex 18
2	2.27	Development of performance standards for a digital navigational data system (NAVDAT)	2024	MSC	NCSR		Completed		MSC 103/21, para.18.18; MSC 106/19, para.16.47.1.2, MSC 108/20, para. 12.19, MSC 109/22, paras. 13.9 and 19.43; resolutions MSC.569 (109) and MSC.509(105)/Rev.1. NCSR 10/22, sec.8, MSC 108/20, para. 12.19; NCSR 11/19, sec.8, annexes 5 and 6
2	2.28	Development of amendments to SOLAS chapters IV and V and performance standards and guidelines to introduce VHF Data Exchange System (VDES)	2025	MSC	NCSR			Completed	MSC 103/21, para.18.12; MSC 106/19, para. 16.47.1.1; MSC 109/22, para.19.43; NCSR 12/20, section 9 and annexes 10 to 15
Notes:	MSC 109 extended the target completion year to 2025.								
6	6.1	Role of the human element	Continuous	MSC / MEPC	III / PPR / CCC / SDC / SSE / NCSR	HTW	No work requested	No work requested	MSC 89/25, paras. 10.10, 10.16 and 22.39 and annex 21; MEPC 78/17, paras. 10.4 and 13.

Sub-Committee on Navigation, Communications and Search and Rescue (NCSR)									
Reference to SD, if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output for Year 1	Status of output for Year 2	References
6	6.2	Validated model training courses	Continuous	MSC / MEPC	III / PPR / CCC / SDC / SSE / NCSR	HTW	Ongoing	Ongoing	MSC 100/20, paras. 10.3 to 10.6 and 17.28; MSC 105/20, sec.16, MSC 108/20 PPR 9/21, sec.12; MEPC 79/15, paras. 9.1, 9.14 to 9.15; MEPC 81/16, para.10.1; NCSR 12/20, section 14 and annex 19
7	7.1	Unified interpretation of provisions of IMO safety, security, environment, facilitation, liability and compensation-related conventions	Continuous	MSC / MEPC / FAL / LEG	III / PPR / CCC / SDC / SSE / NCSR		Ongoing	Ongoing	MSC 76/23, para. 20.3; MSC 78/26, para. 22.12; MSC 108/20, para. 18.13, sec.19, MSC.1/Circ.1456/Rev.1, MSC.1/Circ.1572/Rev.2, MSC.1/Circ.1509/Rev.1, MSC.1/Circ.1511/Rev.1, MSC.1/Circ.1680; MSC 110/21, para. 11.14, MSC.1/Circ.1692 MEPC 78/17, sec.4, and paras. 5.6 and 5.7; MEPC 79/15, paras. 4.8, 4.26, 4.27, 6.26 to 6.29; MEPC 80/17, paras. 4.11 and 5.24
7	7.2	Developments in GMDSS services, including guidelines on maritime safety information (MSI)	Continuous	MSC	NCSR		Ongoing	Ongoing	MSC 108/20, sec.12, MSC.1/Circ.1310/Rev.2, NCSR 12/20, section 5, and annexes 5 and 6

Sub-Committee on Navigation, Communications and Search and Rescue (NCSR)									
Reference to SD, if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output for Year 1	Status of output for Year 2	References
7	7.20	Develop measures to prevent the loss of containers at sea	2025	MSC	III / HTW / SDC / NCSR	CCC	No work requested	No work requested	MSC 108/20, para. 3.9 to 3.12 and 3.70, MSC.550(108)
7	7.22	Routeing measures and ship reporting systems	Continuous	MSC	NCSR		Ongoing	Ongoing	MSC 108/20, para. 12.4, SN.1/Circ.343; MSC 109/22, para.13.3, COLREG.2/Circ.81, SN.1/Circ.344; NCSR 12/20, section 3 and annexes 1 to 4; SN.1/Circ.272/Add.3
7	7.23	Updates to the LRIT system	Continuous	MSC	NCSR		Ongoing	Ongoing	NCSR 12/20, section 4
7	7.44	Revision of SOLAS regulation V/23 and associated instruments to improve the safety of pilot transfer arrangements	2024	MSC	NCSR		Completed		MSC 106/19, paras.16.12 to.14; MSC 109/22, paras.13.14 to 13.19 and annexes 15 to 22; MSC 110/21, sec.3 NCSR 11/19, sec.13 and annexes 8 to 13
7	7.49	Development of guidelines for the use of electronic nautical publications (ENP)	2025	MSC	NCSR		In progress	Completed	MSC 104/15/4, MSC 105/20, para. 18.11; NCSR 12/20, section 12 and annex 17
7	7.50	Identification of measures to improve the security and integrity aspects of AIS	2025	MSC	NCSR		Completed		MSC 107/20, para. 17.77; MSC 109/22, para.13.20; Res.MSC.570(109), NCSR 11/19, sec.14 and annex 14

Sub-Committee on Ship Design and Construction (SDC)									
Reference to SD, if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output for Year 1	Year 2	References
1	1.16	Experience-building phase (EBP) for the reduction of underwater radiated noise from shipping	2026	MEPC	SDC		In progress	In progress	MSC 110/21, sec.11; MSC 108/20, par.18.24; MSC 107/20, par. 12.24 and MSC 105/20, par. 15.23; MEPC 81/16, paras. 10.11-10.16 and MEPC 78/17 para. 10.3 SDC 11/17, sec.15; SDC 10/17, par. 5.21; SDC 9/16, sec.5; SDC 8/18, sec.14 and annex 11;
Notes:	SDC 10 completed the work on the output; MEPC 82 approved the *Revised guidelines for the reduction of underwater radiated noise from shipping to address adverse impacts on marine life* (MEPC.1/Circ.906/Rev.1) and the Action Plan for the reduction of underwater noise from commercial shipping (MEPC 82/17, paras. 9.7 and 9.15). Furthermore, MEPC 82 agreed to change the title of output 1.16 from "Review of the 2014 Guidelines for the reduction of underwater noise from commercial shipping to address adverse impacts on marine life (MEPC.1/Circ.833) (2014 Guidelines) and identification of next steps" to "Experience-building phase (EBP) for the reduction of underwater radiated noise from shipping" and extended its target completion year from 2024 to 2026 (MEPC 82/17, para. 9.16).								
2	2.3	Amendments to the IGF Code and development of guidelines for alternative fuels and related technologies	Continuous	MSC	HTW / PPR / SDC / SSE	CCC	Ongoing	Ongoing	MSC 94/21, paras.18.5 and 18.6; MSC 96/25, paras.10.1 to 10.3; MSC 97/22, para.19.2; PPR 6/20, para. 3.39; MSC 102/24, para. 21.4; MSC 106/19, para. 16.42, MSC 108/20, secs.3 and 14; MSC 109/22, secs.3 and 14.
2	2.4	Further development of the IP Code and associated guidance	2025	MSC	SDC		In progress	Completed	MSC 104/18, par. 11.5; MSC 105/20, sec.15, MSC 106/19, sec.3; resolutions MSC.521(106) & MSC.527(106), MSC 108/20,sec.15;MSC 110, para.11.3 and 11.4 SDC 10/17, sec.4; SDC 11/17, para. 4.11
Notes:	MSC 105 renamed the output from "Mandatory instrument and/or provisions addressing safety standards for the carriage of more than 12 industrial personnel on board vessels engaged on international voyages"; MSC 107 extended the target completion year to 2025 (MSC 107/20, proposed biennial agenda 2024-25).								

Sub-Committee on Ship Design and Construction (SDC)									
Reference to SD, if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output for Year 1	Year 2	References
2	2.5	Safety objectives and functional requirements of the Guidelines on alternative design and arrangements for SOLAS chapter II-1	2024	MSC	SSE	SDC	Completed		MSC 82/24, para.3.92; MSC 98/23, annex 38; MSC 102/24, para. 19.16. MSC 105/20, para. 15.13 and 18.54, MSC 108/20, para. 15.8, MSC.1/Circ.1212/Rev.2 SDC 10/17, par. 7.11
2	2.6	Guidelines for use of Fibre-Reinforced Plastics (FRP) within ship structures	2026	MSC	SDC		In progress	In progress	MSC 98/23, par. 10.22; MSC 107/20, par. 17.89; MSC 110/21, para. 18.105
Notes:	MSC 110 extended the target completion year to 2026.								
2	2.9	Revision of SOLAS chapters II-1 (part C) and V, and related instruments regarding steering and propulsion requirements, to address both traditional and non-traditional propulsion and steering systems	2028	MSC	SSE	SDC	In progress	In progress	MSC 105/20, par. 18.23; MSC 107/20, par. 12.4; MSC 110/20, par. 11.12
2	2.20	Development of Guidelines for emergency towing arrangements for ships other than tanker and revision of appendices A and B of MSC.1/Circ.1175	2025	MSC	SDC		In progress	Completed	MSC 107/20, para. 12.12, MSC 108/20, paras. 15.2 to.4; MSC 110/21, para. 11.2 SDC 8/18, sec.12; SDC 9/16, paras. 9.15 and 9.16; SDC 11/17, para. 3.17

Sub-Committee on Ship Design and Construction (SDC)									
Reference to SD, if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output for Year 1	Year 2	References
		/Rev.1							
Notes:	MSC 108 expanded this output to absorb post-biennial output 214 on the "Revision of appendices A and B of the Revised guidance on shipboard towing and mooring equipment (MSC.1/Circ.1175/Rev.1)".								
3	3.8	Development of a safety regulatory framework to support the reduction of GHG emissions from ships using new technologies and alternative fuels	Continuous	MSC	MEPC / III / HTW / CCC / SDC / SSE	MSC	Ongoing	Ongoing	MSC 109/22, sec.6
6	6.1	Role of the human element	Continuous	MSC / MEPC	III / PPR / CCC / SDC / SSE / NCSR	HTW	No work requested	Ongoing	MSC 89/25, paras. 10.10, 10.16 and 22.39 and annex 21; MEPC 78/17, paras. 10.4 and 13.
6	6.2	Validated model training courses	Continuous	MSC / MEPC	III / PPR / CCC / SDC / SSE / NCSR	HTW	No work requested	No work requested	MSC 100/20, paras. 10.3 to 10.6 and 17.28; MSC 105/20, sec.16, MSC 108/20 PPR 9/21, sec.12; MEPC 79/15, paras. 9.1, 9.14 to 9.15; MEPC 81/16, para.10.1
6	6.15	Revision of resolution A.1050(27) to ensure the safety of personnel entering enclosed spaces on board ships	2024	MSC	III / HTW / PPR / SDC / SSE	CCC	No work requested	No work requested	MSC 101/24, para. 21.48; MSC 104/18, para. 15.16; MSC 106/19, para. 16.31; MSC 108/20, para. 14.15; MSC 110/21, sec.16, MSC resolution
7	7.1	Unified interpretation of provisions of IMO	Continuous	MSC / MEPC /	III / PPR / CCC /		Ongoing	Ongoing	MSC 76/23, para. 20.3; MSC 78/26, para. 22.12; MSC 108/20, para. 18.13,

Sub-Committee on Ship Design and Construction (SDC)									
Reference to SD, if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output for Year 1	Year 2	References
		safety, security, environment, facilitation, liability and compensation-related conventions		FAL / LEG	SDC / SSE / NCSR				sec.19, MSC.1/Circ.1456/Rev.1, MSC.1/Circ.1572/Rev.2, MSC.1/Circ.1509/Rev.1, MSC.1/Circ.1511/Rev.1, MSC.1/Circ.1680; MSC 110/21, para. 11.14, MSC.1/Circ.1692 MEPC 78/17, sec.4, and paras. 5.6 and 5.7; MEPC 79/15, paras. 4.8, 4.26, 4.27, 6.26 to 6.29; MEPC 80/17, paras. 4.11 and 5.24
7	7.20	Develop measures to prevent the loss of containers at sea	2025	MSC	III / HTW / SDC / NCSR	CCC	No work requested	No work requested	MSC 108/20, para. 3.9 to 3.12 and 3.70, MSC.550(108)
7	7.21	Amendments to the 2011 ESP Code	Continuous	MSC	SDC		Ongoing	Ongoing	MSC 92/26, para.13.31; MSC 107/20, par. 12.2; MSC 108/20, sec.3 and par. 15.5, MSC.553(108); MSC 110/21, sec.3 and par. 11.7
7	7.25	Amendment to regulation 25 of the of the 1988 Load Line Protocol regarding the requirement for setting of guard rails on the deck structure	2025	MSC	SDC		In progress	Completed	MSC 108/20, para. 15.23.1; MSC 110/21, para. 11.13 SSE 11/17, para. 9.6
7	7.35	Amendments to the Guidelines for construction, installation, maintenance and inspection/survey of means of	2025	MSC	SSE	SDC	In progress	Completed	MSC 106/19, par.16.28; MSC 108/20, par.15.23.1; MSC 110/21, para. 11.11 SDC 11/17, para. 7.7

Sub-Committee on Ship Design and Construction (SDC)									
Reference to SD, if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output for Year 1	Year 2	References
		embarkation and disembarkation (MSC.1/Circ.1331) concerning the rigging of safety netting on accommodation ladders and gangways							
Notes:	MSC 108 extended the target completion year to 2025								
7	7.42	Revision of the Interim explanatory notes for the assessment of passenger ship systems' capabilities after a fire or flooding casualty (MSC.1/Circ.1369) and related circulars	2027	MSC	HTW / SSE	SDC	In progress	In progress	MSC 110/20, sec.18; MSC 108/20, par. 15.23.3; MSC 105/20, paras15.24.2 and 18.54; MSC 103/21, para. 18.31.
Notes:	MSC 108 extended the target completion year to 2025 and MSC 110 extended it to 2027.								
7	7.47	Review of the 2009 Code on Alerts and Indicators	2026	MSC	SSE / NCSR	SDC	In progress	Completed	MSC 108/20, para. 18.24.2; MSC 110/21, para.11.21 and 18.105 SDC 11/17, para. 12.9

Sub-Committee on Ship Systems and Equipment (SSE)									
Reference to SD, if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output for Year 1	Status of output for Year 2	References
2	2.3	Amendments to the IGF Code and development of guidelines for alternative fuels and related technologies	Continuous	MSC	HTW / PPR / SDC / SSE	CCC	No work requested	No work requested	MSC 94/21, paras.18.5 and 18.6; MSC 96/25, paras.10.1 to 10.3; MSC 97/22, para.19.2; PPR 6/20, para. 3.39; MSC 102/24, para. 21.4; MSC 106/19, para. 16.42, MSC 108/20, secs.3 and 14; MSC 109/22, secs.3 and 14.
2	2.5	Safety objectives and functional requirements of the Guidelines on alternative design and arrangements for SOLAS chapter II-1	2024	MSC	SSE	SDC	No work requested	No work requested	MSC 82/24, para.3.92; MSC 98/23, annex 38; MSC 102/24, para. 19.16. MSC 105/20, para. 15.13 and 18.54, MSC 108/20, para. 15.8, MSC.1/Circ.1212/Rev.2
2	2.9	Revision of SOLAS chapters II-1 (part C) and V, and related instruments regarding steering and propulsion requirements, to address both traditional and non-traditional propulsion and steering systems	2028	MSC	SSE	SDC	No work requested	No work requested	MSC 105/20, par. 18.23; MSC 107/20, par. 12.4; MSC 110/20, par. 11.12
2	2.16	Revision of SOLAS chapter III and the International Life-Saving Appliance (LSA) Code	2027	MSC	SSE		Extended	In progress	MSC 108/20, para. 18.25; MSC 109/22, para. 19.48; MSC 110/21, sec.14 SSE 7/21, sec.5;SSE 8/20, sec.5; SSE 9/20, sec.5; SSE 10/20, sec.5; SSE 11/20, sec.5

Sub-Committee on Ship Systems and Equipment (SSE)									
Reference to SD, if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output for Year 1	Status of output for Year 2	References
Notes:	To remove gaps, inconsistencies and ambiguities based on the safety objectives, functional requirements and expected performance for SOLAS chapter III. MSC 109 extended the target completion year to 2027.								
3	3.8	Development of a safety regulatory framework to support the reduction of GHG emissions from ships using new technologies and alternative fuels	Continuous	MSC	MEPC / III / HTW / CCC / SDC / SSE	MSC	No work requested	No work requested	MSC 109/22, sec.6
5	5.11	Review and update of the Code of practice for atmospheric oil mist detectors (MSC.1/Circ.1086)	2026	MSC	SSE		No work requested	Completed	MSC 107/20, para. 17.39; SSE 11/20 para. 7.7; MSC 110/21, para.14.14, MSC.1/Circ.1086/Rev.1 SSE 10/20 para. 17.16; SSE 11/20 para. 7.7
6	6.1	Role of the human element	Continuous	MSC / MEPC	III / PPR / CCC / SDC / SSE / NCSR	HTW	No work requested	No work requested	MSC 89/25, paras. 10.10, 10.16 and 22.39 and annex 21; MEPC 78/17, paras. 10.4 and 13.
6	6.2	Validated model training courses	Continuous	MSC / MEPC	III / PPR / CCC / SDC / SSE / NCSR	HTW	Ongoing	Ongoing	MSC 100/20, paras. 10.3 to 10.6 and 17.28; MSC 105/20, sec.16, MSC 108/20 PPR 9/21, sec.12; MEPC 79/15, paras. 9.1, 9.14 to 9.15; MEPC 81/16, para.10.1 SSE 10/20, sec.11, SSE 11/20, sec.11
6	6.15	Revision of resolution A.1050(27) to ensure the safety of personnel entering enclosed spaces on board ships	2024	MSC	III / HTW / PPR / SDC / SSE	CCC	No work requested	No work requested	MSC 101/24, para. 21.48; MSC 104/18, para. 15.16; MSC 106/19, para. 16.31; MSC 108/20, para. 14.15;

Sub-Committee on Ship Systems and Equipment (SSE)									
Reference to SD, if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output for Year 1	Status of output for Year 2	References
									MSC 110/21, sec.16, MSC resolution
7	7.1	Unified interpretation of provisions of IMO safety, security, environment, facilitation, liability and compensation-related conventions	Continuous	MSC / MEPC / FAL / LEG	III / PPR / CCC / SDC / SSE / NCSR		Ongoing	Ongoing	MSC 76/23, para. 20.3; MSC 78/26, para. 22.12; MSC 108/20, para. 18.13, sec.19, MSC.1/Circ.1456/Rev.1, MSC.1/Circ.1572/Rev.2, MSC.1/Circ.1509/Rev.1, MSC.1/Circ.1511/Rev.1, MSC.1/Circ.1680; MSC 110/21, para. 11.14, MSC.1/Circ.1692 MEPC 78/17, sec.4, and paras. 5.6 and 5.7; MEPC 79/15, paras. 4.8, 4.26, 4.27, 6.26 to 6.29; MEPC 80/17, paras. 4.11 and 5.24 SSE 10/20 sec.12, SSE 11/20 sec.10
7	7.14	Revision of the provisions for helicopter facilities in SOLAS and the MODU Code	2024	MSC	SSE		Completed		SSE 10/20, sec.9; MSC 109.22, para. 12.11 SSE 10/20, para. 9.5
Notes:	MSC 109 decided that this output had been completed.								
7	7.15	Development of amendments to SOLAS chapter II-2 and the FSS Code concerning detection and control of fires in cargo holds and on the cargo deck of container ships	2028	MSC	CCC	SSE	In progress	In progress	MSC 103/21, para.18.8; SSE 8/20, sec.10; MSC 106/19, sec.9; SSE 9/20, sec.10; SSE 10/20, sec.10; SSE 11/20, sec.12;

Sub-Committee on Ship Systems and Equipment (SSE)									
Reference to SD, if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output for Year 1	Status of output for Year 2	References
									MSC 110/21, sec.18 SSE 11/20, sec.12
Notes:	MSC 110 extended the target completion year to 2028								
7	7.19	Amendments to the LSA Code for thermal performance of immersion suits	2027	MSC	SSE		In progress	In progress	MSC 92/26, para.13.34; SSE 9/20, sec.7; SSE 10/20, sec.15; SSE 11/20, sec.15, MSC 110/21, sec.18 SSE 11/20, sec.15
Notes:	MSC 109 extended the target completion year to 2025 and MSC 110 extended it to 2027.								
7	7.29	Comprehensive review of the requirements for maintenance, thorough examination, operational testing, overhaul and repair of lifeboats and rescue boats, launching appliances and release gear (resolution MSC.402(96)) to address challenges with their implementation	2027	MSC	SSE		In progress	In progress	SSE 10/20, sec.14; SSE 11/20, sec.14; MSC 110/21, sec.18 SSE 11/20, sec.14
7	7.30	Amendments to SOLAS chapter III and chapter IV of the LSA Code to require the carriage of self-righting or canopied reversible liferafts for new ships	2027	MSC	SSE		In progress	In progress	MSC 109/22, sec.12; MSC 110/21, sec.18 SSE 10/20, sec.6; SSE 11/20, sec.6
7	7.32	Development of amendments to paragraph 8.3.5 and annex 1 of the 1994 and 2000 HSC Codes	2024	MSC	SSE		Completed		MSC 109/22, sec.12
7	7.33	Development of design and prototype test requirements for the arrangements used in the operational	2025	MSC	SSE		In progress	Completed	SSE 10/20, sec.4; SSE 11/20, para. 4.18.2; MSC 110/21, sec.14 SSE 11/20, para. 4.18.2

Sub-Committee on Ship Systems and Equipment (SSE)									
Reference to SD, if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output for Year 1	Status of output for Year 2	References
		testing of free-fall lifeboat release systems without launching the lifeboat							
7	7.34	Revision of the 2010 FTP Code to allow for new fire protection systems and materials	2026	MSC	SSE		In progress	In progress	SSE 10/20, sec.8; MSC 109/22, sec.12; SSE 11/20, sec.8; MSC 110/21, sec.14 SSE 11/20, sec.8
7	7.35	Amendments to the Guidelines for construction, installation, maintenance and inspection/survey of means of embarkation and disembarkation (MSC.1/Circ.1331) concerning the rigging of safety netting on accommodation ladders and gangways	2025	MSC	SSE	SDC	No work requested	No work requested	MSC 106/19, par.16.28; MSC 108/20, par.15.23.1; MSC 110/21, para. 11.11
Notes:	MSC 108 extended the target completion year to 2025.								
7	7.36	New requirements for ventilation of survival craft	2027	MSC	SSE		In progress	In progress	MSC 97/22, para.19.22; SSE 8/20, sec.3; MSC 106/19, sec.11; MSC 107/20, sec.14; SSE 10/20, sec.3; MSC 108/20, para. 18.25. MSC 109/22, sec.12; SSE 11/20, sec.3; MSC 110/21, sec.18 SSE 11/20, sec.3
Notes:	MSC 109 extended the target completion year to 2025 for further discussion on the compelling need; MSC 110 extended the target completion year to 2027.								

Sub-Committee on Ship Systems and Equipment (SSE)									
Reference to SD, if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output for Year 1	Status of output for Year 2	References
7	7.37	Evaluation of adequacy of fire protection, detection and extinction arrangements in vehicle, special category and ro-ro spaces in order to reduce the fire risk of ships carrying new energy vehicles	2027	MSC	SSE		In progress	In progress	SSE 10/20, sec.16; SSE 11/20, sec.16 SSE 11/20, sec.16
7	7.41	Development of provisions to consider prohibiting the use of fire-fighting foams containing fluorinated substances, in addition to PFOS for fire-fighting on board ships	2026	MSC	SSE		In progress	In progress	MSC 101/24, para.21.27; MSC 102/24, paras. 19.31 and 21.19; SSE 8/20, sec.12; MSC 106/19, sec.11; SSE 9/20, sec.15; MSC 107/20, sec.14; SSE 10/20, sec.13; SSE 11/20, sec.13; MSC 110/21, sec.18 SSE 10/20, sec.13; SSE 11/20, sec.13
7	7.42	Revision of the Interim explanatory notes for the assessment of passenger ship systems' capabilities after a fire or flooding casualty (MSC.1/Circ.1369) and related circulars	2027	MSC	HTW / SSE	SDC	No work requested	No work requested	MSC 110/20, sec.18; MSC 108/20, par. 15.23.3; MSC 105/20, paras. 15.24.2 and 18.54; MSC 103/21, para. 18.31.
Notes:	MSC 108 extended the target completion year to 2025.								
7	7.47	Review of the 2009 Code on Alerts and Indicators	2026	MSC	SSE / NCSR	SDC	No work requested	No work requested	MSC 108/20, para. 18.24.2; MSC 110/21, para.11.21 and 18.105
7	7.48	Review and update SOLAS regulation II-2/9 on containment of fire to incorporate existing guidance and clarify requirements	2026	MSC	SSE		In progress	In progress	MSC 104/15/2; MSC 105/20, paras. 18.8 and 18.9; MSC 109/22, para.12.10 SSE 11/20, sec.9

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ANNEX 31

PROVISIONAL AGENDAS FOR THE FORTHCOMING SESSIONS OF THE SUB-COMMITTEES

PROVISIONAL AGENDA FOR CCC 11

Opening of the session

1 Adoption of the agenda

2 Decisions of other IMO bodies

3 Amendments to the IGF Code and development of guidelines for alternative fuels and related technologies (2.3)

4 Development of guidelines for the use of ammonia cargo as fuel and provisions for the use of alternative fuels other than cargo on gas carriers (1.17)

5 Amendments to the IMSBC Code and supplements (7.13)

6 Amendments to the IMDG Code and supplements (7.10)

7 Revision of the Revised guidelines for the preparation of the Cargo Securing Manual (MSC.1/Circ.1353/Rev.2) to include a harmonized performance standard for lashing software to permit lashing software as a supplement to the Cargo Securing Manual (7.40)

8 Consideration of reports of incidents involving dangerous goods or marine pollutants in packaged form on board ships or in port areas (7.28)

9 Unified interpretation of provisions of IMO safety, security, environment, facilitation, liability and compensation-related conventions (7.1)

10 Development of measures to prevent the loss of containers at sea (7.20)

11 Revision of the Interim recommendations for carriage of liquefied hydrogen in bulk (2.25)

12 Development of a safety regulatory framework to support the reduction of GHG emissions from ships using new technologies and alternative fuels (3.8)

13 Biennial status report and provisional agenda for CCC 12

14 Election of the Chair and Vice-Chair for 2026

15 Any other business

16 Report to the Committees

PROVISIONAL AGENDA FOR HTW 12

Opening of the session

1 Adoption of the agenda

2 Decisions of other IMO bodies

3 Validated model training courses (6.2)

4 Role of the human element (6.1)

5 Reports on unlawful practices associated with certificates of competency (6.3)

6 Comprehensive review of the 1978 STCW Convention and Code (6.17)

7 Development of a safety regulatory framework to support the reduction of GHG emissions from ships using new technologies and alternative fuels (3.8)

8 Scoping exercise and enhancement of the effectiveness of provisions on fatigue and seafarers' hours of work and rest (6.9)

9 Biennial status report and provisional agenda for HTW 12

10 Election of Chair and Vice-Chair for 2026

11 Any other business

12 Report to the Maritime Safety Committee

PROVISIONAL AGENDA FOR III 11

Opening of the session

1 Adoption of the agenda

2 Decisions of other IMO bodies

3 Consideration and analysis of reports on alleged inadequacy of port reception facilities (7.7)

4 Lessons learned and safety issues identified from the analysis of marine safety investigation reports (7.4)

5 Measures to harmonize port State control (PSC) activities and procedures worldwide (1.11)

6 Validated model training courses (6.2)

7 Identified issues relating to the implementation of IMO instruments from the analysis of data (7.5)

8 Updated Survey Guidelines under the Harmonized System of Survey and Certification (HSSC) (7.27)

9 Non-exhaustive list of obligations under instruments relevant to the IMO Instruments Implementation Code (III Code) (1.5)

10 Development of guidance on assessments and applications of remote surveys, ISM Code audits and ISPS Code verifications (1.18)

11 Unified interpretation of provisions of IMO safety, security, environment, facilitation, liability and compensation-related conventions (7.1)

12 Follow-up work emanating from the Action Plan to Address Marine Plastic Litter from Ships (4.3)

13 Biennial agenda and provisional agenda for III 12

14 Election of Chair and Vice-Chair for 2026

15 Any other business

16 Report to the Committees

PROVISIONAL AGENDA FOR NCSR 13

Opening of the session

1 Adoption of the agenda

2 Decisions of other IMO bodies

3 Routeing measures and ship reporting systems (7.22)

4 Updates to the LRIT system (7.23)

5 Developments in GMDSS services, including guidelines on maritime safety information (MSI) (7.2)

6 Response to matters related to the ITU-R Study Groups and ITU World Radiocommunication Conference (2.1)

7 Development of global maritime SAR services, including harmonization of maritime and aeronautical procedures and amendments to the IAMSAR Manual (1.34)

8 Development of guidelines for EPIRB which implement the two-way communication service via the SAR/Galileo Return Link service as a complement to EPIRB performance standards (resolution MSC.471(101)) (2.18)

9 Development of guidance to establish a framework for data distribution and global IP-based connectivity between shore-based facilities and ships for ECDIS S-100 products (2.12) and operational guidance for route exchange (2.15)

10 Development of performance standards for dual frequency multi-constellation satellite-based augmentation systems (DFMC SBAS) and advanced receiver autonomous integrity monitoring (ARAIM) in shipborne radionavigation receivers (2.7)

11 Development of a transition scheme for the introduction of digital technology for Very High Frequency (VHF) voice communications (2.5)

12 Revision of the Performance standards for gyro-compasses (resolution A.424(XI)) and Guidance for navigation and communication equipment intended for use on ships operating in polar waters (MSC.1/Circ.1612) (2.14)

13 Development of performance standards for Ranging mode (R-mode) in radionavigation receivers (2.17)

14 Unified interpretation of provisions of IMO safety, security, environment, facilitation, liability and compensation-related conventions (7.1)

15 Biennial status report and provisional agenda for NCSR 14

16 Election of Chair and Vice-Chair for 2027

17 Any other business

18 Report to the Maritime Safety Committee

PROVISIONAL AGENDA FOR SDC 12

1 Adoption of the agenda

2 Decisions of other IMO bodies

3 Revision of the Interim explanatory notes for the assessment of passenger ship systems' capabilities after a fire or flooding casualty (MSC.1/Circ.1369) and related circulars (7.42)

4 Amendments to the 2011 ESP Code (7.21)

5 Revision of SOLAS chapters II-1 (part C) and V, and related instruments regarding steering and propulsion requirements, to address both traditional and non-traditional propulsion and steering systems (2.9)

6 Development of engine control room alert management (ECRAM) performance standards (1.14)

7 Guidelines for use of fibre-reinforced plastics (FRP) within ship structures (2.6)

8 Experience-building phase for the reduction of underwater radiated noise from shipping (1.16)

9 Development of a safety regulatory framework to support the reduction of GHG emissions from ships using new technologies and alternative fuels (3.8)

10 Unified interpretation of provisions of IMO safety, security, environment, facilitation, liability and compensation-related conventions (7.1)

11 Review and, if necessary, amendment of SOLAS regulations II-2/13.4.1.1 and 13.4.2.1 to clarify the requirements on escape arrangements from the lower part of machinery spaces (7.33)

12 Development of amendments to chapter 6 of the 2009 MODU Code regarding electrical equipment capable of operation after shutdown (1.3)

13 Development of amendments to chapter 15 of the FSS Code on enclosed spaces containing a nitrogen receiver or a buffer tank of nitrogen generator system (7.31)

14 Revision of the Guidelines for the application of plastic pipes on ships (resolution A.753(18)) (7.32)

15 Biennial status report and provisional agenda for SDC 13

16 Election of Chair and Vice-Chair for 2027

17 Any other business

18 Report to the Maritime Safety Committee

PROVISIONAL AGENDA FOR SSE 12

Opening of the session

1 Adoption of the agenda

2 Decisions of other IMO bodies

3 New requirements for ventilation of survival craft (7.36)

4 Revision of the Revised guidelines for the maintenance and inspections of fixed carbon dioxide fire-extinguishing systems (MSC.1/Circ.1318/Rev.1) to clarify the testing and inspection provisions for CO_2 cylinders (7.25)

5 Revision of SOLAS chapter III and the LSA Code (2.16)

6 Amendments to SOLAS chapter III and chapter IV of the LSA Code to require the carriage of self-righting or canopied reversible liferafts for new ships (7.30)

7 Development of amendments to paragraph 2.1.2.5 of chapter 5 of the FSS Code on construction requirement for gaskets (1.13)

8 Revision of the 2010 FTP Code to allow for new fire protection systems and materials (7.34)

9 Review and update SOLAS regulation II-2/9 on containment of fire to incorporate existing guidance and clarify requirements (7.48)

10 Unified interpretation of provisions of IMO safety, security, environment, facilitation, liability and compensation-related conventions (7.1)

11 Validated model training courses (6.2)

12 Development of amendments to SOLAS chapter II-2 and the FSS Code concerning detection and control of fires in cargo holds and on the cargo deck of containerships (7.15)

13 Development of provisions to consider prohibiting the use of fire-fighting foams containing fluorinated substances, in addition to PFOS, for fire-fighting on board ships (7.41)

14 Comprehensive review of the Requirements for maintenance, thorough examination, operational testing, overhaul and repair of lifeboats and rescue boats, launching appliances and release gear (resolution MSC.402(96)) to address challenges with their implementation (7.29)

15 Amendments to the LSA Code for thermal performance of immersion suits (7.19)

16 Evaluation of adequacy of fire protection, detection and extinction arrangements in vehicle, special category and ro-ro spaces in order to reduce the fire risk of ships carrying new energy vehicles (7.37)

17 Development of a safety regulatory framework to support the reduction of GHG emissions from ships using new technologies and alternative fuels (3.8)

18 Biennial status report and provisional agenda for SSE 13

19 Election of Chair and Vice-Chair for 2027

20 Any other business

21 Report to the Maritime Safety Committee

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ANNEX 32

REVISED TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE SUB-COMMITTEES

The Sub-Committee on Carriage of Cargoes and Containers (CCC)[1]

1 Under the direct instructions of the Maritime Safety Committee and the Marine Environment Protection Committee, the Sub-Committee on Carriage of Cargoes and Containers (CCC) will consider technical and operational matters related to the following subjects, including the development of any necessary amendments to relevant conventions and other mandatory and non-mandatory instruments, as well as the preparation of new mandatory and non-mandatory instruments, guidelines and recommendations, for consideration by the Committees, as appropriate:

.1 effective implementation of the relevant conventions, codes and other instruments, mandatory or recommendatory, as appropriate, dealing with cargo operations, which include packaged dangerous goods, solid bulk cargoes, bulk gas cargoes, and containers;

.2 evaluation of safety and pollution hazards of packaged dangerous goods, solid bulk cargoes and gas cargoes;

.3 survey and certification of ships carrying hazardous cargoes;

.4 further enhancement of the safety and security culture, and environmental consciousness in all cargo and container operations; and

.5 cooperation with other relevant UN bodies, IGOs and NGOs on international standards related to containers and to cargo operations.

2 The conventions and other mandatory instruments (as may be amended from time to time) referred to above include, but are not limited to:

.1 1974 SOLAS Convention (chapters VI and VII and other relevant parts, as appropriate);

.2 MARPOL (Annexes III and V, as appropriate);

.3 International Convention for Safe Containers (CSC), 1972;

.4 International Maritime Dangerous Goods (IMDG) Code and related supplements;

.5 International Maritime Solid Bulk Cargoes (IMSBC) Code and related supplements;

.6 International Code for the Construction and Equipment of Ships carrying Liquefied Gases in Bulk (IGC Code);

.7 International Code for the Safe Carriage of Packaged Irradiated Nuclear Fuel, Plutonium and High-Level Radioactive Wastes on board Ships (INF Code);

[1] Version in tracked changes set out in annex 6 of document CCC 10/16.

.8 International Code for the Safe Carriage of Grain in Bulk;

.9 Code of Safe Practice for Cargo Stowage and Securing (CSS Code); and

.10 International Code of Safety for Ships using Gases or Other Low-flashpoint Fuels (IGF Code).

3 The non-mandatory instruments, referred to in paragraph 1, which the Sub-Committee may be called upon to review, include, but are not limited to:

.1 Code of Safe Practice for Solid Bulk Cargoes (BC Code);

.2 Code for the Construction and Equipment of Ships carrying Liquefied Gases in Bulk (GC Code);

.3 Code of Safe Practice for Ships Carrying Timber Deck Cargoes;

.4 Code of Practice for the Safe Loading and Unloading of Bulk Carriers (BLU Code);

.5 Recommendations on the Safe Transport of Dangerous Cargoes and related Activities in Port Areas;

.6 *Guidelines for the preparation of the Cargo Securing Manual*;

.7 Emergency Response Procedures for Ships Carrying Dangerous Goods (EmS Guide);

.8 Medical First Aid Guide for Use in Accidents Involving Dangerous Goods (MFAG);

.9 Reporting procedures, including inspection programmes for cargo transport units carrying dangerous goods; reporting of incidents involving harmful substances and/or marine pollutants; reporting of casualties involving dangerous cargoes;

.10 *IMO/ILO/UNECE Guidelines for Packing of Cargo Transport Units*;

.11 Recommendations on the Safe Use of Pesticides in Ships;

.12 any recommendations and guidelines relevant to the carriage of bulk cargoes; and

.13 any recommendations and guidelines relevant to alternative fuels and related technologies.

4 Any other relevant technical and operational issues referred to it by the Committees or other technical bodies of the Organization.

The Sub-Committee on Human Element, Training and Watchkeeping (HTW)[2]

1 Under the direct instructions of the Maritime Safety Committee and as may be requested by the Marine Environment Protection Committee, the Sub-Committee on Human Element, Training and Watchkeeping (HTW) will consider technical and operational matters related to the following subjects, including the development of any necessary amendments to relevant conventions and other mandatory and non-mandatory instruments, as well as the preparation of new mandatory and non-mandatory instruments, guidelines and recommendations, taking into account the role of such measures in the protection of the marine environment, for consideration by the Committees, as appropriate:

.1 minimum international standards for training and certification of seafarers;

.2 principles of safe watchkeeping;

.3 minimum international standards for training and certification of fishing vessel personnel;

.4 maritime safety, security and environmental protection culture in all ship operations;

.5 review of the principles of safe manning of ships and training issues related to the human element taking into account technological, organizational and social developments;

.6 promotion of awareness of lessons learned from the analysis of accident and incident reports and information;

.7 review, updating and revision of IMO model courses;

.8 promotion and implementation of the Organization's human element strategy, including the chain(s) of responsibility in maritime safety, security and environmental protection;

.9 coordination with relevant United Nations bodies, IGOs and NGOs on international standards related to the training and certification of seafarers; and

.10 revision/development of relevant guidelines relating to training of seafarers issues, such as maritime safety, security and protection of the marine environment.

2 The conventions and other mandatory instruments (as may be amended from time to time) referred to above include, but are not limited to:

.1 1978 STCW Convention, including STCW Code;

.2 1995 STCW-F Convention;

.3 1974 SOLAS Convention and the 1978 and 1988 Protocols relating thereto, and associated Codes, as appropriate;

[2] Approved with no changes from the original (MSC 92/26, annex 40).

.4 MARPOL annexes, as appropriate;

.5 2012 Cape Town Agreement, as appropriate;

.6 1966 Load Lines Convention and the 1988 Protocol relating thereto; and

.7 1969 Tonnage Measurement Convention.

3 The non-mandatory instruments referred to in paragraph 1, which the Sub-Committee may be called upon to review, include, but are not limited to:

.1 Code for the Construction and Equipment of Mobile Offshore Drilling Units (MODU Code); and

.2 Principles of safe manning.

4 Any other relevant technical and operational issues referred to it by the Committees or other technical bodies of the Organization.

The Sub-Committee on Implementation of IMO Instruments (III)[3]

1 Under the direct instructions of the Maritime Safety Committee and the Marine Environment Protection Committee, the Sub-Committee on Implementation of IMO Instruments (III), in addressing the effective and consistent global implementation and enforcement of IMO instruments concerning maritime safety and security and the protection of the marine and atmospheric environment, will consider technical and operational matters related to the following subjects, including the development of any necessary amendments to relevant conventions and other mandatory and non-mandatory instruments, as well as the preparation of new mandatory and non-mandatory instruments, guidelines and recommendations, for consideration by the Committees, as appropriate:

.1 comprehensive review of the rights and obligations of States emanating from the IMO treaty instruments;

.2 assessment, monitoring and review of the current level of implementation of IMO instruments by States in their capacity as flag, port and coastal States and countries training and certifying officers and crews, with a view to identifying areas where States may have difficulties in fully implementing them;

.3 identification of the reasons for the difficulties and trends in implementing provisions of relevant IMO instruments, taking into account any relevant information collected through, inter alia, the assessment of performance, IMO Member State Audit Scheme (IMSAS), reports on alleged inadequacy of port reception facilities, the investigation of marine casualties and incidents and port State control (PSC) and through data analysis to maintain an efficient and comprehensive knowledge-based mechanism to support the identification of trends and provide input into the IMO rule-making process, while paying particular attention to the perceived difficulties faced by developing countries;

.4 consideration of proposals to assist States in implementing and complying with IMO instruments by the development of appropriate mandatory and non-mandatory instruments, guidelines, recommendations and unified interpretations as implementation-supporting tools for consideration by the Committees, as appropriate;

.5 analysis of reports of investigation into marine casualties and incidents to draw lessons learned to prevent reoccurrences and to identify safety issues feeding back to the IMO rule-making process;

.6 review of analysis of findings and root causes arising from IMSAS audits to identify difficulties some Member States may face in complying fully with various IMO instruments for improving Member State capabilities and overall performance, including the assessment of the effectiveness and appropriateness of provisions of various IMO instruments identified through recurrent findings from the audits to further inform the IMO rule-making process.

[3] Version in track changes set out in annex 6 of document III 10/18.

.7 promote and facilitate implementation of IMO standards on maritime safety and security and the protection of the marine and atmospheric environment, in particular those recently adopted/entered into force, to maintain an updated and harmonized guidance on port State control inspection, and on survey and certification;

.8 promotion of global harmonization of PSC activities; and

.9 promotion of safety of fishing vessels, in particular in cooperation with FAO and ILO on IUU and related matters.

2 The conventions and other mandatory instruments (as may be amended from time to time) referred to above include, but are not limited to:

.1 SOLAS (chapters I, IX, XI-1, XIII and appendix and other relevant chapters, as appropriate), Load Lines, Tonnage and COLREG Conventions;

.2 MARPOL, BWM and AFS Conventions and other related environmental instruments, as appropriate;

.3 codes and other provisions made mandatory under SOLAS, Load Lines, MARPOL and BWM Conventions;

.4 International Safety Management (ISM) Code;

.5 Code for Recognized Organizations (RO Code);

.6 IMO Instruments Implementation Code (III Code); and

.7 Casualty Investigation Code.

3 The non-mandatory instruments referred to in paragraph 1, which the Sub-Committee may be called upon to review, include, but are not limited to:

.1 Survey Guidelines under the HSSC;

.2 Procedures for port State control;

.3 Non-exhaustive list of obligations under instruments relevant to the IMO Instruments Implementation Code (III Code); and

.4 fair treatment of seafarers, non-convention ship-related matter, etc.

4 Any other relevant technical and operational issues referred to it by the Committees or other technical bodies of the Organization.

The Sub-Committee on Navigation, Communications and Search and Rescue (NCSR)[4]

1 Under the direct instructions of the Maritime Safety Committee and as may be requested by the Marine Environment Protection Committee, the Sub-Committee on Navigation, Communications and Search and Rescue (NCSR) will consider technical and operational matters related to the following subjects, including the development of any necessary amendments to relevant conventions and other mandatory and non-mandatory instruments, as well as the preparation of new mandatory and non-mandatory instruments, guidelines and recommendations, for consideration by the Committees, as appropriate:

.1 obligations of Governments and operational measures related to safety of navigation, including hydrographic and meteorological services, ships' routeing, ship reporting systems, aids to navigation, radionavigation systems, vessel traffic services, and pilot transfer arrangements, including the role of such measures in the protection of the marine environment;

.2 operational requirements and guidelines relating to navigational safety and associated issues, such as regulations for the prevention of collisions and groundings, bridge procedures, voyage planning, avoidance of dangerous situations, places of refuge including maritime assistance services and relevant aspects of maritime security;

.3 carriage requirements, performance standards and operational guidelines for the use of shipborne navigational equipment and other navigational requirements, including bridge design, bridge visibility and nautical publications;

.4 obligations of Governments and operational measures related to the Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (GMDSS), including the establishment of shore-based facilities and the dissemination of maritime safety information (MSI), as reported in the GMDSS Master Plan;

.5 obligations of Governments and operational measures related to search and rescue, including the development and maintenance of the Global SAR Plan and the harmonization of aeronautical and maritime search and rescue procedures, in cooperation with ICAO;

.6 obligations of Governments and operational measures related to LRIT;

.7 technical and operational requirements and guidelines relating to radiocommunications and search and rescue, in cooperation with ITU;

.8 carriage requirements, performance standards and operational guidelines for the use of shipborne radiocommunication and search and rescue equipment;

.9 matters related to the ITU Maritime Services and liaison with ITU technical bodies on related issues; and

.10 evaluation for recognition of mobile satellite services for use in the GMDSS and satellite navigation systems as components of the World-Wide Radionavigation System.

[4] Version in track changes in annex 9 of document MSC 110/WP.11.

2 The conventions and other mandatory instruments (as may be amended from time to time) referred to above include, but are not limited to:

.1 1974 SOLAS Convention (chapters IV and V and other relevant chapters, as appropriate) and the 1978 and 1988 Protocols relating thereto;

.2 MARPOL annexes, as appropriate;

.3 International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREG), 1972;

.4 International Code of Signals;

.5 International Codes of Safety for High-Speed Craft (HSC Code), 1994 and 2000, as appropriate; and

.6 International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR), 1979.

3 The Sub-Committee may be also called upon to review non-mandatory instruments, in particular those related to mandatory instruments referred to in paragraph 1.

4 Any other relevant technical and operational issues referred to it by the Committees or other technical bodies of the Organization.

The Sub-Committee on Ship Design and Construction (SDC)[5]

1 Under the direct instructions of the Maritime Safety Committee and as may be requested by the Marine Environment Protection Committee, the Sub-Committee on Ship Design and Construction (SDC) will consider technical and operational matters related to the following subjects, including the development of any necessary amendments to relevant conventions and other mandatory and non-mandatory instruments, as well as the preparation of new mandatory and non-mandatory instruments, guidelines and recommendations, for consideration by the Committees, as appropriate:

.1 design, construction, subdivision and stability, buoyancy, sea-keeping and arrangements, including evacuation matters, of all types of ships, vessels, craft and mobile units covered by IMO instruments;

.2 testing and approval of construction and materials;

.3 load line matters;

.4 tonnage measurement matters;

.5 safety of fishing vessels and fishermen; and

.6 survey and certification.

2 The Conventions and other mandatory instruments (as may be amended from time to time) referred to above include, but are not limited to:

.1 1974 SOLAS Convention (chapters II-1, II-2, VIII, X, XI-1, XII, XIV and XV and other relevant chapters, as appropriate) and the 1978 and 1988 Protocols relating thereto;

.2 MARPOL Annexes, as appropriate;

.3 1966 Load Line Convention and the 1988 Protocol relating thereto;

.4 1969 Tonnage Measurement Convention;

.5 2012 Cape Town Agreement;

.6 International Codes of Safety for High-Speed Craft (HSC Code), 1994 and 2000;

.7 International Code for Application of Fire Test Procedures (FTP Code), for tests related to ship construction and materials;

.8 International Code on Intact Stability, 2008;

.9 International Code on the Enhanced Programme of Inspections During Surveys of Bulk Carriers and Oil Tankers, 2011 (2011 ESP Code);

[5] Version in track changes set out in annex 13 of document SDC 11/17/Add.1.

.10 International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code);

.11 International Code of Safety for Ships Carrying Industrial Personnel (IP Code);

.12 coating performance standards;

.13 Code on Noise Levels on Board Ships; and

.14 Condition Assessment Scheme (CAS).

3 The non-mandatory instruments, referred to in paragraph 1, which the Sub-Committee may be called upon to review, include, but are not limited to:

.1 Code of Safety for Dynamically Supported Craft (DSC Code);

.2 Code for the Construction and Equipment of Mobile Offshore Drilling Units (MODU Code);

.3 Code of Safe Practice for the Carriage of Cargoes and Persons by Offshore Supply Vessels (OSV Code);

.4 Code of Safety for Special Purpose Ships (SPS Code);

.5 Code on Noise Levels on Board Ships;

.6 *Interim guidelines for wing-in-ground (WIG) craft*;

.7 Standards for Ship Manoeuvrability;

.8 Guidelines for the Design, Construction and Operation of Passenger Submersible Craft;

.9 *Interim guidance to assist in the implementation of the Cape Town Agreement of 2012*;

.10 Code of Safety for Fishermen and Fishing Vessels, 2005 (parts A and B);

.11 FAO/ILO/IMO Voluntary Guidelines for the design, construction and equipment of small fishing vessels, 2005;

.12 Requirements, recommendations and guidelines relevant to ship design, construction, materials, arrangements, stability, load lines and fishing vessels safety; and

.13 *Revised guidelines for the reduction of underwater radiated noise from shipping to address adverse impacts on marine life*.

4 Any other relevant technical and operational issues referred to it by the Committees or other technical bodies of the Organization.

The Sub-Committee on Ship Systems and Equipment (SSE)[6]

1 Under the direct instructions of the Maritime Safety Committee and as may be requested by the Marine Environment Protection Committee, the Sub-Committee on Ship Systems and Equipment (SSE) will consider technical and operational matters related to the following subjects, including the development of any necessary amendments to relevant conventions and other mandatory and non-mandatory instruments, as well as the preparation of new mandatory and non-mandatory instruments, guidelines and recommendations, for consideration by the Committees, as appropriate:

.1 systems and equipment, including machinery and electrical installations, of all types of ships, vessels, craft and mobile units covered by IMO instruments;

.2 testing and approval of systems and equipment;

.3 life-saving equipment, appliances and arrangements; and

.4 analyses of casualty and incident records relating to ship systems and equipment.

2 The conventions and other mandatory instruments (as may be amended from time to time) referred to above include, but are not limited to:

.1 1974 SOLAS Convention (chapters II-1, II-2, III and other relevant chapters, as appropriate) and the 1978 and 1988 Protocols relating thereto, as appropriate;

.2 International Code for Application of Fire Test Procedures, 2010 (2010 FTP Code), for testing related to systems and equipment;

.3 International Code for Fire Safety Systems (FSS Code), and

.4 International Life-Saving Appliances (LSA) Code.

3 The non-mandatory instruments, referred to in paragraph 1, which the Sub-Committee may be called upon to review, include, but are not limited to:

.1 Code for the Construction and Equipment of Mobile Offshore Drilling Units (MODU Code), for systems and equipment issues;

.2 Code of Safety for Diving Systems, 2023;

.3 Code on Alerts and Indicators; and

.4 any recommendations and guidelines relevant to ship systems and equipment.

4 Any other relevant technical and operational issues referred to it by the Committees or other technical bodies of the Organization.

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6 Version in track changes set out in annex 13 of document SSE 11/20.

ANNEX 33

BIENNIAL STATUS REPORT[1] OF THE MARITIME SAFETY COMMITTEE FOR THE 2024-2025 BIENNIUM

Maritime Safety Committee (MSC)									
Reference to SD,[2] if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output for Year 1	Status of output for Year 2	References
1	1.3	Revision of the criteria for the provision of mobile satellite communication services in the Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (GMDSS) (resolution A.1001(25))	2024	MSC	NCSR		Completed		MSC 101/24, para.21.33; MSC 107/20, para. 17.77.2, MSC 108/20, sec.12, MSC 109/22, para. 13.11 and annex 14
1	1.4	Analysis of consolidated audit summary reports	Continuous	Assembly	MSC / MEPC / LEG / TCC / III	Council	Completed	No work requested	MEPC 61/24, para. 11.14.1; MSC 88/26, para. 10.8; C 120/D, para. 7.1 and 7.2; MSC 105/20, para.13.10; MSC 106/19, paras. 14.11 and 16.37; MSC 108/20, paras.13.8 and 13.9; MSC 109/22, para. 15.11 MEPC 78/17, paras. 10.7 to

[1] For details, refer to Organizational Planning module of GISIS.

[2] Strategic directions:
SD 1: Ensure implementation of IMO instruments supported by capacity development
SD 2: Integrate new, emerging and advancing technologies in the regulatory framework
SD 3: Respond to climate change and reduce greenhouse gas emissions from international shipping
SD 4: Continue to engage in ocean governance
SD 5: Enhance global facilitation, supply chain resilience and security of international trade
SD 6: Address the human element
SD 7: Ensure the regulatory effectiveness of international shipping
SD 8: Ensure organizational effectiveness
OW: Other work

Maritime Safety Committee (MSC)									
Reference to SD,[2] if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output for Year 1	Status of output for Year 2	References
									10.11; MEPC 79/15, para.9.3; MEPC 81/16, para.10.7; MEPC 83/17, para.11.6 MSC 105/20, para.13.10; MSC 106/19, paras. 14.11 and 16.37; MSC 108/20, paras. 13.8 and 13.9; MSC 109/22, para. 15.11
1	1.5	Non-exhaustive list of obligations under instruments relevant to the IMO Instruments Implementation Code (III Code)	Continuous	MSC / MEPC	III		In progress	Ongoing	MSC 91/22, para. 10.30; MSC 108/20, para. 13.7.3; MSC 109/22, para.15.17 MEPC 77/16, paras.10.8 and 10.9; MEPC 79/15, para. 9.13; MEPC 81/16, para. 10.9.3; MEPC 83/17, para.11.9
Notes:	MSC 109 and MEPC 83 changed the type of output from "annual" to "continuous".								
1	1.7	Identify thematic priorities within the area of maritime safety and security, marine environmental protection, facilitation of maritime traffic and maritime legislation	Annual	TCC	MSC / MEPC / FAL / LEG		Completed	Completed	MEPC 78/17, sec.12; MEPC 80/17, sec.12, MSC 110/21, para. 20.9, FAL 49/22, para. 16.5 MSC 110/21, para.20.9
1	1.11	Measures to harmonize port State control (PSC) activities and procedures worldwide	Continuous	MSC / MEPC	HTW / PPR / NCSR	III	Ongoing	Ongoing	MSC 101/24, para. 21.48; MEPC 75/18, paras. 11.10 and 11.11; MSC 104, para.13.7.1; MSC 108/20, para.13.7.1; MSC 109/22, prar.15.7 MEPC 78/17, paras.7.73 and 9.8; MEPC 79/15, paras. 9.5 and 9.6; MEPC 81/16,

Maritime Safety Committee (MSC)									
Reference to SD,[2] if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output for Year 1	Status of output for Year 2	References
									para.10.9.1; MEPC 83/17, para.11.9
1	1.14	Development of guidance in relation to Mandatory IMO Member State Audit Scheme (IMSAS) to assist in the implementation of the III Code by Member States	2024	MSC / MEPC	III		Completed		MSC 103/21, para.18.38; MSC 106/19, paras.14.23 and 14.24; MSC 108/20, paras.13.10 to 13.13 MEPC 76/15, paras. 10.2 and 12.5; MEPC 79/15, para. 9.3; MEPC 81/16, para.10.8; MSC-MEPC.2/Circ.19
Notes:	MSC 108, having concurred with the decision of MEPC 81, approved MSC-MEPC.2/Circ.19 on Guidance in relation to the IMO Member State Audit Scheme (IMSAS) to assist in the implementation of the III Code by Member States.								
1	1.17	Development of guidelines for the use of ammonia cargo as fuel and provisions for the use of alternative fuels other than cargo on gas carriers	2026	MSC	CCC		Extended	In progress	MSC 103/21, para.18.2; MSC 104/18, para. 15.16; MSC 105/20, para. 18.50; MSC 108/20, para. 14.20 and sec.18; MSC 109/22, paras. 14.5 to 14.10 and 19.38.1.
Notes:	MSC 109 changed the title of output from "Review of IGC Code" to "Development of guidelines for the use of ammonia cargo as fuel and provisions for the use of alternative fuels other than cargo on gas carriers" and extended the target completion year to 2026.								
1	1.18	Development of guidance on assessment and applications of remote surveys, ISM Code audits and ISPS Code verifications	2025	MSC / MEPC	III		In progress	In progress	MSC 104/18, para.15.5; MSC 106/19, para.14.16; MSC 105/20, para. 18.52; MSC 108/20, para. 13.13; MSC 109/22, para.15.16 MEPC 79/15, para. 9.13; MEPC 81/16, para. 10.1; MEPC 83/17, para.11.1
Notes:	Target completion year extended to 2025.								

Maritime Safety Committee (MSC)									
Reference to SD,[2] if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output for Year 1	Status of output for Year 2	References
1	1.34	Development of global maritime SAR services, including harmonization of maritime and aeronautical procedures and amendments to the IAMSAR Manual	Continuous	MSC	NCSR		Completed	Ongoing	MSC 108/20, sec.12; MSC 109/22, para. 13.4 and annex 11, MSC.1/Circ.1686
1	1.35	Review of the appropriateness and effectiveness of SOLAS regulation IV/5 (Provision of radiocommunication services)	2025	MSC	NCSR		Completed		MSC 106/19, para. 16.37; MSC 107/20, para. 17.78.3; MSC 109/22, para. 13.10
2	2.1	Response to matters related to the ITU-R Study Groups and ITU World Radiocommunication Conference	Continuous	MSC	NCSR		Ongoing	Ongoing	MSC 106/19, paras.13.28 to 13.33; MSC 107/20, paras. 15.4 and 15.5 and annex 36
2	2.3	Amendments to the IGF Code and development of guidelines for alternative fuels and related technologies	Continuous	MSC	HTW / PPR / SDC / SSE	CCC	Ongoing	Ongoing	MSC 94/21, paras.18.5 and 18.6; MSC 96/25, paras.10.1 to 10.3; MSC 97/22, para.19.2; PPR 6/20, para. 3.39; MSC 102/24, para. 21.4; MSC 106/19, para. 16.42, MSC 108/20, secs.3 and 14; MSC 109/22, secs.3 and 14.
2	2.4	Further development of the IP Code and associated guidance	2025	MSC	SDC		In progress	Completed	MSC 104/18, par. 11.5; MSC 105/20, sec.15, MSC 106/19, sec.3; resolutions MSC.521(106) & MSC.527(106), MSC 108/20,sec.15;MSC 110, para.11.3 and 11.4
Notes:	MSC 107 extended the target completion year to 2025 (MSC 107/20, proposed biennial agenda 2024-25).								

Maritime Safety Committee (MSC)									
Reference to SD,[2] if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output for Year 1	Status of output for Year 2	References
2	2.5	Safety objectives and functional requirements of the Guidelines on alternative design and arrangements for SOLAS chapter II-1	2024	MSC	SSE	SDC	Completed		MSC 82/24, para.3.92; MSC 98/23, annex 38; MSC 102/24, para. 19.16. MSC 105/20, para. 15.13 and 18.54, MSC 108/20, para. 15.8, MSC.1/Circ.1212/Rev.2
2	2.6	Guidelines for use of Fibre-Reinforced Plastics (FRP) within ship structures	2026	MSC	SDC		In progress	In progress	MSC 98/23, par. 10.22; MSC 107/20, par. 17.89; MSC 110/21, para. 18.105
Notes:	MSC 110 extended the target completion year to 2026.								
2	2.7	Development of joint FAL-LEG-MEPC-MSC guidelines on electronic certificates	2026	FAL	MSC / MEPC / LEG		No work requested	Completed	FAL 48/20 para. 2.12; MSC 108/20, para. 2.8.2; MEPC 81/16, para. 2.10 to 2.12; LEG 111/17, para. 11.4 to 11.9; FAL 49/22, para. 9.5
Notes:	FAL 49 had approved the joint Guidelines for the use of electronic certificates (FAL-LEG-MEPC-MSC.1/Cir.1) set out in FAL 49/22/Add,1 annex 6, and agreed to forward them to LEG 112, MEPC 83 and MSC 110 for concurrent approval. MSC 110 concurrently approve the Guidelines.								
2	2.8	Revision of the Guidelines on Maritime Cyber Risk Management (MSC-FAL.1/Circ.3/Rev.2) and identification of next steps to enhance maritime cybersecurity	2026	MSC	FAL	MSC	In progress	Completed	MSC-FAL.1/Circ.3/Rev.3; MSC 109/22, para.7.7; FAL 49/22, para. 10.5, MSC 110/21, sec.7
Notes:	MSC 108/20, section 6; MSC 109 extended the target completion year to 2026; FAL 49 has approved MSC-FAL.1/Circ.3/Rev.3 and concurred to extend the target completion year to 2026.								
2	2.9	Revision of SOLAS chapters II-1 (part C) and V, and related instruments regarding steering and propulsion requirements, to	2028	MSC	SSE	SDC	In progress	Extended	MSC 105/20, par. 18.23; MSC 107/20, par. 12.4; MSC 110/20, par. 11.12

Maritime Safety Committee (MSC)									
Reference to SD,[2] if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output for Year 1	Status of output for Year 2	References
		address both traditional and non-traditional propulsion and steering systems							
2	2.11	Development of a comprehensive strategy on maritime digitalization	2027	FAL	MSC / MEPC		In progress	No work requested	MSC 108/20, para. 2.16; MEPC 82/17, para. 14.10; FAL 49/22, sec.8
Notes:	FAL 49 approved the work plan.								
2	2.12	Development of guidance to establish a framework for data distribution and global IP-based connectivity between shore-based facilities and ships for ECDIS S100 products	2026	MSC	NCSR			In progress	MSC 109/22, paras.19.27 to 19.34
2	2.14	Development of procedures and requirements for the recognition of augmentation systems in the World-wide radionavigation system	2025	MSC	NCSR				MSC 107/20, para. 17.58.1
2	2.16	Revision of SOLAS chapter III and the International Life-Saving Appliance (LSA) Code	2027	MSC	SSE		Extended	In progress	MSC 108/20, para. 18.25; MSC 109/22, para. 19.48; MSC 110/21, sec.14
Notes:	To remove gaps, inconsistencies and ambiguities based on the safety objectives, functional requirements and expected performance for SOLAS chapter III. MSC 109 extended the target completion year to 2027.								
2	2.17	Development of guidelines for software maintenance of shipboard navigation and communication equipment and systems	2026	MSC	NCSR			Completed	MSC 107/20, para. 17.33

Maritime Safety Committee (MSC)									
Reference to SD,[2] if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output for Year 1	Status of output for Year 2	References
2	2.18	Development of guidelines for EPIRB which implement the two-way communication service via the SAR/Galileo Return Link service as a complement to EPIRB performance standards (resolution MSC.471(101))	2026		NCSR			In progress	MSC 107/20, para. 17.35
2	2.19	Revision of the Performance Standards for Shipborne BeiDou Satellite Navigation System (BDS) Receiver Equipment (resolution MSC.379(93))	2025	MSC	NCSR			Completed	MSC 107/20, para. 17.55
2	2.20	Development of Guidelines for emergency towing arrangements for ships other than tanker and revision of appendices A and B of MSC.1/Circ.1175/Rev.1	2025	MSC	SDC		In progress	Completed	MSC 107/20, para. 12.12, MSC 108/20, paras. 15.2 to.4; MSC 110/21, para. 11.2
Notes:	MSC 108 expanded this output to absorb post-biennial output 214 on the "Revision of appendices A and B of the Revised guidance on shipboard towing and mooring equipment (MSC.1/Circ.1175/Rev.1)".								
2	2.21	Review of Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) studies by the FSA Experts' Group	Continuous	MSC			Completed	Ongoing	MSC 105/20, sec.11; MSC 106/19, sec.9; MSC 107/20, sec.10, MSC 108/20, sec.11; MSC 109/22, sec.11.
2	2.23	Development of a goal-based instrument for maritime autonomous surface ships (MASS)	2026	MSC			In progress	In progress	MSC 104/18, para15.9.2; MSC 105/20, sec.7; MSC 106/19, sec.5; MSC 107/20, sec.5, MSC 108/20, sec.4; MSC 109/22, sec.5.

Maritime Safety Committee (MSC)									
Reference to SD,[2] if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output for Year 1	Status of output for Year 2	References
									MSC 110/21, sec.5
2	2.25	Revision of the Interim recommendations for carriage of liquefied hydrogen in bulk	2026	MSC	CCC		In progress	In progress	MSC 105/20, para. 18.28; MSC 108/20, sec.14, MEPC 82/17, para. 14.12.
Notes:	MSC 108 extended the target completion year to 2026.								
2	2.27	Development of performance standards for a digital navigational data system (NAVDAT)	2024	MSC	NCSR		Completed		MSC 103/21, para.18.18; MSC 106/19, para.16.47.1.2, MSC 108/20, para. 12.19, MSC 109/22, paras. 13.9 and 19.43; resolutions MSC.569 (109) and MSC.509(105)/Rev.1.
2	2.28	Development of amendments to SOLAS chapters IV and V and performance standards and guidelines to introduce VHF Data Exchange System (VDES)	2025	MSC	NCSR			Completed	MSC 103/21, para.18.12; MSC 106/19, para. 16.47.1.1; MSC 109/22, para.19.43. MSC 110/21, para.15.4 to 15.7 and annexes 22 to 27
Notes:	MSC 109 extended the target completion year to 2025.								
3	3.8	Development of a safety regulatory framework to support the reduction of GHG emissions from ships using new technologies and alternative fuels	Continuous	MSC	MEPC / III / HTW / CCC / SDC / SSE	MSC	Ongoing	Ongoing	MSC 109/22, sec.6
4	4.2	Input to the ITCP on emerging issues relating to sustainable development and achievement of the SDGs	Continuous	TCC	MSC / MEPC / FAL / LEG		No work requested	No work requested	MEPC 72/17, sec.12; MEPC 73/19, sec.13; MEPC 74/18, sec.12 MEPC 78/17, sec.12; MEPC 80/17, sec.12

Maritime Safety Committee (MSC)									
Reference to SD,[2] if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output for Year 1	Status of output for Year 2	References
5	5.2	Guidelines and guidance on the implementation and interpretation of SOLAS chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code	Continuous	MSC			Ongoing	Ongoing	
Notes:	MSC 109 changed the type of the output from "annual" to "continuous".								
5	5.3	Consideration and analysis of reports on piracy and armed robbery against ships	Continuous	MSC			Ongoing	Ongoing	MSC 105/20, para. 9.1; MSC 106/19, sec.7; MSC 107/20, sec.7, MSC 108/20, sec.8; MSC 109/22, secs.9 and 19.
Notes:	MSC 109 changed the type of output from "annual" to "continuous".								
5	5.4	Revised guidance relating to the prevention of piracy and armed robbery to reflect emerging trends and behaviour patterns	Continuous	MSC	LEG		Ongoing	Ongoing	MSC 105/20, para. 9.1; MSC 106/19. para. 7.7; MSC 107/20, sec.7; MSC 108/20, sec.8, MSC 109/22, secs.9 and 19.
Notes:	MSC 109 changed the type of output from "annual" to "continuous".								
5	5.9	Development of amendments to the Revised guidelines for the prevention and suppression of the smuggling of drugs, psychotropic substances and precursor chemicals on ships engaged in international maritime traffic (resolutions FAL.9(34) and MSC.228(82))	2027	FAL	MSC		No work requested	No work requested	FAL 48/20 para. 17.7; MSC 108/20, para. 2.16; FAL 49/22, sec.12

Maritime Safety Committee (MSC)									
Reference to SD,[2] if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output for Year 1	Status of output for Year 2	References
5	5.11	Review and update of the Code of practice for atmospheric oil mist detectors (MSC.1/Circ.1086)	2026	MSC	SSE		In progress	Completed	MSC 107/20, para. 17.39; SSE 11/20 para. 7.7; MSC 110/21, para.14.14, MSC.1/Circ.1086/Rev.1
5	5.13	IMO's contribution to addressing unsafe mixed migration by sea	2026	MSC / FAL / LEG			In progress	In progress	FAL 41/17, para.7.15; MSC 98/23, para.16.14; FAL 43/20, para.10.7; MSC 101/24, para.19.8; MSC 104/18, para9.5; MSC 105/20, sec.10; FAL 46/24, para.11.4, MSC106/19, sec.8; resolution MSC.528(106); MSC 107/20, sec.9, MSC 108/20, sec.9; MSC 109/22, sec.10; FAL 49/22, sec.14; MSC 110/21, sec.10
Notes:	FAL 49 had agreed to extend the target completion year to 2026 (FAL 49/WP.3).								
6	6.1	Role of the human element	Continuous	MSC / MEPC	III / PPR / CCC / SDC / SSE / NCSR	HTW	Ongoing	Ongoing	MSC 89/25, paras. 10.10, 10.16 and 22.39 and annex 21; MEPC 78/17, paras. 10.4 and 13.
6	6.2	Validated model training courses	Continuous	MSC / MEPC	III / PPR / CCC / SDC / SSE / NCSR	HTW	Ongoing	Ongoing	MSC 100/20, paras. 10.3 to 10.6 and 17.28; MSC 105/20, sec.16, MSC 108/20 PPR 9/21, sec.12; MEPC 79/15, paras. 9.1, 9.14 to 9.15; MEPC 81/16, para.10.1

Maritime Safety Committee (MSC)									
Reference to SD,[2] if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output for Year 1	Status of output for Year 2	References
6	6.3	Reports on unlawful practices associated with certificates of competency	Continuous	MSC	HTW		Completed	Completed	MSC 83/28, para.12.2; MSC 109/22, sec.19
Notes:	MSC 109 changed the type of output from "annual" to "continuous".								
6	6.10	Development of an entrant training manual for PSC personnel	2027	MSC / MEPC	III		Postponed	Postponed	MSC 103/21, para.18.36; MSC 106/19, para.16.46 MEPC 76/15, paras. 10.1, 10.2 and 12.5; MEPC 79/15, para. 9.3
Notes:	It will be developed after the finalization of the IMO Model Course 3.09 on Port State Control, which is expected to be validated by III 11.								
6	6.15	Revision of resolution A.1050(27) to ensure the safety of personnel entering enclosed spaces on board ships	2024	MSC	III / HTW / PPR / SDC / SSE	CCC	In progress	Completed	MSC 101/24, para. 21.48; MSC 104/18, para. 15.16; MSC 106/19, para. 16.31; MSC 108/20, para. 14.15; MSC 110/21, sec.16, MSC resolution
6	6.17	Comprehensive review of the 1978 STCW Convention and Code	2026	MSC	HTW		In progress	In progress	MSC 105/20, para.18.13; MSC 107/20, para. 17.71; MSC 108/20, para. 16.5
7	7.1	Unified interpretation of provisions of IMO safety, security, environment, facilitation, liability and compensation-related conventions	Continuous	MSC / MEPC / FAL / LEG	III / PPR / CCC / SDC / SSE / NCSR		Ongoing	Ongoing	MSC 76/23, para. 20.3; MSC 78/26, para. 22.12; MSC 108/20, para. 18.13, sec.19, MSC.1/Circ.1456/Rev.1, MSC.1/Circ.1572/Rev.2, MSC.1/Circ.1509/Rev.1, MSC.1/Circ.1511/Rev.1, MSC.1/Circ.1680; MSC 110/21, para. 11.14, MSC.1/Circ.1692

Maritime Safety Committee (MSC)									
Reference to SD,[2] if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output for Year 1	Status of output for Year 2	References
									MEPC 78/17, sec.4, and paras. 5.6 and 5.7; MEPC 79/15, paras. 4.8, 4.26, 4.27, 6.26 to 6.29; MEPC 80/17, paras. 4.11 and 5.24
7	7.2	Developments in GMDSS services, including guidelines on maritime safety information (MSI)	Continuous	MSC	NCSR		Ongoing	Ongoing	MSC 108/20, sec.12, MSC.1/Circ.1310/Rev.2, MSC 110/21, paras. 15.2 to 15.3 and annexes 20 and21
7	7.4	Lessons learned and safety issues identified from the analysis of marine safety investigation reports	Continuous	MSC / MEPC	III		Completed	Ongoing	MSC 92/26, para. 22.29; MSC 106/19, paras.14.2 to 14.6; MSC 108/20, paras.13.3 to 13.6; MSC 109/22, paras.15.2 to 15.6 MEPC 79/15, para. 9.3; MEPC 81/16, para. 10.6; MEPC 83/17, paras.11.2 and 11.3
Notes:	MSC 109 and MEPC 83 changed the type of output from "annual" to "continuous".								
7	7.5	Identified issues relating to the implementation of IMO instruments from the analysis of data	Continuous	MSC / MEPC	III		Completed	Ongoing	MSC 96/25, para.23.13; MSC 106/19, paras.14.12 and 16. MSC 108/20, para.13.4; MSC 109/22, para.15.3 MEPC 79/15, paras. 12.13 and 12.14; MEPC 81, para.10.3; MEPC 83/17, para.11.1
Notes:	MSC 109 and MEPC 83 changed the type of output from "annual" to "continuous".								

Maritime Safety Committee (MSC)									
Reference to SD,[2] if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output for Year 1	Status of output for Year 2	References
7	7.6	Consideration and analysis of reports and information on persons rescued at sea and stowaways	Continuous	MSC / FAL			Postponed	Postponed	FAL 49/22, para. 19.8
Notes:	MSC 109 changed the type of output from "annual" to "continuous". FAL 49 concurred with it.								
7	7.10	Amendments to the IMDG Code and supplements	Continuous	MSC	CCC		Ongoing	Ongoing	MSC 105/20, para. 3.59 and 14.4; MSC 108/20, secs.3 and 14
7	7.13	Amendments to the IMSBC Code and supplements	Continuous	MSC	CCC		Ongoing	Ongoing	MSC 105/20, para. 14.4 and para. 3.57; MSC 107/20, para. 17.10 and 17.12
7	7.14	Revision of the provisions for helicopter facilities in SOLAS and the MODU Code	2024	MSC	SSE		Completed		SSE 10/20, sec.9; MSC 109.22, para. 12.11
Notes:	MSC 109 decided that the item had been completed.								
7	7.15	Development of amendments to SOLAS chapter II-2 and the FSS Code concerning detection and control of fires in cargo holds and on the cargo deck of container ships	2028	MSC	CCC	SSE	In progress	In progress	MSC 103/21, para.18.8; SSE 8/20, sec.10; MSC 106/19, sec.9; SSE 9/20, sec.10; SSE 10/20, sec.10; SSE 11/20, sec.12; MSC 110/21, sec.18
Notes:	MSC 110 extended the target completion year to 2028.								
7	7.19	Amendments to the LSA Code for thermal performance of immersion suits	2027	MSC	SSE		In progress	In progress	MSC 92/26, para.13.34; SSE 9/20, sec.7; SSE 10/20, sec.15; SSE 11/20, sec.15, MSC 110/21, sec.18
Notes:	MSC 109 extended the target completion year to 2025. MSC 110 extended the target completion year to 2027.								

Maritime Safety Committee (MSC)									
Reference to SD,[2] if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output for Year 1	Status of output for Year 2	References
7	7.20	Develop measures to prevent the loss of containers at sea	2025	MSC	III / HTW / SDC / NCSR	CCC	In progress	In progress	MSC 108/20, para. 3.9 to 3.12 and 3.70, MSC.550(108)
7	7.21	Amendments to the 2011 ESP Code	Continuous	MSC	SDC		Ongoing	Ongoing	MSC 92/26, para.13.31; MSC 107/20, par. 12.2; MSC 108/20, sec.3 and par. 15.5, MSC.553(108); MSC 110/21, sec.3 and par. 11.7
7	7.22	Routeing measures and ship reporting systems	Continuous	MSC	NCSR		Ongoing	Ongoing	MSC 108/20, para. 12.4, SN.1/Circ.343; MSC 109/22, para.13.3, COLREG.2/Circ.81, SN.1/Circ.344
7	7.23	Updates to the LRIT system	Continuous	MSC	NCSR		Ongoing	Ongoing	
7	7.24	Verified goal-based new ship construction standards for tankers and bulk carriers	Continuous	MSC			Ongoing	Ongoing	MSC 106/19, sec.4; MSC 107/20, sec.4, MSC 109/22, sec.4
7	7.25	Amendment to regulation 25 of the of the 1988 Load Line Protocol regarding the requirement for setting of guard rails on the deck structure	2025	MSC	SDC		In progress	Completed	MSC 108/20, para. 15.23.1; MSC 110/21, para. 11.13
7	7.26	Reports to the MSC on information communicated by STCW Parties	Continuous	MSC			Ongoing	Ongoing	MSC 109/22, secs.19 and 21, MSC.1/Circ.1164/Rev.29
Notes:	MSC 109 changed the type of output from "annual" to "continuous".								
7	7.27	Updated Survey Guidelines under the Harmonized System of Survey and Certification (HSSC)	Continuous	MSC / MEPC	III		In progress	Ongoing	MSC 79/23, paras. 9.19 and 9.20;MSC 104, para.13.7.2; MSC 106/19, paras.14.13 to 14; MSC 108/20, para.13.7.2;

Maritime Safety Committee (MSC)									
Reference to SD,[2] if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output for Year 1	Status of output for Year 2	References
									MSC 109/22, sec.15. MEPC 68/21, paras. 14.5 and 14.6; MEPC 72/17, paras. 7.4 and 4.24 to 4.33; MEPC 77/16, para.10.7; MEPC 79/15, paras. 9.7 to 9.9; MEPC 81/16, para.10.9.2; MEPC 83/17, para.11.9
Notes:	MSC 109 and MEPC 83 changed the type of output from "annual" to "continuous".								
7	7.28	Consideration of reports of incidents involving dangerous goods or marine pollutants in packaged form on board ships or in port areas	Continuous	MSC / MEPC	III	CCC	In progress	Ongoing	CCC 7/15, sec.9; CCC 8/18, sec.9; CCC 9/14, sec.9; MSC 109/22, secs.14 and 19
Notes:	MSC 109 and MEPC 83 changed the type of output from "annual" to "continuous".								
7	7.29	Comprehensive review of the requirements for maintenance, thorough examination, operational testing, overhaul and repair of lifeboats and rescue boats, launching appliances and release gear (resolution MSC.402(96)) to address challenges with their implementation	2027	MSC	SSE		In progress	In progress	SSE 10/20, sec.14; SSE 11/20, sec.14; MSC 110/21, sec.18
7	7.30	Amendments to SOLAS chapter III and chapter IV of the LSA Code to require the carriage of self-righting or canopied reversible liferafts for new ships	2027	MSC	SSE		In progress	In progress	MSC 109/22, sec.12; MSC 110/21, sec.18

Maritime Safety Committee (MSC)									
Reference to SD,[2] if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output for Year 1	Status of output for Year 2	References
7	7.32	Development of amendments to paragraph 8.3.5 and annex 1 of the 1994 and 2000 HSC Codes	2024	MSC	SSE		Completed		MSC 109/22, sec.12
7	7.33	Development of design and prototype test requirements for the arrangements used in the operational testing of free-fall lifeboat release systems without launching the lifeboat	2025	MSC	SSE		In progress	Completed	SSE 10/20, sec.4; SSE 11/20, para. 4.18.2; MSC 110/21, sec.14
7	7.34	Revision of the 2010 FTP Code to allow for new fire protection systems and materials	2026	MSC	SSE		In progress	In progress	SSE 10/20, sec.8; MSC 109/22, sec.12; SSE 11/20, sec.8; MSC 110/21, sec.14
7	7.35	Amendments to the Guidelines for construction, installation, maintenance and inspection/survey of means of embarkation and disembarkation (MSC.1/Circ.1331) concerning the rigging of safety netting on accommodation ladders and gangways	2025	MSC	SSE	SDC	Extended	Completed	MSC 106/19, par.16.28; MSC 108/20, par.15.23.1; MSC 110/21, para. 11.11
Notes:	MSC 108 extended the target completion year to 2025.								
7	7.36	New requirements for ventilation of survival craft	2027	MSC	SSE		In progress	In progress	MSC 97/22, para.19.22; SSE 8/20, sec.3; MSC 106/19, sec.11; MSC 107/20, sec.14; SSE 10/20, sec.3; MSC 108/20, para. 18.25. MSC 109/22, sec.12;

Maritime Safety Committee (MSC)									
Reference to SD,[2] if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output for Year 1	Status of output for Year 2	References
									SSE 11/20, sec.3; MSC 110/21, sec.18
Notes:	MSC 109 agreed with SSE 10's request for an extension of the target completion year to 2025 for further discussion on the compelling need; MSC 110 extended the target completion year to 2027.								
7	7.37	Evaluation of adequacy of fire protection, detection and extinction arrangements in vehicle, special category and ro-ro spaces in order to reduce the fire risk of ships carrying new energy vehicles	2027	MSC	SSE		In progress	In progress	SSE 10/20, sec.16; SSE 11/20, sec.16
7	7.40	Revision of the Revised guidelines for the preparation of the cargo securing manual (MSC.1/Circ.1353/Rev.2) to include a harmonized performance standard for lashing software to permit lashing software as a supplement to the Cargo Securing Manual	2025	MSC	CCC		In progress	In progress	MSC 108/20, para. 18.18
7	7.41	Development of provisions to consider prohibiting the use of fire-fighting foams containing fluorinated substances, in addition to PFOS for fire-fighting on board ships	2026	MSC	SSE		In progress	In progress	MSC 101/24, para.21.27; MSC 102/24, paras. 19.31 and 21.19; SSE 8/20, sec.12; MSC 106/19, sec.11; SSE 9/20, sec.15; MSC 107/20, sec.14; SSE 10/20, sec.13; SSE 11/20, sec.13; MSC 110/21, sec.18

Maritime Safety Committee (MSC)									
Reference to SD,[2] if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output for Year 1	Status of output for Year 2	References
7	7.42	Revision of the Interim explanatory notes for the assessment of passenger ship systems' capabilities after a fire or flooding casualty (MSC.1/Circ.1369) and related circulars	2027	MSC	HTW / SSE	SDC	In progress	In progress	MSC 110/20, sec.18; MSC 108/20, par. 15.23.3; MSC 105/20, paras. 15.24.2 and 18.54; MSC 103/21, para. 18.31.
Notes:	MSC 110 extended the target completion year to 2027.								
7	7.44	Revision of SOLAS regulation V/23 and associated instruments to improve the safety of pilot transfer arrangements	2024	MSC	NCSR		Extended	Completed	MSC 106/19, paras.16.12 to.14; MSC 109/22, paras.13.14 to 13.19 and annexes 15 to 22; MSC 110/21, sec.3
7	7.45	Development of guidance to assist competent authorities in the implementation of the Cape Town Agreement of 2012	2024	MSC	III		Completed		MSC 106/19, paras.16.17 and 16.46; MSC 108/20, 13.14; MSC 109/22, paras.15.12 to 15.15; Res.MSC.571(109)
Notes:	MSC 109 adopted resolution MSC.571(109) on guidance to assist competent authorities in the implementation of the Cape Town Agreement of 2012.								
7	7.47	Review of the 2009 Code on Alerts and Indicators	2026	MSC	SSE / NCSR	SDC	Extended	Completed	MSC 108/20, para. 18.24.2; MSC 110/21, para.11.21 and 18.105
7	7.48	Review and update SOLAS regulation II-2/9 on containment of fire to incorporate existing guidance and clarify requirements	2026	MSC	SSE		In progress	In progress	MSC 104/15/2; MSC 105/20, paras. 18.8 and 18.9; MSC 109/22, para.12.10
7	7.49	Development of guidelines for the use of electronic nautical publications (ENP)	2025	MSC	NCSR		In progress	In progress	MSC 104/15/4, MSC 105/20, para. 18.11

Maritime Safety Committee (MSC)									
Reference to SD,[2] if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output for Year 1	Status of output for Year 2	References
7	7.50	Identification of measures to improve the security and integrity aspects of AIS	2025	MSC	NCSR		Completed		MSC 107/20, para. 17.77; MSC 109/22, para.13.20; Res.MSC.570(109)
8	8.1	Endorsed proposals for the development, maintenance and enhancement of information systems and related guidance (GISIS, websites, etc.)	Continuous	Council	MSC / MEPC / FAL / LEG / TCC		Ongoing	Ongoing	MEPC 78/17, para. 4.45; MEPC 79/15, paras. 6.1 to 6.5 and 9.4; MEPC 80/17, paras. 6.11 to 6.13
8	8.9	Revised documents on organization and method of work, as appropriate	Annual	Council	MSC / MEPC / FAL / LEG / TCC		Completed	Completed	MSC-MEPC.1/Circ.5/Rev.6, subject to concurrence of MEPC 83; MSC 109/22, secs.18 and 19; MEPC 78/17, sec.13; MEPC 79/15, sec.11; MEPC 80/17, sec.13; FAL 49/22, para. 18.5 (FAL Circ.3/Circ.217/Rev.3)
8	8.12	Consideration for the enhancement and improvement of multilingualism and the language services at IMO	Continuous	Council	MSC / MEPC / FAL / LEG / TCC		No work requested	No work requested	
OW.	OW 3	Endorsed proposals for new outputs for the 2024-2025 biennium as accepted by the Committees	Annual	Council	MSC / MEPC / FAL / LEG / TCC		Completed		MEPC 78/17, sec.14; MEPC 79/15, sec.12; MEPC 80/17, sec.14; MSC 109/22, sec.19. MSC 109/22, sec.19
OW.	OW 8	Cooperate with the United Nations on matters of mutual interest, as well as provide relevant input/guidance	Continuous	Assembly	MSC / MEPC / FAL / LEG / TCC	Council	Ongoing	Ongoing	C 120/D, paras.17(a).1-17(a).5 MEPC 78/17, para. 7.6 and sec.8; MEPC 79/15, paras.

Maritime Safety Committee (MSC)									
Reference to SD,[2] if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ	Status of output for Year 1	Status of output for Year 2	References
									7.3 to 7.5; MEPC 80/17, paras. 7.2 to 7.4; MSC 110/21, para. 20.7
OW.	OW 9	Cooperate with other international bodies on matters of mutual interest, as well as provide relevant input/guidance	Continuous	Assembly	MSC / MEPC / FAL / LEG / TCC	Council	Ongoing	Ongoing	C 120/D, paras.17(a).1-17(a).5 MEPC 78/17, secs.7 and 8; MEPC 79/15, secs.7 and 8; MEPC 80/17, secs.7 and 8

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ANNEX 34

WORK PROGRAMME OF THE MARITIME SAFETY COMMITTEE FOR THE 2026-2027 BIENNIUM*

Maritime Safety Committee (MSC)						
Reference to SD, if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ(s)
1	1.2	Input on identifying emerging needs of developing countries, in particular SIDS and LDCs to be included in the ITCP	Continuous	TCC	MSC / MEPC / FAL / LEG	
1	1.3	Development of amendments to chapter 6 of the 2009 MODU Code regarding electrical equipment capable of operation after shutdown	2026	MSC	SSE	SDC
1	1.4	Analysis of consolidated audit summary reports	Annual	Assembly	MSC / MEPC / LEG / TCC / III	Council
1	1.5	Non-exhaustive list of obligations under instruments relevant to the IMO Instruments Implementation Code (III Code)	Continuous	MSC / MEPC	III	
Notes:	MSC 109 and MEPC 83 agreed to change the type of output from "annual" to "continuous".					
1	1.7	Identify thematic priorities within the area of maritime safety and security, marine environmental protection, facilitation of maritime traffic and maritime legislation	Annual	TCC	MSC / MEPC / FAL / LEG	

* Outputs with a target completion year in the current biennium pertaining to Sub-Committees the sessions of which are yet to be held in 2025 (i.e. III 11 and CCC 11) are shown in strikethrough text and in brackets.

Reference to SD, if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ(s)
1	1.11	Measures to harmonize port State control (PSC) activities and procedures worldwide	Continuous	MSC / MEPC	HTW / PPR / NCSR	III
1	1.13	Development of amendments to paragraph 2.1.2.5 of chapter 5 of the FSS Code on construction requirements for gaskets	2026	MSC	SSE	
1	1.14	Development of engine control room alert management (ECRAM) performance standards	2028	MSC	HTW / SSE	SDC
1	1.17	Development of guidelines for the use of ammonia cargo as fuel and provisions for the use of alternative fuels other than cargo on gas carriers	2026	MSC	CCC	
Notes:	MSC 109 changed the title of output from "Review of IGC Code" to "Development of guidelines for the use of ammonia cargo as fuel and provisions for the use of alternative fuels other than cargo on gas carriers" and extended the target completion year to 2026.					
~~1~~	~~1.18~~	~~[Development of guidance on assessment and applications of remote surveys, ISM Code audits and ISPS Code verifications]~~	~~2025~~	~~MSC / MEPC~~	~~III~~	
1	1.34	Development of global maritime SAR services, including harmonization of maritime and aeronautical procedures and amendments to the IAMSAR Manual	Continuous	MSC	NCSR	
2	2.1	Response to matters related to the ITU-R Study Groups and ITU World Radiocommunication Conference	Continuous	MSC	NCSR	

Reference to SD, if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ(s)
2	2.3	Amendments to the IGF Code and development of guidelines for alternative fuels and related technologies	Continuous	MSC	HTW / PPR / SDC / SSE	CCC
2	2.5	Development of a transition scheme for the introduction of digital technology for Very High Frequency (VHF) voice communications	2027	MSC	NCSR	
2	2.6	Guidelines for use of Fibre-Reinforced Plastics (FRP) within ship structures	2026	MSC	SDC	
2	2.7	Development of performance standards for dual frequency multi-constellation satellite-based augmentation systems (DFMC SBAS) and advanced receiver autonomous integrity monitoring (ARAIM) in shipborne radionavigation receivers	2027	MSC	NCSR	
2	2.9	Revision of SOLAS chapters II-1 (part C) and V, and related instruments regarding steering and propulsion requirements, to address both traditional and non-traditional propulsion and steering systems	2028	MSC	SSE	SDC
Notes:	MSC 110 extended the target completion year to 2028.					
2	2.11	Development of a comprehensive strategy on maritime digitalization	2027	FAL	MSC / MEPC	
Notes:	FAL 49 approved the work plan.					
2	2.12	Development of guidance to establish a framework for data distribution and global IP-based connectivity between shore-based facilities and ships for ECDIS S-100 products	2026	MSC	NCSR	

Reference to SD, if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ(s)
2	2.14	Revision of the Performance standards for gyro-compasses (resolution A.424(XI)) and Guidance for navigation and communication equipment intended for use on ships operating in polar waters (MSC.1/Circ.1612)	2028	MSC	NCSR	
2	2.15	Development of operational guidance for route exchange	2026	MSC	NCSR	
2	2.16	Revision of SOLAS chapter III and the International Life-Saving Appliance (LSA) Code	2027	MSC	SSE	
2	2.17	Development of performance standards for Ranging mode (R-mode) in radionavigation receivers	2027	MSC	NCSR	
2	2.18	Development of guidelines for EPIRB which implement the two-way communication service via the SAR/Galileo Return Link service as a complement to EPIRB performance standards (resolution MSC.471(101))	2026	MSC	NCSR	
2	2.21	Review of Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) studies by the FSA Experts' Group	Continuous	MSC		
2	2.23	Development of a goal-based instrument for maritime autonomous surface ships (MASS)	2026	MSC		
2	2.25	Revision of the Interim recommendations for carriage of liquefied hydrogen in bulk	2026	MSC	CCC	
Notes:	MSC 108 extended the target completion year to 2026.					

Reference to SD, if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ(s)
3	3.8	Development of a safety regulatory framework to support the reduction of GHG emissions from ships using new technologies and alternative fuels	Continuous	MSC	MEPC / III / HTW / CCC / SDC / SSE	MSC
4	4.2	Input to the ITCP on emerging issues relating to sustainable development and achievement of the SDGs	Continuous	TCC	MSC / MEPC / FAL / LEG	
5	5.2	Guidelines and guidance on the implementation and interpretation of SOLAS chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code	Continuous	MSC		
5	5.3	Consideration and analysis of reports on piracy and armed robbery against ships	Continuous	MSC		
5	5.4	Revised guidance relating to the prevention of piracy and armed robbery to reflect emerging trends and behaviour patterns	Continuous	MSC	LEG	
5	5.6	Development of amendments to the Revised guidelines on the prevention of access by stowaways and the allocation of responsibilities to seek the successful resolution of stowaway cases (resolutions FAL.13(42) and MSC.448(99))	2027	FAL	MSC	
5	5.9	Development of amendments to the Revised guidelines for the prevention and suppression of the smuggling of drugs, psychotropic substances and precursor chemicals on ships engaged in international maritime traffic (resolutions FAL.9(34) and MSC.228(82))	2027	FAL	MSC	

Reference to SD, if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ(s)
5	5.13	IMO's contribution to addressing unsafe mixed migration by sea	2026	MSC / FAL / LEG		
Notes:	FAL 49 agreed to extend the target completion year to 2026 (FAL 49/22).					
6	6.1	Role of the human element	Continuous	MSC / MEPC	III / PPR / CCC / SDC / SSE / NCSR	HTW
6	6.2	Validated model training courses	Continuous	MSC / MEPC	III / PPR / CCC / SDC / SSE / NCSR	HTW
6	6.3	Reports on unlawful practices associated with certificates of competency	Continuous	MSC	HTW	
6	6.5	Comprehensive revision of the guidelines on the implementation of the ISM Code by Administrations and companies	2028	MSC /[MEPC]	HTW	III
Notes:	MSC 110 invited MEPC 84 to also become a parent organ.					
6	6.6	Revision of the IMO Standard Marine Communication Phrases (resolution A.918(22))	2028	MSC	HTW	NCSR
6	6.9	Scoping exercise and enhancement of the effectiveness of provisions on fatigue and seafarers' hours of work and rest	2027	MSC	III	HTW
6	6.10	Development of an entrant training manual for PSC personnel	2026	MSC / MEPC	III	
Notes:	It will be developed after the finalization of the IMO Model Course 3.09 on Port State Control, which is expected to be validated by III 11.					
6	6.17	Comprehensive review of the 1978 STCW Convention and Code	2031	MSC	HTW	
7	7.1	Unified interpretation of provisions of IMO safety, security, environment, facilitation, liability and compensation-related conventions	Continuous	MSC / MEPC / FAL / LEG	III / PPR / CCC / SDC / SSE / NCSR	

Reference to SD, if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ(s)
7	7.2	Developments in GMDSS services, including guidelines on maritime safety information (MSI)	Continuous	MSC	NCSR	
7	7.4	Lessons learned and safety issues identified from the analysis of marine safety investigation reports	Continuous	MSC / MEPC	III	
7	7.5	Identified issues relating to the implementation of IMO instruments from the analysis of data	Continuous	MSC / MEPC	III	
7	7.6	Consideration and analysis of reports and information on persons rescued at sea and stowaways	Continuous	MSC / FAL		
7	7.10	Amendments to the IMDG Code and supplements	Continuous	MSC	CCC	
7	7.13	Amendments to the IMSBC Code and supplements	Continuous	MSC	CCC	
7	7.15	Development of amendments to SOLAS chapter II-2 and the FSS Code concerning detection and control of fires in cargo holds and on the cargo deck of container ships	2028	MSC	CCC	SSE
7	7.19	Amendments to the LSA Code for thermal performance of immersion suits	2027	MSC	SSE	
~~7~~	~~7.20~~	~~[Develop measures to prevent the loss of containers at sea]~~	~~2026~~	~~MSC~~	~~III / HTW / SDC / NCSR~~	~~CCC~~
7	7.21	Amendments to the 2011 ESP Code	Continuous	MSC	SDC	
7	7.22	Routeing measures and ship reporting systems	Continuous	MSC	NCSR	
7	7.23	Updates to the LRIT system	Continuous	MSC	NCSR	

Reference to SD, if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ(s)
7	7.24	Verified goal-based new ship construction standards for tankers and bulk carriers	Continuous	MSC		
7	7.25	Revision of the Revised guidelines for the maintenance and inspections of fixed carbon dioxide fire-extinguishing systems (MSC.1/Circ.1318/Rev.1) to clarify the testing and inspection provisions for CO_2 cylinders	2026	MSC	SSE	
7	7.26	Reports to the MSC on information communicated by STCW Parties	Continuous	MSC		
7	7.27	Updated Survey Guidelines under the Harmonized System of Survey and Certification (HSSC)	Continuous	MSC / MEPC	III	
7	7.28	Consideration of reports of incidents involving dangerous goods or marine pollutants in packaged form on board ships or in port areas	Continuous	MSC / MEPC	III	CCC
7	7.29	Comprehensive review of the Requirements for maintenance, thorough examination, operational testing, overhaul and repair of lifeboats and rescue boats, launching appliances and release gear (resolution MSC.402(96)) to address challenges with their implementation	2027	MSC	SSE	
7	7.30	Amendments to SOLAS chapter III and chapter IV of the LSA Code to require the carriage of self-righting or canopied reversible liferafts for new ships	2027	MSC	SSE	
7	7.31	Development of amendments to chapter 15 of the FSS Code on enclosed spaces containing a nitrogen receiver or a buffer tank of nitrogen generator systems	2027	MSC	SSE	SDC

Reference to SD, if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ(s)
7	7.32	Revision of the Guidelines for the application of plastic pipes on ships (resolution A.753(18))	2026	MSC	SSE	SDC
7	7.33	Review and, if necessary, amendment of SOLAS regulations II-2/13.4.1.1 and 13.4.2.1 to clarify the requirements on escape arrangements from the lower part of machinery spaces	2027	MSC	SDC	
7	7.34	Revision of the 2010 FTP Code to allow for new fire protection systems and materials	2026	MSC	SSE	
7	7.35	Amendments to section 4.2 of the IMSBC Code regarding the cargo information and sample declaration form to be provided by the shipper	2026	MSC	CCC	
7	7.36	New requirements for ventilation of survival craft	2027	MSC	SSE	
7	7.37	Evaluation of adequacy of fire protection, detection and extinction arrangements in vehicle, special category and ro-ro spaces in order to reduce the fire risk of ships carrying new energy vehicles	2027	MSC	SSE	
7	7.39	Review of the financial architecture of the LRIT system	2026	MSC		
~~7~~	~~7.40~~	~~[Revision of the Revised guidelines for the preparation of the cargo securing manual (MSC.1/Circ.1353/Rev.2) to include a harmonized performance standard for lashing software to permit lashing software as a supplement to the Cargo Securing Manual]~~	~~[2025]~~	~~MSC~~	~~CCC~~	

Reference to SD, if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ(s)
7	7.41	Development of provisions to consider prohibiting the use of fire-fighting foams containing fluorinated substances, in addition to PFOS for fire-fighting on board ships	2026	MSC	SSE	
7	7.42	Revision of the Interim explanatory notes for the assessment of passenger ship systems' capabilities after a fire or flooding casualty (MSC.1/Circ.1369) and related circulars	2027	MSC	HTW / SSE	SDC
Notes:	MSC 108 extended the target completion year to 2025, and MSC 110 extended it to 2027.					
7	7.43	Review of the Casualty Investigation Code and the associated implementation Guidelines (resolution A.1075(28))	2028	MSC	III	
7	7.48	Review and update SOLAS regulation II-2/9 on containment of fire to incorporate existing guidance and clarify requirements	2026	MSC	SSE	
8	8.1	Endorsed proposals for the development, maintenance and enhancement of information systems and related guidance (GISIS, websites, etc.)	Continuous	Council	MSC / MEPC / FAL / LEG / TCC	
8	8.9	Revised documents on organization and method of work, as appropriate	Continuous	Council	MSC / MEPC / FAL / LEG / TCC	
8	8.12	Consideration for the enhancement and improvement of multilingualism and the language services at IMO	Continuous	Council	MSC / MEPC / FAL / LEG / TCC	
OW	OW 3	Endorsed proposals for new outputs for the 2026-2027 biennium as accepted by the Committees	Annual	Council	MSC / MEPC / FAL / LEG / TCC	

Reference to SD, if applicable	Output number	Description	Target completion year	Parent organ(s)	Associated organ(s)	Coordinating organ(s)
OW	OW 8	Cooperate with the United Nations on matters of mutual interest, as well as provide relevant input/guidance	Continuous	Assembly	MSC / MEPC / FAL / LEG / TCC/III	Council
Note:	The III Sub-Committee was included as an associated organ as a result of the instruction by MSC 110 to review the draft guidelines for the seaworthiness and safety inspection of small fishing vessels and associated inspection checklist, under output OW 8.					
OW	OW 9	Cooperate with other international bodies on matters of mutual interest, as well as provide relevant input/guidance	Continuous	Assembly	MSC / MEPC / FAL / LEG / TCC	Council

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ANNEX 35

POST-BIENNIAL AGENDA OF THE MARITIME SAFETY COMMITTEE*

Maritime Safety Committee (MSC)								
Number	Biennium (when the output was placed on the post-biennial agenda)	Reference to strategic direction, if applicable	Description	Parent organ(s)	Associated organs(s)	Coordinating organ(s)	Timescale (sessions)	References
194	2022-2023	1	Development of measures to ensure the safe operation of elevators on board ships	MSC	SSE		4	MSC 106/19, paras.16.25 and.26
201	2022-2023	2	Consideration of descriptions of Maritime Services in the context of e-navigation	MSC	FAL / NCSR		1	MSC 107/20, para. 17.77.1. MSC.1/Circ.1610/Rev.1
202	2022-2023	2	Development of generic performance standards for shipborne satellite navigation system receiver equipment	MSC	NCSR		1	MSC 107/20, para. 17.76
210	2022-2023	6	Development of guidance to address time pressure and related organizational factors	MSC	III	HTW	1	MSC 107/20, para. 17.23

* For details, refer to Organizational Planning module of GISIS.

Number	Biennium (when the output was placed on the post-biennial agenda)	Reference to strategic direction, if applicable	Description	Parent organ(s)	Associated organs(s)	Coordinating organ(s)	Timescale (sessions)	References
233	2024-2025	6	Development of guidelines addressing risks of falls from height	MSC	III	HTW	4	MSC 110/21, para.18.46
213	2022-2023	7	Development of guidelines for harmonizing the date format of various certificates issued under IMO instruments	MSC / FAL	III		2	MSC 107/20, para. 17.41
216	2022-2023	7	Development of amendments to the LSA Code and resolution MSC.81(70) to address the in-water performance of SOLAS lifejackets	MSC	SSE		2	MSC 101/24, para.21.6; SSE 9/20, para.8.19; MSC 101/24, para.21.9 MSC 107/20, para. 14.24
217	2022-2023	7	Safety measures for non-SOLAS ships operating in polar waters	MSC	SDC		2	MSC 107/12, par.3, MSC 107/20, par. 17.80 and annex 38
225	2024-2025	7	Clarification of applicable equipment standards for fire-fighters' outfits in chapter 3 of the FSS Code	MSC	SSE		1	MSC 110/21, para.18.39
226	2024-2025	7	Revision of resolution MSC.81(70) concerning requirements for testing the compliance of pyrotechnics	MSC	SSE		2	MSC 110/21, para.18.52

Number	Biennium (when the output was placed on the post-biennial agenda)	Reference to strategic direction, if applicable	Description	Parent organ(s)	Associated organs(s)	Coordinating organ(s)	Timescale (sessions)	References
227	2024-2025	7	Mitigation of fire risks caused by leakages from low-pressure fuel pipes and lubrication oil pipes, and use of thermal imaging cameras when inspecting insulations, in engine-rooms	MSC	SSE		2	MSC 110/21, para.18.56
228	2024-2025	7	Revision of the LSA Code regarding lowering speed requirements for fast rescue boats	MSC	SSE		1	MSC 110/21, para.18.61
229	2024-2025	7	Revision of testing requirements for floor covering materials in SOLAS regulation II 2/6.2.1	MSC	SSE		1	MSC 110/21, para.18.77
230	2024-2025	7	Revision of SOLAS regulation II-2/20 and chapter 7 of the FSS Code	MSC	SSE		1	MSC 110/21, para.18.80
234	2024-2025	7	Application of resolution MSC.402(96) to high-speed craft and mobile offshore drilling units in the HSC Codes and MODU Codes	MSC	SSE		2	MSC 110/21, para.18.48

Number	Biennium (when the output was placed on the post-biennial agenda)	Reference to strategic direction, if applicable	Description	Parent organ(s)	Associated organs(s)	Coordinating organ(s)	Timescale (sessions)	References
236	2024-2025	7	Development of guidelines addressing the implementation of provisions left "to the satisfaction of the Administration", or equivalent, in the relevant mandatory IMO instruments	MSC	III		2	MSC 110/21, para.18.91
Notes:	To be commenced by the III Sub-Committee during the 2028-2029 biennium.							
31	2024-2025	7	Finalization of a non-mandatory instrument on regulations for non-convention ships	MSC	III		1	MSC 96/25, para. 9.4; MSC 101/24, para. 21.38; MSC 104/18, sect.5; MSC 105/20, sect.4; MSC 107/20, paras. 17.83, 19.9 and 19.10, MSC 108/20, sect.10; MSC 109/22, sect.17

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ANNEX 36

SUBSTANTIVE ITEMS FOR INCLUSION IN THE AGENDAS FOR MSC 111 AND MSC 112

111th session of the Committee (12 to 22 May 2026)

Decisions of other IMO bodies

Amendments to mandatory instruments

Goal-based new ship construction standards

Development of a goal-based instrument for maritime autonomous surface ships (MASS)

Development of a safety regulatory framework to support the reduction of GHG emissions from ships using new technologies and alternative fuels

Measures to enhance maritime security

Piracy and armed robbery against ships

Unsafe mixed migration by sea

Formal safety assessment

Review of the financial architecture of the LRIT system

Ship design and construction (Report of the twelfth session of the Sub-Committee)

Human element, training and watchkeeping (Report of the twelfth session of the Sub-Committee)

Carriage of cargoes and containers (Report of the eleventh session of the Sub-Committee)

Navigation, communications and search and rescue (Report of the twelfth session of the Sub-Committee)

Pollution Prevention and Response (Report of the thirteenth session of the Sub-Committee)

Application of the Committees' method of work

Work programme

Any other business

112th session of the Committee (30 November to 4 December 2026)

Decisions of other IMO bodies

Amendments to mandatory instruments

[Goal-based new ship construction standards]

[Development of a goal-based instrument for maritime autonomous surface ships (MASS)]

Development of a safety regulatory framework to support the reduction of GHG emissions from ships using new technologies and alternative fuels

Measures to enhance maritime security

Piracy and armed robbery against ships

[Unsafe mixed migration by sea]

[Formal safety assessment]

Ship systems and equipment (Report of the twelfth session of the Sub-Committee)

Navigation, communications and search and rescue (Report of the thirteenth session of the Sub-Committee)

Implementation of IMO instruments (Report of the twelfth session of the Sub-Committee)

Carriage of cargoes and containers (Urgent matters emanating from the twelfth session of the Sub-Committee)

Application of the Committees' method of work

Work programme

Election of Chair and Vice-Chair for 2027

Any other business

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ANNEX 37

STATEMENTS BY DELEGATIONS AND OBSERVERS[1]

AGENDA ITEM 1

Statement by the Islamic Republic of Iran

Madam Chair,

Mr. Secretary-General,

Distinguished Delegations

As you all are aware, nowadays my country, Iran, has been attacked by the Israeli regime and made another dark page in its history.

I came to this session of the Maritime Safety Committee of the IMO in order to declare our position's on this criminal act of aggression and its consequences at the regional and global levels.

At the outset, I would like to express my sincere appreciation to those Member States that have condemned the Israeli regime's recent aggression and expressed solidarity with Iranian nation.

These principled positions demonstrate an enduring commitment to international law.

I rise today to inform the IMO of an unfolding crisis that not only endangers the sovereignty of my country but also jeopardizes international peace and security, including the maritime and ports sector.

On 13 June 2025, the Israeli regime initiated aggression, coordinated aerial and missile attacks against several cities across the Islamic Republic of Iran.

These operations, planned and executed with the support of a Certain State, deliberately struck peaceful nuclear facilities, economic infrastructure, civilian people, and national assets. Among the sites deliberately targeted was the Natanz nuclear facility, a safeguarded installation operating under continuous monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

The targeting of such facilities presents a serious and unacceptable risk of radiological catastrophe, constitutes a violation of the IAEA Statute, and undermines the global non-proliferation regime.

It is important to underscore that the Islamic Republic of Iran is a responsible state and a State party in full compliance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

Iran has consistently maintained cooperation and transparency with the Agency in accordance with its safeguards obligations.

[1] Statements have been included in this annex in the order in which they are listed in the report, sorted by agenda items, and in the language of submission (including translation into any other language if such translation was provided).

In stark contrast, the Israeli regime remains outside the NPT framework, refuses to accede to this global treaty, and continues to operate a vast and undeclared arsenal of nuclear weapons beyond any international supervision.

We are confronted with a deeply troubling reality: the very regime that has never accepted international obligations under the NPT and possesses actual nuclear weapons is launching military aggression under the pretext of nuclear concerns—against a State that is fully transparent and legally bound under the non-proliferation regime.

This is not only a profound injustice; it is a direct assault on the credibility and integrity of the international Legal Order and non-proliferation architecture.

Distinguished Colleagues;

In recent days, the Israeli regime has extended its unlawful attacks to include Iran's vital petrochemical and gas infrastructure in Asalouyeh, a strategic zone located on the northern shores of the Persian Gulf.

These actions directly endanger international maritime security and the global energy supply chain.

If the international community fails to take urgent and concrete measures to halt this unlawful aggression, the risk of escalation at sea becomes imminent.

We must remind everyone of the repeated physical attacks on 12 Iranian oil tankers that occurred between 2019 and 2021, as well as the acts of maritime sabotage—including the placement of magnetic mines—particularly in the Red Sea and the Mediterranean Sea, which are often attributed to the Israeli regime.

In addition, we draw the IMO's attention to the 2020 cyberattack on Shahid Rajaee Port's infrastructure in southern Iran, which severely disrupted maritime and port operations and was widely reported to have been orchestrated by Israeli regime.

These hybrid threats—combining physical and cyber aggression—represent a multifaceted assault on maritime safety, port security, and the freedom of navigation, which this Organization is mandated to protect.

Over the past days, this act of aggression has been intensified. Hundreds of civilians, including senior officials, scientists, women, and children, have been killed and injured. In one horrific attack, a residential building was bombed, killing at least 20 children.

These atrocities are not random. They are part of a deliberate and systematic pattern-consistent with the well-documented conduct of a child-killing regime that has committed similar crimes in Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, and now Iran.

Just recently, the Israeli regime deliberately targeted the headquarters of the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) during a live news broadcast.

This appalling act represents not only a deliberate war crime but a direct assault on the principle of press freedom.

These actions constitute grave breaches of international humanitarian law, amounting to war crimes and crimes against humanity.

The Islamic Republic of Iran strongly condemns these criminal acts and affirms that responsibility extends not only to the Israeli regime, but to certain state that materially support, arm, or shield it.

Madam Chair,

As responsible members of the International Maritime Organization (IMO), we are committed to adhering to all international maritime principles and regulations.

Despite the various sanctions imposed on Iran, my country is very active in search and rescue (SAR) operations in the Persian Gulf region.

We also play a significant role in reducing the negative environmental impacts caused by oil pollution by collecting advanced equipment to combat oil spills and conducting regular drills to address these issues. Furthermore, with over one hundred thousand seafarers capable of providing services to international shipping, we play an significant role in the region.

Madam Chair,

This pattern of aggression has direct implications for this Organization's mandate. Article 1 of the IMO Convention affirms the Organization's responsibility to ensure safe and secure shipping.

The destabilization of the maritime activities, compounded by regional insecurity, poses a direct threat to international navigation.

Attacks targeting maritime-linked infrastructure violate not only the IMO Convention but also the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, the SOLAS Convention, and Assembly
Resolution A.924(22), which calls on States to protect the safety of maritime navigation against unlawful acts.

If peace and security are permitted to be violated by the Israeli regime with impunity, the consequences will inevitably spill into all domains of international security, including maritime and naval.

What has occurred is not a simple challenge; it is a direct challenge to the integrity of international law and the main role of the United Nations.

Further compounding the gravity of this situation, Israeli officials have openly claimed responsibility for these strikes, declaring that their objective was to "wreck" diplomatic negotiations.

This admission confirms the political motive: to sabotage dialogue and provoke wider conflict. Such conduct is incompatible with the principles of international peace and security.

Today's situation is a direct consequence of decades of impunity, selective enforcement, and double standards.

The complicity of the Certain State in these unlawful acts is undeniable. It has acknowledged its assistance, including the provision of weapons and intelligence used in the attacks.

This represents not only moral complicity but legal responsibility under international law.

No *State shall recognize as lawful a situation created by such a breach, nor provide aid or assistance in maintaining it. All States are under a binding obligation to cooperate in bringing the unlawful situation to an end through lawful and peaceful means.*

Despite these provocations, the Islamic Republic of Iran has exercised its legitimate right of self-defence as enshrined in Article 51 of the United Nations.

Iran will respond firmly and proportionately to these acts of aggression—at a time, by means, and in a manner of its choosing.

Our response will be necessary to restore deterrence, defend our people and sovereignty, and uphold the principles of international law. No aggressor may act with impunity.

We call upon this Organization and its Member States to speak out firmly and act decisively.

Silence in the face of aggression enables impunity.

We urge all States to reaffirm their commitment to the UN charter, uphold international law, and take meaningful steps to ensure that maritime safety is not held hostage to criminal violence and aggression.

No aggressor may act with impunity.

Silence is not impartiality

.
I would be grateful if you would annex these comments to the final report.

Thank you. Madam Chair

Statement by the delegation of Israel

Mr. Chair, Distinguished Delegates,

Thank you for the floor.

We are here to uphold the safety and security of global maritime navigation. But today, I must sound the alarm — because this foundational principle of the IMO is being openly and aggressively threatened by the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Iran is not merely violating international norms. It is actively dismantling them.

It has spent years building a strategic infrastructure of chaos — not just within its borders, but across the entire Middle East and beyond. It has enriched uranium to unprecedented levels for a non-nuclear weapons state, obstructed international inspectors, and openly vowed repeatedly to annihilate a fellow member state of the United Nations.

These are not just words. These are plans. Iran has armed itself with thousands of ballistic missiles, worked toward a nuclear trigger mechanism, and destabilised the whole region by activating for decades a coordinated terror axis stretching from Lebanon to Yemen — operated by its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and its terrorist proxies.

One of these proxies — the Houthis in Yemen — now serves as Iran's long arm at sea.

Let me be blunt: the Islamic Republic of Iran has turned our whole region and the Red Sea specifically into a war zone.

Through its political, financial, and military backing of the Houthi rebels, Iran has enabled a campaign of maritime terrorism against civilian vessels. Since late 2023, dozens of commercial ships have been attacked with Iranian-supplied drones, anti-ship missiles, and naval mines. Several seafarers have been killed. International shipping has been forced to reroute, raising costs, delaying supplies, and threatening the stability of global trade.

Iran's goal is not hidden but out in plain sight. It seeks to weaponise the world's busiest sea lanes, hold international shipping hostage, and impose its will through violence.

This is not a regional dispute. This is a strategic assault on the global maritime and economic order.

The evidence is overwhelming. Iranian components have been found in Houthi weapons. IRGC advisers are known to operate inside Yemen. Intelligence has exposed direct coordination between Tehran and Houthi commanders.

So I ask this room: how much longer will we tolerate a UN member state purposely arming terrorists to target international shipping? How many more attacks must occur before this committee calls Iran by its name — not a "sponsor" of terrorism, but its engine?

Excellencies,

We cannot protect seafarers if we allow state-backed terror to flourish unchecked. We cannot secure trade routes if we pretend that what's happening in the Red Sea is disconnected from decisions made in Tehran.

We urge the MSC to:

1. Clearly and unequivocally condemn the Iranian regime for its direct role in destabilizing maritime security.
2. Call for stricter enforcement of arms embargoes and sanctions related to Houthi forces and Iranian arms transfers.
3. Support international maritime patrols and coordinated responses in high-threat zones.

Iran's actions endanger not only ships and sailors, but the very credibility of our institutions. If the world's sea lanes become fair game for ideological warfare, the consequences will not stop at the Bab al-Mandeb.

They will reach ports in Europe, Asia, Africa — and every nation represented in this room.
It is time to speak with clarity. Iran is not just violating maritime safety. It is waging war against it.

And the cost of inaction will be paid by the global economy — and by innocent lives at sea.

Thank you

AGENDA ITEM 2

Statement by the delegation of the Russian Federation at MSC 110 – reaction for political statements of other delegations

Прослушав очередные длительные выступления других делегаций политической направленности, затрагивающие вопросы, выходящие далеко за пределы компетенции вашего Комитета и Организации, сделанные к тому же, вопреки призывам Председателя под несоответствующим пунктом повестки дня. Мы вновь являемся свидетелями предоставления ложной информации и манипуляции фактами выступавшими делегациями (и прежде всего делегацией Украины)

В отношении повторяющихся обвинений в адрес нашей страны в атаках на объекты гражданской и гражданской портовой инфраструктуры или на гражданские суда хотели бы отметить следующее.

Российская армия, в отличие от Вооруженных сил Украины, (которые намеренно бьют по нашим жилым домам, по социальным объектам) никогда не выбирает в качестве целей на территории Украины гражданские объекты, все удары направлены на разрушение военной инфраструктуры, по объектам военно-промышленного комплекса, которые производят военную технику, местам скопления боеприпасов и других орудий убийства мирных людей. В этом и заключается самая большая разница.

При этом стоит отметить неоднократные случаи размещения украинскими подразделениями тяжелой военной техники во дворах жилых домов и на территории различных объектов гражданской инфраструктуры.

Страны запада в целях дальнейшей эскалации конфликта продолжают поставлять Киевскому режиму вооружения и боеприпасы с задействованием гражданских судов под предлогом вывоза агропродукции. Для перевалки и хранения всех этих военных грузов целенаправленно используется портовая инфраструктура. Таким образом, любые транспортные средства, используемые для доставки на Украину военных грузов, а также места их складирования и хранения являются законными целями для поражения. Наличие подобных грузов в местах попадания ракет всегда подтверждается фактами вторичной детонации и масштабом возгорания, характерным для взрывов боеприпасов, а никак не зерна или металла, как постоянно заявляет украинская сторона. Дополнительно это прекрасно видно на спутниковых снимках. Отдельно следует подчеркнуть ответственность судовладельцев за предоставление коммерческих судов для перевозки военных грузов. Это попросту недопустимо, поскольку такими действиями жизни обычных моряков, которые могут и не знать о характере перевозимого груза, ставятся под угрозу.

(В отношении упомянутой резолюции A.1183(33), принятой на 33-ей сессии Ассамблеи ИМО, в очередной раз повторяем, что данная резолюция, по-видимому, является слабейшей в истории ИМО с точки зрения количества государств-членов, которые в явном виде поддержали её принятие при голосовании.)

AGENDA ITEM 5

Statement by the delegation of United Republic of Tanzania

Chair, Distinguished Delegates,

Tanzania wishes to express its support for document MSC 110/5/3 submitted by Mexico, Nigeria, IFSMA, INTERMANAGER, and the Nautical Institute, which prudently calls for a cautious, structured, and safety-focused approach to trials of sole lookout operations during periods of darkness in the context of Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships (MASS).

Tanzania is a growing maritime nation with increasing international shipping activities through key ports such as Dar es Salaam, Tanga, and Mtwara. Our maritime sector faces real-world challenges such as:

.1 Limited access to advanced MASS technology and training, particularly in rural coastal regions;

.2 Insufficient redundancy in human resources, making it risky to experiment with sole-watch keeping models;

.3 Challenges with maritime surveillance and VTS coverage, especially at night and in areas with high artisanal and small-boat traffic;

.4 A growing concern over seafarer fatigue, well-being, and training gaps, which the pandemic and economic pressures have only intensified.

In this context, Tanzania emphasizes that any trial which reduces human presence on the bridge at night must be carefully regulated and internationally supervised, especially to prevent undermining the safety of navigation in areas with high-density or low-tech traffic, including fishing communities and small crafts, which are prevalent along our coastlines.

We also fully endorse the paper's call for:

.1 Fatigue training based on MSC.1/Circ.1598;

.2 Ensuring at least two awake personnel on duty during trials;

.3 Independent data collection and monitoring to provide verifiable safety benchmarks;

.4 And time-bound trials, with clear objectives and reporting mechanisms to the IMO.

Tanzania recognizes the potential of MASS for improving maritime efficiency and reducing operational costs. However, we also recognize that technology must not outpace safety. As such, we support the proposal to task HTW 12 with revising the out-dated MSC.1/Circ.566, to reflect the modern bridge environment and ensure that trials of sole lookout watch keeping at night proceed with caution, transparency, and robust safeguards.

We stand ready to contribute to this process and encourage a collaborative approach that reflects the diversity of global maritime realities, including those of developing and coastal nations.

Thank you, Chair.

AGENDA ITEM 6

Statement by the delegation of France

Document MSC 110/6/4

Good afternoon,

For the ease of interpreters, please find our draft statement on agenda item 5 on MASS related to human element (§ 2 according to MSC 110/J/5.

Madame la Présidente,

Cette délégation remercie les Etats-Unis pour le travail de coordination et les délégations ayant soumis des propositions sur ce point de l'agenda.

Nous souhaitons tout d'abord réaffirmer notre souhait de voir élaborer tel que cela avait été décidé au MSC 109, un plan de travail qui comprenne un calendrier, des tâches et les priorités à respecter lors de l'attribution, aux sous-comités, des résultats des travaux sur les questions relatives à la sécurité dans le contexte des GES.

Aussi, avant de confier au sous-comité SDC la tâche de réviser la résolution A.491(XII), nous souhaiterions que l'urgence à y procéder soit analysée par le groupe de travail sur la base de critères validés et également comparées aux autres recommandations du rapport du groupe de travail en référence au document MSC 109/WP.9/Add1.

La France partage l'avis du groupe par correspondance sur la nécessité de réviser à terme le code NUC mais dans le cadre d'une approche prescriptive, à périmètre et méthodologie constants. Nous considérons que la navigation commerciale internationale de réacteurs nucléaires en tant que moyen de propulsion directe ou en tant que source d'énergie, devra s'appuyer sur un référentiel partagé et explicite. Ce référentiel doit assurer une cohérence méthodologique dans l'instruction des autorisations de navigation pour éviter les difficultés récurrentes d'interprétation des Etats du pavillon, mais aussi des Etats côtiers et des Etats du port. Cela sous-entend une application homogène de ce référentiel pour les phases de conception, de l'approbation par l'installateur, de l'exploitation et du démantèlement.

Par ailleurs, nous souhaitons insister sur le fait que l'acceptabilité du public passera par la démonstration que :

.1 la sûreté nucléaire des navires dans les environnements marins est au même niveau que les installations à terre (en référence aux prescriptions de l'AIEA),

.2 la sécurité du navire nécessaire pour la sûreté nucléaire est assurée en toutes circonstances.

Selon les prévisions les plus optimistes de l'industrie les réacteurs de génération IV, argument principal d'une révision urgente du code neutre technologiquement ne seront disponibles qu'à l'horizon 2030 au plus tôt. Cette échéance sur leur disponibilité, conditionnée par leur préalable certification et approbation à terre, reste compatible avec un travail de révision ultérieur du code dans le cadre d'une approche prescriptive sur un biennium de travail futur de notre Comité. Cette échéance doit nous laisser le temps d'examiner leur comptabilité avec les exigences du transport maritime.

Le développement de la propulsion maritime nucléaire est un sujet complexe qui mérite un cadre de travail spécifique qui ne peut être limité à un sous-comité. En effet, les freins ne sont pas seulement liés au Code NUC. Certains enjeux relèvent d'autres comités, voire d'autres organisations (citons par exemple la question des accès aux ports, assurances en responsabilité, prévention de la pollution, application des garanties de non-prolifération).

En conclusion, nous proposons que le groupe de travail examine en détail ces éléments et propose un cadre de travail adapté, prenant en compte à la fois la spécificité du sujet qui nécessite un travail conjoint tel que cela est souligné par plusieurs soumissions avec l'AIEA et les autorités de sûreté nationales, et prenne en compte le calendrier exposé ci-dessus.

Nous souhaiterions que cette déclaration soit annexée au rapport.

Statement by the delegation of Saudi Arabia

"Thank you, Chair.

We would also like to extend our thanks to the Chairs of the working groups and the Secretariats for their dedication and hard work throughout this meeting.

The Kingdom supports the ongoing efforts under the MSC and the working group on GHG safety. We believe these efforts are essential to enabling the safe use of alternative fuels, as urgency in addressing emissions must not come at the expense of safety or operational reliability.

We strongly believe that the safety implications of adopting alternative fuels are of critical importance, particularly given that the maritime industry operates under exceptionally challenging conditions, including long voyages, extreme weather, and extended fuel storage durations. These realities demand fuels and technologies that are not only environmentally sustainable, but also thoroughly validated for safety, stability, and compatibility with onboard systems.

Finally, Chair, we wish to stress the importance of ensuring equal consideration and fair treatment of all views presented within the working groups. Constructive engagement and inclusive dialogue are essential to achieving effective and balanced outcomes of our discussions.

We would like to annex this statement to the report of the committee

Thank you."

Statement on the Cautious use of Alternative Fuels

While we fully support the decarbonization of international shipping, we must express serious concerns regarding the accelerated push for alternative fuels without adequate technical validation. The adoption of unsafe, unstable, or unscalable solutions risks undermining the long-term credibility, environmental integrity, and fairness of the transition. Urgency must not come at the expense of safety or operational reliability.

We are particularly concerned with proposals to increase the biofuel blend cap beyond 25%, which pose serious technical risks, including engine incompatibility, phase separation, clogging, and fuel instability. These risks are widely recognized and could compromise vessel safety, increase maintenance burdens, and disrupt operations. Furthermore, a higher cap may incentivize the use of low-quality or unsustainable biofuels, directly contradicting the environmental objectives of this Organization.

It is also important to acknowledge that the performance of the road and aviation sectors cannot be directly applied to maritime shipping, which operates under far more demanding conditions. Fuels proven in land or air applications may not demonstrate the same reliability at sea, due to differences in dynamics, especially during long voyages, harsh climates, and extended storage periods.

We further caution against the assumption that infrastructure will automatically evolve alongside regulations. Robust infrastructure investments require clear, stable signals based on tested and mature fuel candidates. Fragmented pilot projects do not provide a sufficient foundation for safe or scalable adoption.

We therefore emphasize the need for a rigorous and evidence-based evaluation of all alternative fuels. In particular, we call for:

.1 A strong technical review of the safety implications of fuels including, and not limited to FAME and ammonia, in line with this committee's core mandate. These concerns must be fully addressed before any guidelines are amended.

.2 An assessment of the working methods within the GHG safety working group, as the comments raised by our delegation were not adequately addressed.

.3 A clear reaffirmation that, even if documents are forwarded to other subcommittees, this working group must retain the authority to propose revisions before any mandatory guidelines are finalized.

We kindly ask to annex this statement to the meeting's report

Statement by the delegation of the United Kingdom

Thank you Chair

The UK recognises the potential role of nuclear technologies in supporting GHG emissions reductions and the need to develop a clear safety regulatory framework to support adoption. We are therefore open to the initiation of work to revise the Nuclear Code as proposed in MSC110/6/4. The UK supports this work taking place under the auspices of the GHG Safety Regulatory Framework and welcomes the input of experts on nuclear technologies. We would also support the comment from IACS regarding the need for the working group to consider which elements of the proposal may be relevant for other Committee and sub-committees and how this would be prioritised alongside other work.

The UK would also like to encourage further contributions and discussion on the potential timeframes for commercial adoption of onboard nuclear technology, as this may impact the timeframes for progressing this work.

The UK would like to emphasise the importance of strong cooperation between IMO and IAEA throughout the progression of this work, including through the ATLAS project, and we would welcome further information on how this cooperation will be taken forward. For example, it would be valuable for IAEA to contribute to future discussions on these issues at technical level.

Turning to 110/6/11, the UK would like to offer the following comment. IAEA instruments are relevant for maritime applications of nuclear technologies. This includes IAEA safeguarding agreements, which would continue to apply for maritime applications. When referencing IAEA instruments, IMO should therefore not seek to adapt or interpret IAEA terminology, but should focus on the areas within its remit. The continued use of the word 'safeguard' will continue to be appropriate in this context. We ask that this is reflected in the report of the meeting and is taken into account in any further discussion.

Thank you

AGENDA ITEM 8

Statement by the delegation of Estonia

Thank you Madam Chair!

Since this is the first time we take the floor then our condolences to republic of India. In addition thank to delegations for coffee, nice lunch and reception.

We support statements made by Ukraine and Poland.

Maritime security is facing increasing challenges due to rising tensions, intensified maritime traffic, hybrid threats, and the growing presence of unregulated or suspicious maritime activities.

Safe navigation, protection of critical infrastructure, and the enforcement of international maritime law have become central to stability. We must strengthen cooperation, enhance maritime domain awareness, and ensure the interoperability of coastal authorities.

Monitoring systems, such as AIS and LRIT, must be supported by tools that enable timely inspection and action against non-compliant vessels. Security at sea is inseparable from environmental protection and economic stability. A strong, coordinated, and rules-based maritime order is not only a regional necessity but a strategic imperative as a whole.

We ask this statement would be included to the report.

Statement by the delegation of Nigeria

MSC 110/8

Thank you Chair,

Nigeria acknowledges with appreciation the comprehensive update provided in document MSC 110/8 and commends the Secretariat for its sustained efforts in strengthening global maritime security, particularly through the GISIS Maritime Security module, capacity-building programmes, and the Enhancement of Global Maritime Security initiative.

As a coastal State on the Gulf of Guinea, a region that has seen significant progress in suppressing piracy and armed robbery thanks to coordinated national, regional, and international efforts; we recognize the strategic importance of maintaining updated Port Facility Security Plans and promoting interoperability through digital platforms such as GISIS.

Nigeria is committed to ensuring its national maritime security data remains accurate and up to date, and we are enhancing collaboration among port authorities, the Designated Authority, and other stakeholders in line with SOLAS regulation XI-2/13.

We also welcome the Secretariat's initiative to reduce administrative burdens through electronic transfers, which will be considered in our ongoing digitalization reforms.

We are particularly encouraged by the focus on new and emerging threats, including cybersecurity, UAS, and insider risks.

Nigeria supports the call for expanded technical assistance and training, especially for developing countries, and welcomes the targeted inclusion of women security professionals in the IMO's upcoming activities.

As a beneficiary and contributor to regional maritime security programmes, we strongly advocate for sustained multilateral collaboration and resource mobilization, including through the IMST Fund.

We urge fellow Member States to support the Secretariat's work through voluntary contributions and by actively participating in future capacity-building initiatives.

Finally, Nigeria reiterates its full commitment to implementing IMO maritime security instruments and to fostering a secure, resilient, and inclusive global maritime transport system.
Thank you Chair

Statement by the delegation of Poland

Thank you Chair, and Good afternoon to all distinguished delegates,
On behalf of the Member States of the European Union and the European Commission, Poland expresses its appreciation to the IMO Secretariat for its continued efforts in global maritime security. We recognise the progress outlined in document MSC 110/8, including advancements in GISIS Maritime Security, the global programme for the enhancement of maritime security, and initiatives under the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact.

We also thank contributors under agenda item 8, whose valuable insights help address maritime security challenges and reinforce collective efforts to ensure safety at sea. Compliance with the SOLAS Convention, the ISPS Code, and the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation — alongside other key instruments — remains essential in safeguarding maritime transport and protecting seafarers.

Furthermore, we thank Ukraine for highlighting critical aspects of maritime security. As Ukraine has pointed out, Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine—which must cease immediately—has led to alarming violations of maritime security norms, threatening navigation safety, port infrastructure, and the well-being of seafarers. Attacks on Ukrainian ports and merchant vessels contradict international safety regulations and undermine regional stability. The ongoing disruption of maritime operations in the Black Sea underscores the urgent need for strict adherence to IMO security frameworks.

As emphasized in previous meetings, all states must comply with international regulations and respect the safety of seafarers ensuring vessels can operate without unlawful interference.

The EU stands in full solidarity with Ukraine and supports all efforts to strengthen maritime security and uphold the rule of law in international waters.

Chair, we request that this statement be included in the report.

Statement by the delegation of Portugal

Thank you Madam Chair,

Allow us first to thank the Secretary General for yesterday's reception and all delegations for sponsoring coffee breaks. We also express our heartfelt condolences to all those affected by recent maritime and aviation incidents.

Regarding the intervention of Ukraine, which we thank, Portugal's firm support and solidarity for Ukraine and the Ukrainian people remains unwavering. We align ourselves with the intervention made by Poland.

Madam Chair,

As a maritime nation, Portugal understands that maritime security is not a distant concern – it is a daily reality. Our sovereignty, economic, environmental, and human security are deeply tied to the security of our seas.

Today, maritime threats are growing – in scale and in complexity - including piracy, illicit trafficking, attacks on commercial vessels, illegal fishing, and environmental crimes. The impacts of climate change on the ocean, and its role as a risk multiplier for threats to international security, is another factor to take into account. These compounding threats destabilize regions, weaken State authority, and put lives at risk – from seafarers to coastal communities.

In addressing these threats, while also ensuring the freedom of navigation and promoting the rule of law, this delegation believes that the foundation of our response must be in international law – primarily the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

In addition, Portugal continues to defend that a holistic approach to maritime security issues and sustained cooperation at sea is needed. Where capacity-building plays a crucial role, and it needs to be tailored to each nation's unique needs and threat profiles.

Complementing efforts in this domain, the Atlantic Centre, established in 2021 by Portugal and comprising 27 Member States from 3 continents, has played a pivotal role. The Centre has developed a range of international events, assessed threats, facilitated political dialogue, expanded knowledge, and implemented multilateral capacity-building projects, further reinforcing collective security and stability in the maritime space.

The Atlantic Centre's "Atlantic Community of Interest" has proven effective, as noted in UNSC Resolution 2634/2022 and in the "Declaration on Atlantic Cooperation", uniting States, International Organizations, academia, and industry to foster coordination.

We will not enter into detail about the Centre and its activities and projects for the sake of time as a presentation was delivered during lunchtime.

Madam Chair, distinguished delegates,

Portugal remains committed to working with all partners to ensure our seas remain open, safe, and governed by the rule of law.

Thank you.

Statement by the delegation of Ukraine

Thank you, Chair.

On behalf of the Ukrainian delegation, I wish to express our profound gratitude to the IMO Secretariat — not only for the submission of document MSC 110-slash-8 but for its unwavering commitment to enhancing maritime security worldwide.

While there are many facets to ensuring the sustainability of seaborne trade, let us be clear: security is the alpha and omega of all comprehensive IMO action. Whether we are discussing marine environment protection, traffic facilitation, ship construction safety, or seafarers' training, none of these objectives can be realized in the absence of good order at sea. When systematic, unlawful armed interference with shipping prevails, and when there is no genuine respect for the lives and health of maritime workers, regulations and standards become unenforceable.

Regrettably, some member states continue to flout these fundamental principles. Chair, this is now the eighteenth session of the MSC since the Russian Federation's illegal occupation and attempted annexation of Crimea. Since 2014, Russia's actions in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov have been designed to turn the region into a grey zone for international maritime law—an area of heightened danger for shipping and for all who depend on it.
The aggression began with the seizure of Ukrainian offshore drilling platforms and government vessels, in blatant violation of the SUA (Suppression of Unlawful Acts) Convention and its Protocol. Security plans for Ukrainian port facilities were breached, forcing the Ukrainian Government to officially cease operations and declare ports closed indefinitely.

Since the full-scale invasion of February 2022, the Russian Federation has abandoned even the pretence of upholding maritime security. As highlighted in resolution A.1183(33), Russia has adopted essentially terrorist tactics—targeting Ukrainian port infrastructure and foreign-flagged ships calling at our ports. Unable to enforce a full naval blockade, Russia has sought instead to intimidate and disrupt the special maritime corridor through random, indiscriminate strikes. These attacks, carried out with cruise and ballistic missiles and unmanned aerial combat vehicles, have escalated dramatically, most notably last autumn and this spring.

Less than a month ago, on 23 May, a Ukrainian port worker lost his life during routine container handling, once again due to an Iskander ballistic missile. Such reckless and inhumane actions perpetuate the crisis of stranded ships. Both the 35th Extraordinary Council session and 105th session of this Committee in early 2022 demanded that the stranded vessels be safely evacuated together with seafarers. Yet, dozens of vessels remain trapped in Ukrainian ports, particularly Mykolaiv and Kherson, as a direct result of Russian hostilities.

Chair, I must reiterate: the Russian Federation is shedding the blood of innocent seafarers and port workers in pursuit of its malign political ambitions, with utter disregard for the underpinning principles of the IMO. The hypocrisy is stark: by attacking Ukrainian ports, Russia has also violated UN Security Council resolution 2341 on the protection of critical infrastructure from terrorist attacks — a resolution it itself supported in 2017, and which was sponsored by Ukraine to explicitly recognize the critical status of maritime transport facilities.

Earlier this year, the IMO Secretary-General visited Ukraine, witnessing firsthand the devastating impact of Russia's aggression on our ports, our seafarers, and our maritime infrastructure. His visit brought global attention to the very real dangers faced daily by Ukrainians.

The Ukrainian delegation strongly believes that a substantial review of maritime security regulations is urgently needed. Just as the ISPS Code was introduced in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, we must now respond resolutely to the brutal misconduct of the Russian Federation and to breaches of freedom of navigation in the Red Sea. In this regard, we reserve the right to submit proposals on the relevant issue for consideration at the next MSC meeting.

Still, just as Ukrainian ports are attacked from the sea, Ukrainian cities are bombarded from the sky. In recent weeks, the Russian Federation has resorted to outright terror against the civilian population of Ukraine. Women and children are being killed in their homes. The most horrifying recent case occurred on 17 June 2025, when a massive missile attack on Kyiv took the lives of 28 civilians and injured 140 more. A permanent member of the UN Security Council is using its arsenal to butcher civilians and devastate urban life. It is a deliberate campaign to instil fear and suffering in Ukraine and beyond. This is their way of establishing ceasefire, this is how they understand peace.

Our collective action must safeguard the lives and health of maritime workers, strengthen the resilience of critical supply chains, and contribute to a just, lasting, and comprehensive peace in Ukraine.

We respectfully request that this statement be reflected in the final report of the 110th session of the MSC Committee and appended in its annex.

Thank you.

Ukraine Statement in response to RF Statement

Thank you, Chair, for giving me the floor and happy Day of the Seafarer to all.

In response to the statement made recently by the delegation of the Russian Federation, I would like to state that we reject the continued attempts by Russia to manipulate facts and deflect responsibility for its own violations of international law.

I would like to start and briefly respond to the criticism regarding Ukraine's intervention under agenda item 8, Measures to enhance maritime security.

Let me be absolutely clear: the issue we raised under this item is directly and entirely relevant to its subject matter. Russia's full-scale aggression against Ukraine, including its repeated attacks on maritime infrastructure and shipping, represents one of the most pressing and dangerous threats to maritime security in the world today.

Our intervention was not only justified, but necessary. It addressed real and ongoing threats to seafarers, ports, ships, and the freedom of navigation in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov — precisely the concerns this agenda item is intended to cover.

Moreover, the session was attended by a high-level and representative Ukrainian delegation, including professionals with direct expertise and eyewitness experience of Russia's maritime aggression. They came specifically for this Committee and for this agenda item. It was a unique opportunity for this Committee to hear the voices of those on the front lines — port workers, mariners, crisis coordinators — people whose testimony carries both professional authority and moral weight.

Far from "wasting time," our contribution enriched the Committee's understanding of maritime security challenges and reaffirmed the IMO's relevance in responding to real-world crises.
Russia's claims of "politicization" and "double standards" are not only hypocritical — they are absurd. The decisions adopted by the Assembly, the Council, and multiple IMO bodies since 2022, in primis, resolution A.1183(33) on "The impact of the Russian Armed Invasion of Ukraine on International Shipping" are fully in line with the Organization's mandate, based on facts, international legal norms, and the will of the majority of Member States.

Let us be honest: it is not political discussions that have undermined the work of this Committee — it is Russia's unprovoked and illegal war of aggression that has created an unprecedented threat to maritime safety and security in the Black Sea and beyond.

Russia continues to attack Ukrainian port infrastructure, civilian vessels, and commercial shipping. No amount of false narratives or distorted "satellite imagery" can change the simple legal truth: these are not legitimate military targets — they are war crimes.

We reject Russia's unfounded allegations that humanitarian shipments were used to transport weapons. These are lies designed to justify indiscriminate attacks that violate the most basic principles of international humanitarian law.

And finally, Chair, please allow me to remind distinguish delegates: while we work here today, the war continues. Since the opening of this Committee's session and just over the past few days, the Russian Federation has launched several new attacks on civilian targets in Kyiv, Dnipro, and Odesa – far from any front line. Hundreds of civilians have been killed or wounded, many of them in their homes and workplaces – in peaceful cities, under direct missile and drone fire.

Thank you, Chair, and I request that this statement be reflected in the Committee's report and attached to its annex.

Statement by the delegation of the United Kingdom

Thank you, Chair

The UK would like to thank the Secretariat for the comprehensive update on the Maritime Security module of the Global Integrated Shipping Information System (GISIS) and IMO's programme on the Enhancement of Global Maritime Security training programme.

The UK is pleased to be able to continue to support this work through the International Maritime Security Trust (IMST) Fund. These initiatives not only strengthen global maritime security but also foster a culture of continuous improvement and cooperation.

This is more important now than ever. As others, including the distinguished representative of Ukraine, have highlighted, adherence to the rules-based order is fundamental to maritime security, freedom of navigation and resilience of international trade.

The United Kingdom remains deeply concerned about the continuing threats to maritime infrastructure and personnel in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov and reiterates the importance of upholding international maritime law. The United Kingdom continues to denounce and condemn the illegal war of aggression waged by Russia against Ukraine. Russia's actions undermine our shared work to build maritime security and safety capacity.

Statement by the delegation of the United Republic of Tanzania

Document MSC 110/8

Chair,

Distinguished Delegates,

The United Republic of Tanzania wishes to express its strong support for the continued efforts of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to enhance global maritime security, as detailed in document MSC 110/8.

We commend the Secretariat for its dedicated work in strengthening maritime security governance through the use of the GISIS Maritime Security module, the delivery of technical assistance, and its proactive engagement with international and regional partners.

Chair, Tanzania acknowledges the critical role of accurate and up-to-date information in GISIS for enhancing transparency and preparedness. We are committed to reviewing and updating our port facility security information in accordance with SOLAS regulation XI-2/13, and we encourage fellow Member States to do the same.

We also recognize the value of the global programme for the Enhancement of Maritime Security, from which Tanzania has directly benefited, and in that sense we appreciate the National workshop for PFSO's/Security Awareness conducted from 30th September to 4th October 2024 which over 40 PSFOs and Security Officers participated.

In this regard, we express our sincere appreciation to the IMO Secretariat for the delivery of in-country activities, including technical support and training provided under the EU-funded regional projects. These initiatives have strengthened the capacity of our port and maritime security personnel and improved coordination at the national level. Furthermore, Tanzania supports the development of new training modules that address emerging threats such as cyber-attacks and uncrewed aerial systems. These innovations are essential to keeping pace with the evolving maritime threat landscape.

Tanzania also values the IMO's collaboration with the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT) and other agencies under the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact. We welcome continued cooperation in this regard and support further integration of port and maritime security measures within broader regional and international counter-terrorism frameworks.

Finally, Tanzania encourages all SOLAS Contracting Governments to contribute to the International Maritime Security Trust (IMST) Fund to ensure the sustainability and expansion of this vital programme.

Chair,

Tanzania remains committed to working with IMO and its Member States to safeguard maritime security in our region and globally. We reaffirm our support for the actions proposed in this document and look forward to continuing collaboration.

We kindly request that this statement be appended to the report of the Committee.

Thank you.

Document MSC 110/8/1

Chair,

Distinguished Delegates,

The United Republic of Tanzania welcomes and strongly supports the proposal submitted by Ecuador, India, Italy, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, and South Africa to promote the use and expansion of International Maritime Information-Sharing Centres (ISCs) as a strategic measure to enhance global maritime security and combat organized maritime crime.

Tanzania recognizes that maritime security is not only a global concern but also a critical national and regional priority. The Indian Ocean waters off the Tanzanian coast are increasingly vulnerable to a range of maritime security threats, including:

.1 Piracy and armed robbery against ships, particularly in the Western Indian Ocean region;

.2 Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing, which undermines food security, marine biodiversity, and the livelihoods of coastal communities;

.3 Drug trafficking and smuggling of goods, taking advantage of porous maritime borders;

.4 Human trafficking and illegal migration, facilitated through maritime routes;

.5 And the emerging risks of cyber security threats targeting port infrastructure vessel systems, and other maritime communication networks.

These threats disrupt Tanzania's maritime economy, compromise safety at sea, and threaten regional stability. Given the strategic role of the Port of Dar es Salaam and other Tanzanian ports in regional trade, enhanced maritime domain awareness and real-time intelligence sharing are essential to secure both national waters and the broader Indian Ocean corridor.
In this context, Tanzania emphasizes the critical value of International Maritime Information-Sharing Centres (ISCs) in addressing these threats through:

.1 Timely exchange of maritime security information across national and regional boundaries;

.2 Improved coordination among naval, coast guard, and maritime authorities to detect, assess, and respond to incidents at sea;

.3 Enhanced capacity-building and technical support, especially for developing coastal States;

.4 And fostering a culture of cooperation, vigilance, and proactive prevention of maritime crime.

Chair,

Tanzania is a committed partner to the Djibouti Code of Conduct and its Jeddah Amendments and continues to engage actively with regional maritime security mechanisms, including the Regional Maritime Information Fusion Centre (RMIFC) in Madagascar and the Regional Centre for Operational Coordination (RCOC) in Seychelles. We believe that further investment in these and other ISC platforms will be indispensable to strengthening maritime governance in the region.

We therefore urge the Committee to adopt the proposed resolution and to further promote the development of interoperable, well-resourced, and technologically advanced ISCs that serve the needs of coastal States like Tanzania.

Tanzania also calls upon the IMO and Member States to continue supporting capacity-building, technical assistance, and information-sharing infrastructure in the Western Indian Ocean to ensure that no State is left behind in the global fight against maritime insecurity.

We kindly request that this statement be appended to the report of the Committee.

Thank you, Chair.

AGENDA ITEM 9

Statement by the delegation of Indonesia

Thank you, Chair.

Indonesia thanks the Secretariat for preparing the report contained in document MSC 110/8, particularly regarding the reported increase in piracy and armed robbery incidents in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore (SOMS).

While we fully support the objective of ensuring maritime safety and security, we respectfully wish to express concern that many of the reported incidents appear not to have been cross verified with the littoral States, particularly Indonesia.

In several reports, the nature of the incidents does not clearly meet the threshold of piracy or armed robbery as defined under existing international instruments.

For instance, there was an incident report in the GISIS dated 7 June 2025 in the Malacca Strait involving a Cypriot vessel, Mykonos Wave, where they claimed to have sighted unknown persons in the engine room. The consequence of this reported incident was: "the crew was not injured, and nothing was stolen." However, this incident is still listed as piracy and armed robbery in the GISIS.

This raises challenges in validating their accuracy and hinders our ability to respond constructively.

We therefore encourage closer consultation with the relevant coastal States prior to finalizing such data, to ensure clarity, consistency, and reliability of the reporting.

Indonesia remains committed to strengthening regional cooperation in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore and stands ready to continue to engage with the other littoral States and the Secretariat to enhance reporting mechanisms and promote a common understanding of maritime security developments in our region.

Thank you.

Statement by the delegation of Malaysia

Thank you, Chair.

Malaysia expresses sincere appreciation to the Secretariat for the diligent and comprehensive preparation of the document under consideration. The meticulous compilation and presentation of incident data is greatly valued, as it plays a vital role in strengthening maritime safety and operational integrity on a global scale. Malaysia particularly welcomes the continued practice of sharing incident reports and encourages the timely dissemination of such information to relevant national authorities. Access to this data enables Malaysia to maintain accurate records, conduct in-depth analysis, and implement targeted improvements that enhance navigational safety and support evidence-based maritime policy development.

While Malaysia acknowledges the reported increase in piracy and armed robbery incidents in 2024 within the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, we wish to provide clarification based on national records. According to data maintained by the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA), no incidents have been officially reported within Malaysia's jurisdiction in the Strait of Malacca for the years 2023 and 2024. To ensure greater clarity and support precise situational analysis, Malaysia recommends that future reporting distinguish clearly between incidents occurring in the Malacca Strait and those in the Singapore Strait. This distinction is important due to the differing operational responsibilities, enforcement regimes, and navigational characteristics of these two vital sea lanes.

Malaysia remains deeply committed to safeguarding its maritime domain through a range of proactive and coordinated measures. These include sustained maritime patrols, regular enforcement operations, prompt response to assistance requests, and the timely execution of maritime security interventions. These efforts underscore Malaysia's dedication to maintaining the highest standards of safety, security, and rule of law at sea.

In this regard, Malaysia respectfully invites fellow delegations to support its recommendations for improved data disaggregation and encourages continued collaboration in enhancing maritime domain awareness, with the shared objective of ensuring safe, secure, and resilient shipping routes for all.

Request our intervention to be appended in the Committee report.

Thank you, Chair.

Statement by the delegation of the Kingdom of the Netherlands

My delegation would like to inform the Committee about a recent incident related to this agenda item.

On 30 May last m/v Orange Frost, a refrigerated cargo ship sailing under the flag of Curaçao, one of the registries of our Kingdom with IMO no 9797656, was attacked by pirates approximately 220 nm West-Southwest of Port Harcourt, Nigeria. One crew member, the 2nd engineer with Russian nationality, was injured and was held hostage. The remaining 16 crew members managed to lock themselves in the ship's citadel and to contact the shipowner.

This resulted in the mobilization of a Navy security team by the Government of Nigeria with the effect that the pirates left the vessel and the 16 crew members could be rescued. After that the vessel could resume her voyage and proceed to a safe port with dispensation for the 2nd engineer.

Unfortunately we have no actual information on the whereabouts and condition of the 2nd engineer, so we assume that he is still held hostage by the pirates. We pray for his health and safe return.

We take this opportunity to express our gratitude to the Government of Nigeria for their prompt action and assistance.

And we request that our statement is attached to the report of the Committee.

Statement by the delegation of ReCAAP-ISC

A good day to all delegates

I propose to make a brief comment with respect to the nature of the localized spike in Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships (PAR) cases in Asia.

Since January till to date, there have been 88 incidents of PAR in Asia, which accounts for a 69% year-on-year increase at the half-year mark of 2025. Of the 88 incidents, 2 were minor incidents of piracy on the high seas and 86 were armed robbery incidents that occurred within coastal States' jurisdiction.

While the number of incidents in the anchorages off the ports of Bangladesh, Indonesia and the Philippines have decreased in 2025, the increase in the number of incidents in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore (SOMS) which accounts for 85% of the total number of incidents in Asia (75 of 88), remains a concern.

Within the SOMS, 74 incidents occurred in the Singapore Strait and one incident in the Malacca Strait, which come under the jurisdiction of three littoral States, namely Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. The incidents mainly occurred in the Philip Channel, along a narrow part of the eastbound lane of the strait. Perpetrators usually target ships that are vulnerable while manoeuvring at slow speed and have low freeboard. Majority of the incidents were of robbery and theft, where the perpetrators did not harm the crew, and they escaped upon being sighted. Nevertheless, these incidents cannot be ignored, and the littoral States have been urged to increase coordinated patrols and create sufficient deterrence.

In the mean time, the ReCAAP ISC continues to provide updates on developing situation and analysis of modus operandi to aid ship owners and operators in adopting appropriate precautionary measures.

An interactive dashboard known as Re-VAMP, launched by the Centre, enables shipping industry to gather key insight and correlation of past and present incidents of PAR, enabling suitable preventive measures prior entering the area of concern.
Further, ReCAAP ISC Mobile App has been introduced to facilitate user-friendly one-stop incident reporting to the nearest coastal State.

Dealing with PAR is the shared responsibility of maritime stakeholders. However, to address the current localized spike in the cases of unauthorized boarding and petty thefts, a concerted effort by the law enforcement agencies of the littoral States is required.

May I request this statement be recorded. Thank you, Madam Chair.

AGENDA ITEM 13

Statement by the delegation of Kenya

Thank you, Chair and good afternoon to all distinguished delegates.

The Republic of Kenya joins fellow Member States in expressing heartfelt condolences to India over the recent air accident in which many precious lives were lost and extend our solidarity and hope for a swift and safe release of the kidnapped seafarer in Nigeria.

We sincerely thank the delegations who have generously provided us with refreshments, meals and even entertainment. We also commend the Secretary General for hosting a warm welcome reception.

Coming to the agenda item, Kenya expresses its gratitude to the Secretariat for presenting Paper MSC 110/WP.3, which details the outcomes of the second cycle of independent evaluations under the STCW Convention. We particularly appreciate the thorough coordination by the Secretariat and the professionalism of the panel of competent persons in conducting these reviews.

However, we note a minor discrepancy in the report concerning Kenya as captured on page 12 of the Annex. The date recorded for the submission of collated information to the competent persons is inaccurately listed as identical to the date of the independent evaluation. We kindly request the Secretariat to verify and amend the error for accuracy of the record.

As a coastal nation with a vital maritime hub for the East African region, we remain steadfast in our commitment to the full and effective implementation of the STCW Convention. We are dedicated to upholding the highest standards of seafarer training, certification, and watchkeeping, which are critical to ensuring maritime safety and security. In collaboration with other member states, Kenya looks forward to actively contributing to the ongoing comprehensive review of the Convention to globally strengthen and modernize maritime standards.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

AGENDA ITEM 14

Statement by the delegation of Malaysia

Thank you, Chair.

We thank Saudi Arabia for the wonderful hospitality.

To the matter.

Malaysia shares the concerns raised regarding IACS Unified Interpretations (UIs) and emphasizes the need for IMO oversight to ensure consistency and fairness. The current process, where UIs are adopted by IACS majority vote without full IMO consensus, risks regulatory conflicts for Malaysian-flagged ships, burdens flag state authorities with independent reviews, and creates enforcement discrepancies that may lead to Port State Control detentions or increased compliance costs. Additionally, sudden UI changes create uncertainty for our shipowners and operators. Malaysia urges the IMO to formalise the approval process for critical UIs, considers harmonizing regional standards, and may establish a national review mechanism to assess impacts before implementation. We support strengthening IMO's role in UI adoption to ensure transparency and uniform compliance.

This intervention aligns closely with the concerns raised by Liberia and the UAE, echoing their call for stricter IMO oversight of IACS UIs. By supporting this position, Malaysia would contribute to fostering a cohesive and robust regulatory framework that benefits all member states while safeguarding its own maritime interests.

Thank you, Chair.

AGENDA ITEM 15

Statement by the delegation of the Kingdom of the Netherlands

Related to subjects under the remit of the NCSR Sub-Committee, my delegation would like to take this opportunity to inform the Committee about an incident with a Dutch flagged ship that took place on Monday 2 June.

On this day Dutch flagged containership **Veendijk** was boarded 17 nautical miles off the coast of Libya, slightly east of Benghazi, by representatives of the Libyan Arab Armed Forces, and was accused of trespassing a restricted area.

Passports and seaman's books of the crew were seized, and a leaflet in deficient English was left on board indicating that vessels approaching latitude 34 degrees North towards the Libyan coast should report 72 hours in advance of passing the indicated area. This had not been done by the ship due to unawareness of the restricted area, as information about the restricted area had not been communicated through the official channels as provided by the SOLAS Convention, i.e. through VHF, NAVTEX or T&P notices in the official charts. Finally it was indicated that the restricted area referred to concerned the so-called Live Firing Restricted Zone off the port of Derna.

Upon instruction of the Libyan Arab Armed Forces the ship was directed to the anchorage of Benghazi in order to await further instructions. Threats were issued by the Libyan Arab Armed Forces that not following up the advice would be answered with shooting. Upon hearing by a court, and paying a fine equal to € 35.000,-, the ship was released and could resume its journey.

With this information my delegation would like to issue a warning to all Contracting Governments, International Organizations and Non-Governmental Organizations, in particular those representing shipowners and seafarers, to take due account of these practices taking place, and to advise ships to avoid entering this area without notifying the Libyan Arab Armed Forces, as this could have serious negative consequences and result in high fines.
And we request that our statement is attached to the report of the Committee.

Statement by the delegation the Russian Federation

« Спасибо, госпожа Председатель,
В течение 2022-2025 годов компания Inmarsat Global Limited, признанный ИМО поставщик услуг подвижной спутниковой связи, ввела ограничения в отношении судов под флагом Российской Федерации, а также судов, зарегистрированных, находящихся в собственности или эксплуатируемых в Российской Федерации, отключив более 100 судов от услуг системы подвижной спутниковой связи Inmarsat, признанной компонентом Глобальной морской системы связи при бедствии и для обеспечения безопасности (ГМССБ).
Необходимо отметить, что введение ограничений в отношении судов под флагами различных государств в последнее время приобрело глобальный характер.
Например, в 2018 году Иран вынес вопрос об отключении от сети подвижной спутниковой связи Inmarsat на рассмотрение 121-й сессии Совета ИМО, подчеркнув тот факт, что такие преднамеренные действия представляют угрозу безопасности мирового судоходства и окружающей среде, а следовательно, противоречат основным принципам ИМО и обязательствам ее государств-членов.
В ситуации с российскими судами указанные ограничения со стороны признанного поставщика услуг спутниковой связи в ГМССБ привели к блокировке услуг подвижной спутниковой связи Inmarsat на борту российских судов.
Отключение судов от услуг признанной в рамках ГМССБ системы подвижной спутниковой связи Inmarsat создает угрозу безопасности мирового торгового судоходства, провоцирует риски для критической информационной инфраструктуры морского транспорта и для окружающей среды. Такие действия противоречат базовым критериям и целям ИМО, обязательствам государств-членов, поскольку нарушают принципы свободного международного судоходства.
В связи с вышеизложенным, Российская Федерация призывает Комитет:
- рассмотреть сложившуюся ситуацию;
- получить разъяснения от компании Inmarsat Global Limited в отношении наложенных ограничений на оказание услуг связи;
- оказать содействие в полном восстановлении услуг спутниковой связи на борту судов, осуществляющих плавание под флагом Российской Федерации, а также судов, зарегистрированных, находящихся в собственности или эксплуатируемых в Российской Федерации;
- принять действенные меры с целью исключения повторения подобной практики в будущем.
Спасибо ».
***

« Thank you, madam Chair,

During 2022-2025, Inmarsat Global Limited, an IMO recognized provider of mobile satellite services, imposed restrictions on vessels under the flag of the Russian Federation, as well as vessels registered, owned or operated in the Russian Federation, disconnecting over 100 vessels from the services of the Inmarsat mobile satellite communication system, being a recognized component of the Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (GMDSS).

It should be noted that the introduction of restrictions on vessels flying the flags of various States has recently appeared across the globe.

For example, in 2018, Iran raised the issue of disconnections from the Inmarsat mobile satellite communication network at the 121st session of the IMO Council highlighting the fact that such deliberate actions pose a threat to the safety of global navigation and the environment, and therefore contradict the basic principles of the IMO and the obligations of its Member States.

In the case of Russian vessels, these restrictions imposed by the recognized mobile satellite services provider in the GMDSS have led to the barring of Inmarsat mobile satellite communication services on board Russian vessels.

Disconnecting ships from the services of the Inmarsat mobile satellite communications system recognized in the GMDSS poses a threat to the safety of global merchant shipping, provokes risks to the Critical information infrastructure of maritime transport and to the environment. Such actions contradict the basic criteria and objectives of IMO, as well as the obligations of Member States, as they violate the principles of free international navigation.

Based on the above-mentioned, the Russian Federation calls on the Committee:

.1 to consider the current situation;

.2 to request clarifications from Inmarsat Global Limited regarding the restrictions imposed on the provision of communication services;

.3 to assist in the full restoration of satellite communication services on board of all affected vessels, including those under the flag of the Russian Federation as well as vessels registered, owned or operated in the Russian Federation; and

.4 to take effective measures to prevent the recurrence of such practices in the future.

Thank you».

AGENDA ITEM 18

Statement by the delegation of ITF

Thank you, Chair,

Fatigue at sea is no longer just a safety concern, it is a systemic issue affecting the integrity of compliance and the well-being of seafarers. Mounting empirical evidence points to widespread under-reporting of hours of work and rest, and the reality behind these records deserves our urgent attention.

The World Maritime University study, based on interviews with over 1,800 seafarers, found that only one in three had never altered their records. 28% admitted to resting less than the regulatory minimum of 10 hours in a 24-hour period. The predominant cause cited: insufficient manning.

The 2024 Cardiff University survey of over 1,200 crew members similarly found that more than one third had not had adequate sleep in the 48 hours prior to completing the questionnaire. That same study documented how fatigue contributed directly to incidents, including the grounding of the NCL Salten after three port calls in 24 hours, where the officer on watch fell asleep.

Fatigue undermines safety, corrodes compliance culture, and places port State control officers in an impossible position: the paperwork says "compliant," but the reality often does not. One of the root causes is that safe manning is not always safe. While IMO resolution A.1047(27) sets out clear principles for establishing minimum safe manning, the WMU study concluded that in practice, those principles are not adhered to in most instances. This has led to a chronic gap between workload and workforce, pushing seafarers toward record-keeping malpractices simply to keep the ship moving and avoid commercial penalties.

Digital reporting tools, KPI-linked bonuses, and job insecurity have only increased the pressure to falsify records. At the same time, port State control officers confirm that due to time constraints and the sheer volume of items to inspect they rarely have the capacity to verify the accuracy of hours of rest data. Meanwhile, fatigue-related groundings, collisions, and personal injuries continue to occur, eroding public confidence in our regulatory framework.

Chair, I am aware that we are not here today to propose new manning scales, prescribe port State control procedures, or duplicate the work of other bodies. But I must stress that the scale and impact of this issue demand coordinated attention and cross-committee examination. Fatigue-related casualties are not waiting.

Seafarers tell us they are "trapped in cognitive dissonance where deviance is normalized." A regulatory system that relies on knowingly falsified data cannot be the foundation of a credible safety culture, especially as crews are being asked to handle increasingly complex fuels, technologies, and operations.

By acting decisively, we can restore credibility to the hours of rest regime, equip port State control officers with clearer tools to act, and reaffirm our shared commitment to the lives at sea. Chair, I respectfully urge the Committee to support the actions proposed in our submission, and demonstrate that the safety, health, and dignity of seafarers remain at the heart of our work.

Thank you Chair.

Statement by the delegation of Malaysia

Thank you, Chair.

Malaysia has proactively developed a comprehensive industry guideline designed to complement existing international safety requirements concerning the use of personnel transfer baskets during crew embarkation and disembarkation, particularly in offshore operations involving vessels and platforms. This guideline was formulated in response to the critical need to enhance safety protocols within Malaysia's Oil and Gas sector, where such transfer operations are frequent, complex, and inherently risky.

The successful implementation of this national guideline has demonstrated its effectiveness in safeguarding personnel. Since its adoption, no accidents or safety incidents involving personnel transfer baskets have been reported, highlighting Malaysia's commitment to maintaining and promoting the highest safety standards within the industry.

Recognising the global relevance and potential benefits of this safety initiative, Malaysia strongly urge IMO considers developing a standardised, internationally recognised guideline on the safe use of personnel transfer baskets. Such a framework, developed under IMO's authority and in collaboration with member states and stakeholders, would provide uniform safety protocols to be adopted worldwide, thereby enhancing operational safety not only in offshore oil and gas sectors but across the wider maritime and shipping industries.

Malaysia, as a co-sponsor of this submission, respectfully urges the Committee to consider establishing a dedicated working group tasked with thoroughly reviewing this proposal, engaging relevant experts, and initiating the drafting of a comprehensive IMO guideline. This effort will contribute significantly to harmonising safety standards, reducing operational risks, and protecting seafarers and offshore workers globally.

Malaysia wishes to express its appreciation to Australia for preparing document MSC 110/18/9. As a co-sponsor of document MSC 109/19/4, Malaysia strongly supports the proposal for a comprehensive review of the Casualty Investigation Code (CI Code) and its associated guidelines.

We recognise that Member States have, over the years, raised persistent concerns regarding the quality and timeliness of marine safety investigations and reporting. These recurring issues point to the urgent need to reassess the Code's relevance and effectiveness in today's dynamic maritime environment. At the core of this effort lies the Code's fundamental objective: the prevention of future casualties through thorough, timely, and effective investigations.

Malaysia believes that a transparent and inclusive review process will help restore trust in the investigation regime, while also fostering stronger cooperation between Member States and the wider maritime industry.

Although several proposals for amendment have been put forward since the Code became mandatory in 2010, none have been adopted. This current initiative marks the first holistic attempt to review the Code in its entirety. Malaysia emphasises that any revision should ensure the Code remains a high-level framework — balancing regulatory effectiveness with practical feasibility and avoiding undue legislative burden.

Our support is firmly rooted in the shared commitment to the essential purpose of marine safety investigations: to protect lives at sea and safeguard the marine environment. We are of the view that timely, consistent, and high-quality investigations are vital to achieving these aims.

Thank you, Chair.

Statement by the delegation of the Russian Federation

MSC 110/18/16 (Russian Federation),
MSC 110/INF.6 (Russian Federation)

« Спасибо, госпожа Председатель,
Атомная энергетика является важным элементом для достижения чистых нулевых выбросов (Net Zero) как в мировой промышленности, так и в международном судоходстве к 2050 году.

Большим потенциалом для дальнейшего развития атомной энергетики обладает энергоснабжение потребителей с использованием атомных реакторов малой мощности, установленных на самоходном или несамоходном плавучем атомном судне-энергоблоке. Такие атомные реакторы могут производить электроэнергию и обеспечивать светом и теплом населенные пункты, порты и транспортные «хабы», заводы по производству альтернативного топлива, и другие объекты в отдаленных регионах, где отсутствует доступ к централизованным энергосетям либо ограничены природные ресурсы.

Таким образом, плавучие энергоблоки (ПЭБ, floating power unit FPU), могут привести к существенному ускорению регионального развития при колоссальном снижении выбросов углекислого газа.

Помимо основных преимуществ, таких как мобильность, возможность обеспечивать отдалённые районы и предприятия электроэнергией, отсутствие вредных выбросов, - использование ПЭБ имеет целый ряд других преимуществ, описанных в наших документах на эту сессию.

Проекты плавучих атомных энергоблоков и самоходных торговых судов с ядерными энергетическими установками (далее – ЯЭУ, nuclear power plant NPP) разрабатываются во многих странах мира (Российская Федерация, Китай, Южная Корея, США, и др.), и у международной общественности имеется запрос на скорейшее внедрение и реализацию таких проектов. В настоящее время в Российской Федерации успешно функционирует первый в мире ПЭБ «Академик Ломоносов» мощностью 70 МВт в порту города Певек на Севере России, обеспечивая зеленой электроэнергией и теплом порт и город без выбросов CO2 и других парниковых газов.

Еще четыре модернизированных ПЭБ мощностью не менее 106 МВт каждый, с реакторами нового поколения в настоящее время в стадии постройки для обеспечения разработки одного из крупнейших месторождений меди с нулевыми выбросами парниковых газов.

Разработчики стремятся учитывать в своих проектах как передовые требования с точки зрения ядерной безопасности, так и с точки зрения безопасности жизни на море.

Международное агентство по атомной энергии (МАГАТЭ- IAEA) выполнило анализ применимости существующих требований к ПЭБ (Safety Report Series № 123, 2023), который демонстрирует, что ПЭБ должны соответствовать стандартам МАГАТЭ.

При этом в настоящее время отсутствует однозначность в вопросе о применимости Международной конвенции по охране человеческой жизни на море (Конвенция СОЛАС) и Кодекса безопасности ядерных торговых судов (Кодекс БЯТС) к ПЭБ. Это подтверждается и в отчете корреспондентской группы (КГ) по разработке нормативной базы по обеспечению безопасности для поддержки сокращения выбросов парниковых газов с судов с использованием новых технологий и альтернативных видов топлива MSC 110/6.

С точки зрения принципиальных технических решений, влияющих на обеспечение ядерной и радиационной безопасности, различия между реакторными
установками на ядерных судах для обеспечения движения и на ПЭБ для выработки электроэнергии практически отсутствуют. Представляется, что требования СОЛАС должны выполняться как для самоходных ядерных судов, так и для несамоходных судов с реакторными установками на борту.

Разделы СОЛАС, относящиеся к ядерным судам, ранее не актуализировались, как и Кодекс БЯТС.

Считаем целесообразным привести СОЛАС и Кодекс БЯТС в соответствие с современным уровнем развития ядерного судостроения, сделав его положения технологически нейтральными, для того чтобы они распространялись на различные типы реакторов, в том числе перспективные конструкции.

Прозрачность в отношении регулирования как самоходных, так и несамоходных ядерных судов будет способствовать существенному развитию таких проектов, возможности масштабного производства ПЭБ на верфях по всему миру.

В этой связи Российская Федерация призывает государства-члены ИМО согласиться с предложением нового результата:
«Внесение поправок в Международную Конвенцию по охране человеческой жизни на море 1974 года (СОЛАС) и пересмотр Кодекса по безопасности ядерных торговых судов (Кодекс БЯТС) (резолюция A.491(XII)) с целью актуализации действующих требований, предъявляемых к проектированию, строительству и эксплуатации самоходных торговых судов с ЯЭУ, а также с целью распространения их применения на несамоходные атомные ПЭБ для регулирования безопасности ПЭБ». Дополнительная информация к нашему предложению представлена в информационном документе MSC 110/INF.6.
Спасибо».
***
« Thank you, madam Chair,

Nuclear power engineering is an important element for the achievement of net-zero emissions by 2050 both from the global industry and the international shipping.

Power supply of consumers with the use of Small Modular Reactors installed on a self-propelled or non-self-propelled floating nuclear vessel has a high potential for further development of nuclear power engineering. These nuclear reactors can generate electric power and provide light and heat for settlements, ports and transport hubs, alternative fuel manufacturing plants, and other objects in remote areas without any access to centralized electric power grids or with limited natural resources.

Thus, the nuclear Floating Power Units, or FPUs, can result in considerable acceleration of regional development with significant reduction of carbon dioxide emissions.

In addition to the main FPU advantages – mobility, possibility of power supply for remote regions and enterprises, absence of any harmful emissions – the use of FPUs has a number of other advantages described in our documents submitted for this session of MSC.

The projects of nuclear floating power units (FPUs) and self-propelled merchant ships with nuclear power plants (NPPs) are developed in many countries of the world (the Russian Federation, China, South Korea, USA, etc.), and the international community has the demand for fastest development and application of such projects. At present, the world's first FPU "Akademik Lomonosov" with the power capacity of 70 MW is successfully operated in the Russian Federation, at the port of Pevek city in the north of Russia, providing "green" electric power and heat for the port and the city without any emissions of CO2 and other greenhouse gases.

Another four modernized nuclear FPUs with the power capacity of at least 106 MW each, with reactors of the new generation, are currently under construction for the development of one of the largest copper deposits with zero greenhouse gas emissions.

The designers of FPUs aim to consider in their projects the advanced requirements both from the viewpoint of nuclear safety and the safety of life at sea.

The IAEA has analyzed the applicability of the existing requirements for FPUs (Safety Report Series No. 123, 2023), and the results demonstrate that FPUs shall comply with the IAEA standards.

Meanwhile, at present there is no unambiguity with regard to applicability of the International Convention for Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) and the Code of Safety for Nuclear Merchant Ships to FNPUs. This is also confirmed in the report of the Correspondent Group (CG) on the development of a safety regulatory framework to support the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions from ships using new technologies and alternative fuels (MSC 110/6).

From the viewpoint of principal technical solutions affecting nuclear and radiation safety assurance, there is almost no difference between the propulsion reactor facilities at nuclear ships and nuclear FPUs for power generation. It seems that the SOLAS requirements shall be fulfilled for both self-propelled nuclear ships and non-self-propelled vessels with reactor facilities on board.

Neither SOLAS provisions concerning nuclear ships nor the Code of Safety for Nuclear Merchant Ships have been updated previously.

We consider it appropriate to bring the SOLAS and the Code of Safety for Nuclear Merchant Ships in compliance with the modern level of development of the nuclear shipbuilding, making the provisions of the SOLAS and the Code technologically neutral so that they could be applied to various types of reactors, including any promising designs.

Transparency in the regulation of both self-propelled and non-self-propelled nuclear ships will facilitate significant development of such projects, the possibility for large-scale manufacturing of nuclear FPUs at shipyards around the world.

In this regard, the Russian Federation encourages the IMO Member States to agree with the proposed new output:

> «Amendments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 (SOLAS) and revision of the Code on the Safety of Nuclear Merchant Ships (resolution A.491 (XII)) in order to update the current requirements for the design, construction and operation of self-propelled merchant ships with nuclear power plants, and also for the purpose of extending their application to non-self-propelled nuclear Floating Power Units (FPUs) to regulate the safety of FPUs». Additional information to our proposal is provided in the information document MSC 110/INF.6.

Thank you».

Statement by the delegation of Tanzania

Chair, distinguished delegates,

The United Republic of Tanzania wishes to thank the co-sponsors of document MSC 110/18/7 for their thoughtful and comprehensive proposal to review and enhance the Long-Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT) system. We acknowledge the pivotal role LRIT plays in ensuring maritime safety, security, environmental protection, and transparency in global shipping operations.

Tanzania, as both a flag State and a coastal State, recognizes the importance of timely and accurate ship tracking. With a long coastline along the Western Indian Ocean and an expanding maritime sector, we face challenges such as illicit maritime activity, IUU fishing, and pollution risks, which underscore the need for effective use of LRIT data.

We therefore express our strong support for the objectives outlined in MSC 110/18/7, in particular:

.1 Review of the financial model, to facilitate equitable access for developing countries, including the possibility of receiving standard LRIT information at reduced or no cost under specific conditions;

.2 Enhancement of technical cooperation and capacity building, particularly for developing States, to improve understanding, usage, and compliance monitoring of the LRIT system;

.3 Periodic verification and certification of LRIT equipment on board ships to ensure continuous and accurate data transmission;

.4 Encouraging the use of more advanced and cost-effective technologies to modernize the LRIT system in line with global developments.

We welcome the initiative by IMSO to conduct extended data monitoring and transparency assessments, and we encourage IMO to explore ways of integrating such analysis into regular auditing processes to combat non-compliance and prevent the rise of "dark fleet" operations.

Tanzania stands ready to collaborate with other Member States and IMSO to ensure the LRIT system remains effective, affordable, and future-ready, especially for countries with limited resources but growing maritime responsibilities.

We kindly request that, this statement be appended to the report of the Committee.
Thank you, Chair.

AGENDA ITEM 20

Statement by the delegation of Estonia

Thank you Madam Chair!

Maritime safety and security are increasingly impacted by a new set of interconnected risks that demand urgent and coordinated international attention. Among the most pressing are the deliberate disruption of satellite-based navigation systems, the persistence of substandard shipping practices, and the growing vulnerability of electronic communication networks, including critical underwater infrastructure.

GNSS interference and spoofing and jamming, particularly in sensitive regions undermine the safety of navigation and maritime traffic management. Intentional disruptions to GNSS systems can result in serious navigational errors, increased risk of collisions, and potential environmental incidents.

Simultaneously, the continued presence of substandard vessels — often having problems with registration, with unclear ownership, poor maintenance, and no valid insurance — presents a direct threat to maritime safety, environmental protection, and the global supply chain. These ships often evade regulatory oversight and pose a high risk of accidents or unlawful activity.
Moreover, the maritime sector is becoming increasingly dependent on secure electronic communication and data exchange, both above and below the waterline. Threats to underwater infrastructure such as submarine cables and pipelines, whether through sabotage or unintentional damage, carry severe implications not only for maritime connectivity but for national and economic security.

Maritime security can no longer be treated in isolation; it requires cross-sectoral collaboration that bridges navigation, safety, cybersecurity, and communications infrastructure. Only by working together can we ensure the resilience and integrity of global maritime operations in the face of evolving threats.

We ask this statement would be included to the report.

Statement by the delegation of FAO

Thank you, Chair, for giving me the floor

I would like to underscore the long-standing cooperation between FAO and IMO on ocean related matters, particularly in the area of safety at sea.

Fishing is one of the most dangerous occupations in the world. Most fatalities and accidents happen on small scale fishing vessels of less than 12 meters in length.

According to the *State of the World Fisheries and Aquaculture 2024*, published by FAO every two years, the global fishing fleet in 2022, was estimated at 4.9 million vessels, two-thirds of which are motorized. Small vessels make up most of the world's fleets.

Despite hazards and risks, only 5 % of small fishing vessels are insured. By comparison, 90 percent of large industrial vessels (> 24 m in length) and 50-60 percent of semi-industrial vessels s (12–24 m in length) are covered by marine hull insurance.

The draft guidelines for the seaworthiness and safety inspection of small fishing vessels aim to facilitate the supply of insurance services to small-scale fishers worldwide, particularly in developing countries, where inspection of small fishing vessels is generally lacking.
These guidelines contribute to the suite of joint IMO/ILO/FAO safety codes, recommendations and guidelines for small fishing vessels. They are in line with FAO instruments[2] and the FAO Blue Transformation, as agreed by FAO Members at the Committee on Fisheries (COFI).
FAO expects to endorse these guidelines in one of the future COFI sessions and would be keen to make these guidelines a joint voluntary instrument with IMO, similarly as joint instruments in the past.

Finally, FAO also looks forward to the entry-into-force of the CTA and continued collaborative efforts with IMO on the safety in fisheries.

I would be grateful if you could include my statement in the final report.

Statement by the delegation of IACS

With reference to the invitation to IACS in paragraph 17.15 of document MSC 104/18:

"Ongoing work in IACS (MSC 103/20/3 (IACS))

[2] The FAO Voluntary Guidelines for Securing Sustainable Small-Scale Fisheries in the Context of Food Security and Poverty Eradication (SSF Guidelines) recognize that States should support the development of and access to insurance schemes that are appropriate for small-scale fishing communities.

17.15 The Committee noted the information provided in document MSC 103/20/3 (IACS) on the work carried out on developing IACS requirements concerning the longitudinal strength requirement of large containerships and invited IACS to provide an update after finalization of this work, expected in late 2022 (see MSC 104/1/2, annex, paragraph 6.5)."

IACS would like to provide an update on the progress made concerning the development of requirements related to the longitudinal strength of large containerships. In document MSC 103/20/3 submitted by IACS in February 2021, it was initially indicated that this work was expected to be completed by late 2022. However, additional work on the Common Structural Rules has necessitated an extension of the timeline.

As highlighted in paragraphs 11 and 12 of document MSC 103/20/3, IACS project teams have conducted detailed investigations and as a result of this work functional requirements are established to address whipping effects in the relevant sections of Unified Requirement (UR) S11A. The comprehensive revision of the entire UR S11A is still ongoing. The UR S11A is now scheduled for publication together with revised UR S11 and CSR in June 2027.]

Statement by the delegation of ICS

Thank you Chair,

ICS wishes to take this opportunity to bring to the Committee's attention the unfair treatment of Captain Vitaly Tyutkalo, the Master of the **X-Press Pearl**, a ship that many delegations will recall sank off the coast of Sri Lanka in 2021 following a fire onboard that arose from a leak from a container stowed on deck.

Following the sinking, and despite the crew, Master, and shipowner following all safety, emergency and internationally accepted protocols to deal with the incident, several crew members including Captain Tyutkalo were arrested by the authorities and placed under a travel ban.

Whilst most of the crew have subsequently been released, Captain Tyutkalo remains under a travel ban in Sri Lanka, over four years since the incident. This delegation understands that charges were filed against the Master after one year in accordance with local laws, which carry a maximum fine amount of around USD 50,000 but, despite various attempts to secure the release of the Master, none have succeeded. The authorities and judiciary have even rejected an application to deposit the potential fine amount before the court to facilitate the release of the master.

During his time in detention, Captain Tyutkalo has missed his child’s graduation and his daughter's wedding and also suffered a significant deterioration in his physical and mental wellbeing.

This case could not be more topical: in this very room on Monday last week, the IMO/ILO/ICS and ITF held an event to discuss what more can be done by all stakeholders in the maritime sector, including governments, to protect seafarers in cases of unfair treatment and criminalisation. This delegation believes the treatment of Captain Tyutkalo is such a case of unfair treatment; his continued detention in a foreign country, away from his family and without any foreseeable sign of resolution through the judicial process or otherwise, is unacceptable.
We draw the Committee's attention to the 2006 IMO/ILO Guidelines on the Fair Treatment of Seafarers, including the coastal State's obligation to ensure that the Master, once interviewed or otherwise not required for a coastal State investigation following a maritime accident, is permitted to be re-embarked or repatriated without undue delay. This has clearly not happened in this case.

ICS therefore calls for the immediate release of the travel ban imposed on Captain Tyutkalo by Sri Lanka and for Sri Lanka to allow for his repatriation to his home country so that he can return to his family without undue delay.

We would be grateful if this statement can be included in the report and a copy will be provided to the Secretariat.

Statement by the delegation of India

Respected Madam Chair, Distinguished Delegates, Good morning.

India draws attention to recent maritime incidents off its western coast, raising concerns over container ship safety and the carriage of hazardous cargoes, especially lithium-ion batteries
On May 25th, the Liberian-flagged vessel **MSC ELSA 3** sank 30 nautical miles southwest of Kochi. It carried 13 containers with IMDG cargoes. All 24 seafarers were rescued by the Indian Coast Guard and Navy. Immediate measures taken to seal oil tanks to prevent environmental damage.

In early June, Singapore-flagged **Wan Hai 503** suffered an underdeck explosion and fire. Of 22 crew members, 18 were rescued in challenging weather; six injured and four remain missing. The vessel carried 147 dangerous containers. Firefighting and towing operations, coordinated by the Directorate General of Shipping, are ongoing to prevent ecological harm.
Several containers fell overboard, with 65 washing ashore, causing panic among coastal residents. Many more are yet to be traced. Pollution control measures including tedious task of cleaning of plastic nurdles from the coast are ongoing till date.

Recently, a fire onboard Singapore-flagged **MV Interasia Tenacity** was traced to undeclared lithium-ion batteries carried in containers on deck. The fire was contained by the ship's crew, supported by the Indian Coast guard. Similar incident of container fire occurred onboard Liberia flagged **Wan Hai 613** off Mumbai recently due to undeclared lithium-ion batteries on deck which was brought under control by the ship's crew.

These incidents highlight urgent safety concerns regarding cargo carriage on container ships. India urges a global review of packaging, stowage, and monitoring protocols of containerized cargoes. especially lithium-ion batteries and plastic nurdles. The four incidents in quick succession within three weeks demand immediate action from stakeholders to protect seafarers' lives and the livelihoods of Indian fishermen and coastal communities.

Reliance solely on shipper declarations is not adequate. Shipowners/Managers especially the container shipping lines must adopt technology and take responsibility to prevent such incidents in transparent manner. What is in a box can't be a mystery anymore.

India calls on IMO to develop stronger regulatory mechanisms for safety of container ships, cargo management, and crew protection on a war footing. Though these incidents involved foreign vessels and crew from other nationalities, India activated rapid Search and Rescue and emergency response. The authorities remain vigilant and operational 24x7 to respond to emergencies in Indian waters.

Safety Investigations are ongoing, and findings will be shared before the next MSC meeting. India commends Singapore's coordination in emergency response efforts as a Flag State. India remains committed to maritime safety, environmental protection, and seafarer welfare by enforcing a stringent environmental policy.

Madam Chair, India requests this statement to be annexed with the report of the committee.

Thank you, Chair.

Statement by the delegation of Iran

Madam Chair, Distinguished Delegates, Secretary General

In the final hours of the brutal and unlawful military aggression carried out by the Israeli regime against the Islamic Republic of Iran, it is with deep sorrow that I report a heartbreaking tragedy: the martyrdom of an entire family of nine, including our colleague whom had served in the Seafarers Affairs division of Iran's Ports and Maritime Organization.

This horrific attack took place in the dead of night, in a peaceful residential building located in a small northern Iranian town—far from any military or nuclear facility. The strike hit a private home, targeting innocent civilians as they slept.

Among the victims was Mr. Hamed Saber, a respected former chief officer who dedicated his life to training and supporting Iranian seafarers. He was martyred alongside his seven-year-old son, his wife, his elderly parents, his sister, his niece, and his brother-in-law. The loss of this entire family—devoted public servants and innocent civilians—has shaken our maritime and national community to its core.

With this appalling act, the Israeli regime has once again demonstrated—just as it has in Gaza—that it adheres to no moral, religious, or humanitarian principles. Its repeated and deliberate targeting of women, children, and innocent civilians reflects a deeply rooted pattern of cruelty, one that is tragically enabled and supported by certain States.

We condemn this atrocity in the strongest possible terms.

May the memory of the victims be honored, and may justice prevail.
I would ask this intervention be reflected in final report

Thank you.

Madam. Chair, Mr. Secretary-General, Distinguished Delegations

As you all are aware, nowadays my country, Iran, has been attacked by the Israeli regime and made another dark page in its history.

I came to this session of the Maritime Safety Committee of the IMO in order to declare our position’s on this criminal act of aggression and its consequences at the regional and global levels.

At the outset, I would like to express my sincere appreciation to those Member States that have condemned the Israeli regime's recent aggression and expressed solidarity with Iranian nation.

These principled positions demonstrate an enduring commitment to international law.
I rise today to inform the IMO of an unfolding crisis that not only endangers the sovereignty of my country but also jeopardizes international peace and security, including the maritime and ports sector.

On 13 June 2025, the Israeli regime initiated aggression, coordinated aerial and missile attacks against several cities across the Islamic Republic of Iran.

These operations, planned and executed with the support of a Certain State, deliberately struck peaceful nuclear facilities, economic infrastructure, civilian people, and national assets. Among the sites deliberately targeted was the Natanz nuclear facility, a safeguarded installation operating under continuous monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

The targeting of such facilities presents a serious and unacceptable risk of radiological catastrophe, constitutes a violation of the IAEA Statute, and undermines the global non-proliferation regime.

It is important to underscore that the Islamic Republic of Iran is a responsible state and a State party in full compliance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Iran has consistently maintained cooperation and transparency with the Agency in accordance with its safeguards obligations.

In stark contrast, the Israeli regime remains outside the NPT framework, refuses to accede to this global treaty, and continues to operate a vast and undeclared arsenal of nuclear weapons beyond any international supervision.

We are confronted with a deeply troubling reality: the very regime that has never accepted international obligations under the NPT and possesses actual nuclear weapons is launching military aggression under the pretext of nuclear concerns—against a State that is fully transparent and legally bound under the non-proliferation regime.

This is not only a profound injustice; it is a direct assault on the credibility and integrity of the international Legal Order and non-proliferation architecture.

Distinguished Colleagues;

In recent days, the Israeli regime has extended its unlawful attacks to include Iran's vital petrochemical and gas infrastructure in Asalouyeh, a strategic zone located on the northern shores of the Persian Gulf.

These actions directly endanger international maritime security and the global energy supply chain.

If the international community fails to take urgent and concrete measures to halt this unlawful aggression, the risk of escalation at sea becomes imminent.

We must remind everyone of the repeated physical attacks on 12 Iranian oil tankers that occurred between 2019 and 2021, as well as the acts of maritime sabotage—including the placement of magnetic mines—particularly in the Red Sea and the Mediterranean Sea, which are often attributed to the Israeli regime.

In addition, we draw the IMO's attention to the 2020 cyberattack on Shahid Rajaee Port’s infrastructure in southern Iran, which severely disrupted maritime and port operations and was widely reported to have been orchestrated by Israeli regime.

These hybrid threats—combining physical and cyber aggression—represent a multifaceted assault on maritime safety, port security, and the freedom of navigation, which this Organization is mandated to protect.

Over the past days, this act of aggression has been intensified.

Hundreds of civilians, including senior officials, scientists, women, and children, have been killed and injured. In one horrific attack, a residential building was bombed, killing at least 20 children.

These atrocities are not random. They are part of a deliberate and systematic pattern—consistent with the well-documented conduct of a child-killing regime that has committed similar crimes in Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, and now Iran.

Just recently, the Israeli regime deliberately targeted the headquarters of the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) during a live news broadcast.
This appalling act represents not only a deliberate war crime but a direct assault on the principle of press freedom.

These actions constitute grave breaches of international humanitarian law, amounting to war crimes and crimes against humanity.

The Islamic Republic of Iran strongly condemns these criminal acts and affirms that responsibility extends not only to the Israeli regime, but to certain state that materially support, arm, or shield it.

Madam Chair,

As responsible members of the International Maritime Organization (IMO), we are committed to adhering to all international maritime principles and regulations.

Despite the various sanctions imposed on Iran, my country is very active in search and rescue (SAR) operations in the Persian Gulf region.

We also play a significant role in reducing the negative environmental impacts caused by oil pollution by collecting advanced equipment to combat oil spills and conducting regular drills to address these issues.
Furthermore, with over one hundred thousand seafarers capable of providing services to international shipping, we play an significant role in the region.

Madam chair,

This pattern of aggression has direct implications for this Organization's mandate. Article 1 of the IMO Convention affirms the Organization's responsibility to ensure safe and secure shipping.

The destabilization of the maritime activities, compounded by regional insecurity, poses a direct threat to international navigation.

Attacks targeting maritime-linked infrastructure violate not only the IMO Convention but also the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, the SOLAS Convention, and Assembly Resolution A.924(22), which calls on States to protect the safety of maritime navigation against unlawful acts.

If peace and security are permitted to be violated by the Israeli regime with impunity, the consequences will inevitably spill into all domains of international security, including maritime and naval.

What has occurred is not a simple challenge; it is a direct challenge to the integrity of international law and the main role of the United Nations.

Further compounding the gravity of this situation, Israeli officials have openly claimed responsibility for these strikes, declaring that their objective was to "wreck" diplomatic negotiations.

This admission confirms the political motive: to sabotage dialogue and provoke wider conflict. Such conduct is incompatible with the principles of international peace and security.

Today's situation is a direct consequence of decades of impunity, selective enforcement, and double standards.

The complicity of the Certain State in these unlawful acts is undeniable. It has acknowledged its assistance, including the provision of weapons and intelligence used in the attacks.

This represents not only moral complicity but legal responsibility under international law.

No State shall recognize as lawful a situation created by such a breach, nor provide aid or assistance in maintaining it. All States are under a binding obligation to cooperate in bringing the unlawful situation to an end through lawful and peaceful means.

Despite these provocations, the Islamic Republic of Iran has exercised its legitimate right of self-defence as enshrined in Article 51 of the United Nations.

Iran will respond firmly and proportionately to these acts of aggression—at a time, by means, and in a manner of its choosing.

Our response will be necessary to restore deterrence, defend our people and sovereignty, and uphold the principles of international law.

No aggressor may act with impunity.

We call upon this Organization and its Member States to speak out firmly and act decisively. Silence in the face of aggression enables impunity.

We urge all States to reaffirm their commitment to the UN charter, uphold international law, and take meaningful steps to ensure that maritime safety is not held hostage to criminal violence and aggression.

No aggressor may act with impunity.

Silence is not impartiality.

I would be grateful if you would annex these comments to the final report.

Thank you. Madam chair.

Statement by the delegation of ITF

Thank you, Chair,

ITF supports and aligns itself with the intervention made by the International Chamber of Shipping regarding the ongoing situation of Captain Vitaly Tyutkalo, the Master of the **X-Press Pearl**.

This case represents a deeply concerning example of the criminalisation and unfair treatment of seafarers, and raises serious concerns about the implementation of the IMO/ILO Guidelines on the Fair Treatment of Seafarers.

Chair, we urge Member States to reflect on this case not as an isolated incident but as part of a broader pattern that must be addressed with greater urgency. The criminalisation of seafarers has an alarming effect across the maritime industry and poses a threat not only to individuals and their families but also to the global supply chain and maritime safety at large.

We echo the call for the immediate release of the travel ban on Captain Tyutkalo and for steps to be taken to ensure his repatriation without further delay.

Let us not wait for another tragic reminder to take meaningful and coordinated action.

We would kindly ask you chair to have this statement appended to the final report.

Thank you, Chair.

Statement by the delegation of the Russian Federation

« Спасибо, госпожа Председатель,
Несмотря на ранее озвученный комплексный подход к пересмотру документов ИМО, касающихся строительства и эксплуатации судов и иных плавсредств с ядерными энергетическими установками (Конвенция СОЛАС и Кодекс БЯТС), остаются две ключевые области, нормативное регулирование которых является критически важным для устойчивого и безопасного развития атомного судостроения и расширение использования ядерных судов и плавучих энергоблоков в будущем.
1. Первая область, требующая нормативного обновления - это вопрос захода атомных судов и плавучих атомных энергоблоков (ПЭБ) в порты.
Международное сообщество уже неоднократно сталкивалось с проблемами допуска атомных судов в порты третьих стран как на заре развития атомного судостроения, так и в недавнее время, несмотря на наличие успешного опыта эксплуатации гражданских атомных судов, прежде всего российских атомных ледоколов.
Актуальность данного вопроса обусловлена тем, что практически любое торговое судно, включая суда, оснащённые ядерной энергетической установкой, неизбежно должно заходить в порты для выполнения операций по загрузке и выгрузке, техническому обслуживанию и иных задач. Кроме того, следует учитывать возможность заходов в порты при возникновении внештатных или аварийных ситуаций.
Что касается плавучих атомных энергоблоков, их основное предназначение заключается в передаче электроэнергии с нулевыми выбросами парниковых газов объектам и населённым пунктам, расположенным на суше. Это предполагает предварительный заход ПЭБ в порт постоянного базирования для проведения швартовки, подключения к электросетям и взаимодействия с соответствующей инфраструктурой.
В этой связи заслуживает внимания документ, разработанный Международной морской организацией (ИМО) совместно с Международным агентством по атомной энергии (МАГАТЭ) в 1968 году: Публикация №27 «Вопросы безопасности при использовании портов и подходов к ним ядерными торговыми судами». Документ содержит рекомендации для Администраций портов по обеспечению безопасности при заходе и стоянке атомных судов.
Однако в связи с развитием международной нормативной базы и современных подходов к обеспечению ядерной и радиационной безопасности фактически не применяется (it is not valid). В результате на сегодняшний день отсутствует актуальный международный документ, содержащий рекомендации для портовых администраций по безопасному приёму и обслуживанию атомных судов и плавучих атомных энергоблоков.

2. Второй важной областью, требующей особого внимания со стороны международного сообщества в части нормативного переосмысления и обновления, является вопрос определения гражданской финансовой ответственности при эксплуатации ядерных энергетических установок на морском транспорте.
Аналогично наземным объектам использования атомной энергии, операторы ядерных торговых судов и энергоблоков должны нести полную и безусловную ответственность за возможный ущерб, вызванный эксплуатацией ядерной установки на борту судна. Подобный подход отражает принцип, широко принятый в международной практике ядерного права, основанный на необходимости надёжной правовой защиты третьих лиц и окружающей среды.
В 1962 году ведущими государствами в области атомной энергии, была разработана Конвенция об ответственности операторов ядерных судов (так называемая Брюссельская конвенция) - первый и, на данный момент, единственный международный документ, специально регулирующий вопросы ответственности в сфере атомного судостроения. Несмотря на свою актуальность и уникальность, Конвенция так и не вступила в силу по разным причинам.
С учётом растущего интереса к строительству и эксплуатации ядерных судов, а также необходимости выработки универсальных норм, обеспечивающих юридическую определённость и высокий уровень безопасности, вопрос возвращения к данному документу, либо разработки нового международного инструмента в рамках ИМО, МАГАТЭ, или совместно, приобретает особую актуальность.
В документе MSC 110/20/4 в качестве примера представлен опыт Российской Федерации, включающий в себя комплексную систему нормативного регулирования в области обеспечения ядерной и радиационной безопасности при эксплуатации судов и иных плавсредств с ядерными энергетическими установками.
Особое внимание уделено вопросам ответственности за убытки и вред, причинённый радиационным воздействием, где применяется подход, основанный на многолетней практике эксплуатации гражданских атомных судов - в первую очередь, атомных ледоколов, а также единственного в мире действующего плавучего атомного энергоблока. Данный опыт может служить основой для формирования и совершенствования международных подходов в соответствующей области регулирования.
Принимая во внимание вышеуказанное, предлагаем Комитету по безопасности на море инициировать работу по пересмотру, актуализации и распространения следующих документов на плавучие атомные энергоблоки, ИМО совместно с привлечением экспертов МАГАТЭ:
- Конвенция об ответственности операторов ядерных судов, 1962 г.;
- Публикация №27 «Вопросы безопасности при использовании портов и подходов к ним ядерными торговыми судами».
Спасибо».

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« Thank you, madam Chair,

Despite to the previously announced comprehensive approach to the revision of IMO documents related to the construction and operation of ships and other floating units with nuclear power plants (the SOLAS Convention and the Code of Safety for Nuclear Merchant Ships), the two key areas remain, the regulation of which is critically important for the sustainable and safe development of nuclear ship construction and the expansion of the use of nuclear ships and nuclear Floating Power Units (FPUs) in the future.

1. The first area requiring regulatory updating is the issue of entering of nuclear-powered vessels and nuclear Floating Power Units (FPUs) into ports.

The international community has repeatedly faced problems with the approach of nuclear-powered vessels to the ports of third countries both at the early days of the development of nuclear shipbuilding and also more recently, despite the successful experience of operating of civilian nuclear-powered vessels, first and foremost - the Russian nuclear icebreakers.

The urgency of this issue is demonstrated by the fact that almost any merchant vessel, including those equipped with a nuclear power plant, inevitably has to enter the port for loading and unloading operations, technical maintenance and other tasks. In addition, the possibility of port calls in case of extraordinary or emergency situations should be taken into account.

As for nuclear Floating Power Units (FPUs), their main purpose is to generate and transfer the electric power with zero Greenhouse Gas emissions to onshore facilities and settlements. That requires an initial approach of the nuclear FPU into the port of permanent base for mooring, connection to the electricity power grid and for interaction with the relevant port infrastructure.

In this regard, a document developed in 1968 by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) together with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) deserves a particular attention: it is a Publication Safety Series No. 27 "Safety Consideration in the Use of Ports and Approaches by Nuclear Merchant Ships."

The document contains recommendations for Port Administrations for ensuring safety during entering and anchoring of nuclear-powered vessels in ports.

However, due to the development of the international regulatory framework and modern approaches to ensuring nuclear and radiation safety, this document is not actually applied (it is not valid). As a result, at the present time there is no up-to-date international document containing recommendations for port administrations on the safe reception and maintenance of nuclear-powered vessels and nuclear Floating Power Units in ports.

2. The second important area requiring particular attention from the international community in terms of needed regulatory review and update, is the issue of defining of the civil financial liability for the operation of nuclear power plants used on board a maritime transport.

Similar to land-based nuclear energy facilities, operators of nuclear merchant ships and nuclear power units must bear full and unconditional liability for possible damage caused by the operation of a nuclear installation on board a ship. This approach reflects a principle which is widely accepted in the international practice of Nuclear Law based on the need for reliable legal protection for third parties and the environment.

In 1962, leading in the field of nuclear energy States have developed the Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships (the so-called Brussels Convention), the first and, at the present time, the only international document specifically regulating liability issues in the field of nuclear shipbuilding. Despite its relevance and unique nature, the Convention has not entered into force due to various reasons.

Taking into account the growing interest in the construction and operation of nuclear vessels, as well as the need to develop universal standards that ensure legal certainty and a high level of safety, the return back to this document or development of a new international instrument within the IMO, or within the IAEA, or jointly, is becoming particularly relevant.

Document MSC 110/20/4 provides an example of experience of the Russian Federation, which includes a comprehensive regulatory framework for nuclear and radiation safety in the operation of ships and other floating units with nuclear power plants.

Special attention is paid to the issues of liability for losses and damage caused by radiation exposure, which uses an approach based on the long-term practice of operation of civilian nuclear-powered vessels, first and foremost - the nuclear icebreakers, and also the world's only operating nuclear Floating Power Unit (FPU). This experience can serve as a basis for the drafting and improvement of international approaches in the relevant field of regulation.

Taking into account the above-stated, we propose that the Maritime Safety Committee initiates the work on the revision, updating and expansion of application of the following documents for nuclear ships and nuclear Floating Power Units, by the IMO with the involvement of IAEA experts:

- Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships, 1962;

- Publication Safety Series No.27 «Safety Consideration in the Use of Ports and Approaches by Nuclear Merchant Ships».

Thank you».

Statement by the delegation of Sri Lanka

Honourable Chair, Distinguished Colleagues,

As the Sri Lanka Delegation takes the floor for the first time, we extend our appreciation to all delegations who hosted us during this session. Wishing everyone a Happy Sea Farers Day. Apologies to the interpreters as we could not send the statement earlier.

The MV X-Press Pearl disaster began when a fire broke out aboard the vessel, 9.5 nautical miles off the coast of Colombo Port, Sri Lanka, on 20 May 2021. The ship was transporting 1,486 containers, including 81 carrying highly hazardous noxious substances and 439 filled with plastic pellets. The incident led to the world's largest nurdle spill, contaminating over 750 kilometres of coastline with nurdles and partially burned plastic pellets of various sizes. More than 150 coastal communities were severely affected.

Since the incident on 27 May 2021, an estimated 7,938 beach cleanup operations have been carried out, involving 183,228 man days. Four years later, many coastal areas remain polluted with plastic pellets, and continued cleanup efforts are essential.

The Sri Lanka delegation wishes to clarify that Captain Tyulkalo (Chutcalo), Master of **MV Xpress Pearl**, mandated to remain in Sri Lanka has been made pursuant to the lawful orders issued by the Courts of Sri Lanka. The matter remains under judicial consideration, and further actions will be taken in accordance with the rulings of the court and the advice of the Hon. Attorney General of Sri Lanka.

The Sri Lankan judicial system is founded on key principles including the presumption of innocence until proven guilty through due process, the right to a fair trial and access to legal assistance, as outlined in the guidelines on the fair treatment of seafarers detained in connection with alleged crimes.

We acknowledge the advance notice provided by the Principal Director of ICS regarding the issue at hand. However, the informal notification was received well after the close of business in Sri Lanka, leaving the Sri Lankan delegation without any prior insight into the contents of the statement and thus unable to exercise its right to respond appropriately. Furthermore, the delegation did not receive any earlier communication from the concerned parties before the issue was raised at the IMO. In our view, demonizing affected coastal states is no less damaging than criminalizing seafarers.

That said, as a responsible flag and coastal state, and as a significant country of seafarer origin, the Sri Lankan delegation reaffirms its commitment to safeguarding the rights of all seafarers.

Madam Chair, we request that our intervention be included in the final report of the committee. A copy will be provided to the Secretariat.

Thank you.

Statement by the delegation of Tanzania

Chair, Distinguished Delegates,

The United Republic of Tanzania welcomes and strongly supports the proposal submitted by Ecuador, India, Italy, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, and South Africa to promote the use and expansion of International Maritime Information-Sharing Centres (ISCs) as a strategic measure to enhance global maritime security and combat organized maritime crime.

Tanzania recognizes that maritime security is not only a global concern but also a critical national and regional priority. The Indian Ocean waters off the Tanzanian coast are increasingly vulnerable to a range of maritime security threats, including:

.1 Piracy and armed robbery against ships, particularly in the Western Indian Ocean region;

.2 Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing, which undermines food security, marine biodiversity, and the livelihoods of coastal communities;

.3 Drug trafficking and smuggling of goods, taking advantage of porous maritime borders;

.4 Human trafficking and illegal migration, facilitated through maritime routes;

.5 And the emerging risks of cyber security threats targeting port infrastructure vessel systems, and other maritime communication networks.

These threats disrupt Tanzania's maritime economy, compromise safety at sea, and threaten regional stability. Given the strategic role of the Port of Dar es Salaam and other Tanzanian ports in regional trade, enhanced maritime domain awareness and real-time intelligence sharing are essential to secure both national waters and the broader Indian Ocean corridor.
In this context, Tanzania emphasizes the critical value of International Maritime Information-Sharing Centres (ISCs) in addressing these threats through:

.1 Timely exchange of maritime security information across national and regional boundaries;

.2 Improved coordination among naval, coast guard, and maritime authorities to detect, assess, and respond to incidents at sea;

.3 Enhanced capacity-building and technical support, especially for developing coastal States;

.4 And fostering a culture of cooperation, vigilance, and proactive prevention of maritime crime.

Chair,

Tanzania is a committed partner to the Djibouti Code of Conduct and its Jeddah Amendments and continues to engage actively with regional maritime security mechanisms, including the Regional Maritime Information Fusion Centre (RMIFC) in Madagascar and the Regional Centre for Operational Coordination (RCOC) in Seychelles. We believe that further investment in these and other ISC platforms will be indispensable to strengthening maritime governance in the region.

We therefore urge the Committee to adopt the proposed resolution and to further promote the development of interoperable, well-resourced, and technologically advanced ISCs that serve the needs of coastal States like Tanzania.

Tanzania also calls upon the IMO and Member States to continue supporting capacity-building, technical assistance, and information-sharing infrastructure in the Western Indian Ocean to ensure that no State is left behind in the global fight against maritime insecurity.
We kindly request that this statement be appended to the report of the Committee.
Thank you, Chair.